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The  European  Union  currently  enjoys  access  to  the  coastal  fish  stocks  of  numerous 
developing  third  countries  (particularly  in  West  Africa)  in  terms  of  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements.  These  agreements  are  concluded  under  and  legitimated  by  the  international 
fisheries regime,  which  ardently promotes the sustainable use of fisheries resources and the 
sustainable development of fisheries. In this thesis I analyse these agreements from a (legal) 
sustainability perspective. Based on my research, I argue that rather than functioning as legal 
instruments  of conservancy,  these  agreements  operate  as  means  to  inequitably  promote the 
respective economic and political  self-interests of the parties involved. They run contrary to 
the sustainability tenet of international fisheries law and expose its inherent weaknesses.
The  need  to  actively  promote  the  sustainable  use  of  marine  fisheries  arises  from  the 
difficulties  in  ensuring their effective management,  which  in  turn  stem  from  their common 
resource  nature.  International  law  responds  by  obliging  states  to  foster  the  long-term 
sustainable  use  of fisheries  from  a  biological,  social  and economic  perspective  towards  the 
broader  goal  of  sustainable  fisheries  development.  Coastal  states,  however,  particularly 
developing countries, struggle to achieve these objectives in their own waters. The challenge 
is not only to ensure the rational domestic management of their fisheries but also to engender 
the  cooperation  of  foreign  states  that  access  their  stocks  towards  these  ends.  Fishing 
arrangements between the European Union (EU) and West African coastal states have on the 
whole not reflected  such  cooperation,  as  I illustrate in  my thesis  with  reference to the case 
study of EU-Senegalese fishing relations. In response to the deficiencies of the international 
fisheries  regime  in  this  regard,  I  identify  possible  alternative  approaches  to  future  bilateral 
fisheries interactions which will likely better foster sustainable fishing.4
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In  this  thesis  I  examine  bilateral  fisheries  relations  between  the European  Union  (EU)  and 
West African coastal states. Specifically, I analyse the bilateral fisheries agreements between 
these parties from the perspective of sustainability with reference to the illustrative case study 
of EU-Senegalese fisheries interactions. My particular interest lies in  assessing the extent to 
which these agreements operate as mechanisms of conservancy in accordance with the overall 
tenet  of international  fisheries  law.  In  examining  this  issue  I  address  a  further  underlying 
concern,  namely  the  ability  of  the  current  international  fisheries  regime  in  general  to 
effectively promote sustainable fisheries through bilateral fishing agreements as well as more 
broadly.  The  subject-matter  of  this  dissertation  is  not  constrained  to  the  legal  realm;  in 
addition,  it  traverses  a  wide  range  of  other  disciplines  including  fisheries  management, 
environmental regulation, development cooperation and trade relations. My aim in presenting 
this interdisciplinary work is to bring into the public domain a unique analysis of a subject- 
area that has to date received little academic coverage.  In  light of the current dire  status of 
world  marine  fisheries  and  the  increasingly  tangible  global  sustainable  development 
challenges, the relevance and timing of this thesis is apposite.
It would not have been possible for me to write this thesis without the emotional, intellectual 
and  financial  support  of  various  bodies  and  persons.  Firstly,  I  gratefully  acknowledge  the 
generous  financial  support  of the  Commonwealth  Scholarship  Commission  and  the  British 
Council,  without which  it would not  have been  possible for me  to embark  on this  research 
degree.  In  addition,  I owe  a great debt of gratitude to  my supervisor Dr Jane Holder at the 
Faculty  of  Laws,  University  College  London,  for  her  valuable  and  insightful  input, 
enthusiasm and constant encouragement throughout the writing of this thesis. I am also most 
grateful to the various officials who agreed to be interviewed in the course of my research and9
who gave most generously of their time and expertise. In addition, I wish to acknowledge the 
support  over the  years  of Professor Jan  Glazewski  from  the Faculty  of Law,  University of 
Cape Town, who inspired me to take an interest in environmental and fisheries law in the first 
place and who continues to encourage and nurture my various endeavours in this area.  I am 
also  indebted  to  friends  and  family,  in  particular Anashri  Pillay,  Patricia Dingle,  Malcolm 
Dingle  and  above  all,  Patrick Gobel,  without  whose  love  and  support  this  thesis  might not 
have seen the light of day.10
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PARTI 
CORE THEMATIC LENSES
In  this  section  I  introduce  some  of the  key  theoretical  elements  that  underlie  the  subject- 
matter  of  my  thesis.  In  chapters  2,  3  and  4,  I  lay  the  groundwork  for  this  dissertation, 
presenting  three  broad  thematic  disciplines  that  provide  common,  inter-related  threads 
throughout this  work, namely common  resource  management and the  goal  of sustainability, 
integration  towards  sustainable  development,  and  the  colonial  legacy.  Each  field  of  study 
offers  a  unique  insight  into  my  interrogation  of  the  extent  to  which  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements  between  the  EU  and  developing  coastal  states  operate  as  legal  instruments  of 
sustainability.  I  draw  on  these  ‘thematic  lenses’  both  individually  and  cumulatively  in  my 
study.  I  begin  in  chapter  2  by  examining  the  complexity  of  common  natural  resource 
management,  focusing  specifically  on  legislative  and  policy  mechanisms  employed  to 
promote  the  goal  of  sustainable  fisheries  management.  I  extend  my  examination  of 
‘sustainability’  to  chapter  3.  Here,  rather  than  merely  following  the  well-trodden  path  of 
discussing the meaning of the concept and its relationship to sustainable development, I focus 
more on the nature and evolution of principles and regulatory mechanisms that are employed 
at  an  international  and  domestic  level  to  realise  this  principle  in  the  context  of  marine 
fisheries.  In  particular,  I  examine  integration  as  a  means  to  foster  sustainability  towards 
sustainable fisheries development. Fisheries management decisions - particularly questions of 
access  to  fisheries  resources  -  are,  however,  informed  by  broader  concerns  than  merely 
regulatory  frameworks.  In  the  final  chapter  of  this  section,  I  explore  the  socio-economic 
impact  of colonisation  on  such  decisions,  examining  in  detail  the  particular  impact  of the 
European colonial legacy on EU-West African fisheries relations.13
1
INTRODUCTION
1.  Locating the thesis in the broader biological and political context
We are at a stage in the earth’s history where the oceans and their living resources are under 
severe threat from unsustainable use. Currently, an alarming percentage of commercial marine 
fish stocks have already been harvested to their full capacity. The law, at an international and 
domestic  level,  is  increasingly  urging  governments  and  fisheries  managers  to  harness  a 
precautionary approach in pursuing the rational use of remaining fish stocks and the recovery 
of  depleted  species,  as  well  as  the  conservation  of  the  marine  environment.  Contrary  to 
aspirations,  the imposition  of jurisdictional  conservation  responsibility over coastal  fisheries 
by the  1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has so far resulted 
in little significant improvement in fisheries management despite its curtailing of historically 
unregulated  open  access  to  marine  resources.  The  common  resource  nature  of  marine 
fisheries,  which  makes  them  notoriously  difficult  to  manage  sustainably  from  a  biological, 
social  and economic perspective, continues to dog the efforts of coastal  states towards these 
ends.  The  sustainable  use  of  marine  living  resources,  however,  is  a  vital  aspect  of  the 
worldwide imperative of sustainable development, a goal that developing states in particular 
are  struggling  to  define  and  to  achieve.  The  successful  pursuit  of  sustainable  fishing  both 
necessitates  the  rational  domestic  management  of  coastal  fisheries  and  requires  foreign 
nations  that  access  these  stocks  to  cooperate  with  the  relevant  coastal  states  to  ensure  the 
biological  sustainability  and  the  sustainable  development  of their fisheries.  The  manner in 
which bilateral fishing relations between the EU and various West African coastal states have 
historically played out, however, has not followed this route. Instead, it has mirrored patterns 
of natural  resource  abuse  which  were established  under past  colonial  relations  between  the14
parties  and perpetuated by  subsequent trade  and  aid policies.  This  coincides  with  the EU’s 
broader  tendency  to  export  its  ‘insatiable  demands  for  natural  resources’  to  developing 
countries to meet its own needs in the face of increasing depletion of domestic natural capital, 
as noted in the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)’s  ‘Europe 2005:  Ecological Footprint’ 
report.1
2.  Objectives of the thesis
In this thesis I examine bilateral fisheries agreements between the European Union (EU) and 
developing coastal third countries with a view to exploring the theoretical role and practical 
effects  of these  legal  instruments  with  particular reference to  sustainability.  Specifically, in 
light  of  the  conservacy  thrust  of  the  legal  framework  within  which  they  are  crafted  and 
legitimated (noticeably that of UNCLOS), I interrogate these arrangements to assess whether 
(and  if  so,  the  extent  to  which)  they  are  informed  by  and  operationalise  the  objective  of 
sustainable  fishing  or  whether  instead,  they  serve  to  merely  realise  the  respective  parties’ 
socio-economic interests, as shaped by their political legacy of unequal dependency.
My thesis demonstrates that these agreements primarily aim to effectuate the fulfilment of the 
parties’ narrowly-conceived national interests and thus operate potentially as legal vectors of 
unsustainable  fisheries  development  in  the  coastal  states.  This  sharply  contrasts  with  the 
strong  conservacy  theme  of the  EU’s  domestic  fisheries  policy  and,  more  importantly,  the 
international fisheries regime. The thesis thus highlights the weakness of international law and 
policy in effectively promoting the objectives of sustainable fishing and sustainable fisheries 
development,  exposing the disparity between  the theoretical  pursuit of these ideals through
1  The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) International, Global Footprint Network and Netherlands Committee
for the World Conservation Union, Europe 2005:  The Ecological Footprint (WWF Gland, Switzerland, 2005) at
3 and 6 .1 discuss this report and its implications in greater detail below at pp  124 and 247-249.15
legally-sanctioned regulatory means and their practical operationalisation. There is clearly a 
need for reform in this area, but for reasons illuminated in my thesis, the solution does not lie 
in  simply  re-shaping  international  law  to  better  promote  these  goals;  nothing  short  of  a 
fundamental  overhaul  of  the  sovereignty-based  international  regime  established  under 
UNCLOS would suffice. Rather, an ecologically-sound approach rooted in the recognition of 
the  complex,  common  resource  nature  of  marine  fisheries  is  required  that  harnesses 
alternative regulatory means to advance these objectives, formulated within the boundaries of 
the  law  but  guided  by  an  alternative  supplementary  ‘ethical’  framework.  I  revisit  these 
suggestions and discuss them in detail below in my conclusions in chapter 9.
3.  Thematic Menses’ employed in the thesis
In this thesis I draw primarily on three main bodies of literature to provide me with thematic 
‘lenses’  for  understanding  and  analysing  the  subject-matter  under  examination.  These 
thematic areas of modem  (environmental)  law and policy broadly comprise:  the sustainable 
use of common  natural  resources  and the regulatory means  to pursue this  goal,  the process 
and principle of integration towards the pursuit of sustainable development, and the enduring 
impact  of  the  colonial  legacy  between  European  powers  and  their  erstwhile  territories  on 
modem inter-state socio-economic relations. A substantial amount has been written on each of 
these individual topics, but there are relatively few works that draw on all three of these areas 
to examine a specific socio-legal phenomenon from different yet intricately related angles. In 
particular,  there  is  no  substantial  body  of  literature  that  employs  these  thematic  lenses  to 
analyse the regulatory role of bilateral fisheries agreements between the EC  and developing 
West African states with respect to sustainability. This thesis contributes towards developing 
such a body of literature.
2 At pp 245-256.16
With  regard  to  the  ‘sustainable  use’  lens,  the  literature  concerning  the  meaning  of 
‘sustainability’  as  a  core  objective  of  modem  environmental  law  and  natural  resource 
management  is  vast.  The  essence  of  ‘sustainability’  as  a  component  of and  necessary step 
towards  realising  the  globally-endorsed  ideal  of  sustainable  development,  has  been  well- 
traversed,  although less  so in the context of marine fisheries.  The contents of and means to 
achieve sustainable fisheries have traditionally been regarded as more elusive topics, largely 
as a result of the acknowledged complexity of managing these common resources.
Like other natural resources that fall into this category, marine fisheries elude the possibility 
of sustainable  management  unless  they  are  subject  to  regulation  in  terms  of some  type  of 
property  regime  as  their  physical  characteristics  make  it  almost  impossible  to  otherwise 
control  who  uses  them  and  how  much  of  them  is  used.  The  solution  offered  by  the 
international  regime  to  the  historically  poor  management  of  open  access  fisheries  was  to 
introduce  a  zonal, jurisdiction-based  regulatory  system  in  1982  through  UNCLOS,  which 
imposed conservation  duties  on  states over their coastal  fisheries  stocks  up to  200 nautical 
miles  from  baseline.  UNCLOS  was,  however,  vague  in  its  wording  and  generous  in  the 
sovereign powers that it granted coastal states in managing their fisheries. The interpretation 
and operationalisation of the Convention’s conservation and sustainable  use provisions thus 
varied considerably  between  states.  They  were  -  and  remain  -  able  to  align  their domestic 
policies with UNCLOS’  broad principles and to employ regulatory means legitimated by the 
Convention while at the same time effectively moving no further towards the over-riding goal 
of ensuring sustainable fisheries management worldwide. The flawed logic of carving up the 
ocean into national preserves with politically-drawn boundaries in the hope that coastal states 
might  effectively  manage  the  migratory  fish  stocks  that  pass  through  their jurisdictional17
waters  in  isolation  from  the  broader  ecological  context,  is  clear.3  Global  socio-economic 
realities do little to improve the chances that in particular developing coastal states are able to 
foster  sustainable  fishing  in  their  waters.  They  struggle  to  prioritise  sound,  long-term 
domestic fisheries management over other pressing national priorities and are driven by short­
term  socio-economic  needs  to  conclude  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  distant-water 
fishing nations granting them access to their frequently depleted coastal stocks.
In  order  for  me  to  structure  a  suitable  analytical  lens  from  the  vast  thematic  material 
comprising  this  subject-area  I  first  needed  to  thoroughly  grasp  the  manner  in  which  the 
concept  of  ‘sustainability’  is  employed  in  international  fisheries  law  and  management,  the 
specific complexities of managing fisheries as a common resource, and the intercept between 
these  two  areas.  The  importance  of  examining  my  thesis  subject-matter  from  this  angle 
justifies the time that I spend crafting this analytical tool.
My  second  thematic  lens  is  the  principle  and process  of integration  towards the  pursuit of
sustainable  development.  While  the  components  of  sustainable  development  are  widely-
acknowledged, how best to operationalise this goal remains contested. At heart, it involves the
merging  or  integration  of  (economic)  development  with  environmental  protection,  to  be
realised  through  national  political  action  as  individual  governments  best  see  fit.  Although
sustainable development is arguably not an international legal obligation to which states may
be  held  accountable,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  states’  management  of  their  domestic
environments is now a matter of ‘international concern’  and may be scrutinised against this
(albeit  ‘unmeasurable’) standard. Globally, states are thus taking action to realise sustainable
development.  Integration  serves  both  as  a guiding principle in  this  regard and a procedural
tool or process towards this end. As an instrumental mechanism, it facilitates and drives the
3 See P Copes,  ‘The Impact of UNCLOS III on Management of the World’s Fisheries’ (1981) 5 (3) Marine 
Policy 2 1 7 -2 2 8  at 222.18
infusion of environmental concerns into all domestic spheres, providing a means to ensure the 
biological, social and economic sustainability of all projects, plans and policies at a national 
level.  As  a  guiding  ideal,  it  is  both  the  foundation  on  which  the  principle  of  sustainable 
development rests and an objective in its own right. It has become an indispensable feature of 
international  and  (most)  domestic  environmental  regulation,  giving  rise  to  onerous  legal 
obligations  to  adequately  accommodate environmental  protection  in  all  aspects of domestic 
and state activity (exemplified by its prominence in EU legislation).
Integration  is  a  burdensome  principle  to  pursue  and  a  difficult  process  to  effectively 
operationalise.  With  minimal  clear guidance from the international regime, it has thus been 
largely up  to individual  governments  at  a domestic  level  to  give content  to  and realise the 
integration  of  their  environmental  needs  with  other  competing  national  priorities. 
Governments  are increasingly  employing procedurally-based regulatory  mechanisms to this 
end,  most  commonly  environmental  assessment.  In  the  EU,  other  ‘new’  mechanisms  are 
emerging  as  alternatives  to  traditional  command-and-control  means,  particularly  in  the 
environmental sphere. In fisheries, integration efforts in the EU have been slow to mature, but 
are  increasingly  mimicking  developments  in  the  environmental  sphere  in  the  hope  of 
advancing. The urgent need to harness integration and other related efforts in marine fisheries 
towards  sustainable  fisheries  development  worldwide  (due  to  the  crisis-level  of many  fish 
stocks)  is  acknowledged  internationally,  but  if Europe  has  found  the  road rough,  so  much 
more so have developing coastal  states. They frequently struggle to effectively prioritise the 
need for sustainable fisheries management and development domestically, as typified by the 
example  of Senegal.  In  the  same  way  that  sustainable  development  efforts  in  one country 
cannot truly be isolated from sustainable development efforts in another (as the environment 
and its ecosystems do not respect political boundaries), integration efforts should arguably be 
similarly regarded. Assistance from distant-water fishing nations to foster sustainable fisheries19
development  efforts  in  developing  coastal  states  is  vital  if integration  is  to  mean  anything 
beyond  a  domestic  ideal  that  can  only  be  realised  in  economically-capable  countries. 
Arguably, means that are better suited to these ends than extraction-based bilateral fisheries 
agreements should be employed to achieve this.
The  enduring  impact  of the  colonial  legacy  between  European  powers  and  their  erstwhile 
territories  on  modem  socio-economic  relations  between  these  parties  is  my  third  thematic 
lens.  The colonisation  of African  states  by European  powers  in  the  late  nineteenth  century 
undeniably  shaped  the  socio-economic  development  of  the  (then)  colonies  and  laid  the 
foundation for future relations between the parties post-independence. Neo-colonialists argue 
that  such  relations  have  been  dominated  by  the  pervading,  all-encompassing  influence  of 
colonial  dependency,  with  the  former  colonising  powers  using  capitalist  economic 
instruments  to  sustain  this  relationship  and  maintain  the  developing  former  colonies  in 
continued  social,  economic  and  political  subjugation  and  impoverishment.  I  argue  that 
bilateral  fisheries  relations  between  the  EU  and  West  African  coastal  states  are  strongly 
influenced  by  past  colonial  trade  and  economic  interactions,  not  least  in  the  role  that  the 
African  states continue to fulfil  as suppliers of raw natural  materials to Europe via bilateral 
fisheries  agreements.  These  agreements  are  concluded  against  the  backdrop  of the  parties’  
development  cooperation  relationship,  which  evolved  from  early  inter-dependent 
associationalist  relations  into  an  alliance  of  increasingly  unequal  dependence  in  terms  of 
which  African  states  became  ever-more reliant on  the  trade  and  aid concessions granted to 
them by Europe.
Viewed from this angle, if  - as I propose is the case - bilateral fisheries agreements between 
the EU and developing coastal states indeed serve primarily as legal instruments to realise the 
parties’  respective  self-interests,  the  potential  for sidelining  sustainability  concerns  is  high:20
the EU is empowered to ensure that it enjoys access to coastal fish stocks on terms that serve 
its socio-economic needs, while the coastal states are driven to permit such access in order to 
secure short-term economic benefits and to maintain  ‘good’  political relations with the EU. I 
discuss  this  ‘colonial  legacy’  in  detail  in  chapter  4  and  use  it  as  an  analytical  lens  for 
examining the EU’s bilateral fisheries interactions with developing coastal states.
3.  Scope and structure of the thesis
The scope of this thesis is vast, covering a subject-area that is broad from both a geographic 
and  a  thematic  perspective.  To  assist  the  reader,  I  have  structured  the  thesis  so  that  it 
progresses from the general to the more specific; milestones along the way are marked by the 
division  of the  work into four parts.  Part I begins  with  the broad,  more  theoretical  subject- 
matter, Part II places this  subject-matter in  a domestic policy context and Part III hones the 
focus even more narrowly to a geographically-contained illustrative case study; in Part IV, I 
present  my  conclusions.  Because  the  subject-matter  is  so  extensive  and  in  light  of  word 
constraints, I have excluded a number of pertinent yet extrinsic issues from discussion in my 
thesis. In particular, I do not discuss the pursuit of sustainable fishing in the high seas in any 
significant  detail.  While  I  acknowledge  the  artificiality  of  doing  so  from  an  ecological 
perspective especially in light of my discussion on the management of fisheries as a common 
resource, given the limits of this thesis, I would not have been able to do this subject justice.
I begin in Part I by introducing the three core thematic concepts that underpin my thesis and 
serve  as  analytical  ‘lenses’  for examining  the  socio-economic  phenomena  explored  in  this 
work. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 lay out the thematic lenses for such analyses in turn. Chapter 1  sets 
the  scene,  presenting  the  thesis  as  an  interrogation  of the  contention  that  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements  between  the  EU  and  developing  coastal  states  operate  as  legal  instruments  of21
sustainability. In chapter 2, I discuss the complexity of marine fisheries management arising 
from their common resource nature and look at regulatory responses aimed at promoting the 
‘sustainable’  use of these resources. I examine this further in chapter 3, where I focus on the 
concept of ‘sustainable’  fishing and on efforts by the international legal regime and domestic 
fisheries  managers  to  foster  this  goal.  Bilateral  fisheries  agreements  between  the  EU  and 
developing coastal  states  are legitimated by international fisheries law and national fisheries 
policies  developed  under  it;  the  extent  to  which  they  are  intended  as  legal  instruments  of 
conservacy, however, is influenced also by the broader socio-economic context in which they 
are concluded. In chapter 4 I explore this context and highlight the significant influence of the 
parties’  shared colonial  legacy and its modem manifestations on the negotiation and content 
of these agreements.
In  Part  II,  I  narrow  my  focus  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  international  sustainability 
objectives  and principles  inform the EU’s  regulation  of its marine  fisheries.  I move from a 
broad overview of EU policy and management in this sector to a detailed investigation of the 
regulatory  measures  that  shape  the  Community’s  external  bilateral  fishing  relations  with 
developing  coastal  states.  I  begin  in  chapter  5  by  examining  the  incorporation  into  and 
evolution of sustainability concerns in the EU’s fisheries policy, with particular reference to 
the influential role of integration efforts in this process. In chapter 6, I focus on the extent to 
which  these  broader  developments  in  the  Community’s  fisheries  policy  have  (at  least 
theoretically)  permeated  the  EU’s  policy  concerning  its  bilateral  fisheries  relations  with 
developing  third  countries.  Specifically,  I  note  a  similar  trend  to  that  identified  in  other 
aspects of the fisheries policy towards adopting  ‘new’ regulatory modes in an effort to better 
promote the integration of environmental and sustainability concerns in this sphere.22
Part  III is  a discussion  and analysis  of the practical  operationalisation  of the EU’s bilateral 
fisheries  policy  with  reference  to  the  case  study  of  EU-Senegalese  fisheries  agreements, 
specifically the most recent arrangement.  I analyse this agreement with particular interest in 
its promotion (or not) of sustainable fishing and the extent to which it operates (or not) as a 
legal  instrument  of  conservacy.  I  begin  by  introducing  Senegalese  fisheries  in  chapter  7, 
paying particular attention to the state of domestic coastal  fish  stocks  as  a prelude to an in- 
depth  examination  of  Senegal’s  most  recent  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  with  the  EU  in 
chapter  8.  Here,  I  critically  analyse  the  (legal)  nature  of this  agreement  and  its  impact  on 
sustainable fishing and sustainable fisheries development in Senegal.
In  Part IV,  I draw  on  my earlier findings  and employ my thematic  lenses to formulate the 
conclusions  of my  thesis  in  chapter 9.  Most  importantly,  I  surmise  that  the  EU’s  bilateral 
fisheries  agreements  with  developing  coastal  states  do  not  fulfil  their  intended  conservacy 
functions,  but  rather  operate  as  legal  instruments  to  satisfy  the  parties’  respective  self- 
interests.  In  response,  I  suggest  various  alternative,  complementary  means  to  better  foster 
sustainable fishing.
4.  Methodology
The research  methods that I employed in  this thesis  are  largely  socio-legal  as this  mode of 
research  is  best  suited  to  the  chosen  subject-matter.  I  used  a  combination  of  theoretical, 
literature-based,  desk-top  research  and  empirical  work.  My  empirical  research  primarily 
comprised  gathering  and  analysing  data  for  the  illustrative  case  study  of  EU-Senegalese 
fisheries  relations  with  particular  focus  on  the  parties’  most  recent  bilateral  fisheries 
agreement.  I  chose  this  case  study  as  I  believe  that  the  impact  of  these  fishing  relations, 
particularly  through  the  most  recent  agreement,  exhibits  the  operation  of  key  theoretical23
conclusions that I draw in my thesis.  At the same time, the case study provides an  in-depth 
insight  into  an  example  of  the  matters  discussed  in  the  thesis  and  renders  an  otherwise 
(possibly) unfamiliar area of inter-state interaction more accessible to the reader.4
I  selected this  particular case  study for two  primary  reasons.  Firstly,  Senegal  was  the  first 
African country to conclude a bilateral  fisheries agreement with the EU and the parties have 
since renewed this  arrangement  seven  times.  There  is  thus  a strong tradition  of legitimated 
Community fishing in Senegalese waters. I was particularly interested in how this relationship 
had  evolved  over  time  in  response  to  and  shaped  by  international  legal  developments  and 
broader domestic  and international  socio-economic  and political  factors.  I was initially also 
drawn  to  this  case  study  as  it is  one of the EU’s  few  bilateral  fisheries  interactions  with  a 
West African  state that has attracted significant public attention  and criticism for its alleged 
adverse  impacts  on  the  state  of  Senegalese  fish  stocks  and  its  domestic  fishing  industry, 
particularly the livelihoods of its artisanal sector. Questions of sustainability appeared to lie at 
the heart of these criticisms and it thus seemed an apt case study for my area of interest.
The  case  study  is  not  intended  to  be  representative  of  West  African  or  other  developing 
coastal  states’  bilateral  fishing  relations  with  the EU  (or other Western  fishing  nations);  it 
operates  merely  as  an  illustrative  case  study,  designed  to  serve  the  purposes  that  I  have 
outlined  above.  Some  of the  conclusions  in  my  thesis  may  nevertheless  have  a  bearing on 
analyses of fishing interactions between other coastal West African states and the EU; to the 
extent  that  I  suggest  such  analogies  in  this  thesis,  I  do  so  purely  as  a  matter  of  logical 
deduction rather than statistical inference.5
4 I draw on the work of JC Mitchell,  ‘Case and Situation Analysis’  (1983) 31  Sociological Review 187-211  in 
justifying my use of such a case study. See in particular at  192.
51 refer to Mitchell ibid at  189, 206 and 207 to substantiate such an approach.24
Empirical  research  was  necessary  to  supplement  my  theoretical  research  as  apart  from 
primary sources, such as EU legal and policy documents, and general secondary material on 
international  fisheries  management by bodies  like the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organisation  (FAO), there was little formal  literature on the topic of EU-developing coastal 
state  bilateral  fisheries  agreements.  In  particular,  there  was  a  dearth  of  relevant  academic 
writing.  This  was  true  to  an  even  greater  extent  with  regard  to  the  case  study  of  EU- 
Senegalese  fisheries  relations.  In  particular,  I  was  unable  to  access  Senegalese  fisheries 
legislation and policy through traditional reference material.
I used four main methods to conduct my empirical research: formal interviews (conducted by 
telephone, e-mail and in person with two key stakeholders in the EU, two key national players 
in  the  Senegalese  Direction  des  Peches  Maritimes  (DPM)  and  two  non-governmental 
organisation  (NGO)  representatives  based  in  Dakar,  Senegal),  semi-structured  interviews 
(carried  out  in  person  with  four  other  officials  within  DPM),  observational  research 
(conducted in Dakar, Senegal and its surrounds and in the southern fishing village of Toubab 
Dialo),  and  informal  interviews  (conducted  via  question-answer e-mail  exchanges  with  the 
EU stakeholders and two officials in the FAO). The empirical research was carried out after I 
had completed my initial desk-bound research, primarily during the period of September 2005 
to February 2006. The majority was conducted in Dakar, Senegal during a nine day visit from 
30 January until 8 February 2006. The first formal interview was conducted with the Brussels- 
based  EU  official  by  telephone  in  September  2005  following  a  number  of  informal 
investigative e-mail exchanges prior to this date. The remainder of the formal interviews took 
place in Dakar.  In the period between August 2005  and August 2006, numerous informal e- 
mail  exchanges  took  place  between  myself  and  my  interviewees  (those  conducted  post­
interviews primarily concerned points of clarity and follow-up questions), as well as with two 
key  FAO  personnel:  a  senior  scientific  officer,  who  clarified  numerous  technical  and25
biological issues concerning West African fisheries, and the former director of DPM and head 
of the Senegalese bilateral fisheries agreement negotiation team with the EU (Mr Gueye) who 
provided me with useful contacts in the Senegalese fisheries ministry.
The interviewees were selected for different reasons. The EU representatives were chosen as 
they respectively occupied positions that had a direct bearing on my area of research: one was 
head  of  the  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  unit  within  the  EU  Commission’s  Directorate- 
General  Fisheries  (DG  Fisheries)  while  the  other  was  the  permanent EU  representative  in 
Dakar, responsible for over-seeing the EU’s bilateral fisheries agreements with West African 
coastal  states.6  The  DPM  officials  were  selected  less  systematically.  After  months  of 
frustrating  attempts  to  identify  and  forge  links  with  suitable  person(s)  in  the  Senegalese 
government, I was put in touch with a DPM fisheries statistician (Mr Ndaw). It was through 
Mr Ndaw that I was able to secure an interview with the (then) director of DPM (Ms Diop) as 
well as with a former key national player in the DPM and current legal advisor to the Ministry 
(Mr Samb, who also played an instrumental role in drafting Senegal’s national fisheries laws 
and codes). These were the only two formal interviews conducted with DPM officials on the 
basis of pre-prepared interview questions.
The NGO representatives that I interviewed in Dakar were both selected prior to my visit and 
interview  appointments  were  scheduled  in  advance  via  e-mail  contact.  Firstly,  I  choose  to 
interview  the  World  Wide  Fund  for  Nature  (WWF)’s  Western  Africa  Marine  Ecosystem 
representative. This was based on the fact that the WWF, an internationally-recognised global 
environmental conservation, research and advocacy organisation, has been particularly active 
in  its  criticism  of the  EU’s  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  West  African  coastal  states
6 As noted in the annexed list of interviewees, the (then) head of the DG Fisheries Bilateral Fisheries Agreement 
Unit no longer holds this position. He is now the Executive Director of the new EU Fisheries Control  Agency (as 
from June 2006).from a sustainability perspective as well as in its efforts to advise the respective parties in how 
to negotiate agreements that better foster sustainable fishing and the sustainable development 
of  the  coastal  states’  fisheries.7  The  second  NGO  that  I  selected  -  Enda  Prospectives 
Dialogues  Politiques  (Enda  Diapol)  -  is  a  much  smaller,  less  well-known  international 
organisation that  works  on  coordinating  African  state  policies  in  the  spheres  of  the 
environment, fisheries and trade. Its Dakar-based branch focuses exclusively on West African 
fisheries;  its  particular  aim  is  to  foster  coherence  between  West  African  states’  fisheries 
policies and their environmental and trade policies at a local, regional and international level. 
I  chose  these  particular  two  NGOs  for  their  environmentally-grounded  interests  in  West 
African fisheries relations with the EU and for their potentially differing perspectives on these 
relations.  My  interview  questions  were  based  on  a  written  questionnaire.  Their  aim  was 
primarily to ascertain  the  respective NGO representatives’  official  positions  on  the  impacts 
(positive  and  negative)  of  the  EU-Senegalese  fisheries  agreements  to  date  from  a 
sustainability  perspective,  as  well  as  any  recommendations  to  improve  the  promotion  of 
sustainable fishing via future agreements (or other means). I was aware that both NGO’s were 
relatively critical  of the agreements and thus factored this into my questions.  I recorded the 
answers and comments of my interviewees by hand and subsequently typed them up.
The formal interviews with the EU and DPM representatives were also conducted on the basis 
of  written  questionnaires.8  The  questionnaires  respectively  comprised  ten  and  eleven  core 
questions.  They  focused  primarily  on  two  key  aspects  of  the  (then)  current  EU-Senegal 
bilateral  fisheries  agreement,  namely  resource  management  issues  (including  surplus 
determination, fishing opportunities and the importance of sustainable fishing) and matters of
7 Largely, this is through the development and promoting of a handbook to this end (see W Martin and others, A 
Handbook Negotiating Fishing Access Agreements (WWF, Washington D C 2001). Currently, a manual for best 
practice to negotiate fisheries agreements is being developed in collaboration with the World  Conservation 
Union (IUCN) for West African states, coupled with regional training courses to enhance the technical capacity 
of national negotiators.
8 The questionnaires are attached to the thesis (annex  1).27
compensation  and value  (including specific questions concerning targeted action payments). 
In  addition,  the questions  were concerned with  the broader context in  which  the agreement 
operated,  such  as  the  impact  of  fisheries  agreements  on  the  domestic  fishing  industry 
(particularly the artisanal sector) and the relation between fisheries agreements generally and 
EU-Senegalese trade  and  development interactions.  Additional  questions  were posed to the 
DPM officials about the state of Senegalese fisheries.
Where possible, the interview questions were sent to the interviewees in advance. In all cases, 
interviewees’  responses  were  recorded  by  hand  and  subsequently  typed  up.  The  particular 
wording  of  the  questions  was  modified  slightly  as  necessary  to  match  the  country  or 
organisational  identity  of the  particular interviewee.  In  some  instances,  where interviewees 
introduced  an  interesting  issue  that  was  related  to  the  topic  under  discussion  or  made  a 
comment at a tangent to the specific question asked but nevertheless relevant to my interests, I 
diverted from the formal questions for a few minutes to listen to and record what was being 
said  and  possibly  also  to  ask  further  related  questions  or  to  seek  a  point  of clarity.  This 
enhanced my knowledge of the subject-area under research; it did not detract from the overall 
utility of having a core set of uniform questions for each interview as this ensured a degree of 
consistency between the various interviews and guaranteed that comments and views on key 
matters were obtained from all of the chosen interviewees. It was not, however, my intention 
to compare the interviewee’s responses  or to perform  any kind of statistical  analysis of the 
data  obtained  from  the  interviews.  My  aim  in  conducting  these  interviews  was  firstly  to 
supplement  the  written  data  that  I  had  already  accessed  on  EU-developing  coastal  state 
(particularly, Senegalese) fisheries relations and bilateral fisheries agreements. This included 
clarifying certain points that were somewhat vague in the literature. Through the interviews I 
also hoped to access relevant Senegalese legal and policy documents (I was successful in this 
goal). Secondly, I hoped to ascertain first hand the official viewpoints of the state bodies and28
organisations represented by my interviewees on  specific  matters concerning these relations 
and  agreements.  All  of  the  data  gathered  was  used  as  background  material  to  enrich  my 
understanding of the subject-matter of my thesis. In  addition, I draw on  some of the data in 
the text of my thesis  to  clarify,  accentuate or question  points  made  in  the literature;  this  is 
indicated  either  as  a  quotation  in  the  text  or  a  reference  in  the  footnotes  to  the  particular 
source.
All interviewees were informed prior to the interview of my status as a PhD student and the 
fact that data from the interviews would be incorporated into my thesis. They were all  asked 
during the interview to indicate whether they preferred data used from their interviews to be 
directly  referenced  to  them  by  name  or  whether  they  preferred  to  remain  anonymous;  I 
reconfirmed their respective  decisions  via e-mail  following  the  interviews.  The  majority of 
interviewees  preferred to remain  anonymous.  Material  that is  used from  these interviews in 
the  text  of my  thesis  is  referenced  simply  as  ‘interviews  (Dakar February  2006)’,  whereas 
material that originates from interviewees who indicated that they were content to be quoted 
is referenced directly to the person concerned. The only evident ethical issue arising from the 
formal interviews was the tendency of the EU and DPM officials respectively to interject their 
official  responses  with  personal  opinions.  The  interviewees  usually  subsequently 
acknowledged this and requested that these particular comments should remain anonymous if 
subsequently utilised in the text of the thesis.
The four  ‘semi-structured’  interviews  that  I conducted  with  DPM  officials  were  scheduled 
after my arrival in Dakar with the assistance of Mr Ndaw. While they were similarly based on 
pre-prepared  written  interview  questions,  I  devised  the  questionnaires  at  relatively  short- 
notice (usually the night prior to the interview) and tailored each set of questions to the area of 
expertise of the particular interviewee. For example, questions concerning the success (or not)29
in  using marine protected areas to promote domestic  fisheries  conservation  in coastal  areas 
were  directed  at  the particular individual  with  a portfolio on  marine protected  areas.  These 
interviewees  were not  selected on a systematic basis, but were chosen  somewhat randomly, 
determined largely by who had time and was willing to subject themselves to an interview and 
which  officials could offer potentially relevant input to my research.  A  limiting factor with 
regard to these informal  interviews was the language constraint -  they were conducted in  a 
mixture of fairly basic English and French; in contrast, there were no language difficulties in 
the  formal  interviews  -   they  were  all  conducted  in  English  as  the  interviewees  were 
competent English speakers.
My observational research comprised surveying fishers, fish processors and sellers in Dakar’s 
ports and in Toubab Dialo, a small fishing village south of the capital where I undertook a two 
day  site-visit  with  the  aim  of observing  the  central  role  of  fishing  to  the  livelihoods  and 
culture of local coastal communities. Here, I watched artisanal fishers harvesting coastal fish 
in their pirogues and mending their fishing nets on the beach and women preparing the catch 
on the beach for local consumption (smoking or cooking the fish). I recorded my observations 
in  rough  fieldnotes.  The  data  was  used  purely  as  background  information  to  expand  my 
knowledge of Senegalese fisheries.
Overall, a limiting factor of my empirical research was the relatively short time period that I 
spent in  Senegal.  Poor infrastructure,  including telecommunications,  made  travelling in  and 
around  Dakar  time-consuming  and  frequently  made  scheduling  and  keeping  appointments 
difficult.  Accordingly,  had I spent a longer time in Dakar or returned for a second research 
visit,  I  would  likely  have  been  able  to  schedule  meetings  with  a  wider  spectrum  of 
stakeholders  in  the fishing industry, including officials  from  the  scientific  advisory body to 
the DPM (the  Centre  de  Recherches  Oceanographiques  de Dakar Thiaroye,  (CRODT))  andpossibly  also  representatives  from the  different domestic  fishing  sectors.9  While this  would 
undoubtedly have further enriched my knowledge and understanding of the subject-area, I do 
not believe that my inability to do so hampered the substantive quality of my research or its 
utility.
9 Cross-reference with pp  177,  178 for more on CRODT and the general institutional structure of fisheries 
management in Senegal.31
2
COMMON RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN FISHERIES: SUSTAINABILITY 
CHALLENGES AND LEGAL RESPONSES
I.  Introduction
World fisheries are currently in crisis. From a biological perspective this is manifested in the 
fact that  around 70  percent  of the  world’s commercially exploitable  stocks  are either fully- 
fished, over-fished, depleted or in slow recovery and most of the world’s fishing grounds have 
been  exhausted.10  There  is  a  corresponding  increasing  recognition  of  the  inadequacies  of 
current  biological  and  scientific  fisheries  management  models.1 1   Fisheries  management  is 
therefore  similarly  in  turmoil  regarding  how  best to  address  the  biological  crises  and  what 
(new) methods should be employed to this end.12 The causes of the crises are not unknown - 
they include over-capacity of vessels and gear, poor monitoring and enforcement and rampant 
illegal,  unregulated  and  unreported  (IUU)  fishing.  The  solutions,  legal  and  otherwise, 
however,  are  less  clear.  The  challenge  is  to find an  effective  way  to  sustainably regulate  a 
common  natural  resource  that  is  under  increasing  global  demand.  It  is  this  challenge  that
10 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture Report (FAO, Rome
1994)  and State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture Report (FAO, Rome  1996). See also R Rayfuse and M 
Wilder,  ‘International Fisheries and Sustainability: Dealing with Uncertainty’  (2000) Living Resources  114, F 
Berkes,  ‘Property Rights and Coastal Fisheries’  in RS Pomeroy (ed), Community Management and Common 
Property of Coastal Fisheries in Asia and the Pacific:  Concepts, Methods and Experiences (International Centre 
for Living Aquatic Resources (ICLARM), Manila Philippines  1994), K Crean and D Symes (eds), Fisheries 
Management in Crises (Fishing News Books, Oxford  1996), D Symes,  ‘Fishing in Troubled waters’  in Crean 
and Symes at 7, JR McGoodwin, Crisis in the World's Fisheries: People,  Problems,  and Policies (Stanford 
University Press, Standford  1990), ME Smith,  ‘Chaos in Fisheries Management’  (1990) 3 Maritime 
Anthropological Studies  1   -   13 at  1, and S Hanna,  ‘Transition in the American Fishing Commons: Management 
Problems and Institutional Design Challenges’ in N Dolsak and E Ostrom (eds), The Commons and the New 
Millennium (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts USA 2003) at 62, 63. Around 50 percent of 
these stocks are fully-exploited, meaning that they are being fished at their maximum biological productivity; 
increased fishing will not produce increased sustainable harvests and could reduce reproduction to dangerously 
low levels. Over-exploited stocks are those where fishing already does not produce increased sustainable 
harvests and reproduction is at dangerously low levels, while depleted stocks are those where the populations are 
currently only a fraction of their historical size and require re-building.
1 1   Symes ibid at 7.
12 Ibid, Smith op cit n  10 at  1   and JA Wilson and P Kleban,  ‘Practical Implications of Chaos in Fisheries: 
Ecologically Adapted Management’  (1992) 5 Maritime Anthropological Studies 67 -  75.32
forms  the  basis  of this  chapter.  I  focus  in  particular on  how  the  international  legal  regime 
seeks to promote the goal  of sustainable fisheries management.  In chapter 3  below, I revisit 
the  concept  of sustainability  and  comprehensively  address  its  meaning  and  its  relationship 
with the related principle of sustainable use and the ideal of sustainable development. These 
chapters  thus  introduce  two  of the  analytical  lenses  that  I employ  in  my  thesis,  as  I  have 
explained in chapter 1.
2.  The challenge of common resource management
Forests,  grazing  land  and  fisheries  are  all  examples  of common  natural  resources.  Marine 
fisheries  are often  described as a  ‘classical’  example of a common  natural resource because 
they  exemplify  the  two  defining  characteristics  of these  resources.1 3   The  first  is  that  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  prevent  users  from  extracting  from  a  common  natural  resource  (the 
exclusion problem) while the second is that extraction by one user diminishes the volume of 
the resource and detracts from the ability of others to use the resource (the subtractability or 
rivalry  problem).1 4  These  characteristics  give  rise  to  two  particular management  problems: 
how  to  effectively  regulate  access  to  the  resource  and  how  best  to  control  its  level  of 
exploitation.1 5   It  is  generally  acknowledged  that  these  challenges  cannot  be  adequately 
addressed unless  the common  resource is  subject to  a property rights  system,  as a resource 
that is subject to no property regime (open access) is highly susceptible to over-exploitation.
1 3  Berkes op cit n  10 at 51  and CM Rose,  ‘Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for 
Common Resources’  (1991) Feb Duke Law Journal  1  at 3. See also S Ciriacy-Wantrup and R Bishop, 
“‘Common Property” as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy’ (1975)  15 Natural Resources Journal 713 -  727 
at 722.
14 E Ostrom and others, Rules,  Games and Common-Pool Resources (University of Michigan Press, USA  1994) 
at 6, E Ostrom,  ‘The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-Property 
Institutions’ in D Bromley and others (eds), Making the Commons Work:  Theory and Practice and Policy (ICS 
Press, San Francisco California  1992) at 295, RJ Oakerson,  ‘Analyzing the Commons:  A Framework’ in 
Bromley and others at 44, and R Wade,  ‘The Management of Common Property Resources: Finding a Co­
operative Solution’ (1987) 2 World Bank Research Observer 219 -  234 at 220.
1 5  D Feeny,  ‘Frameworks for Understanding Resource Management on the Commons’  in Pomeroy op cit n 9 at 
20.33
This is because it is open  to use by anybody who has the capacity to exploit it while at the
same time nobody has an incentive to conserve it. 1 6 Arguably, individuals  will  thus tend to
use the  resource  to  maximise  their own  short-term benefits  with  little consideration for the
long-term  implications  of  their  actions.  They  will  likely  make  no  effort  to  conserve  the
resource in the belief that other users will either neutralise these efforts or benefit from them
without sharing the costs.1 7 If nobody conserves the resource, it will of course become over-
1 8 utilised and may eventually be destroyed.
Some  kind of property rights  regime is  thus  arguably necessary  (although  not sufficient) to 
prevent the over-exploitation of common resources.1 9  There is no definitive answer as to what 
property regime(s) is better suited to this end but literature and practice suggest that common 
resources  are  best  managed  under  one  or  more  of  three  types  of  property  regimes:  state
90 (government)  property,  private  property,  or  common  (communal)  property.  The 
characteristics of the particular resource and the context in which it is located will dictate (at 
least  in  part)  the  most  suitable  property  regime(s).2 1   A  number  of  writers  suggest  that  a 
combination of property regimes is best for managing coastal fisheries resources.22 This view 
is  also reflected in  the practice of coastal  states - many  have  implemented  state regimes  in 
conjunction  with  private  property  rights  systems  to  manage  the  fisheries  in  their  adjacent
16 G Stevenson, Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use Applications (Cambridge 
University Press, UK  1991) at 9, Feeny ibid at 22 and Hanna op cit n  10 at 8.
1 7 J Bowers, Sustainability and Environmental Economics: An Alternative Text (Addison Wesley Longman, 
England  1997) at 189.
1 8  G Hardin,  ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968)  162 Science  1243 -  1248 reproduced in JA Baden and DS 
Noonan (eds), Managing the Commons (2nd edn Indiana University Press, USA  1998). Hardin’s theory is 
discussed and analyzed below at p 35. Ostrom (1992) op cit n  14 at 293 and 297 and Wade op cit n  14 at 220.
19 E Schlager and E Ostrom,  ‘Property-Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An Empirical Analysis’ (1993) in 
T L Anderson and R T Simmons (eds), The Political Economy of Customs and Culture: Informal Solutions to the 
Commons Problem (Rowman and Littlefield, Landham  1993) and Ostrom ibid at 293.
20 As noted by Hanna op cit n  10 at 8.
21 See for example F Berkes,  ‘Success and Failure in Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey’ in Bromley and others 
op cit n  14 and  F Runge,  ‘Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development’  (1986)  14 
World Development 623-635 at 624.
22 See for example Berkes ibid at 56, Feeny op cit n  15 at 22 and D Feeny and others,  ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons: Twenty-two Years Later’  in Baden and Noonan op cit n  18 at 78.34
waters. In some jurisdictions, common property rights systems are used (although this is not
23 wide-spread).
In  a government or state property regime, the state owns  the common resource.  It regulates 
both access to the resource and the level and nature of its use.24 Most coastal states own and 
regulate  fisheries  in  their  12  nautical  mile  territorial  waters,  as  permitted  by  the  United 
Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of the  Sea  (UNCLOS);  in  addition,  they  assert  sovereign 
rights  over the fisheries  in  their 200 nautical  mile exclusive economic  zones  (EEZs).25  If a 
private property system is in place, individuals own  ‘units’ of the common resource and have 
the right  to  exclude  others  from  using them.  In  marine  fisheries,  coastal  states  may permit 
individuals to hold a fishing quota -  a right to catch a fixed amount of a certain species of fish 
- or an individual transferable quota.26 These rights are recognised by the state and are legally 
enforceable.27 In a common (or communal) property system, however, the common resource 
is  owned  and  regulated  by  an  identifiable  group  of users,  who  can  exclude  outsiders  from 
using the resource. Within the group, individual users may enjoy equal rights of access or use
23 Such as in Asia and on a project or area-specific basis in countries such as South Africa and Turkey. For 
examples of co-management projects in South Africa, see M Hauck and M Sowman (eds),  Waves of Change: 
Coastal and Fisheries Co-management in South Africa (University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town 2003). For 
a more general discussion on co-management see RE Townsend and SG Pooley,  ‘Distributed Governance in 
Fisheries’  in S Hanna and M Munasinghe (eds), Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological 
Issues (The Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics and The World Bank, Washington DC USA
1995).
24 For explanations of the various property regimes suitable for regulating common resources, including state 
property regimes, see for example Bromley and others op cit n  14 at 23, Berkes (1994) op cit n  10 at 56, Feeny 
op cit n  15 at 22, and Feeny and others op cit n 22 at 79.
25 Feeny ibid at 22 and Bromley and others ibid at 23. Articles 2 and 3 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (adopted December  10  1982 , entered into force  16 November  1994) (1982) 21 ILM 
1261 regulate the territorial  waters while Part V regulates the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Cross-reference 
with p 45 below where I discuss the EEZ in greater detail.
26 These concepts re-visited below at p 48.
27  See Bromley and others op cit n  14 at 24, Berkes (1994) op cit n  10 at 56 and Feeny and others op cit n 22 at 
79.35
and their rights may be transferable.28 While their rights are in some cases recognised by the
29 state, they may operate de facto only.
Historically, Hardin’s view that only a state or private property rights system can prevent the 
destruction of a common resource dominated.  In recent years,  however, commentators have 
taken increasing note of evidence that supports the contention that a common property regime
30 can  potentially  also ensure  the sustainable  management  of a common  natural  resource.  I
3 1 discuss this further below in the context of a critique of Hardin’s theory.
2.1  Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ theory and suggested property-rights solutions
Hardin’s  ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ theory is one of the most influential models of common 
natural  resource  management.  The  theory  uses  the  example  of common  grazing  land in  an 
open  access  system  and  argues  that  as  a  ‘rational  being’  the  user  of  this  land  will  try  to 
maximise his  personal  gain  by grazing an ever-increasing number of cattle on the common 
land.32 He will do this because the private benefits from this action exceed the private costs, 
as the cost of maintaining the land is distributed among all users. The user therefore becomes 
‘locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit’  until the commons 
can no longer sustain  any grazing at all  and collapse.  ‘Therein is the tragedy...freedom in  a
28 As Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop op cit n  13 point out, individuals within the group do no necessarily enjoy 
equal rights regarding the amount of the resource that they may use over a period of time; they may simply enjoy 
equal rights to use the resource (at 714, 715).
29 See Bromley and others op cit n  14 at 25, 26, Berkes (1994) op cit n  10 at 56, Feeny and others op cit n 22 at 
79, and Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop ibid at 714, 715.
30 Feeny and others ibid at 86. One of the empirical examples referred to is the cooperative-based management of 
coastal fisheries in Japan (at 81). Other examples include forests, meadowlands and irrigation works in Japanese 
villages (at 84) as well as various forms of common property management in South India. Reference is also 
made to successful common property management of coastal fisheries in Turkey (see Berkes (1992) op cit n 21
at 83).
3 1 At p 38.
32 Flardin op cit n  18 at 7.36
commons brings ruin to  all’.33 Hardin  argued that the only way to prevent the tragedy is to 
either allocate individual  property rights to  individual  grazing  units  of the common  land (a 
private property rights regime) or for the state to control the land and regulate access to it (a 
state property rights regime).34
Gordon  proposed  a similar theory to Hardin’s  some fourteen  years earlier in  the context of 
fisheries  management.35  He  drew  on  the  economic  theory  of natural  resource  utilisation  to 
argue  that  where  natural  resources  such  as  fisheries  are  unregulated  ‘free  goods’,  over­
exploitation  will  occur.  This  is  because fish  in  such  a system  are  ‘valueless’  as there is no 
certainty that if they are not harvested on one day they will still be available the next; a factor 
of production  that  is  valued  at nothing  in  business calculations  yields  nothing in  income.36 
Competitive harvesting under such a system therefore yields no economic rent (the revenue or 
excess  value  that  is  produced  above  the  cost  of  harvesting).37  Accordingly,  commercial 
fishing  is  not  economically  sustainable.  Even  if rent  is  initially  generated  it  will  arguably 
dissipate:  with  no limit on  who can extract and how much  they can  take, fishers will  either 
withdraw more than  is economically optimal  or over-invest in  fishing  equipment.  Gordon 
suggested  the  same  solutions  as  Hardin,  namely  that  fisheries  should  either  be  subject  to 
public or private property regulation.39
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid at 8.
35 SH Gordon,  The Economic Theory of Common Property Resources: The Fishery’  (1954) 62 Journal of 
Political Economy 124 -  142, reproduced in Baden and Noonan op cit n  18 at  17.
36 Gordon ibid at 28.
37 Ibid at 7 and 28 and Rose op cit n  13 at  13. Rose cites the goal of fisheries management as the identification 
and maintenance of the use level at which the resource’s rents are at their greatest (at  14). See also VT Kaitala 
and GR Munro,‘The Management of Transboundary Resources and Property Rights Systems: The Case of 
Fisheries’  in Hanna and Munasinghe op cit n 23 at 70.
38 E Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge  1990) at 48.
39 Ibid at 29.37
The ‘free rider’ problem is a common, key thread in the above two theories. Both are based on 
the assumption that humans  are narrowly self-interested and will  always  act to further their 
own  individual  interests  rather  than  those  of  the  group.40  Individuals  thus  tend  not  to 
contribute towards joint efforts if they know that they cannot be excluded from the benefits of 
the end result; they are tempted to ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others. The problem is that if all 
individuals in a group are free-riders, the common good will not be produced.41 In the context 
of Hardin’s commons theory, free-rider behaviour prevents the group from mutually agreeing 
on an effective way to manage the common resource.42
This assumption of human nature is supported by two other influential models: the ‘Prisoners’ 
Dilemma’ game theory, and Olson’s theory of collection action. The former describes how, in 
the  absence  of  intervention  by  a  higher  authority,  the  rational  strategy  of  each  individual 
‘player’  in  a  group  effort  will  lead  collectively  to  an  irrational  outcome  that  harms  the 
group.43  This  will  arise  because  any  given  individual  player  will  suspect  that  every  other 
player will  not cooperate fully to address a particular issue but will instead  ‘defect’  at some 
point.  The individual  player will  therefore  also  ‘defect’,  viewing  this  as  his/her best option 
despite the fact that all players may be better off if they cooperated.44 The theory supports the 
assertion that no individual(s) will act to conserve a common natural resource and that it will 
accordingly become depleted.45 Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’ theory echoes this finding. 
It presents a pessimistic view of the viability of collective action, challenging the group theory 
that individuals with common interests will act voluntarily to promote those interests. Olson 
argues that individuals will not act to achieve common or group interests unless there is some
40 This assumption about human nature has been criticised and is discussed below.
41 Runge op cit n 21  at 625 and E Ostrom,‘Reflections on the Commons’  in Baden and Noonan op cit n 18 at 
100.
42 Runge ibid at 626 and Anderson and Simmons op cit n  19 at 3.
43 Ostrom (1998) op cit n 41  at 97, 98 and Runge ibid at 625, 626.
44 Rose op cit n  13 at 4.
45 Ibid.38
special  feature  that  ‘makes’  them  do  so 46  The  theory  therefore  disregards  the  prospect  of 
voluntary collective action resulting in the successful management of a common resource 47
All  of  these  theories  discount  the  possibility  that  users  can  extricate  themselves  from  a 
common  resource use dilemma.  In particular, they discredit common  property regimes as  a 
solution to this predicament. Yet numerous empirical examples refute the inappropriateness of 
common property solutions, thus presenting a critique of Hardin’s theory. Whilst influential,
<4,R
Hardin’s theory has been severely criticised on numerous grounds.  One of its core failings is 
its  narrow,  dichotomous focus on private  and state property regimes  as  the  solutions to the 
effective management of common resources to the exclusion of common property systems.49 
Studies  that  highlight  the  capacity  of  common  property  regimes  to  deal  with  common 
resource management difficulties just as effectively as private and state property systems, are 
particularly  rich  in  coastal  fisheries.50  From  these  and  other  examples,  researchers  have 
compiled  a  comprehensive  ‘checklist’  of  factors  that  predispose  a  common  resource  to 
effective management by common property regimes relating to the resource itself, the users 
and the context.5 1
46 For example, the group is very small or there is coercion or ‘some other special device’  - Ostrom (1998) op cit 
n 41  at  99. Collective action is action by more than one individual that is intended to attain a common goal or 
satisfy a common interest where the goal or interest cannot be obtained by the individual person on their own 
(Wade op cit n  14 at 221).
47 As Wade points out (ibid), his findings (and those of other scholars, such as Ostrom) question this argument. 
With reference to empirical case studies, Wade engages in a critical analysis of Olson’s theory (228, 229). His 
paper culminates in the production of a list of conditions that are likely to support successful collective action in 
the management of common resources (231, 232). These should be read in conjunction with a similar list 
produced by Ostrom (1990) op cit n 38.
48 See for example McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 89, Anderson and Simmons op cit n  19 and Feeny and others op cit 
n 22.
49 Anderson and Simmons ibid at 6.
50 D Bromley, Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy (Basil Blackwell, London UK 
1991) at 25 and Feeny and others op cit n 22 at 80, 81.
5 1   See in particular the work of Ostrom (1990) op cit n 38 and Wade (op cit n  14). Ostrom describes these factors 
as  ‘design principles’ (at 90). For the full contents of these lists and detailed explanations of them, see Ostrom at 
90-102 and Wade at 230 -  232. For a critique of their work see A Agrawal,  ‘Common Property Institutions and 
Sustainable Governance of Resources’  (2001) 29 World Development  1649 -   1672.39
Another  fundamental  critique  of  Hardin’s  theory  is  that  it  seems  to  equate  open  access 
regimes  with  regimes  of  a  common  property  nature.52  At  the  very  least,  it  obscures  the 
difference between the two. This stems from Hardin’s failure to define the term ‘commons’ in 
his  paper.53  He  does  not  identify  key  characteristics  of  ‘commons’  nor does  he  distinguish 
them  from  the  property  rights  regimes  in  which  they  operate.54  This  leads  him  to  confuse 
‘commons’  (a  type  of  property)  with  ‘common  property’  (a  property  rights  regime).  As 
‘commons’  are  subject to  an  open  access  regime  in  Hardin’s  theory,  this confusion  in  turn 
equates  an  open  access  regime  with  a  common  property  system.55  This  has  the  effect  of 
attributing the ‘tragedy of the commons’ to common resources held under a common property 
regime. As noted above, this assumption is incorrect.  Arguably, Hardin’s theory would have 
been clearer if the author had defined his key terms and more accurate if his paper had been 
titled the ‘tragedy of open access’.56
The theory has also been faulted for being socially and culturally ‘simplistic’ in that it ignores 
the  impact  that  social  norms  may  have  on  individuals’  behaviour  in  differing  cultural 
contexts.57  Hardin’s  failure  to  take  cultural  norms  into  account  may  partly  explain  the 
disparity  between  the  predictions  of  his  theory  and  the  successful  outcome  of  numerous 
empirical  examples  of common  resource management.58  In  addition,  the  theory is criticised 
for  failing  to  acknowledge  the  potential  ability  of users  to  extricate  themselves  from  their 
common  resource  dilemma.  Hardin’s  portrayal  of  users  as  helpless  victims  trapped  in  a
52 McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 92, Stevenson op cit  n  16 at 3, Bromley op cit n 50 at 22.
53 Anderson and Simmons op cit n  19 at 2.
54 Feeny and others op cit n 22 at 78.
55 P Larmour, The Governance of Common Property in  the Pacific Region (National Centre for Development 
Studies, Canberra  1997) at 3. K Singh, Managing Common Pool Resources:Principles and Case Studies (Oxford 
University Press, Delhi  1994) notes the importance of distinguishing between these two regimes in practice 
because what may appear to outsiders to be an open access regime might in fact be a common property system 
managed de facto by internal rules of an identifiable group of users (at 4, 5).
56 Stevenson op cit n  16 at 3.
57 McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 93 and Bromley op cit n 50 at 22.
58 Anderson and Simmons op cit n  19 at 2.40
situation  beyond  their  control  has  been  discredited  by  numerous  case  studies.59  In  these 
examples,  the  users  have  recognised  their destructive  extraction  patterns  and  have  devised 
means  to  avoid  ‘the  tragedy’.60  Related,  is  the  denunciation  of Hardin’s  assumption  about 
human  nature,  namely  that  all  humans  are  ‘rational,  narrowly  self-interested,  myopic 
maximisers’.6 1   Collective  action theorists  and scholars  are particularly vehement in refuting 
this view.62
Finally, and particularly relevant to this thesis, Hardin’s theory fails to take adequate account 
of the nature of the common resource in question. This is problematic as the characteristics of 
the  resource  invariably  shape  the  effects  of its  use.63  In  particular,  the  theory inadequately 
deals  with  fugitive  resources,  such  as  fisheries.64  These  are  mobile  resources  that  are 
incapable of ownership until they are possessed by capture.65
Combined,  the above criticisms suggest that Hardin’s theory,  while insightful, is inadequate 
and incomplete.66 It is not as easy to solve common resource management problems as Hardin 
suggests, particularly those of fisheries. Clearly, open access is not conducive to the long-term 
survival of common natural resources; some type of property rights system is needed in order 
to meet this goal. No one property rights regime can be guaranteed to ensure the sustainable 
use  of all  common  resources;  the  most  suitable regime  must  be  decided  on  a case-by-case
59 Hardin describes users as  ‘locked’  into a system in which they are compelled to perpetuate their destructive 
exploitative actions (op cit n  17). Those discrediting Hardin’s portrayal include Ostrom (1992) op cit n  14, 
Ostrom and others op cit n  14, Wade op cit n  14, Feeny (1994) op cit n  15 and Berkes (1994 ) op cit n 10.
60 McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 92, Bromley op cit n 50 at 22 and Berkes ibid at 59. See also Ostrom and others 
ibid at 4, 5.
61 Anderson and Simmons op cit n  19 at 3.
62 For example, Ostrom (1992) op cit n  14, Wade op cit n  14, Feeny (1994) op cit n  15 and Berkes (1994) op cit 
n  10.
63 Feeny and others op cit 22 at 87.
64 Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop op cit n  13 at 724.
65 Ibid. The theory also inadequately deals with ubiquitous resources, such as air, solar radiation and wind. These 
resources are not scarce  ‘prior to some stage of economic development’. They therefore only need to be 
regulated once this point is reached
66 Feeny and others op cit n 22 at 86.41
basis guided by the nature of the resource and the context in which it is used. This leads me to 
consider the goal of ‘effective’ management of common natural resources.67
Writers  address the objective  of effective common  resource  management in  different ways, 
but the common theme is the goal of ‘sustainable use’ or the ‘sustainability’ of the resource in 
question.68  It is therefore important to have  an  idea of the meaning of these concepts.  As  I 
discuss  them  more  fully  in  the  next  chapter,  it  is  sufficient  at  this  point  to  understand 
‘sustainable use’  as the regulated use of a natural resource in a way that protects the resource 
while  facilitating  the  users’  ability  to  maximise  their  socio-economic  benefits.69  When  a 
resource is used in this manner, it is used  ‘sustainably’. The objective is thus to ensure both 
the biological sustainability of the resource and the long-term social and economic well-being 
of its users.
3.  The particular challenges of sustainable fisheries management
Marine fisheries are complex to manage because they are subject to open  access in the high 
seas  as  well  as  potentially  also  in  coastal  waters.  In  an  effort  to  facilitate their sustainable 
management, international  law - through UNCLOS -  sought to remove much of the world’s 
fisheries  from  this  open  access  system  and  subject  them  to  coastal  state jurisdiction.  Most 
coastal states have now claimed the 200 nautical mile EEZ to which they are legally entitled 
and have implemented property regime(s) in these waters to regulate their fisheries. Only the 
high seas beyond the 200 nautical mile boundary thus remain open access. Here, management
67 This conclusion is supported by Ostrom (1992) op cit n  14, Ostrom and others op cit n  14, Wade op cit n  14 
and Agrawal op cit n 51, as well as Runge op cit n 21  at 624 and 633.
68 See for example Ostrom ibid at 293, Wade ibid at 220, Stevenson op cit n  16 at  10, Feeny and others op cit n 
22 and Hanna and Munasinghe op cit n 23.
69 J Bowers op cit n  17 at  192,  192, Hanna and Munasinghe ibid at 5, and WM Lafferty and O Langhelle, 
‘Sustainable Development as Concept and Norm’ in WM Lafferty and O Langhelle (eds),  Towards Sustainable 
Development: on the Goals of Development and the Conditions of Sustainabilitv (St Martin’s Press Incorporated. 
USA  1999) at 1.42
therefore  remains  highly  problematic  and  the  only  way  forward  appears  to  be  through 
increased  international  cooperation  underpinned  by  effective  institutional  support.  Coastal 
states have,  however,  struggled to  achieve sustainable fisheries  management in  their waters 
and continue  to  grapple  with  how  best to  use property  rights  and other technical  measures 
towards this end.  A central  element of their fisheries management policies are the scientific 
models  on  which  they  are  based,  particularly  the  commonly  used  Gordon-Schaefer  bio- 
economic model.
A  key  difficulty  facing  early  fisheries  management  was  how  to  determine  a  fishery’s 
maximum sustainable  yield (MSY) - the  largest long-term  average catch  (yield) that can be 
taken  from  a  fish  stock  without  interfering  with  the  species’  ability  to  reproduce  and  thus 
maintaining the average size of the stock.70 Rooted in biological  theory,  Schaefer’s  ‘logistic 
model’  was the first to present a viable formula to this end. It was deficient, however, as the 
optimal level of fishing effort cannot be determined in relation to MSY alone; it also depends 
on economic factors, such as the cost of extraction and the market value of the catch. In 1954, 
Gordon developed a model that definitively captured the relationship between economics and 
fisheries  (as  noted  above),  relating  total  revenues  from  fishing  to  total  fishing  effort  in  a
7 1 surplus  production  model.  This  theory  could  determine  a  fishery’s  maximum  economic 
yield (MEY) which, put simply, refers to the maximum sustainable economic benefits that can 
be  obtained from  a fishery.  It  complemented  the earlier Schaefer model  and  cumulatively, 
their works gave rise to what is commonly referred to as the Gordon-Schaefer bio-economic
72 model.  For  many  years,  fisheries  managers  worldwide  applied  this  model  but  they
70 Bowers ibid at 19 and P Birnie and A Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press, England 2002) at 551.
71 Op cit n 35. Cross-reference with p 36 above.
72 McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 69-71  and Symes op cit n  10 at 5.43
nevertheless  failed  to  achieve  sustainable  fisheries  management.73  This  was  most  likely 
because of the numerous weaknesses of the model.74
The  major criticism  of the  model  is  that  it is  too  simplistic:  it  fails  to  take  account of the 
inherent complexity and instability of the marine environment and therefore discounts the fact 
that  fish  stocks  might fluctuate  for a  variety of reasons  that  are  unrelated to  fishing effort, 
such  as  pollution  or  temperature  and  current  change.75  This  is  highlighted  by  alternative 
‘chaos’  theorists,  who  identify  various  fisheries  management challenges  that  stem  from the 
unpredictability  of the  marine  environment.76  They  emphasise  the  problematic  outcome of 
fisheries managers’  inability to accumulate the necessary amount  and type of knowledge to 
make  accurate  predictions  about  fish  stocks  namely,  that  it  renders  conventional  fisheries 
management  approaches  that  manipulate  the  recruitment  of  species’  populations  -  such  as
77 quotas - inherently weak tools.
The bio-economic model also fails to reflect the fact that it is not only the volume of a catch 
that  impacts  the population  level  of species  and their growth  rate,  but  also  other variables, 
such as the age and gender structure of the catch and the location and timing of harvesting.78 
Related is that the model  is concerned with regulating single  species only.  It therefore does 
not take account of interactions between different species, which can lead to inaccurate stock
79 level predictions.
73 McGoodwin ibid at 72.
74 Symes op cit n  10 at 7. See also S Cunningham, M Dunn and D Whitmarsh, Fisheries Economics: An 
Introduction (Mansell Publishing Ltd, London England  1985) at 98-100.
75 McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 71, Symes ibid at 6 and Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 552.
76 Smith op cit n 10. See also Wilson and Kleban op cit n  12, where the authors focuses particularly on the 
development of practical methods for maintaining sustainability in chaotic fisheries.
77 Wilson and Kleban ibid at 71. See also Smith ibid at 9, who notes that  ‘...a small change in the local water 
temperature, a ghost-net, some vessel dumping waste overboard can be the minute disturbance that leads to a 
change that ripples along the food chain, amplifying in scale as it moves up in scale’.
78 Bowers op cit n  17 at  190,  191.
79 McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 72 and Symes op cit n  10 at 6.44
Despite its various flaws, the bio-economic model nevertheless remains the primary basis for
80 modem  fisheries  management  perhaps  precisely  because  of  its  apparent  simplicity. 
Alternative,  more  conservation-based  strategies  that  seek  to  address  its  deficiencies  have 
evolved, such as optimal sustainable population and optimal ecological resource management, 
all  of which  are rooted in  the objective of sustainable  use.8 1   They remain  less widely-used, 
however. While some international legal instruments support these newer models, UNCLOS 
endorses the use of the maximum sustainable yield model in the context of a zonal, property 
rights  approach  to  effective  fisheries  management.  Specifically,  it  grants  coastal  states 
jurisdiction over their adjacent coastal waters and requires them to ensure that fish stocks in 
these waters are maintained or restored  to levels which can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield.
4.  The legal response
The  approach  advocated  by  UNCLOS  is  comparatively  new.  Historically,  the  international 
legal regime for marine resource management reflected Grotius’  concept of the  ‘freedom of
the seas’: the sea and its resources were open to use by all and incapable of ownership by any
82 single nation.  This regime came under increasing challenge and in the wake of World War 
II,  coastal  states  began  to  claim  jurisdiction  over  their  adjacent  marine  waters  and  the 
resources  in  them.  The  legitimacy  of their  claims  were  disputed,  however,  and  there  was 
accordingly a need for legal clarification on the matter.83
80 McGoodwin ibid at 74 and Symes ibid at 7.
81 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 552.
82 Grotius H, The Freedom of the Sea or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East India 
Trade (trans Magoffin and Scott New York,  1619).
83 A particularly important challenge was that by the UK and Germany to Iceland’s extension of its coastal 
fishing zone from  12 nautical miles to 50 nautical miles in  1972  - see UK v Iceland [1974] ICJ Rep 3 
Germany v Iceland [1974] ICJ Rep  175 (the Icelandic Fisheries Cases). I discuss the claims of coastal states to 
extended marine fisheries jurisdiction in greater detail at p  146.45
The 1982 UNCLOS attempted to impose some order on the management of coastal resources
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and to tackle the broader issue of the management of the oceans.  It set about achieving these 
goals  by  (inter  alia)  establishing  various  maritime  zones  in  which  it  granted  coastal  states 
different jurisdiction  over  the  marine  resources  in  them.85  The  most  relevant  zone  from  a 
fisheries  management  perspective  is  the exclusive economic  zone  (EEZ),  which  all  coastal 
states are entitled to claim and in which they enjoy legal control over all marine resources.86
Specifically, within the EEZ, coastal states enjoy ‘sovereign rights’
‘...  for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superajacent to the seabed and of
87 the seabed and its subsoil...’
These  rights  are  tempered  by  the  obligation  to  ensure  the  ‘proper’  conservation  and 
management  of  the  living  marine  resources  in  these  waters  ‘taking  into  account  the  best 
scientific advice available’.88 In particular, coastal states must prevent the over-exploitation of 
their coastal fisheries by determining their total allowable catch (TAC).89 These conservatory 
obligations  are  offset  by  the  need to  institute  measures  to  ensure  the  optimal  utilisation  of 
coastal  fisheries  and  to  ensure  that  stocks  are  maintained  or  restored  at  levels  ‘which  can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors’.90  To  foster  the  ‘optimal  utilisation’  of their  fisheries,  coastal  states  that  lack  the 
capacity to fully harvest their TACs are obliged in terms of article 62(2) to grant other states
84 Op cit n 25. The preceding conferences were the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea I (1958) 
and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea II (1960).
85 As I introduced above at p 34.
86 The EEZ is regulated by arts 55 -7 5 . From a fisheries management perspective, the most important provisions 
are located in arts 61 and 62, titled  ‘Conservation of the living resources’ and  ‘Utilisation of the living resources’ 
respectively.
87 Article 56(l)(a).
88 Article 61(2).
89 Articles 61(1) and (2).
90 Articles 61(3) (for MSY) and  62(1). While these provisions do not explicitly oblige coastal states to promote 
the ‘sustainable use’ of coastal fisheries, their overall tenet clearly promotes this objective. Cross-reference with 
p 55 where I revisit this discussion.46
reasonable  access  to  their  surplus  stocks  on  the  basis  of  agreement.9 1   This  obligation  has 
given rise to numerous bilateral fisheries agreements between coastal states and distant water 
fishing nations worldwide, including between the EU and various developing coastal states, as
92 I discuss further in my thesis.
The rights  granted to coastal  states  over their EEZ fisheries  are,  however,  arguably  a mere 
‘legal fiction’  because the migratory nature of fish makes it impossible for a coastal  state to
QO
exercise exclusive control over a species throughout its lifecycle.  The fugitive nature of fish 
also means that no state can truly ‘own’ the fish in its waters prior to capture. In an attempt to 
make sense of the rights granted to coastal states by UNCLOS, it has been suggested that they 
should  be  viewed  as  rights  to  the  income  streams  associated  with  fishery resources,  rather 
than rights to individual fish.94 This explanation provides some theoretical clarity but it does 
not  alter  the  fact  that  even  though  EEZ  stocks  are  legally  no  longer  part  of the  fisheries 
‘commons’, coastal  states nevertheless  struggle  to effectively control  them  because  of their 
common  resource characteristics.  UNCLOS’s  exclusive economic  zone  provisions  go  some 
way to assist coastal  states towards effective fisheries management, but they are complex to 
implement given the extent of the data that is required to comprehensively fulfil them. 95 In 
addition,  coastal  states  enjoy  significant  scope  in  interpreting  and  implementing  these 
provisions.  Some  states  may  therefore  be  inclined  to  promote  their  short-term  economic 
interests by down-playing biological and environmental considerations in operationalising the 
rights and duties contained in the EEZ articles.96
91 Article 62(2). This obligation is also partially to  ‘compensate’ distant-water fishing nations for their loss of 
free access to former high seas fish stocks, as I discuss further below at p  140 below.
921  examine art 62(2) and its implications in detail in chap 6 below at p  139-143.
93 S Macinko and D Bromley,  ‘Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherence from 
Legal and Economic Doctrine’  (2004) 28 Vermont Law Review 623-661  at 628-643.
94 Ibid at 656.
93 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 661. For more on the complexity of UNCLOS’s total allowable catch and 
surplus provisions in particular, cross-reference with pp  139-143 below.
96 Ibid.47
The  reasons  for  the  failure  of states  to  secure  more  effective  management  of their coastal 
fisheries  to  date  are  thus  complex  and  are  largely  rooted  in  domestic  weaknesses.  They 
include  inadequate  scientific  data  collection  and  analysis,  political  pressure  to  prescribe 
conservation  and  management  measures  that  are  insufficiently  strict,  non-compliance  of 
fishers  with  regulations  facilitated  by poor enforcement,  and  the  over-capacity  of domestic 
fleets.97 But clearly it is not possible for any one state to ensure the sustainable use of coastal 
fisheries alone; foreign  states fishing in its waters must cooperate towards this goal both by 
complying  with  domestic  fisheries  laws  and  by  seeking  access  on  terms  that  promote 
sustainability  objectives.  In  addition,  all  fishing  states  must  cooperate  to  ensure  the 
sustainable use of fish  in  waters  adjacent to the EEZ as the extension of coastal jurisdiction 
has  led to increasing  and  more  competitive  fishing  in  these  waters  as  well  as  in  the  ocean 
beyond  the  200  nautical  mile  zone.  While  UNCLOS  obliges  such  cooperation  in  the  high 
seas, it does so less expressly in coastal waters. As a result, the access agreements concluded 
between  coastal  states  and  foreign  fishing  nations  are  not  always  conducive  to  fostering
go
sustainable fishing.
4.1  UNCLOS’ zonal approach: a partial solution?
By  subjecting  areas  of  the  ocean  to  coastal  state  control,  UNCLOS  introduced  a  ‘zonal’  
approach to fisheries management. A number of economists have endorsed this method as a 
potentially powerful means to mitigate fisheries management difficulties that stem from their 
common resource nature.99 They argue that the  ‘sovereign rights’  granted by UNCLOS over 
EEZ fisheries confer ‘absolute’  sovereign property rights on coastal states; while these rights
97 RR Chuchill and AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd  edn Manchester University Press, UK  1999) at 321.
981 explore this in greater detail below in chap 6.
99 See, for example, D McRae and G Munro,  ‘Coastal State “Rights” within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone’  in PA Neher, R Arnason and N Mollet (eds), Rights Based Fishing (Kluwer, Dordrecht  1989) at 98 and 
108 in particular. Also W T Burke,  The Law of the Sea Convention Provisions on Conditions of Access to 
Fisheries: Subject of National Jurisdiction’ (1984) 63 Oregan Law Review 73-119.48
are  ‘shaped’  by the  various  duties that UNCLOS  imposes  on coastal  states and the rights it 
affords  foreign  states,  they  are  in  no  way  diminished by  these  circumscriptions.100  Coastal 
states are therefore potentially empowered to efficiently manage what were formally common 
property resources.1 01  Other writers, however, refute the contention  that coastal  states enjoy 
such extensive powers  in their EEZs,  arguing that the EEZ is  a  ‘limited functional zone’  in 
which coastal states simply enjoy extensive rights.102 They support this view by emphasising 
the  restrictive  nature  of  the  many  obligations  imposed  on  coastal  states  in  these  waters,
1 r n
including the duty to allow other states to access their surplus  stocks.  I revisit this debate 
below in greater detail in chapter 6.104
Regardless  of  the  exact  degree  of  their  control  over  their  fisheries,  coastal  states  are 
potentially  empowered  to  impose  suitable  property  regime(s)  in  their  EEZs  towards  the 
sustainable management of their fish stocks. Most states currently favour a highly-centralised 
approach which combines a state property regime with some form of private property rights. 
The most common form of private property rights are quotas, which grant fishers rights to a 
fixed portion of the TAC.  Some states have instead introduced individual transferable quotas 
such  as  New  Zealand,  Australia  and  the  Netherlands.105  Individual  transferable  quotas  are 
different from conventional quotas because they can be either used by their holders or traded 
on  an  open  ‘quota  market’.106  They  foster  greater  economic  efficiency  in  fisheries  and
100 McRae and Munro ibid at 104.
101 Ibid at  103.
102 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 659.
103 AV Lowe,  ‘Reflections on the Waters: Changing Conceptions of Property Rights in the Law of the Sea’ 
(1986)  1  International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law  1-14, particularly at 9.
104 I discuss it in detail at pp  139-143.
105 See D Symes and K Crean,  ‘Privatisation of the Commons: the Introduction of Individual Transferable 
Quotas in Developed Fisheries’ (1995) 26 Geoforum  175-185 and W Davidse, L McEwan and N Vestergaard, 
‘Property Rights in Fishing: From State Property towards Private Property? A Case Study of Three EU 
Countries’ (1999) 23 Marine Policy 537-547. Currently, ITQs are the preferred property rights for fisheries in 
New Zealand and Iceland -  see Yandle T and Dewees M  ‘Privatising the Commons.. .Twelve Years Later: 
Fishers’ Experiences with New Zealand’s Market-based Fisheries Management’ in Dolsak and Ostrom op cit n 
10 and Eythorsson, E  ‘Stakeholders, Courts, and Communities: Individual Transferable Quotas in Icelandic 
Fisheries' ch 6 in Dolsak and Ostrom op cit n  10.
106 Symes and Crean ibid at  176 and Davidse, McEwan and Vestergaard ibid at 539.49
arguably  reduce  over-capacity,  but  also  have  potentially  adverse  conservation  and  social 
impacts.  Their  contribution  towards  sustainable  fisheries  management  is  thus  highly 
contested.107 As noted above, some states have chosen to regulate their coastal fisheries using 
a common property regime.108 Those who advocate this system argue that the more complete 
the  set  of property  rights  that  fishers  hold  over  fish  resources,  the  more  likely  they  are to 
invest  in  their effective  management.109  This  approach  is  particularly  well-suited  to  small- 
scale  in-shore  fisheries  management.110  Fisheries  management  problems  differ,  however, 
according to the location of the fisheries and as a result, no one property rights regime is best- 
suited to promote sustainable fisheries management in all circumstances. Different states have 
tried various options, but overall, success has been low.
5.  Conclusion
Progress  towards  sustainable  coastal  fisheries  management  has  not  improved  significantly 
since the introduction of UNCLOS despite the increased management capacity that is granted 
to coastal  states  by the  Convention.1 1 1   The short  answer as  to  why this  has occurred is that 
there  have  been  inadequate  efforts  to  promote  sustainable  fisheries  management  at  both  a 
domestic  level  and  at  a cooperative  inter-state  level,  particularly  in  the  context  of bilateral 
fisheries agreements as my thesis demonstrates. A more complex answer is that it is rooted in 
the inadequacy  of the  international  legal  regime  and the  regulatory tools  that it employs to 
promote  sustainable  fishing.112  This  arises  from  the  common  resource  nature  of  fisheries 
which makes it difficult  for the  international regime to devise  an  appropriate framework to
107 As I discuss further at pp 78 and 79.
108 At p 34.
109 Schlager and Ostrom op cit n  19. The authors identify and distinguish between  ‘operational-level’ property 
rights of access and withdrawal, and rights at the higher ‘collective choice’  level, which include rights of 
management, exclusion and alienation (at  14,  15).
110 Berkes (1994) op cit n  10 at 60 and McGoodwin op cit n  10 at 96.
111 Churchill and Lowe op cit n 97 at 321, 660 and Birnie and Boyle op cit  n 70 at 684.
112 The reasons for this contention unfold in my thesis and are re-visited in my conclusions in chap 9 (at pp 227- 
233).50
effectively foster sustainable fishing. In turn, fisheries managers are frustrated in their efforts 
to translate loose legal ideals into practice.51
3
THE REGULATION OF FISHERIES TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY
1.  Introduction
In  the  previous  chapter  I  discussed  fisheries  management  difficulties  arising  from  their 
common resource nature.  I identified one of the  key management goals  of the international 
fisheries regime as the  ‘sustainable use’  of living marine resources both in the high seas and 
in coastal waters. In this chapter I focus on this objective in greater detail, particularly in the 
context of coastal waters. I examine its meaning in international law and its relationship to the 
ideal of sustainable development.  In particular, I look at how international  law promotes the 
sustainable use of fisheries and discuss various management concepts  and measures used to 
pursue this objective. The extent to which these are included in legal  arrangements between 
coastal states and foreign fleets seeking access to their waters says much about the degree to 
which these agreements foster the sustainable use of fishing resources. I discuss this in detail 
in chapter 8 with reference to the case study of EU-Senegalese bilateral fisheries relations.
This chapter confirms the findings in chapter 2, namely that managing fisheries towards their 
sustainable  use  is  particularly  challenging.  The  international  legal  regime  continues  to 
struggle to truly foster this goal;  it is constantly evolving and new instruments are emerging 
that  present  alternative  and  potentially  more  effective  means  to  move  forwards.  There  is 
increasing  emphasis  on  the  need  to  improve  scientific  knowledge  about  stocks  and  to 
effectively  incorporate  this  knowledge  into  fisheries  management  decisions  and  measures, 
guided by a precautionary approach.52
2.  International law and the concept of ‘sustainable use’
The ‘sustainable use’ or ‘sustainability’ of natural resources is a core component of the almost 
universal  objective of  ‘sustainable development’.113 An independent notion  in  its own right, 
‘sustainable  use’  is  the  older  of the  two  concepts  in  the  international  legal  sphere.  As  an 
objective  of  natural  resource  management,  it  was  first  used  in  the  context  of  eighteenth 
century  German  forestry  policy.114  It  referred  to  the  exploitation  of  a  single,  renewable 
resource  in  a  manner  that  avoids  physical  depletion  of  the  stock.  This  meaning  was 
subsequently expanded to refer also to the use of a group of resources in the same manner.115 
In the international arena, the objective of the  ‘sustainable use’  of natural resources emerged 
from and should be understood in the context of the evolution of the concept of ‘conservation’ 
in international law. Initially concerned only with narrow protectionist and preservation aims, 
international resource law developed over time to reflect an increasing interest in also meeting 
human needs.116 The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the 
Rio Conference) focused international attention on the need for the sustainable use of natural 
resources  in  the  context  of  promoting  sustainable  development.117  Various  international 
instruments  emerging  from  and  in  the  wake  of  the  Rio  Conference  echo  this  objective, 
including the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity.118
In international  fisheries  law prior to the  landmark  1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOS)  fisheries  treaties  were  concerned  only  incidentally  with
113 Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 69 at  1.
114 Ibid at  1,4.
115 Ibid at 4, 5.
116 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 88, 551.
117 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June  1992 
(Rio Conference).
118 UNCED, Report of the UNCED vol  1   UN Doc A/Conf 151/26/Rev  1  (New York, UN  1992), UNCED,
Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development (New York, UN  1992) and Convention on 
Biological Diversity (1992) 31  ILM 818 (open for signature 5 June  1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 
(CBD).53
conservation.119 They functioned primarily as distributive regulatory instruments, establishing 
national quotas for fish stocks.120 This was mirrored in domestic law and policy, with fisheries 
management  focused  primarily  on  promoting  the  growth  and  development  of  commercial 
national  fisheries.1 21  The  continued decline  of fish  stocks  globally,  however,  necessitated a 
new  international  regulatory  approach  towards  the  conservacy  of  living  marine  resources. 
UNCLOS  attempted  this  by  transferring jurisdiction  over  much  of the  world’s  fisheries  to 
coastal  states  and endorsing  the  management concept of maximum  sustainable  yield,  to be 
promoted both in the high seas and coastal waters. As we saw in chapter 2,  at a national level 
fisheries  managers  paired  this  biologically-driven  ideal  with  the  objective  of  maximum 
economic  profit  by  applying  the  Gordon-Schaefer  bio-economic  model.  Ten  years  later, 
however,  Agenda 21  expressly emphasised the importance of the  sustainable  use of marine 
living resources  in  chapter  17.  By  doing this,  it aligned  international  fisheries policy more 
closely  to  international  environmental  and  natural  resource  law,  in  contrast  to  its  past 
somewhat  dislocated  development.  The  Johannesburg  Plan  of  Implementation,  which 
emerged from the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development (the ten  year 
follow-up to the Rio Conference) echoes Agenda 21. It urges for international cooperation to 
promote  the  conservation  and  sustainable  development  of  the  oceans  in  accordance  with 
chapter  17  of Agenda 21,  and emphasises the need to promote  ‘sustainable  fisheries’.122  It 
does  so  in  the  context  of  endorsing  natural  resources  management  in  a  ‘sustainable  and 
integrated manner [that] is essential for sustainable development’ and urging states to improve
1  99
‘efficiency  and  sustainability  in  the  use  of  resources’.  The  United  Nations  Straddling 
Stocks  Convention,  concluded  a  few  years  after  Agenda  21,  was  the  first  international
119 UNCLOS op cit n 25.
120 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 653.
1 21 M Sutton,  ‘Harnessing Market Forces and Consumer Power in Favour of Sustainable Fisheries’ in TJ Pitcher, 
PJB Hart and D Pauly, (eds) Re-Inventing Fishery Management (Kluwer, Dordrecht  1998) at  126.
122 See principles 31-32 of Agenda 21 op cit n  118.
123 World Summit on Sustainable Development, 26 August -  4 September 2002. See principles 24 and 25 of the 
United Nations Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (UN, New York 
2002).54
fisheries  instrument  to  explicitly  endorse  the  ‘sustainable  use’  of  fisheries.124  Developed 
alongside the International Court of Justice’s hearing of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam case, 
it  reflects  in  a  fisheries  context  the  Court’s  acceptance  of  the  need  for  environmental 
constraints  on  development.125  The  Straddling  Stocks  Convention,  together  with  later 
international  fisheries  instruments  such  as  the  1995  United  Nations  Food  and  Agriculture 
Organisation  (FAO)’s  Code  of Conduct  for Responsible  Fisheries  (discussed  below),  have 
now ensured that the long-term sustainable use of marine living resources is firmly situated at 
the forefront of the international legal regime.126
There is little agreement among writers on what exactly the modem concept of ‘sustainable 
use’  entails.  There  is  consensus,  however,  that  it  has  moved  beyond  its  initial  narrow 
biological focus to now include a broad range of human concerns within its ambit. In essence, 
it refers to the regulation of human activities to protect natural resources while facilitating the 
maximising  of  economic  benefits  and  the  preservation  of  social  systems,  and  has  been 
described as a ‘social-physical-economic concept related to the level of social and individual 
welfare that is to be maintained and developed’.127 This broad, multi-faceted understanding of 
the  concept  has  led  some  writers  to  blur  the  distinction  between  the  ‘sustainable  use’  or 
‘sustainability’  of  natural  resources  and  ‘sustainable  development’,  using  the  terms 
interchangeably rather than viewing them as distinct yet intricately related entities.128
124 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December  1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Straddling Stocks Convention) (adopted August 4  1995, entered into force  11 
December 2001) (1995) 34 ILM  1542.
125 Case concerning the GabCikovo-Nagymaros Dam Project (Hungary v Slovakia)  [1997] ICJ Rep 7.
126 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 
Rome  1995. Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 670, 671.
127 Bowers op cit n  17 at  192,  192, Hanna and Munasinghe op cit n 23 at 5, and Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 
69 at land 5. See also T Zylicz,  ‘Economic Value and Policy Implications’  in A Nordgen  (ed), Science, Ethics, 
Sustainability:  The Responsibility of Science in Attaining Sustainable Development (Uppsala University,
Uppsala Sweden  1997) at  107.
128 For example Zylicz ibid.55
International environmental law is a little more helpful in defining the concept of ‘sustainable 
use’. In relation to biodiversity, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) describes it as 
‘...the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not 
lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential 
to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations’.129 
This  reflects  the  interpretations  outlined  above,  confirming  that  ‘sustainable  use’  embraces 
biological as well as social aspirations in the context of regulating natural resource use.
Within the international fisheries regime, however, there is reluctance to assign a meaning to 
the  term.  This  may  be  related  to  the  fact  that  the  effectiveness  of  traditionally-endorsed 
management  concepts  to  achieve  the  objective  of  ‘sustainable  use’,  such  as  maximum 
sustainable  yield,  are  disputed.130  As  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  key  international 
instrument regulating fisheries -  UNCLOS - does not expressly promote the objective of the 
‘sustainable use’  of marine fisheries.  Instead, it obliges  states to ensure the conservation of 
their coastal marine living resources and to promote their ‘optimum utilisation.’ Fish stocks in 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) are to be maintained or restored to levels that can produce 
the maximum sustainable yield as qualified by  ‘relevant’  environmental, economic and other 
factors.1 3 1   Noticeably, the otherwise conservatory,  biologically-based objective of maximum 
sustainable yield is thus tempered by the obligation to factor in a broad, potentially unlimited 
range  of socio-economic  considerations.  Coastal  states  are  further required  to establish  the 
total  allowable catch  for their EEZ fish  stocks.132 UNCLOS  articulates  these duties in  very 
broad  terms,  however,  and does  not define key  concepts  such  as  ‘optimum utilisation’  and 
‘conservation’.  Accordingly,  coastal  states  have  substantial  discretion  in  the  meanings  that
129 Article 2  ‘Use of terms’ Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) op cit n  118.
130 Cross-reference with pp 43-44 and 71.
1 31  Article 61(3) of UNCLOS op cit n 25. Cross-reference with p 45.
132 Article 62(1) and 61(1) respectively. See pp 45-49 for more on fisheries management within the EEZ.56
133 they assign to these key management concepts and in how they elect to fulfil their duties. 
This is bolstered by the fact that their EEZ fisheries management decisions are exempt from 
compulsory dispute settlement under UNCLOS.134 Thus,  while the over-arching objective of 
these provisions is the ‘sustainable use’ of coastal fisheries, it is largely up to individual states 
to interpret and realise this end as they see fit.
As mentioned above, the Straddling Stocks Convention expressly requires states to promote 
the sustainable use of fisheries resources.135 While its scope is limited to promoting the long­
term  conservation  and  ‘sustainable  use’  of straddling  and  highly  migratory  fish  stocks,  the 
Convention provides a useful insight into the objective of ‘sustainable use’ in marine fisheries 
generally.136  The  Convention  advocates  a  precautionary  approach  towards  this  end  and 
obliges parties to adopt management measures based on the best scientific data to ensure the 
‘long-term  sustainability’  and  optimal  utilisation  of highly  migratory  and  straddling  stocks 
and  to  take  measures  to  prevent  over-fishing  and  excess  fishing  capacity.137  As  with 
UNCLOS,  the  Straddling  Stocks  Convention  noticeably  does  not  define  its  key  terms, 
however, providing minimal insight into what is meant by ‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable use’  
and  more  specifically,  the  extent  to  which  their  ambit  extends  beyond  biological 
considerations to include social, economic and broader ecological factors.
Released in the same year as the Straddling Stocks Convention, the FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible  Fisheries  also  expressly  promotes  the  ‘sustainable  utilisation’  of  fishery
133 Churchill and Lowe op cit n 97 at 289 and S Kaye, International Fisheries Management (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, Netherlands 2001) at 100. See also A Platt McGinn,  ‘Rocking the Boat: Conserving 
Fisheries and Protecting Jobs’  Worldwatch Paper No  142 (Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC 1998) at 56, 
where it is noted that the fisheries conservation principles found in UNCLOS have been difficult to apply as the 
language and intent of the convention in this regard is unclear. Cross-reference with p 46.
134 UNCLOS op cit n 25 at art 297.3. Cross-reference with p  141.
135 Op cit n  124.
136 Straddling Stocks Convention op cit n  124 at art 2.
137 Ibid at arts 5(b),(c) and (g) and 6.57
resources.138  Developed  by  the  FAO,  which  plays  an  active  role  in  fostering  sustainable 
fisheries  management  in  its  quest to  promote  worldwide food  security,  this  voluntary code 
provides a framework for efforts to ensure the responsible, sustainable exploitation of living
139 marine  resources  and  to  promote  sustainable  development  in  fisheries.  It  specifically 
emphasises the need to prevent over-fishing and the use of excess fishing capacity.140 States 
are encouraged to pursue these objectives by adopting measures based on the best scientific 
evidence available that are designed to ensure the
‘...long-term sustainability of fishery resources at levels which promote the objective 
of  their  optimum  utilisation  and  maintain  their  availability  for  present  and  future 
generations; short term considerations should not compromise these objectives.’1 4 1  
‘Sustainable utilisation’  is not defined, nor is the meaning of  ‘sustainability’  clarified in the 
Code.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear from  the  above  quote  that  the  long-term  sustainable  use  of 
fisheries goes hand in hand with their optimal utilisation. Along with an express concern for 
inter-generational  equity,  this  indicates  an  understanding  of  ‘sustainable  use’  and 
‘sustainability’ that regards meeting human needs as an inherent component of these concepts. 
This is captured by the FAO’s express interest in promoting a
‘...shift  from  a  conventional  fishery  management  framework  (essentially  based  on 
biotechnical considerations) to a broader fisheries sustainability framework. This kind 
of  framework  represents  all  dimensions  of  fisheries  together  with  the  relevant 
dimensions  of  the  broader  social  and  economic  context  within  which  the  sector
i  142 operates  .
138 Op cit n 126. See for example the preface and general principle art 6.2.
139 Kaye op cit n  133 at 205, notes that the FAO has contributed significantly toward fisheries management at an 
international level via (inter alia) assisting in the operation of international fishery bodies, acting as a channel of 
discourse between international fisheries organisations, and functioning as a clearing-house to disseminate 
fisheries data worldwide.
140 FAO Code op cit n  126 at general principle art 6.3.
141 Ibid art 7.1.1  ‘Fisheries management’.
142 Preamble to Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Indicators for Sustainable Development of Marine 
Capture Fisheries (FAO, Rome 1999) at 3.58
The international fisheries regime thus clearly supports the conclusion  that in coastal  waters 
(as  well  as  the  high  seas)  the  concept  of  the  ‘sustainable  use’  of  fisheries  has  acquired 
sufficient ‘normative content’ to be used as a yardstick forjudging the permissibility of states’ 
natural resource exploitation.143
As  I  noted  above,  international  environmental  law  instruments  emerging  from  the  Rio 
Conference and in its wake were also explicit in their endorsement of the  ‘sustainable use’ of 
fisheries.  Agenda 21,  a framework programme of action  to implement the Rio Declaration, 
consists  of  forty  chapters  covering  a  range  of  issues.  Chapter  17  provides  an  integrated 
strategy to manage the oceans  and seas towards  sustainable development and advocates the 
‘protection,  rational  use  and  development’  of  their  living  resources.144  To  achieve  this,  it 
outlines ‘programme areas’ for marine and coastal management and development at domestic, 
regional and international levels.145 These include actions designed to achieve the sustainable 
use  and  conservation  of  marine  living  resources  within  the  high  seas  and  under  national 
jurisdiction.146  The  CBD,  which  was  adopted  at  Rio,  promotes  the  ‘sustainable  use’  of all 
biological diversity - on land and in the oceans. The Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal 
Biological  Diversity,  adopted  at  the  CBD’s  1995  Conference  of the  Parties,  is  particularly 
relevant to fisheries.147 One of its five thematic areas is the promotion of the conservation and 
long-term  sustainable  use  of marine  and  coastal  living  resources  in  a  manner that respects 
both  societal  interests  and  the  integrity  of ecosystems.148  Suggested  activities  to  this  end 
include the elimination of destructive fishing practices and the restoration and maintenance of
143 These conclusions are strongly supported by for example, the Straddling Stocks Convention (op cit n  124).
See Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 89.
144 Chapter 17 of Agenda 21  (op cit n 118)  ‘Protection of the Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, including Enclosed and 
Semi-enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of their Living 
Resources’.
145 Ibid at para  17.1.
146 Ibid at Programme Area C, paras  17.44 -  17.68 and Programme Area D, paras  17.69 -   17.95.
147 Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity adopted by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’s Conference of the Parties at its second meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, 6-17 November 1995.
148 See in particular Decision VII/5 of the Jakarta Mandate ibid.59
fisheries stocks to sustainable levels by the year 2015.149 Cumulatively, through their express 
emphasis on the sustainable use of marine fisheries and their articulation of concrete actions 
towards its realisation, the CBD and Agenda 21 made a significant contribution to raising the 
status  of this objective in  the  international  arena.  Their promotion  of the  sustainable use of 
natural  resources  was  no  doubt  influenced  by  the  fact  that  this  concept  is  one  of the  core 
components of sustainable development, the focus of the Rio Conference.
3.  The relationship between ‘sustainable use’ and ‘sustainable development’
‘Sustainable  use’  and  ‘development’  were first formally coupled at an international  level in 
the  World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development’s  1987  Report  (the  Brundtland 
Report),  giving  rise  to  the  concept  of  ‘sustainable  development’.150  At  the  subsequent  Rio 
Conference in 1992, the influence of sustainable development on the progressive development 
of international environmental law and policy received overwhelming endorsement. The ideal 
of sustainable development was reflected in the international  instruments that emerged from 
the Rio Conference and in almost all  of those concluded subsequently.  As  noted above, the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam case was particularly influential in this legal evolution in light of 
the  International  Court  of  Justice’s  express  endorsement  of  the  objective  of  sustainable 
development.1 5 1   While  there  is  debate  as  to  whether  sustainable  development  is  a  legal 
principle to which states can or should be held internationally accountable (as I revisit below), 
it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  case  nevertheless  rendered  states’  management  of  their 
domestic environments a ‘matter of international concern’ for the first time.152
149 Ibid at Programme element 2: Marine and coastal living resources, Operational objective 2.1  (h).
150 The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford  1987) (Brundtland Report).
15 1  Op cit n  125 at para  140.
152 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 85.60
In  simple terms,  sustainable development refers  to economic  development that  satisfies the 
constraints  of sustainability  while  ensuring that  both  the present  and future  generations are 
able  to  meet  their  needs.153  It  has  been  adopted  as  a  policy  by  numerous  governments 
worldwide  and  shapes  the  application  and  development  of international  law  and  policy.154 
While its content is clear, the understanding of its key elements and the envisaged interaction 
between them remain ambiguous, as do their specific  ‘normative implications’.155 Sustainable 
development is defined in the Brundtland Report as
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs’.156 
The Report identifies the two key elements of the concept as  ‘needs’, in particular those of the 
world’s  poor  ‘to  which  overriding  priority  should  be  given’,  and  the  ‘limitations’  of 
technology and social  organisation on the environment’s ability to meet these needs.157 This 
description  of sustainable development was subsequently fleshed out at the Rio Conference, 
in particular by the Rio Declaration  on Environment and Development,  which  maps out the 
main principles underpinning the ideal.158
The substantial  and procedural  components of sustainable development identified in the Rio 
Declaration are not new ideas in the international environmental legal arena, but were brought 
together in  a  succinct,  systematic  way  for the  first  time  in  the Declaration.159  In  total,  the 
Declaration  outlines  twenty-six  principles  of  sustainable  development.  The  procedural 
aspects,  which  are  necessary  to  foster  sustainable  development  at  a  national  level,  include
153 Brundtland Report op cit n  150 at 43 and Bowers op cit n  17 at  192 and 206.
154 Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 69 at 1   and Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 84.
155 Lafferty and Langhelle ibid, Bowers op cit n 16 at  192, D Pearce, A Markandya and BB Barbier (eds), 
Blueprint for a Green Economy (Earthscan Publications, London  1989) and Birnie and Boyle ibid at 85.
156 Brundtland Report op cit n  150 at 43.
157 Ibid.
158 This amplification was invaluable in light of the Brudtland Report’s  ‘inadequate and unhelpful prescription, 
which begs elaboration’  (Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 89).
159 Ibid at 86.61
environmental  impact  assessment  and  access  to  information.160  Numerous  substantive 
components  of  sustainable  development  are  identified;  below,  I  focus  on  those  that  are 
particularly relevant to my thesis.
The  ‘sustainable  use’  of  natural  resources  is  not  expressly  identified  as  a  principle  of 
sustainable development,  but principle 8 of the Rio Declaration calls  for states to  ‘...reduce 
and  eliminate  unsustainable  patterns  of  production  and  consumption’.  This  qualifies  the 
earlier  affirmation  that  ‘states  have...the  sovereign  right  to  exploit  their  own  resources 
pursuant  to  their  own  environmental  and  developmental  policies’.1 6 1   It  is  clear from  these 
principles that sustainable development necessarily involves limits on natural resource use, as 
does  the  overall  tenet  of  the  Declaration.  As  I  noted  above,  key  international  agreements 
signed at and post the Rio Conference also expressly endorse the concept of the  ‘sustainable 
use’ of natural resources.162
An  important  element  of  securing  the  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources  is  adopting  a 
precautionary approach.  This is necessary in  light of current scientific  uncertainty about the 
state  of  natural  living  resources,  particularly  fisheries;  it  is  increasingly  emphasised  in 
international  and  domestic  fisheries  policy  and  law  in  response  to  the  failure  of  fisheries 
management models and mechanisms to date to satisfactorily acknowledge and respond to the 
paucity of data on marine fisheries. The Rio Declaration endorses such an approach, requiring 
that
160 Op cit n  118 at principles  17 and  10 respectively.
161 Ibid at principle 2.
162 Ibid.62
‘[w]here  there  are  threats  of  serious  or  irreversible  damage,  lack  of full  scientific 
certainty  shall  not  be  used  as  a  reason  for  postponing  cost-effective  measures  to 
prevent environmental degradation.’163 
This  duty is  subject to the rider that states need only apply this  method  ‘according to their 
capabilities’.164  This  is  offset,  however,  by  the  Declaration’s  concern  with  addressing 
inequality in the existing international economic system. Specifically, it imposes a duty on all 
states to address the special interests and needs of developing countries and obliges them to 
cooperate to eradicate poverty. 165 Poverty-alleviation is regarded both as a means to achieve 
sustainable development - a  ‘precondition for environmentally sound development’  - and as 
an important end in itself.166 This emphasis on addressing inequality indicates the centrality of 
‘intra-generational equity’ to sustainable development. While this specific term is not used in 
the  Declaration,  it promotes  the  overall  concept,  as  do  the  Brundtland Report  and  Agenda 
21.167
Related, but concerned with equity between rather than within generations, is the concept of 
inter-generational  equity.  Couched  as  a  qualifying  factor  to  the  right  to  development,  it is 
endorsed in principle 3  as  ‘equitably meeting the developmental  and environmental needs of 
present  and  future  generations’.  The  theory  of  inter-generational  equity  requires  each 
generation  to use  and develop its  natural  and cultural  heritage in  such  a way that it can be 
passed  on  to  subsequent  generations  in  ‘no  worse’  condition  that  it  was  received.168  The 
significance of inter-generational equity as a core component of sustainable development was 
emphasised by the  Brundtland Report’s  definition  (quoted above)  and is  echoed by  various 
writers, although they disagree about the exact content of the heritage that must be passed on
163 Ibid at principle 15.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid at principles 6 and 5 respectively.
166 Brundtland Report op cit n  150 at 69 and 8.
167 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 91.
168 Ibid at 89.63
to  the  next  generation.169  This  emphasis  on  equity,  both  between  and  within  different 
generations,  arguably  distinguishes  sustainable  development  from  the  traditional 
understanding  of the  concept  of  ‘sustainable  use’  or  ‘sustainability’.  It  raises  the  issue  of 
whether  the  transition  from  the  conservation-inspired  objective  of  ‘sustainable  use’  to  the 
multi-faceted  ideal  of  ‘sustainable  development’  has  marginalised  the  importance  of 
ecological concerns by emphasising human socio-economic needs. Supporters of the  ‘strong’ 
approach to sustainable development (which I discuss below) support this interpretation.
A final key element of sustainable development is the integration of environmental protection 
and development. A common thread in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21,  ‘integration’  has 
become an intrinsic feature of international environmental regulation and numerous domestic 
regimes, including the EU. Within the Community, compliance with the Treaty obligation to 
integrate environmental concerns into all sectors, including fisheries, continues to prove vital 
yet problematic, as I discuss in chapter 5 below.170 Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration explains 
the concept of integration -
‘in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute 
an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from 
it.’
How  to  achieve  a  balance  between  these  competing  values  is  the  ultimate  challenge;  it  is 
largely left to national  determination. It is imperative that this balance is found, however, as 
the  effective  realisation  of  integration  between  environmental  needs  and  other  competing 
development  priorities  lies  at  the  heart  of  achieving  sustainable  development.1 7 1   While 
achieving this balance may seem to be an ideal that is incapable of realisation, all  states are
169 Such as Pearce, Markandya and Barbier op cit n  155 and A Asheim,  ‘Economic Analysis of Sustainability’ in 
Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 69.
170 Article 6 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)
[2002] OJ C325/01. Cross-reference with pp  118-124.
171
Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 85.bound  to  make  efforts  to  get  as  close  to  its  achievement  as  practicable.  The  World 
Commission  on  Environment  and Development  anticipated  the  difficulty  that  states  would 
experience in adjusting their policies and actions towards achieving sustainable development; 
in  the  Brundtland  Report  it  thus  proposed  the  establishment  of  an  international  ‘charter’ 
prescribing  new  norms  for  state  and  inter-state  behaviour  to  guide  governments  in  the 
transition to sustainable development.172 The idea of developing an  ‘Earth Charter’  was first 
introduced in  1992 at  the Rio Conference;  it was subsequently revitalised as  a civil  society 
initiative under the guidance of an independent Earth Charter commission in 1994. Following 
extensive international consultation and numerous re-drafting, the Earth Charter was officially 
launched  by  the  commission  in  2000  at  a  meeting  held  at  the  United  Nations  Education, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) headquarters. The Charter presents sixteen 
principles to guide the establishment of a global  ‘partnership’  towards  attaining sustainable 
development,  offering  a  viable  alternative  (yet  complementary)  framework  to  that  of  the
| n 'l
international legal regime in pursuing sustainability goals.  I discuss the Earth Charter and 
the key role that it can play towards the achievement of sustainable (fisheries) development in 
greater detail in chapter 9.174
The  way  in  which  the  concept  of  ‘sustainable  development’  is  to  be  understood  and 
operationalised has received a lot of attention in the literature.175  As noted above, at heart it 
involves  a  merging  of  development  and  environmental  protection.  Economic  growth  is  a 
central  element  of  development  and  is  thus  a  key  aspect  of  sustainable  development.176 
However, economic policies that are concerned only with  increasing gross national product
172 Article 80, 85 and 86 at  122,  123 of UN General Assembly Document A/42/427  ‘Development and 
International Economic Cooperation: Environment Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development Note by the Secretary-General’ (1987).
173 For more on the content of the Earth Charter, see pp 246-248.
174 Ibid.
175 See for example Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 69 at  1 6 -2 2  and Zylicz op cit n  127 at  108,  109.
176 Ibid and Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 44.65
per capital run the risk of side-lining environmental concerns. Economic growth that promotes 
‘sustainable  development’  should  instead  take  due  cognisance  of  environmental  matters. 
Arguably,  sustainable  development  is  ultimately  about  achieving  equity  in  the  economic 
system both between  and within generations; it is concerned with the  ‘re-orientation’  of the 
world’s  economic  system  to  ensure  a  better  distribution  of  economic  and  environmental 
benefits  and  burdens.  One  part  of  this  involves  requiring  the  burden  of  environmental 
protection to fall more heavily on the shoulders of the more economically-advanced states, as 
reflected by the concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.177 Another part is to 
assign  suitable  economic  values  to  environmental  processes  or  ‘services’  and  natural 
resources  rather  than  to  regard  them  as  ‘free  goods’,  and  to  incorporate  these  values  into
178 economic  policies  and  planning.  However,  assigning  economic  values  to  environmental 
services and resources that are not mediated through market transactions,  such as the ozone 
layer or mangrove swamps, is difficult if not impossible in practice. An alternative may be to 
place  constraints  on  economic  activities  in  the  form  of  environmental  standards,  such  as 
discharge  and  stock  standards.179  This  would  dispense  with  the  need  to  value  the 
environmental effects of economic activities as instead, the costs of ensuring the sustainability 
of the resource or environmental service in question would be reflected in either the economic 
benefits  that  are  forgone  (if the  economic  activity cannot  go  ahead)  or the  additional  costs 
incurred in meeting the required standards.180
The  partner to  this  economic  growth  is  what  the  Brundtland  Report  refers  to  as  ‘physical 
sustainability’, namely that at minimum the natural systems that support life on earth (such as 
the atmosphere, water and soil) must not be endangered.18 1  According to the Report, ‘physical
177 Outlined in principle 7 of the Rio Declaration op cit n  118. See Birnie and Boyle ibid at 45.
178 Pearce, Markandya and Barbier op cit n  155 at 5-7.
179 Bowers op cit n  17 at  197,198.
180 Ibid at  199,201.
181 Ibid at 43,45.66
sustainability’  can only be achieved if development policies embrace the need for equity by 
promoting (inter alia) equitable access to resources and fair distribution of costs and benefits. 
Accordingly,  even  the  narrowest  view  of  sustainable  development  as  comprising  only
‘physical  sustainability’  necessarily  includes  considerations  of  social  justice  between  and
18^ within generations.  "
‘Sustainable  development’  is  undeniably  focused  on  meeting  human  needs;  its 
anthropocentric bias is evident in both the Brundtland Report and in the Rio Declaration. The 
latter explicitly  confirms  this,  stating  that  ‘human  beings  are  at  the  centre  of concerns  for 
sustainable  development’.183  Given  that  sustainable  development  is  at  core  an  on-going 
balancing of development goals with environmental concerns, however, there is considerable 
debate as to whether there is an inherent hierarchy of values in the concept. Specifically, the 
question is whether,  given  the human-centred nature of sustainable development, it requires 
human  needs  and  social  equity  to  necessarily  trump  ecological  sustainability  (‘physical 
sustainability’) should the two clash in a particular policy decision.
The  various  opinions  expressed  in  the  literature  tend  to  reflect  whether  writers  support  a 
‘strong’  or ‘weak’  view of sustainable development. These two divergent approaches arise in 
the  context  of  examining  the  inter-generational  element  of  sustainable  development, 
specifically the exact nature of the  ‘heritage’  that is to be passed on  from  present to future 
generations.  ‘Weak’  sustainable  development  requires  simply  that  the  current  generation
182 Ibid and Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 69 at 8, 9.
183 Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration op cit n  118 See also Wetlesen,  ‘A Global Ethic of Sustainability?’ in 
Lafferty and Langhelle ibid at 36, 37. See also W Haland,  ‘On Needs -  a Central Concept in the Brundtland 
Report’ in Lafferty and Langhelle. This is, however, challenged by the Earth Charter, which arguably adds an 
additional  ‘ethical’ element to sustainable development, namely inter-species equity or justice (particularly 
through its principles  1-4 and 5-8), thereby challenging the idea that the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development should be humans; instead, its should be the  ‘community of life’ or the  ‘planetary ecosystem’  (K 
Bosselmann  ‘In Search for Global Law: The Significance of the Earth Charter’ (2004) 8 (1) World Views: 
Environment, Culture, Religion 62-75 ). I discuss this later in greater detail at pp 245 and 246.67
leaves the subsequent generation at least as much  ‘capital wealth’ as it inherited. This bequest 
can  comprise  a  mixture  of  man-made  capital  and  natural  capital  (the  stock  of  natural 
environmental  assets).  Supporters  of this  approach  argue  that  most  ‘natural’  capital  can be 
substituted  by  man-made  capital  and  it  thus  does  not  matter to  what  extent  environmental 
assets are depleted as long as they can be adequately substituted;  maintaining the aggregate
1   0,4
quantity of ‘capital wealth’ is what that matters, not its composition.  Seen in this light, it is 
imperative  that  environment  and  natural  resources  are  valued  ‘properly’  if  sustainable
1  RS development is to be achieved.  Provided that this is the case, human needs and social equity 
are of paramount importance and can potentially trump environmental protection.
On the other hand, environmental conservation  dominates the theory of  ‘strong’  sustainable 
development.186  It  requires  that  the  stock  of  environmental  assets  (natural  capital)  is 
maintained at the  same level  as between  generations.  Stocks  of both  natural  and man-made 
capital per capita must thus not decrease from one generation to another; the accumulation of 
man-made goods cannot compensate for the diminished availability of natural capital. This is 
based on the rationale that many environmental functions cannot be substituted by man-made 
capital;  even  if they can  in  the short-term, uncertainty often remains  as  to whether they are 
truly suited to substitution in  the long-run. Taken to its extreme,  this  approach requires that 
non-renewable natural resources should not be exploited even if they have no economic value 
and  their  exploitation  would  not  harm  the  environment.187  In  practice,  however,  many 
supporters of ‘strong’  sustainability take a less radical  stance and accept that non-renewable 
resources can be exploited as long as their use is compensated by the accumulation of suitable 
renewable resources.188
184 Ibid and Pearce, Markandya and Barbier op cit n  155 at 3 and 48.
185 Pearce, Markandya and Barbier ibid.
186 Asheim op cit n  169 at  164.
187 Ibid at  165 and Zylicz op cit n  127 at 108.
188 Asheim ibid.68
Ideally, however, a situation that demands weighing up human versus environmental concerns 
should not arise in the first place. In pursuit of true ‘integration’, policy-makers should instead 
always exclude ‘development paths’ that do not take both ecological sustainability and human 
equity equally into account -
‘sustainable  development  defines  both  a  development  path  and  the  scope  or  limits 
within  which  this  development  should  occur.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  just  any 
development,  but  a  desired  development  which  fulfils  certain  conditions  of 
sustainability’.189
While this  might appear to be an  attempt to side-step a thorny issue,  it is perhaps  the most 
honest  explanation  that  can  be  offered.  As  writers  Birnie  and  Boyle  conclude,  while  the 
concept of ‘integration’ is no panacea, it is most likely the best means to attempt to achieve an 
acceptable  balance  between  environmental  protection  and  competing  human  development 
needs.190
Sustainable development clearly requires political action in order to be realised. Governments 
need to decide on a clear ‘sustainable development path’ that meets the criteria outlined above 
and to implement suitable policies in all sectors towards this end.19 1  This necessitates making 
difficult  social,  political  and  economic  decisions.  Arguably,  choices  will  ultimately  be 
determined by national needs and interests, underpinned by subjective value judgements. This 
is  likely  to  result  in  a  diverse  range  of  domestic  governmental  policies  in  pursuit  of
192 sustainable development.  As noted earlier, there is no definitive yardstick against which to 
measure  these  policies  at  an  international  level  in  order  to  determine  which  states’  
development  fall  short  of being  ‘sustainable’.  This  supports  the  view  that  the  principle  of
189 O Langhelle,  ‘Nature, Market and Ignorance: Can Development be Managed?’  in Lafferty and Langhelle op 
cit n 65 at  111  and Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 65 at  13. See also Haland op cit n  183 at 53.
190 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 8 7 .1 discuss the importance of integration in the context of the EU later at pp 
116-124.
1 9 1  Lafferty and Langhelle op cit n 69 at  17.
192 Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 47.69
‘sustainable development’ is primarily intended to be applied and achieved at a national level 
by individual  governments rather than  as  a legal  principle to  which  governments  should be 
held  to  account  at  an  international  level.  The  role  of the  United  Nations  Commission  on 
Sustainable Development arguably verifies this contention -  its mandate is simply to review 
progress  and facilitate the implementation  of Agenda 21  and the Rio Declaration;  it has no 
authority  to  pass  judgement  on  whether  particular  development  efforts  are  sustainable  or 
not.193  Given  that  it  is  up  to  individual  governments  to  determine  how  best  to  pursue 
sustainable development nationally, it is necessary to examine how they might go about this 
in their fisheries sectors.
The FAO has produced a set of guidelines to assist national  governments towards achieving 
sustainable fisheries development. It cites objectives of sustainable fisheries development as 
including sustainable harvesting and processing activities, ensuring the long-term viability of 
fishery resources,  promoting the well-being of fishers  within  both  their community and the 
wider economic context, and maintaining the health and integrity of the marine ecosystems.194 
The  guidelines  advocate  the  use  of a  system  of indicators  in  monitoring  progress  towards 
these goals and offer suggestions on what indicators can be used.195 Simply put, sustainability 
indicators assist in assessing the performance of fisheries policies and management in relation 
to  sustainable  development  objectives.  They  also  act  as  stimuli  for  action  to  achieve  these 
objectives, assisting fisheries managers in determining what measures should be implemented 
to restore or maintain the sustainability status of the fishery concerned. Indicators thus operate 
as  a  ‘bridge’  between  sustainable development objectives  and management action.196 To be
193 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development website
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd_mandate.htm> accessed  1  July 2006. See also Birnie and Boyle ibid at 
85.
194 FAO op cit n  142 at para  1.2.
195 With the particular aim of fostering the implementation of the FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible 
Fisheries (op cit n  126).
196 FAO op cit n  142 at para  1.3 and A Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems (Blackwell Science, Oxford 2001) 
at  190-197.70
effective, they must be organised within a framework that represents the various ‘dimensions’ 
of sustainable development. This may simply entail subdividing sustainable development into 
its  human  and environment  dimensions,  or the  dimensions  may be  based  on  definitions of 
sustainable  development.  The FAO  guidelines  outline  a comprehensive  set of indicators in 
relation  to  dimensions  that  are  derived  from  the  FAO’s  definition  of  ‘sustainable 
development’,  namely  the  economic,  social,  environmental  (ecosystem/resource)  and 
institutional/governance  realms.197  Suggested  indicators  in  the  ‘environmental’  dimension 
include the catch structure (examining the types of species caught and their size), the quality 
of critical habitats and fishing pressure in different geographical  locations. Indicators for the 
economic component include the profitability of the fishery  and the existence and effect of 
subsidies, while in the social dimension, employment figures are a key indicator. Regarding 
the governance  component,  the capacity  to  manage  a  fishery  (from  a human,  financial  and 
institutional  perspective)  and the state of the compliance regime concerning that fishery are
1  O R important indicators.
Ultimately,  the  extent  to  which  the  sustainable  use  of  fisheries  resources  and  sustainable 
development  in  fisheries  is  effectively  fostered  is  strongly  influenced  by  the  fisheries 
management policy that is in place. I now turn to discuss this issue.
4.  Sustainable fisheries management
It is clear from the discussion so far in this chapter that the dividing line between the concepts 
of  ‘sustainable  development’  and  ‘sustainable  use’  is  by  no  means  clear  and  is  frequently 
blurred by  law  and policy  alike.  In  academic  and  scientific  literature,  the two concepts  are 
often used inter-changeably or are merged into the single objective of a ‘sustainable fishery’.
197 Ibid at for example paras 2.2 and 2.3. See also definition of ‘dimensions’ in Annex  1   Glossary.
198 Ibid at annex 4.71
The vagueness of important terminology and the inconsistency with which key terms are used 
can be confusing and so it is useful at this point to take stock of the meanings and relationship 
between these concepts.  Sustainable development is the broader of the two and operates as an 
over-arching objective;  ‘sustainable use’ is an essential element of and step towards this goal. 
Simply put,  ‘sustainable use’ advocates the rational use of natural resources towards ensuring 
their long-term  ‘sustainability’. In current legal regimes sustainable use is no longer regarded 
as  an  ultimate  objective  in  itself;  it  is  coupled  with  the  need  to  foster  socio-economic 
development  and  must  thus  be  pursued  within  the  framework  and  towards  the  goal  of 
sustainable development. To talk of the  ‘sustainable use’  of fisheries resources or the pursuit 
of  ‘sustainable’  fisheries  is  thus  not  synonymous  with  discussing  the  furtherance  of 
sustainable  development  in  fisheries  (or  ‘sustainable  fisheries  development’),  but  both  are 
inherently part of a progressive movement towards this broader end. In sum, it seems safe to 
say that the modem over-riding objective that guides fisheries managers at a national level is 
that fisheries must be managed and used in a way that ensures their long-term sustainability 
towards the ultimate goal of sustainable fisheries development.
Various  writers  talk  about  the  goal  of  a  ‘sustainable  fishery’.  Below,  I  spend  some  time 
briefly discussing this concept and how it might be achieved. Firstly, it is necessary to define 
what  is  meant  by  a  ‘fishery’.  A  variety  of  definitions  exist,  ranging  from  narrow  bio- 
ecological  meanings to broader multi-dimensional  explanations.  An  example of the latter is 
‘the  range  of  activities  related  to  the  exploitation  of  a  single  stock  or  a  group  of  stocks 
subjected to joint harvesting’.199 This  can  be expanded to describe  a fishery as  a system of 
interacting  ecological,  biophysical,  economic,  social  and  cultural  components.  Key
199 D Greboval and G Munro,  ‘Overcapitalisation and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries: Underlying 
Economics and Methods of Control’  in D Greboval, (ed) Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on 
Underlying Concepts and Issues FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 386 (FAO, Rome  1999) at para 4.2. In the 
narrow sense, it may refer to a group of fish species, a physical fishing area, or to the ‘area where fishing occurs 
and the mix of species captured’  ( Platt McGinn op cit n  133 at fn 7).72
components  of  a  fishery  are  thus  the  natural  system  (fish,  ecosystem,  and  biophysical 
environment),  the  human  system  (including  fishers,  fishing  communities,  the  post-harvest 
community, and the social, economic and cultural environment), and the fishery management 
system  (comprising  fisheries  policy  and  planning,  management,  development  and 
research).200  This  broad  understanding  of  a  ‘fishery’  is  most  commonly  used  in  modem 
literature on fisheries management.201  It thus does not make sense to talk of the  ‘sustainable 
use’ of a fishery, but its ‘sustainability’; as noted above, ‘sustainable use’ is subsumed into the 
broader concept  of  ‘sustainability’.  Maximum  sustainable  yield is  promoted  as  the  primary 
objective  of  a  ‘sustainable  fishery’  and  is  endorsed  as  such  in  UNCLOS.  Yet  as  I  have 
explained, it is a somewhat discredited concept that has contributed little to the achievement 
of  sustainability  to  date.202  As  evidence  of  the  problems  with  the  concept  of  maximum 
sustainable yield unfolded, the perception of ‘sustainability’  at a fisheries management level 
began  to change,  expanding over time  to  include  various  socio-economic  factors  within  its 
ambit.  Thus,  while  there  is  still  much  debate  about  what exactly constitutes  a  ‘sustainable’ 
fishery, it is now generally accepted that it is concerned not only with the biological status of 
the  fishery  in  question,  but  also  the  state  of its  broader economic,  social  and  institutional 
aspects.  ‘Sustainable  fishing’  can  thus  be  taken  to  refer  to  fishing  activities  that  do not 
result  in  ‘undesirable  changes’  in  the  biological  or economic  productivity  of a  fishery,  its 
biological  diversity,  or its  ecosystem  structure  and functioning in  a manner that  ‘forecloses 
options for future generations’.204
200 Charles op cit n  196 at  1, 3 and  10.
2 0 1T Pitcher and D Pauly,  ‘Rebuilding Ecosystems, not Sustainability, as the Proper Goal of Fishery 
Management’ in Pitcher, Hart and Pauly op cit n 121  at 312.
202 See pp 42 and 43. See also Churchill and Lowe op cit n 97 at 282 and Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op 
cit n 74 at 98-100.
203 Charles op cit n  196 at 186 and C Deere, Net Gains: Linking Fisheries Management,  International Trade and 
Sustainable Development (IUCN, Cambridge 2000) at 20.
204 National Research Council (US) Committee on Ecosystem Management for Sustainable Marine Fisheries, 
Sustaining Marine Fisheries (National Academy Press, Washington DC  1999) at  14.73
4.1  The components of a ‘sustainable fishery’
There  is  general  consensus  that  a  ‘sustainable  fishery’  comprises  four broad  components, 
namely ecological sustainability, socio-economic sustainability, community sustainability and 
institutional  sustainability.205  Overall  sustainability  of the  fishery  is  attained  when  all  four 
components  are  simultaneously  achieved.206  Institutional  sustainability,  which  is  achieved 
when there is long-term financial, administrative and organisational capability in a fishery, is 
a prerequisite for achieving the other three components. In particular, the policy measures and
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rules by which the fishery is managed significantly impact all of its other facets.  Ecological 
sustainability  is  attained  if  sustainable  harvesting  levels  of  target  and  related  species  are 
ensured  and  the  health  of  the  ecosystem  is  maintained.  This  component  has  historically 
received  the  greatest  attention  in  fisheries  management  and  is  analogous  to  the  traditional 
understanding of the concept of ‘sustainable use’  (although broader ecological concerns were 
not  initially  included  in  its  ambit).  To  ensure  the  socio-economic  and  community 
sustainability of a fishery,  the long-term  socio-economic  welfare  of all  fishery participants 
must be  secured  and  the  cohesiveness,  welfare  and health  of fishing  communities  must be 
maintained.208  In  a  similar  manner  to  that  of  the  FAO  (described  above),  writers  have 
suggested  indictors  to  measure  the  extent  of sustainability  in  each  of these  ‘sustainability 
components’  of the  fishery.  Indicators  of ecological  sustainability  include catch  level,  fish 
size  and  environmental  quality,  while  community  resiliency  (indicated  by  diversity  in 
employment),  equity  and  food  supply  are  indicators  of  socio-economic  or  community
205 Charles op cit n 196 at 188 and S Cunningham and J-J Maguire,  ‘Factors of Unsustainability in Fisheries’ 
Discussion Paper 1  in Greboval, D (comp), Report and Documentation of the International Workshop on Factors 
Contributing to Unsustainability and Overexploitation in Fisheries, Bangkok,  Thailand, 4-8 February 2002 FAO 
Fisheries Report No 672 (FAO, Rome 2002) at 54. See also N Haggan,  ‘Reinventing the Tree: Reflections on the 
Organic Growth and Creative Pruning of Fisheries Management Structures’  in Pitcher and Pauly op cit n 201  at 
26 on the author’s suggested essential elements of a sustainable fishery.
206 Charles ibid at 190.
207 Ibid at 189.
208 Ibid at 188.74
sustainability.  Institutional  sustainability  indicators  include  management  effectiveness, 
capacity-building and institutional viability.209
Both the sustainability and sustainable development of a fishery are strongly influenced by the 
fisheries  management  arrangement  that  regulate  it.210  The  most  common  management 
methods currently used in fisheries (often in combination) are output controls, input controls 
and technical conservation measures. I examine the potential impact of these methods on  a 
fishery’s sustainability below.
4.2  The role of fisheries management methods
While unsustainability can  arise  in  an  unexploited fishery due  to natural  stock fluctuations 
caused by changes  in  the broader ecological context or adverse impacts  on marine habitats 
from  non-fishing  human  activities  (such  as  coastal  developments),  the  likelihood  of 
unsustainability becomes higher once exploitation begins.211 The greater the exploitation, the 
higher  the  chances  of  unsustainability;  there  is  accordingly  a  strong  relationship  between 
over-exploitation  and  unsustainability.212  The  sustainability  of  a  fishery  can,  however,  be 
fostered by  appropriate  management  measures.  These  are  generally  adopted  at  a  domestic 
level  as  part  of  a  national  fisheries  management  policy  and  are  implemented  in  national 
waters  and on  vessels  registered in  the coastal  state  that  fish  beyond national jurisdiction. 
Vessels fishing in the waters of other coastal states must comply with the fisheries laws and 
regulations  of  these  states.  Bilaterally,  appropriate  measures  should  be  incorporated  into 
fisheries  access  arrangements  to ensure the  sustainable exploitation  of fisheries  targeted by
209 Ibid at 194,  195
210 Ibid at 58.
211 Ibid at 55, 56.
212 Ibid at 57.75
foreign  fleets  in  other  coastal  states’  waters.  Ideally,  these  should  be  dove-tailed  with  the 
domestic fisheries management regime of the coastal states in question.
One of the  most prevalent management techniques  is  ‘output controls’,  that is  measures to 
control  the  physical  output  of  a  fishery  (the  amount  of  fish  extracted).  Most  commonly, 
governments set annual total allowable catches (TACs) for particular species on the basis of 
scientific advice (usually based on maximum sustainable yield). Portions of the TAC are then 
allocated  to  individuals  or  vessels  in  the  form  of  quotas.  Output  controls  address  a  key 
fisheries management difficulty arising from their common resource nature, namely how to 
regulate the level of extraction from a fishery.213 As they do not regulate access to the fishery, 
however, they are usually paired with input controls, which specifically address this matter.214 
Output controls have the potential to hamper progress towards the sustainable use of fisheries 
and their use must thus be carefully controlled and monitored.
A fundamental problem with employing output controls to promote sustainable fishing is the 
incompleteness, uncertainty and subsequent lack of reliability of the scientific data on which 
TACs  are  frequently  based.215  Insufficient  understanding  about  the  dynamic  nature  of fish 
stocks, the complexity of the ecosystems within which they are found and the true impact of 
fishing  on  stocks  give  rise  to  this  problem.  This  stems  from  the  related  scientific 
weaknesses of the maximum sustainable yield model on which TACs are based, as discussed
213 Cross-reference with p 75.
214 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ‘Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change’ 
in FAO, State of Food and Agriculture (FAO, Rome 2002) at 63.
215 A Karagiannakos,  ‘Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and Quota Management System in the European Union’ 
(1996) 20 Marine Policy 235 -  248 at 236, F Foders, Reforming the European  Union’s Common Fisheries 
Policy: Issues in Conservation and Policy Options (European Policy Forum Ltd, England  1994) at 17 and C 
Coffey, Sustainable Development and the EC Fisheries Sector: An Introduction to the Issues (Institute for 
European Environmental Policy, London 1999) at 38, 39. See also Cunningham and Maguire op cit n 205 at 65 -  
67. UR Sumaila,  ‘Protected Marine Areas as Hedge against Uncertainty: An Economist’s Perspective’ in Pitcher, 
Hart and Pauly op cit n 201  at 304, Charles op cit n 196 at 203 and C Walters,  ‘Designing Fisheries Management 
Systems that Do not Depend upon Accurate Stock Assessment’ in Pitcher, Pauly and Hart op cit n 201  at 284.
216 Sumaila ibid at 305 and Kaye op cit n 133 at 165.76
in chapter 2.217 Furthermore, the scientific bases of most TACs are inherently flawed as the 
method focuses on single species stock assessments. This fails to take account of the fact that 
many TAC species are found in mixed fisheries  and their status is thus inherently linked to 
that of the other species in the fishery; the concept of maximum sustainable yield suffers from 
a  similar  problem.218  These  issues  are  exacerbated  in  developing  countries  where 
governments  frequently  lack  the  necessary  technical  and  financial  resources  to  conduct 
comprehensive scientific research and to analyse and apply its findings. In all fishing nations, 
however, it is alleged that scientific advice is in any event often not heeded by policy-makers,
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who instead succumb to political pressure to set TACs above ideal levels.
Clearly,  a  broader,  more  ecologically-based  approach  is  required  to  ensure  that  output 
controls foster rather than  impede sustainable fishing.  This  necessitates  improved scientific 
knowledge  of  stocks  and  marine  ecosystems  generally  and  an  increased  emphasis  on  a 
precautionary approach to setting TACs.220 A precautionary approach requires that a lack of 
scientific  certainty  is  not  used  as  a  reason  to  postpone  or  fail  to  take  conservation  and
9 9 1
management measures  to conserve target and other species  or the  environment.  Such an 
approach is endorsed by the Rio Declaration, implied in UNCLOS  and explicitly advocated 
by  the  subsequent  Straddling  Stocks  Convention,  which,  as  I  noted  earlier,  spells  out  its 
application  in the context of marine fisheries management.222 This  has  significant potential
217 Cross-reference with p 43.
218 See for example CD Payne,  ‘Policy-Making in Nested Institutions: Explaining the Conservation Failure of the 
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 303-24 at 319, Coffey op cit n 
215 at 47 and Karagiannakos op cit n 215 at 237. Cross-reference ibid.
2,9 Churchill and Lowe op cit n 97 at 322, Birnie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 121  and 654, Sutton op cit n 121  at 
127, Payne ibid at 217, Karagiannakos ibid at 214 and Foders op cit n 215 at 18.
220 Churchill and Lowe ibid at 322, Birnie and Boyle ibid at 654 and Coffey op cit n 215 at 39.
221 Derived from principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (op cit n  118) and art 6(2) of the Straddling Stocks 
Convention (op cit n  124). See also art 3(i)  ‘definitions’ in Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/02 of 31 December 
2002 OJ L358/59 and Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission on the 
Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy “Roadmap”’ (Roadmap Communication) COM (2002)  181 final at para 
1.1. For a discussion of the contents of the precautionary approach, see Birnie and Boyle ibid at 115-121.
222 Article 6 of the Straddling Stocks Convention (ibid). See also Birnie and Boyle ibid at 117,118 and  120,  121.77
implications for national governments when setting their TACs and determining the existence 
(or not) of surplus stocks in their coastal waters.
A further key problem with output controls is that they tend to exacerbate discarding, a major 
problem in modem fisheries.223 Discards are marine resources that are caught but immediately 
returned to the sea either because they are non-targeted species (by-catch discards) or they are 
in excess of quota limits or below the minimum landing size (quota discards).224 Discarding
225 runs counter to sustainable use primarily because it is a waste of natural resources.  It can 
also cause conflict between different user groups. This most commonly arises when discards 
by the industrial sector include species that are targeted by small-scale or artisanal users.226 As 
I discuss later in  this  thesis, the EU’s fishing in  Senegalese waters provides an example of 
such problems.
The use of TACs and quotas arguably fosters high levels of discards as they encourage fishers 
to abandon excess-quota fish in order to comply with regulations and to maximise the value of 
their catch.227 Progress in  fisheries technology designed to increase the quantity rather than 
the quality of the catch, together with market forces that are value-biased in favour of certain 
target species, further encourage discarding.228 Particularly problematic is that the full extent 
of  discards  is  rarely  reported,  with  the  result  that  management  measures  are  based  on
223 It is estimated that discards of fish (excluding other marine resources) amount to nearly one third of annual 
marine catch. See Churchill and Lowe op cit n 97 at 322 and Platt McGinn op cit n  133 at 21.
224 M Holden, The Common Fisheries Policy (Fishing New Books, Oxford  1994) at 75,  199, Coffey op cit n 215 
at 5 and K Crean and D Symes,  ‘The Discards Problem: Towards a European Solution’ (1994)  18 Marine Policy 
422 -4 3 4  at 423.
225 Crean and Symes ibid at 422 and Holden ibid at 199.
226 Crean and Symes ibid.
227 Ibid at 424-427, Karagiannakos op cit n 215 at 245 and 246, Foders op cit n 215 at 18, Charles op cit n 196 at 
297and Cunningham and Maguire op cit n 205 at 71.
228 Crean and Symes op cit n 224 at 424 -  427.78
inaccurate stock extraction statistics.229 A ban on discards, requiring all harvested material to 
be landed, is a possible solution, but would only be successful if it was adequately enforced 
and used in combination with effective gear regulations. 230 Most output controls are paired
231 with measures designed to minimise discards, such as by-catch limits.
There is  some  support for the idea that individual  transferable  quotas  (ITQs) could help to
232 eliminate the adverse impacts of output controls on fisheries’ sustainability.  ITQs, as noted 
in chapter 2, aim to reduce over-capitalisation  and thereby improve the economic efficiency 
of  the  fishing  fleet  by  redistributing  fishing  quotas  from  less  to  more  profitable  fishing 
enterprises via the price mechanisms of the quota market.233 This in turn fosters the economic 
efficiency of the fishery. Nevertheless, the contribution of ITQs to the overall sustainability of 
fisheries  is  questioned.  Some  writers  argue  that  they  promote  stock  conservation  as  quota 
holders have a vested interest in the sustainability of the stock due to their status as property 
rights holders.234 Others, however, refute this. They emphasise that ITQs do not confer ‘real 
control’ over the resource, but merely a right to a flow of fishery resources. Accordingly, the 
usual difficulties in ensuring the conservation  of a common resource remain.235 In  addition, 
ITQs may contribute  to  an  increase  in  discarding.  Arguably,  fishers  who  have  paid  a high 
market price for quotas are driven to maximize their revenue by methods that likely include
229 Karagiannakos op cit n 215 at 245 and K Truelove,  ‘Australia: Policy options for Fisheries Bycatch’ in 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Issue 
Papers OECD/ GD (97) 54 (OECD, Paris  1997) at para 2.2.
230 Crean and Symes op cit n 224 at 423,428, National Research Council USA op cit n 204 at 81-84, Truelove 
ibid at para 2.1.3 and A Karagiannakos, Fisheries Management in the European Union (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
Avebury England  1995) at 427.
231 Karagiannakos ibid at 430 -  432.
232 Countries that have adopted individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems include New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, Iceland and the Netherlands. M Milazzo,  ‘Subsidies in World Fisheries: A Re-Examination’ World 
Bank Technical Paper No 406 Fisheries Series (World Bank, Washington DC  1998) at 6 suggests that ITQs have 
contributed towards  ‘significant progress’ in effective fisheries management in these countries.
233 Symes and Crean op cit n  105 at  176,  180, Davidse, McEwan and Vestergaard op cit n 105 at 539 and JD 
Wingard,  ‘Community Transferable Quotas: Internalising Externalities and Minimising Social Impacts of 
Fisheries Management’ (2000) 59 Human Organisation 48-57 at 48,49. See also Platt McGinn op cit n  133 at 
63, and Greboval and Munro op cit n  199 at 32. Cross-reference with p 48, 49.
234 Wingard ibid at 49, 50 and Platt McGinn ibid at 66.
235 Symes and Crean op cit n 105 at 182 and Charles op cit n 196. Cross-reference with p 49.79
discarding.236 The social dimension of sustainable fisheries may also be adversely affected by 
ITQs as they tend to concentrate harvesting rights in the hands of a few fishing companies to
237 the detriment of small-scale fishers and local fishing communities.
Clearly,  output  controls  are  a  potentially  effective  management  method  to  promote  the 
sustainable  use  of fisheries  resources.  However,  measures  must  be  carefully  designed  and 
implemented  in  combination  with  other  suitable  management  means  in  order to  maximise 
efforts to promote this objective.
Input controls are another common fisheries management method.  As noted above, they are 
used to restrict access to fisheries resources. This is achieved by issuing a limited number of 
licenses to fishers and/or fishing vessels thereby controlling entry into the fishery.238 The aim 
is to limit potential fishing capacity (determined by the efficiency of the vessel and its gear), 
which in turn helps to conserve stocks and to generate greater economic benefits for license 
holders, thereby promoting sustainable fishing.239  Input controls must be used in combination 
with other management measures, such as technical conservation measures, however, as they 
are unable  to  control  the  gradual  expansion  of fishing effort  once  fishers  have entered the 
fishery,  which  may  lead  to  over-capacity.240  Over-capacity -   the  excess  potential  fishing 
ability (or capacity) of a vessel or fleet above what is required to harvest the desired catch at 
the  lowest cost  -  is  one  of the  current  leading  causes  of over-fishing;  it is  estimated that
236 Symes and Crean ibid and Charles ibid at 297, 298.
237 Wingard op cit n 233 at 50, Symes and Crean ibid at 181  and Charles ibid at 303, 304. See also Platt-McGinn 
op cit n 133 at 63, 66 and Greboval and Munro op cit n 199 at 41, para 4.3. Limiting the transferability of ITQs 
to within a given fishing community is a potential solution, although it has not proven to be particularly effective 
to date - for example in Iceland (Symes and Crean at 179).
238 Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 at 161.
239 Charles op cit n  196 at 293, Milazzo op cit n 232 at 4, and J Kirkely and D Squires,  ‘Measuring Capacity and 
Capacity Utilisation in Fisheries’ in Greboval op cit n  199 at 76, para 1  and 86.
240 Cunningham and Maguire op cit n 205 at 63, Charles ibid and Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 
at 164.80
modem  fleets  have  at  least  30  percent  more  capacity  than  they  require.241  It  must  thus be 
urgently  addressed  in  order  to  foster  sustainable  fishing.  At  an  individual  fisheries  level, 
capacity can be constrained not only by controlling vessel numbers through licensing, but also 
by regulating other inputs  (such as vessel engine size) by attaching restrictive conditions to 
licenses.  These  must  in  turn  be  capable  of  adjusting  to  ‘capacity-creep’,  that  is  enhanced 
fishing capacity as a result of improved fisheries technology.242 In order to counter the risk 
that fishers will shift their focus from investing in regulated inputs to expanding their use of 
other  unregulated  inputs  (for  example,  hiring  more  crew  or  fishing  out  at  sea  for  longer 
periods), policy makers should take care to regulate sufficient components of effort.243
A ‘user fee’  should be charged for fishing licenses to cover the  ‘environmental cost’ of using 
the  resource  and  to  contribute  towards  fisheries  management  efforts.244  As  noted  above, 
valuing environmental  services and resources is an important aspect of fostering sustainable 
development.  In  addition,  failing  to  charge  a  suitable  levy  arguably  amounts  to  a  ‘cost- 
reducing’  subsidy.245  Fisheries  subsidies  potentially  make  a  significant  eoniribulion  lo 
unsustainable fishing, as I discuss later in this chapter. In addition, not charging for licences 
may result in too many fishers entering the industry if licenses  are allocated on the basis of 
historical involvement in the fishery, as is common practice.246
241 Milazzo op cit n 232 at 6 and Greboval and Munro op cit n  199 at 3. Fishing ‘effort’ refers to the combination 
of fishing capacity and the labour and time spent fishing (Milazzo at 4 and Kirkley and Squires op cit n 239 at 
126, appendix V). The exact definitions of ‘capacity’, ‘over-capacity’, and ‘effort’ are, however, contested 
(Kirkley and Squires at 75 -80 and Milazzo at 4, 5).
242 Charles op cit n 196 at 295. In practice this may be achieved by requiring vessel owners to compensate for 
efficiency increases in, for example, certain gear by making adjustments elsewhere in their fleet to ensure that 
overall catching capacity does not increase.
243 Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 at 164 and Charles ibid at 294. Greboval and Munro op cit n 
199 at para 3.3.2 at 23, 25.
244 Milazzo op cit n 232 at 56, 58, L Westland, Draft Guide for Identifying, Assessing and Reporting on 
Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector (2002) FAO Fisheries Department at para 6.2.9 and Cunningham and Maguire 
op cit n 205 at 66.
2 5 Milazzo ibid at 57, Westland ibid. See also Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 at 162,
246 Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh ibid.81
Technical conservation measures are likewise very useful in promoting the conservation and 
sustainable use of fisheries and the protection of the marine habitat. Their primary objective is 
to protect and restore fish stocks by reducing fish mortality, especially amongst juveniles.247 
Closed areas can protect vulnerable fish stocks and their habitat, while measures that restrict 
fishing gear, such as net size, also contribute towards minimising by-catch and reducing the 
harmful effects of fishing activities on the marine environment. Other examples of technical 
conservation measures include limits on vessel length and engine size, minimum landing size 
for fish and closed seasons.248
As with other fisheries management measures,  governments must take care to minimise the 
potential  of  technical  conservation  measures  to  inadvertently  contribute  to  unsustainable 
fishing  practices.  Minimum  landing  size  restrictions,  for  example,  have  the  potential  to 
increase discards  (discussed  above)  and should  accordingly be coupled  with  selective  gear 
requirements,  such  as  restrictive  mesh  sizes,  or  economic  incentives  to  encourage  more 
selective  fishing  methods/49  The  use  of  closed  seasons  and  closed  areas  should  also  be 
carefully  considered.  They  control  total  output  by  either  limiting  the  period  within  which 
fishing may occur (closed seasons) or prohibiting fishing in certain areas for all or part of a 
season (closed areas),  primarily to protect young  and  spawning fish.  They are a potentially 
highly effective  method of promoting biological  sustainability.  However,  they detract from 
the economic  sustainability of fisheries and may thus encourage fishers to concentrate their 
harvesting  activities  in  adjacent  waters  or  in  alternative  seasons  to  compensate  for  their
247 Cunningham and Maguire op cit n 205 at 58.
248 Coffey op cit n 215 at 40 and Cunningham and Maguire ibid at 58, 152.
249 Crean and Symes op cit n 224 at 425, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Green Paper on The 
Future of the Common Fisheries Policy’ (Green Paper) COM (2001)  135 final at para  1.2, Roadmap 
Communication op cit n 221  at para 5.1.2 and Coffey op cit n 215 at 41.82
economic  losses.  They  should  thus  be  regarded  as  short-term  measures  to  be  used 
sparingly.251
All three of the fisheries management measures outlined above are concerned primarily with 
promoting the biological (ecological) sustainability of a fishery.  As we have seen, however, 
the  objective  of sustainable  use  or  the  ‘sustainability’  of a  fishery  is  also  concerned  with 
broader socio-economic concerns. Fishing subsidies play a particularly controversial role in 
this  regard.  Aimed  at  boosting  profits  in  the  fishing  industry,  subsidies  foster  economic 
growth in the fisheries sector and secure the livelihoods of fishers and fishing communities. 
Arguably, however, they do so at the expense of securing biological sustainability in fisheries. 
At  an  international  level,  the  regulation  of  fisheries  subsidies  by  the  World  Trade 
Organisation  (WTO)  regime is currently under review.  It remains to be  seen  if the current 
regime will be changed and if so,  how  stringent future fisheries subsidy regulation  will be. 
Any revision  to  the  existing regime,  however,  has potentially  far-reaching  implications for 
domestic  fisheries  regulation  and  inter-state  fishing  relations.  I  thus  briefly  discuss  this 
complex yet crucial issue below.
4.3  The impact of fisheries subsidies
Subsidisation of the fishing industry is common  among fishing nations.252 According to the 
World Bank,  global  fisheries  subsidies range from $14-20 billion,  which  amounts to  20-25 
percent of the total revenue of the sector. As I discuss later in my thesis, subsidies are highly 
relevant to the impact of the EU’s fishing in developing third country waters.253 It is generally
250 Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 at 157,  158.
251 Ibid at 157.
252 Ibid at 72 and WE Schrank, Introducing Fishing Subsidies FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 437 (FAO, 
Rome 2003) at iii.
253 Cross-reference with p  130.83
accepted that subsidies to the fishing industry can have a potentially negative impact on the 
sustainability of fisheries. There is less agreement, however, on the extent of this impact and 
on how fisheries  subsidies should be defined, quantified and regulated to mimimise it. The 
effects  of fisheries  subsidies  on  a  range  of  key  issues  such  as  over-capacity,  sustainable 
development and sustainable fisheries management are currently being researched by various 
inter-govemmental organisations such  as the FAO, WTO  and World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF).  While  they  disagree  on  the  extent  to  which  fishing  subsidies  adversely  affect 
capture fisheries,  they recognise that  not  all  fishing subsidies  are  environmentally-harmful; 
some  seek  to  foster  sustainable  fisheries  development  and  poverty-alleviation  and  should 
therefore be permitted, albeit tightly regulated.255
How to define fisheries subsidies in order to identify their use is the first challenge. According 
to  the  WTO’s  Agreement  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures  (ASCM),  a  subsidy 
exists where there is some form of financial contribution from a government or public body 
which  confers  a benefit.256 The FAO  defines  fishing  subsidies  broadly  as  any  government 
intervention, action or non-action, that affects the fishing industry and has an economic value 
i.e.  it increases revenues or decreases costs of the industry.257 For purposes of analysis and 
debate,  the  FAO  categorises  fisheries  subsidies  into  four  broad  groups:  direct  financial 
transfers,  services  and  indirect  transfers,  regulation  affecting  fisheries,  and  lack  of
254 Sec FAO,  Technical Consultation on the Use of Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector: A Summary of Recent 
Work on Subsidies in the Fishing Sector’ (2004) TC SUB/2004/Inf 3 Rome Italy 30 June -  2 July (FAO, Rome 
2004) (FAO Subsidies Report) at, for example para E (ii) (at 9) (FAO contribution), para F (iii) (at 16,  17) 
(OECD contribution), and para H (at 22, 23) (WTO contribution).
255 Ibid at paras E (FAO contribution) and I (WWF contribution). See for example the ASEAN contribution (para 
B at 6 ) and para I (WWF contribution).
256 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation WTO Legal Texts 3 (in force 1 January 
1995) Annex  1A Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) at art 1.
257 FAO Subsidies Report op cit n 254 at para E (FAO contribution) at 10. This reflects the 2002 definition 
utilised by the FAO, namely ‘...government actions or inactions that are specific to the fisheries industry and 
that modifies -  by increasing or decreasing -  the potential profits by the industry in the short-, medium, and 
long-term’.84
intervention.258 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also 
subscribes to a wide understanding of ‘fisheries subsidies’ and subdivides these subsidies into 
similar categories to that of the FAO, namely direct payments, cost-reducing transfers, general 
services and market-price supports.259 The purchase of new vessels, vessel decommissioning 
payments and direct export incentives fall under the category of direct government subsidies 
to  the  industry,  while  examples  of indirect  or  cost-reducing  subsidies  include  government 
payment for fishing rights  in  foreign  coastal  waters,  government-funded fisheries  research, 
subsidised loans and fuel tax exemptions. General services subsidies include funding fisheries 
research  and management  and enforcement expenditures.260  Subsidies that amount to  ‘non­
intervention’ include free access to fishing grounds (as noted earlier), lack of pollution control 
and  non-implementation  of  existing  regulations.  Such  non-action  by  governments  allows 
fisheries producers to impose their costs of production on society and the environment rather 
than to absorb them themselves.261
The impact of fishing subsidies depends on their constitution, the manner in which  they are 
implemented, how they interact with other existing government policies and the nature of the 
fisheries  management  system  in  place.262  Generally  speaking,  fishing  subsidies  impact  in 
three  core  ways:  they  affect  the  economic  growth  of  the  country  in  question,  impact  on 
international trade, and affect the sustainability of domestic fisheries.  In particular, there is
258 Ibid FAO contribution at 9.
259 Ibid. See A Cox, ‘OECD Workshop on Environmentally Harmful Subsidies -A  Stocktaking of OECD Work 
on Subsidies’ Paris, 7-8 November 2002 paper presented OECD Workshop on Environmentally Harmful 
Subsidies International Energy Agency 7 November 2002 <http://wwwl.oecd.org/agr/ehsw/SG- 
SD(2002)16.pdf> accessed June 2006 at 4 and  12.
260 A combination of Schrank op cit n 252 at  13,  14, FAO definition in FAO Subsidies Report op cit n 254 at 
para E (ii) (at 9) (FAO contribution) and OECD definition in FAO Subsidies Report at para F (iii) (at 16,  17).
1  Westland op cit n 244 at para 5.4.
262 O Flaaten and P Wallis,  ‘Government Financial Transfers to Fishing Industries in OECD Countries’ FAO 
Expert Consultation on Economic Incentives and Responsible fisheries (OECD, Paris 2000) at 11.
263 Ibid at 44.85
strong support for the contention that subsidies foster unsustainable fishing practices.264 This 
does  not  necessarily  hold  true  for  all  subsidies,  however -   as  noted  earlier,  a  distinction 
should be made between fishing subsidies that are  ‘environmentally-harmful’  and those that 
are  ‘conservation’  subsidies.265 Conservation subsidies are designed to enhance the resource
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base, reduce  fishing operations  and capacity,  and foster  ‘cleaner’  harvesting technology. 
Examples include funding vessel and fishing permit buyback schemes (decommissioning), re­
training fishers for alternative professions, socio-economic measures to encourage fishers to 
leave  the  industry  (such  as  early  retirement  packages),  and  research  and  development  in 
‘clean’ harvesting gear.
The overwhelming majority of fishing subsidies worldwide, however,  are intended to foster 
increased harvesting and to enhance fishing capacity and thus fall into the alternative category 
of  ‘environmentally-harmful’  subsidies.  A  common  example  is  government  financial 
support for modernising vessels in order to increase their harvesting capacity.  As I discuss 
later  in  chapters  5  and  7,  this  type  of  subsidisation  is  prevalent  in  the  EU  and  in  many 
developing countries that seek to boost the growth of their domestic fishing industry, such as 
Senegal.270 This generates short-term economic benefits, but without careful control can lead 
to  over-capacity  and  resultant  unsustainable  fishing  practices,  as  evidenced  by  the  EU
on  i
example.  Other  subsidies  that  fall  into  this  category  include  the  funding  of  fisheries 
infrastructure, such as constructing and upgrading fishing ports, government-subsidised loans
264 Schrank op cit n 252 (in particular, at 21), Flaaten and Willis ibid, A Cox and C Schmidt,  ‘Subsidies in the 
OECD Fisheries Sector: A review of Recent Analysis and Future Directions’ (OECD, Paris 2002), Cunningham 
and Maguire op cit n 205 at 72, Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 at 97 and Milazzo op cit n 232 at 
79.
265 Milazzo ibid at 12,  14.
266 Ibid at 64.
267 Ibid at 65. The author suggests that no more than five percent of all fisheries subsidies support ‘conservation’.
268 Ibid at 74,78 and 79. It is estimated that they amount to approximately 20 to 25 percent of world capture 
fisheries revenues.
269 Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 at 98.
270 Cross-reference with pp 129 and  166.
271 Schrank op cit n 252 at 1. Cross-reference with pp 129,  130.86
(mainly for construction, modernisation and repair of vessels) and tax preferences, including 
exemptions from fuel tax.272
‘Environmentally-harmful’  subsidies can contribute towards unsustainable fishing in various 
ways.273  Their  main  effect  is  to  ‘artificially’  lower  the  costs  of  fishing.  This  increases 
profitability  and  encourages  participation  in  the  fishery.274  If  the  management  system  is 
unable to adequately control access to and regulate harvesting in the fishery, this can lead to 
excess  effort  and  capacity  and  may  consequently  cause  over-fishing  and  resultant 
unsustainability.  In  addition,  subsidies  enable  economically  inefficient  industries  to 
continue operating, which is not conducive to the long-term sustainability of a fishery.276
Critics argue that subsidies are as much a symptom of ineffective fisheries management as a 
cause of the current crises in fisheries.277 While others continue to contest the empirical link 
between subsidies and unsustainable fisheries, these critics are convinced of the relationship 
and are accordingly currently calling tor subsidy reform. They argue  that the elimination or 
reduction  of environmentally-harmful  fishing  subsidies  will  reduce pressure  on  fish  stocks, 
free up financial resources for other uses, enhance economic efficiency by removing price and 
profit distortions, and stimulate increased international trade.278 With regard to subsidies that 
are retained, their design and implementation should be improved in order to maximise their
272 Milazzo op cit n 232 at 21,42 -  55.
273 Milazzo argues that the results of his study  ‘strongly’  suggest that such subsidies are a ‘significant’ factor in 
undermining the sustainable use of wild fish resources in much of the world (ibid at 79).
274 Ibid at 31. J Suris-Regueiro, M Varela-Lafuente and D Garza-Gil,  ‘Profitability of the Fishing Fleet and 
Structural Aid in the European Union’ (2002) 26 Marine Policy 107-119, in particular at  118. See also Platt- 
McGinn op cit n 133 at 7, where the author notes that about one third of all revenues from fisheries are a result 
of government subsidies.
275 Cunningham and Maguire op cit n 205 at 72.
276 Schrank op cit n 252 at 7.
277 Ibid at 77 and G Porter, Fisheries and the Environment. Fisheries Subsidies and Over-Fishing: Towards a 
Structured Discussion (United Nations Environment Programme, New York 2002) at 11-13.
278 Milazzo op cit n 232 at 79, 80 and Platt McGinn op cit n 133 at 67.87
efficiency  while  minimising  their  adverse  environmental  effects;  ‘conservation’  subsidies 
should be permitted.279
The extent to which national governments are engaged in reforming their fisheries subsidies 
policies  will  likely  be  accelerated  by  current  developments  in  the  WTO  forum.  The 
Ministerial Declaration of the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001 
(the Doha Declaration) identified fisheries subsidies as part of the agenda for new global trade 
discussions.280 Specifically, it stated that members should  ‘aim to clarify and improve WTO 
disciplines  on  fisheries  subsidies  taking  into  account  the  importance  of  this  sector  to 
developing countries’.281 This provided a mandate for negotiations on fisheries subsidies and 
committed WTO members to refine world trade rules in this area. The relevant discussions 
and negotiations have primarily taken place within the WTO’s negotiating group on rules to 
date.
The  need  for  clarity  on  subsidies  in  fisheries  arose  because  many  members  were  of the 
opinion  that  they  are  inadequately  regulated  by  existing  WTO  rules.  Currently,  fisheries 
subsidies are governed by the general Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM);  they  were  excluded  from  the  subsidy  reduction  commitments  in  the  1994 WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture as fisheries were seen to fall outside the ambit of agriculture.  In 
terms  of  the  ASCM,  all  subsidies  (as  defined  in  the  agreement)  are  either  prohibited,
279 Milazzo ibid. Cox and Schmidt op cit n 264 at 42. See also Platt-McGinn ibid.
280 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1 20 November 2001  adopted  14 November 2001 
(Doha Declaration).
281 See para 28 of the Doha Declaration ibid:  ‘... we agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving 
disciplines under the Agreements on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT  1994 and on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, while preserving the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these Agreements 
and their instruments and objectives, and taking into account the needs of developing and least-developed 
participants.  In the initial phase of the negotiations, participants will indicate the provisions, including 
disciplines on trade distorting practices, that they seek to clarify and improve in the subsequent phase.  In the 
context of these negotiations, participants shall also aim to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies, taking into account the importance of this sector to developing countries...’
282 ASCM op cit n 256 and Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation WTO Legal Texts 
3 (in force 1 January 1995) Annex  1A Agreement on Agriculture. In terms of art 2 read together with annex 1 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture, fish and fish products are excluded from the products covered by the Agreement.88
‘actionable’  (subject  to  challenge  within  the  WTO  framework),  or  non-actionable.283  As 
fisheries subsidies  arguably give rise  to numerous sector-specific  queries and concerns, the 
agreement does not comprehensively or adequately deal with them.
During the negotiations it became clear that WTO members disagree on the extent to which 
fisheries subsidies lie at the root of over-exploitation and declining world fisheries stocks as 
opposed  to  poor  fisheries  management  coupled  with  increasing  world  demand  for  fishery 
products.284 Those supporting the need for new measures to regulate fisheries subsidies argue 
that over-capacity, a significant element of over-exploitation, is caused primarily by subsidies. 
This,  they  contend,  cannot  be  offset  by  sound  fisheries  management  regimes  as  the  very 
realisation  of these  regimes  is  impeded  by  the  existence  of  subsidies.  Fisheries  subsidies 
should  therefore  be  better  ‘disciplined’.  Combined  with  sustainable  fisheries  management 
policies  and increased trade  liberalisation,  this  will  likely  result  in  more efficient  fisheries 
production while simultaneously promoting long-term environmental benefits.  If this view 
is persuasive and results m tighter regulation of fishing subsidies within the WTO regime, the 
definition of fishing subsidies and the way in which they are regulated will have potentially
'yof.
far-reaching effects in world fisheries.  Of particular interest to us is whether their definition 
will  be  sufficiently  broad  to  encompass  financial  payments  under  bilateral  fisheries 
arrangements between the EU and third countries and whether EU development cooperation 
projects that fund fisheries development in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states will
283 ASCM ibid at Part II and Part IV respectively. Subsidies are defined in art 1.
284 As reflected in the Report to the Conference adopted by the Regular Session of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment’s (CTE) in July 2003 prior to the 5th Session o f the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, 
Mexico in September 2003.
285 FAO Subsidies Report op cit n 254 at para H (WTO contribution). With regard to the positions of the various 
Members, see -  ‘WTO Rules Negotiations: Deep Divides Prevail on Harmfulness of Fisheries Subsidies’ Bridges 
Weekly Trade News (2002) 6 (36) <http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-10-24/storyl.htm> accessed July 2006.
286 B Gorez and B O’Riordan,  ‘An Examination of Fisheries Relations Between the European Union and the 
ACP Countries’ (papier presented at International Seminar (CTA/CW) on ACP/EU Fisheries Relations: Towards 
a Greater Sustainability 7-9 April 2003 Brussels) <http://www.cta.int/events2003/fisheries/documents.htm> 
accessed February 2006 at para 3.4.89
fall within its ambit.287 Clearly, the trade rules that emerge will strongly impact the direction 
of future fishing relations between the EU and West African coastal states. The EU supports a 
prohibition  of  all  capacity-enhancing  subsidies  and  the  retention  of  ‘conservation’ 
subsidies.288 It does not regard Community compensation for access to the coastal  waters of 
developing  countries  under  its  new  ‘fisheries  partnership’  policy  as  a  subsidy;  it  thus 
envisages that such payments will be unaffected by any new WTO rules.289
The 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration recommitted the WTO rules group to progress 
in its fisheries subsidies work.290 It expressly noted the ‘broad agreement’ among members on 
the need to strengthen the regulation of fisheries subsidies, including by prohibiting those that
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contribute to over-capacity and over-fishing.  The Declaration further calls for ‘appropriate 
and  effective  special  and  differentiated  treatment  for  developing  and  least-developed 
members’  to be an integral part of the negotiations in light of the importance of fisheries to 
the development  priorities,  poverty-reduction  and  livelihood  and food  security  concerns of 
these countries.292 It urged the rules group to complete its analysis of participants’ proposals 
‘as  soon  as  possible’  in  order to  ensure  that  the  suggested  amendments to  the  ASCM  are 
prepared in time for the final  stage of negotiations.293 Any revision of the ASCM will thus 
only be clarified by the end of 2006, as this is  the new end date of the Doha Development
287 Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) of 
the one part, and the European Community and its member states, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 
June 2000 [2000]  OJ L317/3 (Cotonou Agreement). FAO Subsidies Report op cit n 254 at paras F (i) (OECD 
contribution) at 12 and E (FAO contribution). See also Gorez and O’Riordan ibid at para 3.4.
288 Submission by the EU to the Rules Group, April 2003
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/may/tradoc_122825.pdf> accessed July 2006. To date, the EU has 
submitted two papers to the Rules Group, the first in April 2003 and the second in April 2005. The second 
suggests mechanisms for the implementation and enforcement of any new disciplines in this area which may be 
devised by the WTO <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/may/tradoc_120387.pdf> accessed July 2006.
289 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview Dakar 2 February 
2006). The new fisheries partnership approach is discussed in detail at pp  151-157 below.
290 Ministerial Declaration of the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong December 2005 WT/MIN 
(05)/DEC 22 December 2005 adopted on  18 December 2005.
291 Ibid at Annex A: Agriculture.
292 Ibid at para 9.
293 Ibid.90
Agenda.294 Only at this stage will it be clear to member states to what extent they will need to 
adapt their domestic policies and international fisheries relations.
5. Conclusion
The international regime regulating fisheries has yet to find a way to effectively promote the 
sustainable  use  of  marine  fisheries  worldwide.  Its  framework  guidance  is  nevertheless  a 
starting point for state action towards this end both in national waters and beyond. The effect 
of  fisheries  management  mechanisms  and  subsidies  on  the  sustainability  of  fisheries  are 
increasingly known and it is thus up to individual states to ensure that their fisheries policies 
are  suitably  formulated  to  contribute  positively  towards  sustainability.  In  addition, 
international  agreements  between  coastal  states  and foreign  nations  seeking to  access  their 
waters  should  accord  with  international  fisheries  law  by  actively  promoting  sustainable 
fishing and sustainable fisheries development. Specifically, agreements should require the use 
of appropriate management and technical measures towards this end.
In  practice, however,  bilateral  fisheries  agreements are not merely (if even predominantly) 
concerned with  fostering  sustainable fisheries.  Instead, they  are largely concerned  with the 
realisation of the respective  self-interests of the two contracting parties.  These  interests are 
influenced by the broader socio-economic and political relations between the parties. In the 
case of agreements between the EU and West African countries,  these relations are in turn 
strongly shaped by the parties’  shared colonial history, as I discuss in detail in the following 
chapter.
294 At the time of completing writing (December 2006), no revision of the ASCM had been clarified.91
4
THE COLONIAL LEGACY: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TIES 
BETWEEN WEST AFRICAN STATES AND THE EU
1.  Introduction
Bilateral fisheries agreements between the EU and African states, particularly those in West 
Africa,  are  strongly  influenced by the  historically-based  socio-economic  links between  the 
parties.  Specifically, the colonisation of West African states by European powers in the late 
nineteenth  century  impacted  both  the  social  and  economic  development  of  the  colonised 
territories  and  established  trends  for  future  relations  between  the  parties  which  were 
subsequently  sustained  by  a  long-standing  series  of  development  cooperation  agreements 
between  them.  These agreements,  which  are dominated by trade and  aid concessions,  were 
initially imposed on the (then) African colonies at the formation of the European Economic
Community  (EEC)  but  subsequently  evolved  into  comprehensive  negotiated  arrangements 
between the EC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Their impact is key to 
understanding the broader interests and issues that inform bilateral fishing relations between 
the EU and individual West African states, as I discuss in this chapter. In particular, I examine 
the  role  of  the  colonial  legacy  between  the  parties  on  the  fisheries  access  arrangements 
concluded between them.92
2.  The impact of European colonisation on African states
2.1 Historical introduction
European expansion into Africa began in earnest in the eighteenth century and accelerated in 
the  1800s. In the  1870s, heightened competition among the major European states triggered 
numerous territorial claims on the continent in what later became known as the ‘Scramble for 
Africa’.  At the  1884 Berlin  Conference competing claims  were settled and the majority of 
Africa  was  divided  into  European  colonies.295  Colonial  rule  was  pervasive,  impacting 
particularly the economic and political sectors of the colonised states. Challenges to colonial 
rule rose during the 1900s fuelled by the growth of nationalism and the associated emergence 
of  anti-colonial  struggles  and  peaked  after  World  War  II.296  The  first  major  wave  of 
decolonisation occurred among the British and French West African territories in the  1950s; 
the colonising powers  withdrew swiftly in the hope of minimising conflict and maintaining 
positive economic  and political  relations with  the new  governments.297 France  m  particular 
succeeded in maintaining a strong influence in many of its former colonies.
2.2 The origin of EU-African socio-political relations
Colonisation had a profound effect on the economies of the African colonies both during the 
period  of occupation  and  post-independence.  In  particular,  it  impacted  upon  the  economic 
development  of  the  colonies  and  their  economic  relations  with  Europe.298  Prior  to
295 The Berlin Conference November 1884 -  December 1885 resulting in the Berlin Act of 1885. Most the 
territory in West Africa was designated as French colonies.
2%  O’Toole, ‘The Historical Context’ in AA Gordon  and DL Gordon (eds), Understanding Contemporary 
Africa (3rd  edn Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, London and Colorado 2001) at 51 and DL Gordon,  ‘Africa 
Politics’ in Gordon and Gordon at 63.
297 Gordon ibid at 66.
298 ER Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, UK 1993) 
at 5.93
colonisation,  African  economies  had  already  been  subsumed into  the  European-dominated 
international economy by the seventeenth century slave trade, which resulted in a mass loss of 
productive human labour and an associated decrease in agricultural production in the affected
A Q A
African states.  The subsequent period of colonisation corresponded with the spread of the 
industrial revolution throughout Europe, giving rise to an increasing demand for raw materials 
from the African colonies, primarily agricultural products, minerals and metals.  In the West 
African  colonies  traditional  subsistence farming  was  accordingly largely  substituted by the 
cultivation of export crops such as palm oil, rubber, cotton, cocoa and peanuts.300 At the same 
time,  the  colonies  served  as markets  for Europe’s newly  manufactured  textiles,  household 
goods  and  farm  implements.  A  unique  pattern  of consumption  and  trade  in  and  between 
Europe  and its territories  was thus established  during colonisation,  traces of which  are still 
evident to date.
Following de-colonisation, the economic progress of the newly independent states remained 
largely contingent on European markets, finance and expertise as the economic policies that 
they had inherited had been designed to foster Europe’s growth  and development not their 
own socio-economic self-sufficiency.301  European powers encouraged this trend - struggling 
with reconstruction and rising commodity prices in the wake of World War II, it was in their 
interests  that  the  new  African  governments  retained  the  colonial  capitalist  system  and  its 
associated  trade  patterns  along  with  the  supporting  political  structures.302  In  the  face  of 
limited  resources,  most  African  governments  thus  encouraged  increased  exports  of  raw 
materials  to  Europe  and  maintained  the  monocrop  economies  established  under  colonial 
rule.303  Those  governments  that  attempted  to  restructure  their  economies,  primarily  by
299 V DeLancey,  ‘Economies of Africa’ in Gordon and Gordon op cit n 296 at 102 and  103.
300 Gordon op cit n 296 at 58, 58 and O’Toole op cit n 296 at 50.
301 Gordon ibid at 59,60.
302 Ibid at 67.
303 Ibid at 78 and DeLancey op cit n 299 at 107.94
increasing  executive  control  and  nationalising  key  sectors  of  the  economy,  were  largely 
unsuccessful. The inherited colonial  legal  frameworks constrained the efficacy of their new 
laws and policies and in many instances, their development plans were deficient, frequently 
over-emphasising  industrial  development  to  the  detriment  of  the  agricultural  sector.304 
Regional  efforts to promote  African  economic  self-sufficiency  similarly floundered.  Spear­
headed by the Organisation of African Unity, numerous regional economic organisations were 
established  during  the  1980s  to  promote  intra-regional  trade  towards  the  self-sustaining 
economic  development  of  the  continent.305  Most  African  states  nevertheless  continued  to 
struggle economically and thus turned to  international monetary bodies  (such  as  the World 
Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund)  and  foreign  governments  for  financial 
assistance.  Loans  were  conditional  on  the  implementation  of  structural  adjustment 
programmes  which required receiving  governments  to reorder their domestic  economies to 
stimulate increased primary product exports and encourage foreign investment;307 this further 
entrenched the  role of African  states  as  the  suppliers of cheap  raw  materials  in  the  global 
economy.308 Specifically, borrowing governments were obliged to adjust their exchange rates, 
reduce  government  expenditure,  liberalise  trade,  privatise  state-owned  enterprises,  and 
eliminate  subsidies  to  urban  consumers.309  The  majority  of  African  economies  failed  to 
respond positively to this restructuring and governments fell heavily into debt. Efforts towards
3°4 y  Qhaj  jMW [n the Political Economy of Public Enterprise: African Perspectives (Scandinavian Institute 
of African Studies, Uppsala and International Legal Centre, New York 1977) at 10. See also Y Ghai, ‘Control 
and Management of the Economy: Research Perspectives on Public Enterprise’ in Ghai at 26. DeLancey ibid at 
122-125.
305 Organisation of African Union (OAU),‘Charter of the Organisation of African Union’ (1963). In  1999, The 
OAU was superceded by the African Union through the Constitutive Act of the African Union,  11 July 2000, 
Lom6, Togo (which entered into force in 2001).
306 PJ Schraeder, ‘African International Relations’ in Gordon and Gordon op cit n 296 at 150 and DeLancey op 
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308 D Edye and V Linter, ‘The Lom6 IV Convention: New Dawn or Neo-Colonialism?’ European Dossier Series 
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economic  development  were  further  impeded  by  civil  conflict,  which  was  rife  in  many 
African states.310
2.3  Maintaining socio-economic ties: associationism
At the founding of the EEC in  1957,  political  and economic ties between the then  African 
colonies of France, Belgium and Italy and the EEC were formally preserved by the Treaty of 
Rome, which
‘promote[d]  the economic  and  social  development of the  [associated]  countries  and 
territories and ... established] close relations between them and the Community as a 
whole’.311
The two main pillars of these relations were free trade between the EEC and the  associates 
and  economic  aid  from  the  Community  to  the  associate  states.312  The  Treaty  provisions 
entrenched  the  policy  of  ‘associationism’,  which  advocated  maintaining  economic  and 
political cooperation between colonising powers and their colonies in order to secure ‘mutual 
benefits’.313  They had the effect of establishing a unilaterally-created free-trade area between 
the EEC states and their colonies and rendering the EEC states collectively responsible for the 
financial well-being of the colonies. Following independence, the former associated territories 
were no longer bound by the Treaty of Rome. To maintain the benefits afforded them under 
the Treaty they subsequently concluded a Convention of Association with the EEC in  1963 
(the  Yaounde  agreement),  which  provided  for  reciprocal  trade  concessions,  technical 
cooperation and economic assistance. 314 The agreement was renewed for a further five years
310 Gordon ibid at 133.
3,1 Part IV of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) (adopted 24 March 
1957, entered into force 1 January 1958) 298 UNTS  11, arts  131-136. See also Grilli op cit n 298 at 2, 3 and 7.
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in 1969 and was subsequently succeeded by a series of four ‘Lome’ agreements (the first was 
concluded in  1975),  which extended EEC trade  and aid concessions to the broader African 
Caribbean  and Pacific  (ACP)  group  of states.315  The  terms  of the  agreements  altered over 
time, reflecting the change in relations between the EEC and the ACP group. Most noticeable 
was  the  increasing  shift  in  power in  favour  of the  EEC  as  associationism  evolved  from  a 
policy that was initially highly beneficial to the EEC, cushioning it from the possible adverse 
socio-economic effects of decolonisation, to an  approach that offered it few advantages as a 
result of political and economic changes both globally and within the EEC.316 The agreements 
thus concretised the  increasing  socio-economic  dependence  of the former African  colonies 
(and other ACP states) on the EEC in a manner that could be described in some instances as 
neo-colonial.317
Associationism was  particularly strongly advocated by France in  its West African colonies 
both during occupation through its approach of  ‘direct’  rule and post-independence.318 As a 
result, the foreign policies of former French colonies remained strongly aligned with French 
interests  in  the  early  years  of  independence  and  France  maintained  significant  economic 
influence.319  This  was  bolstered  by  the  continued  operation  of  the  ‘franc  zone’,  a  supra­
member states of the EEC were party to the agreement. Just prior to independence in 1959, almost 80 percent of 
the associated territories’ exports went to the EEC and nearly all of the aid that they received came from EEC 
countries (Grilli ibid at  15, table 1.2).
315 ACP-EEC Convention of Lomd (1976) OJ L25/2 (Lome I).
316 Grilli op cit n 298 at 36-39 and 42. See also S Wright,  ‘Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements: 
Contexts and Strategies’ in O Barbarinde and G Faber (eds), The European Union and the Developing 
Countries: The Cotonou Agreement (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden and Boston 2005) at 78.
317 Neo-colonialism refers to the socio-economic dependence of politically-sovereign developing countries on 
their former colonial powers, rooted in and perpetuated by the colonial capitalist system. See EEG Iweriebor,
The Age of Neo-Colonialism in Africa (African Book Builders Ltd, Nigeria 1997) at 1,  12 and 26 and K 
Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (Panaf Books Ltd, London  1965) at ix. At its most 
extreme, neo-colonialism is aligned with the neo-Marxist school of peripheral capitalism and the contemporary 
neo-Marxist school of under-development. See Iweriebor at 19 and S Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on 
the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism (The Harvester Press Ltd, England  1976) at 333 - 364. See also 
Ghai op cit n 304 at 30 and Nkrumah at x.
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319 Exemplified by Senegal during the presidency of Ldopald Sedar Senghor (from 1960 to January  1981). 
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national financial system established by France in  1945 to bind its West and Central African 
colonies  with  a  common  currency,  the  Communaute  Financiere  Africaine  (CFA)  franc. 
Initially tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury, the CFA franc was 
subsequently pegged to  the Euro  when  France  acceded to  the  single European  currency in 
1 9 9 9 320 The extent of the ex-colonies’  economic dependence on France became evident in 
1994,  when  French  devaluation  of  the  CFA  franc  profoundly  affected  West  African
321 economies.
Strong  socio-economic  ties  thus  continued  to  bind  the  majority  of  African  states  to  their 
former colonial powers following independence, particularly those in West Africa. To date, 
European political influence remains powerfully persistent, shaped by the broader economic 
objectives of both individual member states and the European Community (EC). The series of 
preferential  trade  and  aid  agreements  concluded  between  the  EC  and  African  states  post­
independence cemented a relationship of increasingly unequal inter-dependence between the 
parties.
320 Article 111(3) EC Treaty (op cit n 170) enables France to maintain its existing agreement with the CFA franc 
zone by providing for monetary and foreign exchange arrangements with third countries. Regional integration 
has occurred within the franc zone, giving rise to two distinct African monetary unions, namely the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC). They share the single currency of the CFA franc. Schraeder ibid at 226, 227.
321 This was exemplified by its effect on the Senegalese fisheries sector, which I discuss below at p  167. The 
CFA was devalued by fifty percent in response to economic crises in West Africa (Schraeder ibid at 162 -  165).98
3.  The EU’s development cooperation policy towards Africa: cementing historical ties
3.1  The emergence of a Community development cooperation policy
The Community pursues its objectives in the development sphere by three principal means - 
policy  dialogue,  development  cooperation  and  trade.322  Prior  to  1993,  there  was  no  treaty 
basis for EC  development cooperation  action. In  the absence of a guiding legal  framework 
and  clearly  defined  objectives,  it  thus  operated  in  a  rather  uncoordinated  manner.  With 
regards  to  the  ACP countries,  the  Yaounde  and  Lome  arrangements  served  as  unique  EC 
development  cooperation  models  in  relation  to  a  specific,  geographically-defined  group  of 
states.
This changed with the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced the legal basis 
for a Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation  and outlined its primary 
objectives, namely to foster sustainable socio-economic development in developing countnes 
(particularly  the  most  disadvantaged),  facilitate  their  gradual  integration  into  the  world 
economy, and combat poverty within them.323 The Treaty obliged the Community to ensure 
coherence  with  these  objectives  in  implementing  all  policies  likely  to  affect  developing 
countries.324  These  goals  were  recently  further  refined  in  the  renewed  Community 
development policy in which the primary objectives of the policy are cited as the eradication 
of poverty in the context of sustainable development (including the pursuit of the Millennium 
Development goals) together with the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect
322 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: The European Community’s Development Policy’ COM (2000) 212 final (European 
Community Development Policy) at para 2.1. The Treaty provisions governing development cooperation are 
found in Title XX (arts  177-181) of the EC Treaty (op cit n  170).
323 Article 177(1) EC Treaty ibid.
324 Article 178 EC Treaty.99
for  human  rights.325  These  are  to  be  pursued  by  promoting  ownership  of  development 
strategies  and  programmes  of  partner  countries,  enhanced  policy  dialogue  and  delivering 
increased and more effective  aid.326 In  addition,  the EU will  assist developing countries to 
implement ‘sound’  trade policies, promote regional trade integration and pursue new trading 
opportunities,  specifically  in  the  context  of completing  the  EU-ACP economic  partnership 
agreements (discussed below).327
Development cooperation is a shared competence between the Community and member states 
and  the  Treaty  thus  requires  coherence  between  the  policies  of  the  Community  and  the 
individual  member  states.328  Their  development  cooperation  efforts  have  not  always  been
329  ,
complementary,  however,  which  has  resulted  in  duplication  and  friction  at  times.  The 
Community’s development cooperation activities  are compartmentalised along geographical 
lines,  one  of  which  is  the  ACP  bloc.  The  Community  currently  pursues  its  development 
cooperation policy towards the ACP group through the Cotonou agreement, the successor of
the Lome arrangements.
The  series  of Lome  conventions  represented  the  longest-standing  development cooperation 
arrangement between the ACP group and the EC. Operating from 1975 until 2000 with three 
major re-negotiations, they were touted as the ‘flagship’ of the EC’s development cooperation 
initiatives as their provisions constantly adapted in response to changes and new challenges at
325 Articles 5 and 42 of the European Parliament, Council and Commission,  ‘Joint Statement by the Council and 
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting with the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission on European Union. Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’”  [2006] 
OJ C46/1, which builds on the earlier European Community Development Policy (op cit n 322). Note that 
throughout these documents the terms  ‘development’ policy and  ‘development cooperation’ policy are used 
interchangeably. The Millennium Development goals comprise eight ambitious development-related goals to be 
achieved worldwide by 2015.1 discuss them further in the context of my conclusions in chap 9.
326 Ibid at arts  14,  17 and 23-29 respectively.
327 Ibid at art 72. Environmental partnership agreements are explained below at p  104.
328 See art 177(1) EC Treaty op cit n  170.
329 Article 180 EC Treaty ibid:  ‘[t]he Community and member states shall coordinate their policies on 
development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes.. .They may undertake joint 
action’. See also C Santiso,  ‘Reforming European Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation as an Element of 
Foreign Policy’(2002) 8 European Foreign Affairs Review 395-415 at 404.100
national and international levels.330 They afforded the ACP states a number of concessions, 
the  most  significant  of  which  were  non-reciprocal  trade  preferences  and  economic 
assistance.331  The  agreements  nevertheless  failed to  achieve  their  stated broad objective of 
fostering sustainable socio-economic development in the ACP states.332 Critics argue that the 
agreements  instead  locked  the  ACP  states  into  a  colonial-like  dependency  on  the  EU  by 
hindering their export diversification and discouraging foreign direct investment from outside 
the Community.333
The  agreements  affected  bilateral  fisheries  interactions  between  the  parties  both  via  the 
specific obligations that they imposed on the respective parties in this regard and as a result of 
their broader impact on relations between the parties. Under Lome I, the Community declared 
its willingness to develop the fisheries  ‘and related industries’  of ACP states;  in return, the 
ACP countries were obliged to negotiate bilateral fisheries agreements with the EC’s member 
states that were ‘likely to guarantee satisfactory conditions in the fisheries activities in the sea 
waters  within  their  jurisdiction’/ 34  Lome  I  thus  provided  for  potentially  close  bilateral 
fisheries  relations  between  the  EC  and  individual  ACP  states,  both  in  terms  of  sectoral 
development  and  access  to  coastal  ACP  states’  stocks.  Prior  to  November  1976,  when 
competency to conclude bilateral  fisheries  agreements was transferred to the Community, a 
number of access arrangements were concluded between individual member states and West
330 O Barbarinde and G Faber,  ‘From Lome to Cotonou: ACP-EU Partnership in Transition’ in Barbarinde and 
Faber op cit n 316 at 4.
331 Edye and Linter op cit n 308 at 6.
332 Ibid at 14. The aim of the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (1989) OJ L229/ 3 (Lom6 IV) was ‘to promote and 
expedite the economic, cultural, and social development of the ACP states, and to consolidate and diversify their 
relations’ (art 1). This should be read in the context of the development cooperation objectives outlined in Title 
XX EC Treaty (op cit n  170).
333 Edye and Linter op cit n 308 at  13.
334 Articles 1  and 2 of the Joint Declaration on Fishing Activities, Annex XI to the Lome I op cit n 315.101
African  nations.335  The  1980  access  arrangement  between  Senegal  and  the  EC  was  the 
Community’s first bilateral fisheries agreement with an African nation.
The  obligations  imposed  by  the  current  Cotonou  agreement  are  considerably  less 
demonstrative:  parties  are  merely  constrained  in  their  fisheries  relations  by  broad  policy 
objectives.  Specifically,  the  parties  must  cooperate  to  ‘support  sustainable  policy  and 
institutional reforms and the investment necessary for equitable access to economic activities 
and productive resources’  in pursuit of the sustainable development of fisheries and marine 
resources  in  ACP  states’  coastal  waters.337  They  must  further  cooperate  to  foster  the 
sustainable use and management of natural resources by (inter alia) supporting the fulfilment 
of international  commitments  concerning  marine  and fisheries  resources.338  With  regard to 
bilateral  fisheries  agreements,  the  parties  are  simply  obliged  to  negotiate  agreements 
consistent  with  fisheries  development  strategies.339  To  understand  the  effect  of  these 
provisions as well as the broader impact of the agreements on bilateral fisheries arrangements 
between  the EU  and individual  ACP  states necessitates  a more  in-depth  knowledge  of the 
agreements’  contents.  The most significant themes of the agreements  are trade concessions 
and financial aid and I thus divide my discussion below along these lines.
335 Competency was transferred to the Community via Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 on Certain 
External Aspects of the Creation of a 200-mile Fishing Zone in the Community with Effect from 1 January 1977 
[1981] OJ C l05/1. This should be read together with art 300 EC Treaty (op cit n  170). Agreements were 
concluded for example between Italy and Senegal in January  1975, France and Benin in February 1975 and 
Portugal and Morocco in March  1976. For a discussion of these and other bilateral fisheries agreements 
concluded during the negotiation of UNCLOS (op cit n 25) see JE Carroz and MJ Savini,  ‘The New International 
Law of Fisheries Emerging from Bilateral Agreements’ (1979) Marine Policy 79 -  98. Cross-reference with p 
147 where I refer to these agreements again briefly in the context of a detailed examination of the EU’s bilateral 
fisheries agreement policy.
336 Council Regulation (EEC) 2212/80 of 27 June  1980 on the Conclusion of the Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on the Fishing off the Coast of 
Senegal, of the Protocol, and of the Exchange of Letters referring thereto [1980] OJ L226/16.
337 Article 23 the Cotonou Agreement (op cit n 287).
338 Ibid at art 32(1 )(c)(i).
339 Ibid at art 23(d).102
3.2  The impact of trade concessions on EU-African relations
At its formation, the EEC’s trade policy towards its colonies reflected its internal interests in 
fostering  European  development  in  the  post-World  War  II  period  and  establishing  an 
economic union between  its member states.340  As provided for by the Treaty of Rome, the 
EEC promoted reciprocal trade preferences between itself and the associate states en bloc.341 
Mutual  trade  preferences  were  maintained  in  the  subsequent  Yaounde  agreement  but  the 
initial  single free-trade  area was  replaced by eighteen  free-trade  areas between each of the 
former colonies and the Community. The EEC’s concern with maintaining sound economic 
ties with its former colonies  arose from the desire to protect the commercial interests of its 
member states and to penetrate markets that had previously been the exclusive domain of the 
colonising member states.342
Under the Yaounde agreements, ACP trade with the EEC failed to increase significantly. This 
trend continued under the new non-reciprocal system of trade preferences introduced in Lome 
I, in terms of which ACP industrial and agricultural products enjoyed favourable access to the 
European market. ACP exports lagged behind those of other developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America.343 Factors contributing towards this poor performance included the erosion of 
the  ACP  bloc’s  preference  margin  by  the  EEC’s  introduction  of  a  General  System  of 
Preferences for all non-ACP developing countries and its conclusion of preferential bilateral 
trade agreements with other developing countries; domestic factors within ACP states such as 
trade  policies  and  export  taxes  were  also  instrumental.344  Most  noticeably,  ACP  exports
340 Grill op cit n 298 at 152.
341 Ibid at 137 and art 183 EC Treaty op cit n  170.
342 Grilli ibid at 144 and 160.
343 Almost all industrial products enjoyed tariff- and quota- free access to the EEC market while agricultural 
products were granted less favourable preferences and were required to comply with strict rules concerning their 
origin.
344 Grilli op cit n 298 at 170 and 148,  151. The General System of Preferences (GSP) granted developing 
countries market access for industrial products at tariffs below most favoured nation rate. Examples of103
remained  highly  concentrated  at  both  a  country  and  a  commodity  level,  mirroring  past 
colonial trade patterns.345  A  further influential  factor was  that in  order to benefit from the 
trade  preferences,  products  were  -  and  still  are  -  required  to  ‘originate’  from  ACP  states, 
meaning that were either ‘wholly’ obtained in these states or were obtained in the ACP states 
incorporating  materials  that  had  undergone  ‘sufficient  working  or  processing’  in  these 
states.346 ‘Wholly obtained’  fisheries products are defined in relation to the ownership of the 
fishing vessel rather than whether the fish were caught in the jurisdictional waters of the ACP 
country or not and arguably favour EU-registered vessels.347 If not ‘wholly obtained’ in ACP 
states, processed fisheries products can only be classified as  ‘originating’ from ACP states if 
they are ‘sufficiently worked or processed’ in these states.348 The rules of origin are strict and 
with the exception of minor amendments to, for example, the derogation rules, have remained 
the  same  since  the  first  Lome  convention.  They  have  been  criticised  on  various  grounds 
including their complexity, inflexibility, and their tendency to perpetuate the dependency of 
ACP states on the EU -  they arguably provide  a substantial incentive for coastal states that
lack the capacity to profitably harvest their own stocks to grant the Community fleet access to 
these stocks on terms that favour the EU.349 The rule of origin regarding tuna (particularly 
canned tuna) has been subject to particularly ardent criticism as its restrictiveness results in a
preferential trade agreements are Council Decision (EC) 658/2000 of 28 September 2000 on the Conclusion of 
the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the One Part, and the United Mexican States, of the Other Part [2000] OJ 
L276/46 and Council Decision (EC) 979/2002 of 18 November 2002 on the Conclusion of the Agreement 
establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the One Part, and the 
Republic of Chile, of the Other Part OJ [2002] OJ L352/1.
345 Grilli ibid at 168 and  169.
346 As outlined in Annex V of the Cotonou Agreement ‘Trade regime applicable during the preparatory period 
referred to in article 37(1)’ and Protocol  1  ‘Concerning the definition of the concept of “originating products” 
and methods of administrative cooperation’ at arts 2(1 )(a) and (b) respectively.
347 Ibid at arts 3(1)-3(3).
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‘List of working or processing required to be carried out on non-originating materials in order that the product 
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349 See for example CFFA (Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements),  ‘Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements: 
Fisheries’ (2005) 6J European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) InBrief (ECDPM with 
CTA (Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU), Maastricht 2005) 
<www.ecdpm.org/ftainbriefs> accessed March 2006.104
significant portion of potentially highly-valuable ACP tuna catches being unable to comply 
with the rule and accordingly, not benefiting from preferential access to the EU market.350
The  Cotonou  agreement,  which  replaced  the  Lome  agreements  in  June  2000,  introduced 
fundamental changes to the trade arrangements between the EU and the ACP group.351 These 
changes  aimed  to  foster the  development  of  ‘sound’  economic  policies  in  the  ACP  states 
towards macro-economic stability and to promote trade as an engine of growth and sustained 
development in the ACP states.352 The new system provides for the continued operation of the 
uniform,  non-reciprocal  trade  preferences  instituted  under Lom6  until  January  2008,  when 
they will be replaced by a new WTO-compliant arrangement.  The primary instruments of 
the new arrangement will be a series of negotiated regional economic partnership agreements 
that will mutually liberalise trade between the parties.  Non-reciprocal preferences for least- 
developed  ACP  states  will  be  maintained  under  the EU’s  preference  programme  for least
150 See for example, CFFA ibid, Block L and Qi ynbcrg R  *EU rules of origin for ACP tuna products- (HS Chapter 
16.04)’ (2004) paper for Commonwealth Secretariat. Cross-reference with pp 188, 204 and 205, where I discuss 
this in relation to Senegal. The ACP states’ declaration as recorded in the Cotonou agreement is indicative of 
their dissatisfaction with the existing rules of origin -  they request that all catches harvested in their territorial 
waters and EEZs and those obligatorily landed in their ports should enjoy originating status: Declaration XXXIX 
‘ACP Declaration relating to Protocol  1 of Annex V on the origin of fishery products’, which notes that the 
‘ACP States reaffirm the point of view ... that following the exercise of their sovereign rights over fishery 
resources in the waters within their national jurisdiction, including the exclusive economic zone, as defined in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, all catches effected in those waters and obligatorily 
landed in ports of the ACP States for processing should enjoy originating status’. In March 2005, the 
Commission presented a communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Social and 
Economic Committee on suggested revisions of the rules of origin to make them simpler and more transparent 
(Commission of the European Communities  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Social and Economic Committee: The Rules of Origin in Preferential 
Trade Arrangements - Orientations For the Future’ COM (2005)  100 final). The Communication followed the 
adoption by the Commission of an earlier Green Paper on the topic (Commission of the European Communities 
‘Green Paper on the Future of Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements’ COM (2003) 787 final) and 
with regard to fisheries products, suggested that current criteria relating to characteristics of the fishing vessel 
may need to be reviewed, proposing that the origin of the fish should be based on the flag, registration and 
‘simplified yet adequate conditions’ regarding property, while the crew conditions should be removed (at para 
1.1.1.).
351 Cotonou op cit n 287. The agreement was concluded between the fifteen member states of the EU and 77 
ACP states. The agreement is binding for twenty years, subject to review every five years. Various practical 
components, such as the finance provisions and the trade regime will be re-negotiated at shorter intervals.
352 JA McMahon,  ‘Negotiating Continuity or Change?’ in Barbarinde and Faber op cit n 205 at 32,40 and 50 and 
Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the 
ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century -  Challenges and Options for a New Partnership’ COM (1996) 
570 final (Green Paper on Relations with ACP Countries) at iv and 17.
353 Cotonou op cit n 287 at arts 36 and 37.105
developed  countries  (LDCs),  while  non-reciprocal  trade  relations  under  the  EU’s  General 
System of Preferences will be available for any non-LDC states unable to conclude economic 
partnership agreements.354 In both instances, preferences will be conditional on the country’s
355 ability to comply with the appropriate rules of origin.
The  new  trade  arrangements  are  strongly  rooted  in  a  regionalist  approach  that  promotes 
regional  integration  and  intra-regional  trade  as  means  to  boost  ACP  economic 
development.356 The potential  gains  from  trade  arrangements  based  on  regional  integration 
include  trade  creation  and  increased  direct  foreign  investment,  although  it  is  argued  that 
benefits will be minimal for those poorer states that do not engage in intra-regional trade on 
any significant scale.357 Negotiations for the new trade arrangements are currently underway. 
While it is unclear what their final texts  will contain, they will  likely be rooted in the neo- 
liberal  economic  policies  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  framework  and  will 
attempt to redress the incompatibility of Lome’s non-reciprocal trade regime with the WTO’s
most favoured nation principle, which was highlighted by the  1997 WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panel rulings on the Lome banana protocol.358
354 Article 37. The EU’s non-reciprocal preference programme for LDC countries falls under its ‘Everything But 
Arms’ programme (a special arrangement under its GSP), which grants tariff-free access to the EU market for 
almost all exports other than arms from the 49 UN-classified LDCs. The GSP grants products imported from 
GSP beneficiary countries either duty-free access or tariff reduction on entering the EU market depending on 
whether the products are classified as non-sensitive or sensitive. The current GSP scheme runs from January 
2006 until December 2008 (Council Regulation (EC) No 980/05 of 27 June 2005 Applying a Scheme of 
Generalised Tariff Preferences [2005] OJ L I69/1).
355 The rules of origin for products covered by the GSP are contained in arts 66-97 and annexes  12-18 and 21 of 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 Laying down Provisions for the Implementation of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 Establishing the Community Customs Code [1993] OJ L253/1  as 
amended.
356 Although it is unclear to what extent this support of regionalism aims to promote collective self-reliance or to 
tie these economies more closely to the EU’s  ‘trade orbit’. Wright in Barbarinde and Faber op cit n 316 at 71.
357 Ibid at 84, G Faber, ‘Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration among the ACP Countries’ 
in Babarinde and Faber ibid at 87-92 and DW te Velde and S Bilal,  ‘Foreign Direct Investment in the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement: Building on Private Sector Investment’ in Babarinde and Faber ibid at 93 and  197 -  218.
358 Wright op cit n 316 at 20-22 and 68-70. See ‘EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas -  Complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and United States’ Report of the Panel (22 
May 1997) WT/DS27/R and  ‘Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas’ Report of the 
Appellate Body (9 September  1997) WT/DS27/AB/R. The most favoured national principle requires equal 
treatment and non-discrimination among member states. Although a waiver from WTO rules was subsequently 
granted to the EU and ACP group, it was valid only until 2000.106
The  progression  of the  discussions  on  the  new  trade  arrangements  is  likely  to  provide  an 
insight into how future negotiations on other matters, such as fisheries access arrangements, 
might proceed.359 In  particular, it will be interesting to see how Cotonou’s emphasis on the 
need for regular ‘comprehensive’  and  ‘deep’ political dialogue between the parties plays out 
in  practice  in  these  and  other  future  interactions  between  the  EU  and  ACP  states.  The 
express aim of this commitment is to foster information exchange and mutual understanding 
between the parties and to assess progress towards the  ‘essential elements’  of the agreement 
(respect  for  human  rights,  democratic  principles,  and  the  rule  of  law)  and  ‘good 
governance’.361  Cotonou confirms the  ‘equality’  of the partners and their ownership of their 
respective development strategies, but qualifies this freedom by the obligation to have  ‘due 
regard’  for  the  essential  elements.  The  essential  elements  thus  act  as  constraints  on  the 
development strategies that the ACP states may adopt.  ‘Political dialogue’  and ‘equality’  are 
cited as two of the fundamental development cooperation principles on which the agreement 
is  based,  the  third  being  ‘differentiation  and  regionalisation’.362  This  new  emphasis  on 
proactive,  positive  political  dialogue  between  the  parties  represents  a  culmination  of  the 
parties’  movement  away  from  past  ad-hoc  political  interactions,  which  were  historically 
largely limited to  addressing human  rights  and  democracy concerns.  It  is  echoed in  the 
EU’s  new  policy  on  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  developing  coastal  states  in  the
359 S Ponte, JR Nielsen and L Campling,  ‘Trade and Competitiveness in African Fish Exports: Impacts of WTO 
and EU Negotiations and Regulation’ Trade Brief for Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC),  13 
September 2005, <http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=4070> accessed 20 September 2005 suggest that 
the renegotiation of current bilateral fisheries agreements with developing countries will likely be affected by the 
negotiations of the new EPAs.
360 Cotonou op cit n 287 at arts 8(1) and (2).
361 Ibid at arts 2 and 8(4). The essential elements are outlined in art 9(2) and reflect art 177(2) EC Treaty (op cit n 
170).  ‘Good governance’ refers to ‘transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and 
financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development’ (art 9(4)). It is included as a 
‘fundamental’ rather than an  ‘essential’ element and has risen in status from that of a ‘particular aim’ under 
Lom6 IV, although it remains unclear what the exact legal implications of this new legal classification are.
362 Cotonou ibid at art 2.
363 Grill op cit n 298 at 156-158.107
context of promoting increased coordination between development cooperation and fisheries 
development policies in the future.364
3.3  Economic aid: an instrument for maintaining Africa’s dependence on Europe?
The  second key component of the EU’s  development cooperation policy towards  Africa is 
economic  assistance  (aid), which  similarly originates in the past colonial relations between 
EU member states and various African nations. In the face of increasingly diminished trade 
preferences  afforded  to  the  ACP  bloc  by  the  EU,  aid  has  arguably  played  a  key  role  in 
sustaining relations between the parties. The benefits for the ACP states are obvious: aid is an 
important source of foreign income and international purchasing power, while for the EU, aid 
plays a valuable foreign policy role, serving as a symbol of Europe’s commitment to Africa’s 
development  and  a  sign  of  the  transition  from  bilateral  to  multilateral  socio-economic
365 relations between former African colonies and Europe.
Community  aid  is  frequently  described  as  a  ‘new  aid  model’  in  light  of  its  claims  to 
‘additionality’,  political  neutrality  and  joint  management.366  None  of  these  claims  are 
irrefutable  in  the  context  of ACP  aid,  however.  Instead,  Community  aid  to  African  states 
appears  to  be  strongly rooted in,  and indeed  perpetuates,  colonial  patterns  of dependency. 
Specifically,  with  regard  to  ‘additionality’,  Community  aid  to  the  ACP  states  has  not
367 complemented that of bilateral member state aid over the years, but has instead diminished.
364 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission on an Integrated 
Framework for Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Third Countries’ (FPA Communication) COM (2002) 
637 final. I discuss this policy at pp 151-157 below.
365 Grilli op cit n 298 at 53, 55 and 126.
366 Ibid at 91 and P Hoebink,  ‘European Development Aid in Transition’ in Barbarinde and Faber op cit n 316 at 
128.
367 In terms of art 181a EC Treaty (op cit n 170) Community aid is required to complement that of the member 
states.108
Bilateral aid is thus predominant, particularly between France and its ex-colonies.368 The ACP 
states favour the centralisation (or  ‘Europeanisation’) of EU aid as  a means to reduce their 
political  dependence  on  single  donors,  but  member  states  are  reluctant  to  relinquish  the 
leverage  that  aid  provides  them  in  promoting  their  political  and  economic  objectives.369 
Member states’ political interests have also strongly influenced the distribution of Community 
aid as evidenced by the fact that francophone African countries have remained the preferred 
recipients  of Community  aid  under  the  Lome  conventions,  countering  the  EU’s  claims  to 
political neutrality in its aid distribution.370 This is strengthened by the strong regional focus 
of Community aid, which originates in the Treaty of Rome obligation on the Community to
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provide economic assistance to the (then) colonies of its member states.  Given the colonial 
ties of the member states, Community aid was thus initially channelled primarily to Africa, 
particularly West African states.372 The Yaounde agreements cemented this trend, which was 
subsequently entrenched by the Lome agreements. While the EU has since expanded its aid 
net by extending financial assistance to some Latin American and Asian countries, it has not
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done so on a significant scale.  Finally, adherence to the principle of joint management of 
aid  in  terms  of  which  beneficiary  countries  are  encouraged  to  actively  participate  in 
controlling  the  implementation  of  the  projects  financed  by  the  Community,  has  arguably 
diminished over time; the introduction of ‘programming’ of country aid in the  1980s had the 
effect of ‘narrowing’ recipients’ ownership of their development strategies.374
In light of these characteristics, it can be argued that Community aid is simply a continuation 
of  colonial  patterns  of  socio-economic  dependency  in  another  guise,  as  opposed  to  a
368 Grilli op cit n 298 at 96 -  98 and Hoebink op cit n 366 at 136.
369 Grilli ibid at 75-79.
370 Ibid at 102-105.
371 See art 131EC Treaty op cit n 170.
372 Grilli op cit n 298 at 50, 51.
373 The call has come in particular from countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark.
374 Grilli op cit n 298 at 110,111.109
genuinely new  form of cooperation with  developing states.375  This is  supported by broader 
criticisms of EU aid (both Community and bilateral member state aid), namely that it creates 
unsustainable  consumption  habits,  stifles  local  production  of  traditional  food  staples,  and 
continually finances  external  payment imbalances  in  the recipient  countries.  This  fosters  a 
culture  of  ‘entitlement’  to  aid  within  the  recipient  states  and  cements  a  relationship  of 
dependency on the EU for financial assistance rather than fostering domestic self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency.376
The Cotonou package for financial aid does not differ significantly from the approach under 
the previous development cooperation  agreements but it reflects  some acknowledgement of 
the type of concerns highlighted above.377 Most noticeably, it introduces a change in the way 
in which aid is distributed to individual ACP countries: while aid assignment remains result- 
oriented, delivery is now no longer dependent only on needs but also on performance. This is 
measured  by  states’  progress  in  implementing  institutional  reforms  and  sustainable 
development measures and in reducing poverty, as well as their macro-economic and sectoral 
policy performance.378 Aid is no longer locked into specific projects but is instead linked to 
various  sectoral  policies.  In  line  with  the  agreement’s  new  emphasis  on  civil  society 
involvement, capacity-building is now also eligible to receive financial support.379 The hope 
is that these (and other) changes to the aid component will result in more effective use of aid 
in the ACP states by fostering the development of policies that stimulate domestic economic 
growth and boost employment, thus contributing to poverty-reduction efforts.380 Presumably,
375 As highlighted by Grilli ibid and Hoebink op cit n 366.
376 Grilli ibid at 123,145,  146 and Edye and Linter op cit n 308 at 13,14 and 21.
377 K Arts,  ‘ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou Agreement’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 
95-116 at 110.
378 Cotonou op cit n 287 at arts 3(1 )(a) and (b) and 5 of Annex IV.
379 Ibid at art 7, read together with art 3(2) of Annex IV. See also Hoebink op cit n 366 at 148 and  150-153.
380 Green Paper op cit n 249 at 60 and 61.110
this  will  in  turn  foster  self-sufficiency,  although  this  is  noticeably  absent  as  an  express 
objective.
3.4  Conclusion
The comparative advantages that the EU’s development cooperation policy affords the ACP 
states over other developing countries are gradually being eroded. At the same time, the trade 
and  aid  concessions  granted  to  the  ACP  bloc  by  the  EU  are  increasingly  becoming 
conditional,  as  reflected  in  Cotonou’s  emphasis  on  mutual  obligations  and  accountability
*301
through  political  dialogue  and  reviews  of  aid  performance.  Critics  are  sceptical  as  to 
whether the EU’s new development cooperation  approach towards the ACP states reflects a 
new perception of them as ‘fully-sovereign’ entities unbound by dependant ties to their former 
colonial powers or whether it simply mirrors a reality in which the ACP bloc has decreased in 
strategic importance to the EU.382 While there is no easy answer to this question, it is clear 
that  the  Cotonou  arrangement  largely  maintains  the  historically-rooted  patterns  of  socio­
economic  relations  between  West  African  states  and Europe  (albeit  in  an  amended form), 
which arguably sustains their relationship of unequal inter-dependency.
4.  The impact of the colonial legacy on bilateral fisheries agreements
Marine fisheries in West African coastal states  can make a significant contribution to local 
sustainable development if they are sustainably managed as their export potential guarantees 
foreign  income,  the industry provides  significant job opportunities  (on  vessels  and in  land- 
based industries) and the artisanal  sector contributes toward  local food security.  Bilateral
381 Babarinde and Faber op cit n 316 at 9.
382 Ibid.
383 This is discussed in detail in chap 7 in relation to Senegal.Ill
fisheries agreements between these states and the EU have the potential to support and foster 
this objective, but they have historically failed to do so.384 Instead, they have contributed to 
the unsustainable use of fisheries resources in West African coastal waters. While the reasons 
for this are complex, one such contributing factor is arguably the continuing socio-economic 
dependency of the  West African  states  on the EU.  This renders  them inclined to  grant the 
Community access to their waters on terms that favour the EU’s short-term interests over the 
long-term  sustainability  of  their  coastal  fisheries,  as  I  discuss  in  detail  in  subsequent 
chapters.385
5.  Conclusion
In  this  chapter I  have  outlined the broader context  in  which  bilateral  fisheries  agreements 
between  the  EU  and  West  African  coastal  states  take  place  and  have  suggested  that  the 
historically-based social, political and economic relations between the parties provide a useful 
lens for examining these interactions. Colonial relations between European powers and their 
African territories gave way to initial inter-dependency between the parties and subsequently, 
to  a relationship  of increasingly  unequal  dependency  in  terms  of which  the  African  states 
became  ever-more  reliant  on  the  trade  and  aid  concessions  granted  them  by  Europe. 
Throughout,  African  states  fulfilled  the  role  of  the  suppliers  of  raw  natural  materials  to 
Europe. This sets the background for the bilateral fisheries agreements concluded between the 
EU and many West  African  coastal  states.  In  the remainder of my thesis I focus  on  these 
agreements in greater detail and interrogate their role with respect to sustainability. In the next 
chapter, I begin this process by introducing the EU’s common fisheries policy with particular
384 EC Treaty op cit n 170 at arts  177,  178, which require the EU to ensure coherence between development 
goals and fisheries relations with developing coastal third countries.
In particular, in chaps 6-8.112
attention to its contents regarding Community fleet activity in  ‘external’  waters and bilateral 
fisheries agreements.113
PART II
FISHERIES REGULATION IN THE EU
In Part II, I apply the theoretical narrative presented in Part I to  a domestic policy context. 
Specifically, I narrow my focus to examine the manner in which sustainability objectives and 
broader socio-economic concerns inform the EU’s common fisheries policy. My interest lies 
particularly in whether the operationalisation of the EU’s policy concerning external bilateral 
fishing relations with developing coastal states accords with internal Community integration 
efforts in the fisheries sector, or whether, to the contrary, mere lip-service is paid in bilateral 
fisheries agreements to the promotion of sustainability in the pursuit of political and economic 
self-interests. I begin this investigation in chapter 5, by discussing the incorporation into and 
evolution of sustainability concerns within the Community’s fisheries policy with reference to 
concurrent  integration  efforts  in  the  environmental  sphere.  In  the  subsequent  chapter,  I 
transpose this examination into the realm of the Community’s policy concerning EU fishing 
relations with developing third countries. This sets the scene for my work in Part III, where I 
draw on an illustrative case study to illuminate my theoretical deductions.114
5
THE EU’S COMMON FISHERIES POLICY: SUSTAINABILITY AND
INTEGRATION
1.  Introduction
In the previous chapter I explained how the impact of the colonial legacy between Europe and 
West African coastal states affects their bilateral fisheries relations alongside, and frequently 
over and above,  sustainability concerns.  In  this  chapter I narrow  my focus  to  examine the 
extent  to  which  Community  regulation  of  its  fisheries  is  informed  by  the  objective  of 
sustainability.  The  EU’s  modem  common  fisheries  policy  (CFP)  expressly  obliges  the 
Community fleet  to  engage  in  sustainable  fishing.  This  duty  originated  in  concern  for the 
biological conservation of Europe’s fish stocks. It subsequently evolved into a comprehensive 
obligation to ensure the sustainable exploitation of fisheries within and beyond Community 
waters towards  sustainable  development,  in  response  to EC  Treaty  obligations  to  integrate 
environmental  protection  into  all  Community  policies.386  Regulatory methods  incorporated 
into the CFP towards this end reflect similar trends towards ‘new’ modes of governance in the 
environmental  sphere.  The  CFP,  however,  continues  to  be  plagued  by  difficulties  in 
operationalising its sustainability objectives. Together with its belated incorporation into the 
Community’s fisheries policy, this partly explains why the objective of sustainable fishing has 
been  poorly  promoted  by  the  Community  to  date  most  noticeably  through  its  bilateral 
fisheries agreements with developing third countries.387 In the next chapter I home in further 
to examine EU fishing in terms of these agreements with respect to sustainability.
386 The integration principle is contained in art 6 EC Treaty op cit n 170. It is discussed in detail below in pp 116- 
124.
387 ‘Third countries’ is a term used in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of 
Rome) (adopted 24 March  1957, entered into force 1 January 1958) 298 UNTS  11 and in Community115
2.  The economic origins of the common fisheries policy
The Community’s common fisheries policy (CFP) was established in 1970 on the basis of the 
treaty  provisions  creating  a  common  agricultural  policy.388  Its  goals,  which  reflected  the 
predominant economic ambitions of the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) were 
to create a robust Community fishing industry, increase fisheries productivity and establish a 
common  Community market in  fish  and fish  products.389 The founding pillars  of the CFP 
were thus a common organisation of the market in fishery products and a common structural 
policy for the fishing industry.390
The common  organisation  of the  market was  established to  stabilise the prices  of fisheries 
products  and  to  ensure  coherence  between  supply  and  demand.  To  these  ends,  the  CFP 
provided  for  the  introduction  of  market  organisation  measures  establishing  common 
marketing standards for fresh fish products with regard to quality, packaging and labelling,
introducing a price support system based on financial intervention mechanisms and regulating 
fisheries  trade  with  non-Community  countries.391  The  structural  policy  focused  almost 
exclusively on increasing the catch levels of the Community fleet and provided for substantial
documents. It is not legally defined but simply put, refers to countries that are not member states of the European 
Union.
388 Articles 32-38 EC Treaty (op cit n 170), ex arts 38-43 of the Treaty of Rome ibid.  ‘Agricultural products’ are 
defined as ‘.. .the products of the soil, of stock-farming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing 
directly related to these products’ (art 32(1) ex art 38(1)). Article 3(l)(e) EC Treaty cites Community activities 
as including a common policy in fisheries.
389 Article 33 (1) EC Treaty ibid (ex art 39(1)) and W Howarth,  ‘A Sustainable Common Fisheries Policy’
(2003) Water Law 1  - 6 at 4. See also art 2 of the Treaty of Rome ibid regarding the purposes of the formation of 
the European Economic Community (EEC).
390 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2142/70 of 20 October 1970 on the Common Organisation of the Market in 
Fishery Products [1970] OJ L236/5 and Council Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70 of 20 October  1970 Laying 
Down a Common Structural Policy for the Fishing Industry [1970] OJ L236/1. Over the years, various other 
aspects were added to the policy; the modern CFP comprises five ‘pillars’ namely: a conservation and 
management policy, a fisheries structural policy, the common organisation of fisheries markets, an external 
policy (international fisheries relations sphere), and a monitoring and inspection policy.
See Council Regulation (EEC) No 100/76 of 19 January 1976 on the Common Organisation of the Market in 
Fishery Products [1976] OJ L20/1, which replaced Regulation 2142/70 ibid and its various amendments as a 
consolidated single text of the organisation of the market in fishery products (preamble).116
investment to this end.392 Neither policies paid particular attention to fisheries conservation at 
this early stage; the adverse impact of the structural policy in particular on the sustainability 
of Community fishing  soon  became  evident,  however.  In  terms  of the  policy,  Community 
subsidisation was directed almost exclusively at fleet renewal and modernisation throughout 
the  1970s, resulting in a steady increase in Community fishing capacity.  As the structural 
policy  did  not  regulate  the  relationship  between  fleet  capacity  and  resource  availability, 
however, over-capacity became a growing problem which threatened to adversely affect the 
long-term sustainability of Community fish stocks.394 The Community responded in the early 
1980s  by  imposing  restrictions  on  the  expansion  of  capacity;  at  around  the  same  time, 
fisheries conservation  measures  were  introduced  into the  CFP to  supplement the  structural 
policy.
3.  The introduction of environmental measures into the common fisheries policy and the 
influence of the ‘integration principle’
In 1983 the Community introduced a fisheries conservation and management system aimed at
392 Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/76 of 19 January  1976 laying down a Common Structural 
Policy for the Fishing Industry [1976] OJ L20/9. The term  ‘Community fleet’ is used regularly in Commission 
communications and proposals concerning fisheries and I have used it throughout my thesis. The term is not 
legally defined, but the meaning of ‘Community fishing vessel’ is identified as  ‘a fishing vessel flying the flag of 
a Member State and registered in the Community’. I use the term ‘Community fleet’ to refer collectively to 
fishing vessels operating under the flags of coastal Member States and registered in the Community.
393 Funding was available through Community structural funds (specifically, from the European Agriculture 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund) until  1993, when the Financial Instrument of Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) was 
established to finance the fisheries sector. See Council Regulation (EC) No  1263/99 of 21 June 1999 on the 
Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance [1999] OJ L161/54 to be read together with Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1260/99 of 21 June 1999 Laying Down General Provisions on the Structural Funds [1999] OJ L161/1, 
which outlines all Community’s Structural Funds. For a useful discussion on the development of structural funds 
in the EU, see D Allen,  ‘Cohesion and the Structural Funds: Transfers and Trade-offs’ in H Wallace and W 
Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (4th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) at 243- 
265.
394 D Symes,  ‘The Future of Europe’s Fisheries: Towards a 2020 Vision’ (2001) Geography 86 (4) 318-328 at 
320 and Coffey op cit n 215 at 53. Over-capacity is the excess potential fishing ability of a fleet above what is 
required to harvest the desired catch at the lowest cost (cross-reference to p 80 fn 124). It is a major contributing 
factor to over-fishing (Coffey at 53).117
‘...ensur[ing]...the  conservation  of  the  biological  resources  of  the  sea  and  their 
balanced  exploitation  on  a  lasting  basis  and  in  appropriate  economic  and  social 
conditions...’395
The policy suggested conservation measures to these ends including the restriction of fishing 
effort (particularly by limiting catches), the regulation of fishing gear and the establishment of 
minimum  standards  for  fish  size  and  weight.396  The  cornerstone  of the  new  conservation 
policy was the Council’s capacity to annually determine the total allowable catch (TAC) of 
commercially exploitable species in Community waters  and to allocate portions  (quotas) of 
the TAC  to  individual  member  states.397  The  introduction  of these  conservation  measures 
coincided with broader developments in the Community towards environmental regulation.
While the founding treaties of the EEC  made no mention  of the  environment,  Community 
concern  for environmental  matters  grew  over the  years.  In  1987,  the  Single European  Act 
introduced a legal basis for a Community environmental policy and simultaneously imposed
an obligation on the Community to ensure that ‘environmental protection requirements [were] 
a  component  of  the  Community’s  other  policies’.398  This  ‘integration’  obligation  was 
strengthened in the subsequent 1992 Treaty on European Union, which required Community 
institutions and member states to integrate environmental protection  ‘into the definition and
395 Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January  1983 Establishing a Community System for 
the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources [1983] OJ L24/1. It was introduced together with 
Council Regulation (EEC) No  171/83 of 25 January 1983 Laying Down Certain Technical Measures for the 
Conservation of Fishery Resources [1983] OJ L24/14 (which stipulated technical conservation measures) and 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 172/83 of 25 January 1983 Fixing for Certain Fish Stocks and Groups of Fish 
Stocks Occurring in the Community’s Fishing Zone, Total Allowable Catches for 1982, the Share of these 
Catches Available to the Community, the Allocation of that Share between the Member States and the 
Conditions under which the Total Allowable Catches May be Fished [1983] O J L24 /30 (which fixed the TACs 
for certain stocks for the 1982 fishing season (in terms of art 2) and allocated portions of them to the member 
states (art 3)).
396 Regulation 170/83 ibid at art 2.
397 According to Karagiannakos op cit n 230 at 305. See ibid at art 3. ‘Community waters’ refer to the 
Community’s exclusive economic zone established in terms of Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 op cit n 
335.
398 Single European Act (signed 28 February 1986, entered into force 1 July 1987) [1987] OJ L169/1. The 
integration principle is found in art 130(r).118
implementation  of  other  Community  policies’.399  At  the  same  time,  the  Treaty 
environmental  protection  within  broader  sustainability  concerns  (albeit  with  a 
development gloss), providing that
‘[t]he  Community  shall  have  as  its  task...to  promote  throughout  the  Community  a 
harmonious  and balanced development  of economic  activities,  sustainable  and non- 
inflationary growth respecting the environment’.400
Integration thus emerged in the EU as a guiding paradigm as well as a procedural tool. Rooted 
in the recognition of the interdependency of the  social, economic  and biological  aspects of 
sustainability,  it  obliges  the  Community  to  devise  and  implement  means  to  achieve  an 
effective  balance  between  these  objectives  in  all  spheres  towards  the  overall  goal  of 
sustainable development401 The Community took various steps to foster integration including 
introducing institutional reforms and increasingly highlighting the importance of the principle 
in the Council’s annual environmental action programmes 402 A key outcome of the emphasis
on integration was a fundamental shift in EU environmental regulation away from reliance on 
traditional direct command-and-control regulatory modes, such as binding legislation, towards 
new, more collaborative  and procedurally-based  ‘soft’  law  methods of governance.  This is
399 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) (adopted 7 February 1992, entered into force  1 November 
1993) [1992] OJ C191/1  at art 130(r)(2). M Hession and R Macrory, ‘The Legal Duty of Environmental 
Integration: Commitment and Obligation or Enforceable Right?’ in T O’Riordan and H Voisey The Transition to 
Sustainability: The Politics of  Agenda 21 in Europe (Earthscan Publications Ltd, UK  1998) at 106 argue that 
Community bodies as well as member states, both when acting within the Council of Ministers and in their 
implementation of Community policies, are bound by the duty.
400 Ibid at art 2.
401 Cross-reference with p 63, where I discuss integration as an international law objective.
402 In particular, integration was the main theme of the Council of the European Community’s fifth 
environmental action program: Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, Meeting within the Council of 1 February 1993 on a Community Programme of Policy and 
Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development -  A European Community Programme of 
Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development [1992] OJ C l38/1. The 
programme identified  five key Community spheres requiring integration: industry, energy, transport, agriculture 
and tourism (art 4). See also A Lenschow,  ‘New Regulatory Approaches in “Greening” EU Policies’ (2002) 8 (1) 
European Law Journal  19-37 at 21, 22 and D Wilkinson, ‘Steps Towards Integrating the Environment into Other 
EU Policy Sectors’ in O’Riordon and Voisey op cit n 399 at 118. Institutional reforms included the creation of 
an integration unit in the Environment Directorate-General (D-G XI) and the requirement that each Directorate- 
General (D-G) designate an integration correspondent to liaise between their D-G and DG-XI and to ensure that 
environmental concerns are afforded due consideration within their respective DG.
located
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particularly evident in the area of environmental assessment, where the framework regulatory 
rules are characterised by flexibility and emphasis on procedural instruments and means for 
continual evaluation and adaptation.403
In  fisheries,  integration  efforts  were  fraught  and  progress  towards  the  effective 
accommodation  of  environmental  and  sustainability  concerns  was  slow.  Despite  the 
introduction of conservatory measures into the CFP in  1983, the  1992 review of the policy 
revealed that it had failed to stem the decline of key Community fish stocks and to prevent the 
growing  over-capacity  of  the  Community  fleet.404  The  TAC  system  was  identified  as  a 
particularly problematic  element of the conservation policy.  It was  -  and continues to be - 
criticised on a variety of grounds; some mirror earlier general criticisms of TACs (discussed 
in chapter 3), while others are more context-specific 405 A fundamental weakness of the EU’s 
TAC approach is that it is based on inadequate scientific data: the majority of the TACs set by 
the Council  are  ‘precautionary’,  meaning that they  are  determined on  the  basis  of limited
scientific information. Despite the use of terminology, these TACs have traditionally not been 
determined  using  a  precautionary  approach.406  Relatively  few  ‘analytical’  TACs  are 
established,  that  is TACs  derived  from  analyses  of  ‘sufficient’  scientific  data 407  A  further 
problem is that TACs are determined for only a small percentage of the species harvested in 
Community waters, leaving the remaining stock unregulated, and are established on a single­
403 See J Scott and J Holder, ‘Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union’ in G de Burca 
and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US  (Hart, Oxford 2006) at 217-219.
404 Conservation measures were introduced by Regulation  170/83 op cit n 395. See also YH Song,  ‘The EC’s 
Common Fisheries Policy in the  1990s’ (1995) Ocean Development and International Law 26 (1) 31-55 at 40 
and Foders op cit n 215 at 15. See also Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) Establishing a Community 
System for Fisheries and Aquaculture COM (1992) 387 final.
405 Cross-reference with pp 75-79, where I discuss general criticisms of the TAC system from a sustainability
with p 61  where I discuss the precautionary approach.
407 Karagiannakos op cit n 215 at 236, Coffey op cit n 215 at 38, 39 and Foders op cit n 215 at  17. See 
Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the Application of the Community System for Fisheries and Aquaculture in  1996-1998’ COM
(2000)  15 final at para 1.3 (fn 5) for a description of these different types of quotas. The need to improve 
scientific data was still a major concern come the 2002 CFP review -  see Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 3.1.2 
and Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at para 3.1.
perspective.
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species basis, despite the fact that most targeted stocks occur in mixed fisheries.408 Member 
states are also known to use their political influence to persuade the Council to set TACs in 
excess of scientific recommendations, which contributes to over-fishing.409 The principle of 
‘relative  stability’,  which  guides  the  Council’s  allocation  of  portions  of  the  TACs  to 
individual member states, exacerbates this tendency. The principle, which was introduced to 
promote  stability  in  member  states’  fishing  industries  and  to  avoid  protracted  annual 
negotiations on allocations, guarantees each member state a specific percentage of the TAC 
for  each  species  based  on  their  original  ‘reference  allocation’  in  the  1983  quota 
distributions.410  This  approach  is  inflexible  and  is  therefore  arguably  unconducive  to 
promoting sustainable fishing as it is unable to respond effectively to changes in the status of 
fish stocks.411
Both  under-  and  over-utilisation  of  member  states’  quotas  indicate  problems  with  the 
Community quota system. Quotas are underutilised either because the TAC is unrealistically 
high or because individual vessel owners choose to diversify their catches by including high- 
value, non-TAC species in order to maximise their profits 412 More commonly, member states 
exceed their allocated quotas,  which  contributes  to the  over-exploitation of certain  species. 
‘Quota-hopping’ is also common in terms of which vessels registered in one member state re­
register in another in order to utilise its quota. This occurs either because the original member 
state’s  quota has  already  been  fulfilled  or because  the  second  state  has  a  weaker fisheries
408 Foders ibid at 18, Karagiannakos ibid at 243, Coffey ibid at 39 and Song op cit n 404 at 42.
409 See for example CD Payne,  ‘Policy-making in Nested Institutions: Explaining the Conservation Failure of the 
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 303-24 at 315 and 316, 
Karagiannakos ibid at 236, Foders ibid, Song ibid and Green Paper op cit n 249 at for example para 3.1, 
specifically para 3.1.2.
4  For a brief discussion on the principle of ‘relative stability’, see for example Coffey op cit n 215 at 39 and 
Karagiannakos ibid.
411 Coffey ibid, Payne op cit n 409 at 314, 315 and Karagiannakos ibid at 236 for a discussion of the technical 
problems associated with applying the ‘relative stability’ principle.
Karagiannakos ibid at 244 and Song op cit n 404 at 42.121
monitoring  and  enforcement  system.413  In  terms  of the  CFP,  member  states  have  primary 
responsibility  to  ensure  that  their  fleets  comply  with  the  policy;  the  Commission  merely 
monitors the national authorities’ enforcement of the rules 414 This devolution of enforcement 
and  monitoring  powers  makes  the  effective  control  of  output  measures  (like  quotas) 
particularly difficult because the discretion that it affords member states lends itself to  ‘the 
possibility and the perception’  of unequal enforcement among states 415 The TAC and quota 
system  arguably  also  contributes  to  fleet  over-capacity  as  it  operates  as  an  incentive  for 
fishers to
‘...expand the fishing activity in order to utilise the catch possibilities in an accelerated
way...[to] try to take their share before TACs are taken by other fishermen.’416 
It  is  further  criticised  for contributing  to  high  discard  rates  in  Community  waters,  which 
adversely  affect  the  marine  environment  and  contribute  towards  inaccurate  fish  mortality 
figures.417
The  review  of  the  common  fisheries  policy  exposed  these  and  other  weaknesses  of  the 
conservation  system.  A new  guiding framework for Community fisheries management was 
consequently  introduced.  It  was  rooted  in  the  principle  of  sustainability  and  pledged  to 
promote the
‘protection]  and  conservation  of]  available  and  accessible  living  marine  aquatic 
resources,  and  to  provide  for rational  and  responsible exploitation  on  a  sustainable
413 Holden op cit n 224 at 117,118.
414 Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/02 op cit n 221 stipulates that ‘[u]nless otherwise provided 
in Community law, Member States shall ensure effective control, inspection and enforcement of the rules of the 
Common Fishery Policy’. Control and enforcement rules contained in the regulation (arts 21-28) must be read 
together with Council Regulation (EEC) 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 Establishing a Control System Applicable 
to the Common Fisheries Policy [1993] O J L261/1, which lays out the CFP’s control system in detail.
415 Payne op cit n 218 at 317 and Coffey op cit n 215 at 42.
4,6 Karagiannakos op cit n 215 at 244, Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh op cit n 74 at 151, Foders op cit n 215 
at 18 and Payne ibid at 316.
417 Crean and Symes op cit n 224 (in particular at 427) argue that discarded biomass is one of the main sources of 
the failure of the CFP. See also Song op cit n 404 at 42, Coffey op cit n 215 at 39, Karagiannakos ibid at 427 and 
Foders ibid. Cross-reference with p 77, where I discuss the problem of discarding.122
basis, in appropriate economic and social conditions for the sector, taking account of 
its implications for the marine eco-system...’418 
On  the  whole,  the  new  policy  stuck  to  traditional,  familiar  fisheries  regulatory  methods, 
however, relying largely on rigid control of technical  matters.419 From the start, the system 
was  thus  unlikely to  result  in  significant  improvement in  European  fisheries  management. 
What was needed was  a fresh approach to managing the sector. The impetus for this came 
from amendments to the EC Treaty in the late 1990s, together with the expanded integration 
efforts that they sparked.
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam elevated environmental protection to a guiding objective of 
the EU alongside sustainable development, which was introduced into the Community’s legal 
framework in response to international legal developments and rising internal pressure 420 In 
terms of the revised EC Treaty, key tasks of the Community include
‘promot[ing]  throughout  the  Community  a  harmonious,  balanced  and  sustainable
development  of  economic  activities...[and]  a  high  level  of  protection  and 
improvement of the quality of the environment.’421 
Integration was identified as the means to achieve sustainable development -
‘[environmental  protection  requirements  must  be  integrated  into  the  definition  and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities...in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development’ 422
4,8 Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 Establishing a Community 
System for Fisheries and Aquaculture [1992] OJ L389/ 1.
419 Including the use of total allowable catch and various technical conservation measures -  see arts 8(4) and 4(2) 
ibid.
420 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts -  Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (Treaty of Amsterdam) [1997] OJ C 340/0173  10.11.1997 (signed 2 October 1997, entered into 
force 1 May 1999). N Haigh, ‘Introducing the Concept of Sustainable Development into the Treaties of the 
European Union’  in O’Riordon and Voisey op cit n 399 at 71 and Lenschow op cit n 401  at 26. The countries 
that sought increased reference to environmental concerns in the Treaty, particularly the inclusion of the concept 
of sustainable development, included Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Austria (the latter three - 
incorporated in the 1995 enlargement - were the most vocal).
421 Article 2 EC Treaty (op cit n 170) as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam ibid.123
In  an  attempt  to  drive  the  integration  process  forward,  the  Commission  released  an 
‘integration strategy’ in 1998, which was subsequently adopted by the Council and served as a 
reference  point  for  integration  initiatives  in  the  various  Community  sectors  (including 
fisheries).423 The EU’s 2001  sustainable development  strategy went a step further,  obliging 
the  Council  to  develop  sectoral  strategies  to  integrate  environmental  concerns  into  all 
Community policy areas with  a view to implementation as soon as possible.424 In  fisheries, 
the  strategy emphasised the need to  improve  fisheries  management in  order to  reverse the 
decline in key stocks and to ensure sustainable fisheries and marine ecosystem management 
within Community waters and beyond. To achieve these goals, it recommended that during 
the  next  CFP  review  policies  should  be  established  eliminating  fisheries  subsidies  that 
encourage  over-fishing  and  facilitating  the  reduction  of  the  size  and  activity  of  the 
Community fleet to levels compatible with sustainability 425
The  2002  review  acknowledged the  need for  an  overhaul  of the  CFP  in  order to  actively 
promote  integration  towards  the  fostering of genuine  sustainable  fishing.  A  number of the 
earlier sustainable development strategy’s suggestions were adopted in the 2002 restructuring 
of the environmental, structural and external fishing pillars of the CFP (as I discuss below)426 
Reflecting  a  move  towards  less  traditional  regulatory  methods  in  the  drive  towards 
integration, environmental assessment was identified as the most appropriate procedural tool 
to realise the integration obligation within the Community in 2001 427 A Community directive
422 Article 6 EC Treaty.
423 It was adopted by the Council of Ministers at its  1998 Cardiff Summit. European Commission ‘Commission 
Communication to the European Council: Partnership for Integration -  A Strategy for Integrating the 
Environment into European Union Policies’ COM (1998) 333, following the European Council Summit in 
Cardiff,  1998.
424 Communication from the Commission,  ‘A  Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union 
Strategy for Sustainable Development (Commission’s Proposal to the Gothenburg European Council)’ COM
(2001) 264 final.
425 Ibid at 12.
426 At para 4.
427 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the Assessment of 
the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment [2001] OJ L I87/30. The regulation came into124
outlined the circumstances under which environmental assessment of programmes and plans 
in sectors (including fisheries) should be conducted to this end.428 A further important policy 
step was taken in  2005  when, in the context of promoting environmental sustainability, the 
EU endorsed the  findings  of the Europe  2005  Ecological Footprint Analysis report 429 The 
report,  which  applies  the  ‘ecological  footprint’  analysis  to  measure  Europe’s  demand  on 
nature by calculating the total area required to produce the food and fibre that it consumes, 
absorb its waste  and provide  space  for its  infrastructure,  indicates that Europe  is  currently 
‘overshooting’ its own biocapacity (the capacity of its natural resources to renew themselves) 
by more than double 430 Policy and law as well  as  a change in public  attitude thus need to 
urgently affect changes in European consumption and production patterns to benefit not only 
Europe but also the rest of the (largely developing) world on which Europe relies to make up 
its increasing ecological deficit.
The  changes  initiated  in  the  fisheries  sector in  response  to  these  various  developments  in 
Community law and policy became most apparent at the 2002 CFP review.
4.  ‘Sustainability’ as an imperative of the common fisheries policy
The  2002  review  of  the  CFP  revealed  the  policy’s  continued  failure  to  successfully 
accommodate  environmental  protection  into  Community  fisheries  and  to  address 
sustainability concerns,  and highlighted the need to fundamentally re-shape its contents and
force in July 2004. Cross-reference with p  119 above where I discuss environmental assessment in the context of 
‘new’ methods of governance.
428 Ibid at art 2 includes fisheries in the cited sectors. Environmental assessment is a procedure for decision­
making that requires environmental considerations to be taken into account in determining whether or not to 
proceed with proposed projects, plans or policies. It includes environmental impact assessment of plans polices 
and programs. Cross-reference with the requirement to conduct impact assessments of proposed fisheries 
partnership agreements (p 153).
9 WWF 2005 op cit n  1.
430 Ibid at 6. The ecological footprint was first conceived by WE Rees in ‘Ecological Footprints and 
Appropriated Carrying Capacity: What Urban Economics Leaves Out’ (1992) 4 (2) Environment and 
Urbanisation 121-130.1 discuss it in greater detail below at pp 248-250.125
regulatory methods.431 Specifically, the Commission noted the ‘alarming’ state of Community 
fish  stocks,  the  excessive  fishing  capacity  of the  Community  fleet  and  the  poor record of 
control and enforcement in EU fisheries, concluding that
\..[t]he current poor sustainability performance of the CFP proves that many of the 
instruments applied over the last twenty years have reached their limits. In this state of 
crisis there is a need for major change. Reform of the objectives, principles, priorities 
and  instruments  of  the  CFP  is  more  than  ever  necessary  to  deliver  sustainable 
development...,432
Change was initiated through a number of key legislative and policy reforms including new 
regulations  in  the  conservation  and  structural  sphere  and  a  new  distant  water  fishing
433 strategy.
4.1  The new conservation policy
Regulation 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries introduced
the new objective of the CFP as follows:
‘...to provide for sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources...in the context 
of sustainable development, taking account of the environmental, economic and social 
aspects in a balanced manner’.434
‘Sustainable exploitation’ is defined by the Regulation as
‘...the exploitation of a stock in  such  a way that the future exploitation of the stock 
will not be prejudiced and that it does not have a negative impact on the marine eco­
system’ .435
431 Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 3.1.1.
432 Roadmap Communication op cit n 221  at Introduction and Conclusion.
433 1 discuss the new distant water fishing strategy, particularly with regard to bilateral fisheries agreements, in
detail in chap 6.
434 Regulation 2371/02 op cit n 221 at preamble at para 4.126
The regulation retains some old methods to achieve these new objectives (such as Council- 
determined technical conservation measures), but also introduces potentially more innovative, 
holistic regulatory means. For example, it requires the Council to progressively promote the 
implementation of an ecosystems-based approach to fisheries management and to adopt new 
measures  to  achieve  sustainable  fisheries  exploitation.436  The  Council  is  required  to  take 
available scientific, technical and economic advice into account in devising these measures 437 
In the absence of adequate scientific information, it must apply the precautionary approach 438 
This is in compliance with the EC Treaty, which endorses the precautionary principle towards 
promoting a ‘high level’ of environmental protection.439 In particular, the Council must adopt 
measures  that  aim  to  limit  fish  mortality,  minimise  the  environmental  impact  of  fishing 
activities and reduce juvenile catches and discards.440 Member states are bound to apply these 
measures but may also impose conservation and management measures in their own waters 
provided that they are no less  stringent than Community rules  and that  they only apply to 
national vessels.441  Under certain circumstances member states may also impose emergency
conservation  measures  in  their  waters  to  protect  living  aquatic  resources  or  the  marine
442 ecosystem.
435 Ibid at art 3(e).
436 Ibid at art 2(1) read together with art 4.
437 Ibid at art 4(2). The Commission is required to make reference to reports from the Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee (STECF) and advice from the new Regional Advisory Councils. Article 33 provides for 
the establishment of the STECF; the Commission is required to consult the STECF ‘at regular intervals’ on 
living marine resource conservation and management matters, including ‘biological, economic, environmental, 
social and technical considerations’ (art 33(1)). Regional Advisory Councils are to be established by the Council 
for marine areas under the jurisdiction of at least two member states. It is envisaged that they will represent a 
variety of stakeholders’ interests and will advise the Commission on fisheries management matters in the areas 
under their jurisdiction (arts 31, 32). Recommendations of the Commission for improving the quality and 
quantity of fisheries scientific information were outlined in the Roadmap Communication (op cit n 221 at para 
1.1).
438 Regulation 2371/02 ibid at preamble and arts 2(1), 5(3) and 6(3). Also see Roadmap Communication ibid at 
para 1.1 and Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 5.1.1.
Article 174(2) EC Treaty (op cit n 170).
440 Regulation 2371/02 op cit n 221  at art 4(2). These suggested conservation methods reflect recommendations 
in the Commission’s Roadmap Communication (op cit n 221  at paras 1.1 and 1.2). These regulatory provisions 
must be read together with Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the Conservation of 
Fishery Resources through Technical Measures for the Protection of Juveniles of Marine Organisms [1998] O J 
L125/1.
441 Regulation 2371/02 ibid at art 10.
442 Ibid at art 8.127
An important feature of the new conservation policy is that while it retains the TAC and quota 
system,  together with the  ‘relative  stability’  principle, it supplements them with  a broader, 
more  flexible  multi-annual  management  approach  which  is  expressly  aimed  at  fostering 
sustainable fisheries exploitation.443 In terms of this approach, the Council must adopt multi­
annual  ‘management plans’  based  on  recommended  scientific  reference  points  to  maintain 
Community  fish  stocks  within  safe  biological  limits;  for  species  that  are  over-fished,  the 
Council is required to introduce multi-annual ‘recovery plans’ that facilitate their recovery.444 
The Council has relative freedom to devise these plans according to fish stocks’ needs and is 
granted  the  capacity  to  extend  these  plans  beyond  single  species  to  mixed  fisheries  -  this 
responds  to past criticisms  of the  policy’s  failure to manage Community  fish  stocks  more 
holistically.445
A  Community  action  plan  to  address  environmental  challenges  in  the  fisheries  sector was 
introduced  in  2002  to  complement  these  legislative  reforms.446  The  plan  presents  key
principles to guide environmental  integration in Community fisheries,  including precaution, 
prevention, and the progressive implementation  of an ecosystem-based approach  (reflecting 
the  key  drivers  of  the  conservation  regulation)  and  identifies  measures  requiring  priority 
management  action  to  this  end.447  It  is  target-driven  and  includes  a  timetable  for 
implementation.448  Progress  has  already  been  made  towards  various  legislative  and  policy
443 Roadmap Communication op cit n 221  at para 3. In terms of art 20(1) of Regulation 2371/02 ibid, quotas are 
to be allocated by the Council to Member States in ‘...such a way as to assure each Member State relative 
stability of fishing activities for each stock or fishery’.
444 Regulation 2371/02 ibid at arts 5 and 6. See also Roadmap Communication ibid at para 1.1 and Green Paper 
op cit n 249 at para 5.1.1.
Ibid at arts 5(3) and 6(3). The regulation does not elaborate on the possibility of adopting multi-species TACs, 
however. Cross-reference with earlier criticisms of the single-species management approach (at pp  119,  120).
446 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission setting out a Community 
Action Plan to Integrate Environmental Protection Requirements into the Common Fisheries Policy’ 
(Environmental Integration Communication) COM (2002)  186 final.
447 The principles are outlined in art 3 ibid, while arts 4 and 5 prescribe ‘priority’ and ‘complementary’ 
management measures respectively. The Communication is based on an earlier Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,  ‘Fisheries Management and Nature Conservation in 
the Marine Environment’ COM (1999) 363 final.
448 Annex to the Environmental Integration Communication ibid.128
goals including the regulatory elimination of public funding for fleet modernisation (discussed 
below)  and  provision  for  the  adoption  of new  technical  conservation  measures  to  reduce 
discards and by-catch.449 With regard to fishing beyond Community waters, the action plan 
obliges the Community to demonstrate the same commitment to environmental integration in 
its  external  activities  as  internally  and  requires  the  Community  to  adopt  a  strategy  that 
contributes towards global sustainable fishing 450 A new strategy for the EC distant water fleet 
was introduced in 2002, the main components of which are being progressively implemented, 
as I discuss in greater detail in chapter 6 451
A  further  complementary  instrument,  the  2003  European  Code  of  Sustainable  and 
Responsible Fisheries Practices - a ‘soft’  law policy document - outlines guidelines to assist 
EU fishing operators in implementing sustainable fisheries practices.452 The Code is based on 
the FAO’s voluntary Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and supplements the CFP 453 
It suggests, for example, that to avoid over-fishing, fishers should use only the amount of gear
that  is  necessary  and  to  reduce  discards,  operators  should  avoid  fishing  in  areas  that  are 
densely populated by  stocks  unlikely  to  be retained on  board  (due  to  their  size,  nature or 
condition).454
449 See p 129 below on the new structural policy. Regulation 2371/02 op cit n 221 at arts 4(2)(g)(iv) and 4(2)(h) 
provides for the introduction of new technical conservation measures to these ends. See also Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,  ‘Promoting More Environmentally-Friendly 
Fishing Methods: The Role of Technical Conservation Measures’ COM (2004) 438 final.
450 Environmental Integration Communication op cit n 446 at art 3 and Annex.
451 Outlined in Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at para 5. See pp 151-157 for a discussion on the new 
bilateral fisheries relations policy. Progressive implementation has begun through the release of the Commission 
of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission: Community Action Plan for the 
Eradication of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’ COM (2002)  180 final and the FPA Communication 
op cit n 364 (together with Council Conclusions 11485/1/04 on the Commission Communication on an 
Integrated Framework for Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Third Countries (Brussels,  15 July 2004)).
452 European Commission, European Code of Sustainable and Responsible Fisheries Practices (European Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries) (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities 2004).
453 It applies to Community fishing activities both in Community and external waters -ibid at 5. FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries op cit n 126
454 European Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries ibid at 8 (para 5) and 9 (para 7).129
4.2 The impact on the structural policy
The  focus  on  environmental  concerns  and  sustainability during  the  2002  CFP review  also 
prompted  major  changes  in  the  policy’s  structural  sphere,  as  despite  various  Community 
efforts over the years to curtail subsidisation and prevent capacity expansion, there had been 
minimal positive results. Already in  1983, the Community introduced fleet reduction targets 
for member states to be implemented via multi-annual guidance plans (MAGPs). The MAGPs 
proved largely inefficient, however, as their reduction targets were arguably too low and they 
were  poorly  enforced.455  Furthermore,  while  stricter  funding  conditions  were  imposed  for 
fleet  renewal  and  vessel  modernisation,  these  activities  nevertheless  continued  to  receive 
substantial Community support and fleet capacity thus expanded 456 Subsidies also fuelled an 
increasing asymmetry between the number of fishers entering the industry and those leaving 
it 457  Over-capacity  thus  became  and  continues  to  be  one  of  the  leading  causes  of  the 
continuous decline of fish stocks in Community waters.458
During the review the Community acknowledged the need to further reduce its fleet capacity 
to ensure the sustainability of its fisheries, noting that a reduction in fishing effort of up to 60 
percent in several Community fisheries is required 459 Reduced Community fleet capacity is 
also vital to promote sustainable fishing in third country waters because as long as the over­
capacity problem persists, the Community is likely to continue to subsidise its vessels to fish
455 Coffey op cit n 215 at 29, Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 3.3 and Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at 
para 2.2. Milazzo op cit n 232 at 66, 67 concurs that restructuring efforts to date have not resulted in a significant 
change in the profile of the EU fishing fleet.
456 Cunningham, Dunn and Whitemarsh op cit n 74 at 72.
457 Subsidisation enabled fishers to enter the industry with minimal personal investment and guaranteed them 
profits. Schrank op cit n 252 at 31, Suris-Regueiro,Varela-Lafuente and Garza-Gil op cit n 274, Cunningham, 
Dunn and Whitemarsh ibid at 98, Cunningham and Maguire op cit n 2045at 64, Symes and Crean op cit n  105 at 
176, Coffey op cit n 215 at 26 and Milazzo op cit n 232 at 21.
458 S6ng op cit n 404 at 43, Foders op cit n 215 at 23 and Symes op cit n 394 at 327.
459 Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at paras  1 and 3.2. Fishing effort refers to the combination of fishing 
capacity and labour and time spent fishing. Cross-reference with p 80 at fn 241. See also Green Paper op cit n 
249 at para 3.3, Song ibid, Symes ibid at 320, 327 and Coffey op cit n 215 at 53.130
in  foreign  (largely  developing  country)  waters;  this  compounds  the  over-exploitation 
problems which already exist in many of these countries.460
Following the review, the Community thus introduced a new fisheries structural policy with 
the  express  objective  of achieving  a balance between  the  Community  fleet’s  capacity  and 
available fishing opportunities; the policy’s main thrust is to re-direct funding away from fleet 
modernisation towards  structural  measures that promote this  goal.461  Specifically, funds are 
available to  member states  for various  actions  designed to permanently  stop  or reduce the 
fishing  activities  of their  fleets.  This  includes  scrapping  vessels,  permanently  transferring 
them to  a third country  (including  as part of joint enterprises)  or permanently re-assigning 
them for non-profitable purposes other than fishing; member states retain relative freedom in 
how they elect to reduce their fleet.462 Funding is also available for various social measures 
designed to alleviate the adverse impacts of this restructuring, including retirement schemes 
for vessel owners and crew, compensatory lump sum payments for vessel crew who exit the
industry permanently and assistance for fishers diversifying their work activities 463 Subsidies 
to  build  and  modernise  vessels  remain  available  but  are  subject  to  strict  conditions  -
460 As I discuss below at pp  148,  149. See also VM Kaczynski and DL Fluharty,  ‘European Policies in West 
Africa: Who Benefits from Fisheries Agreements?’ (2002) 26 Marine Policy 75-93 at 77 and 90, Foders op cit n 
215 at 23 and Milazzo op cit n 232 at 7 8 .1 examine this phenomenon with reference to the case study of Senegal 
in chaps 7 and 8.
461 Council Regulation (EC) No 2369/02 of 20 December 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 Laying 
Down the Detailed Rules and Arrangements Regarding Community Structural Assistance in the Fisheries Sector
[2002]  OJ L358/49 (preamble) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/99 of 17 December 1999 Laying Down 
the Detailed Rules and Arrangements Regarding Community Structural Assistance in the Fisheries Sector [1999] 
OJ L337/10 (at art 1(1)). The 2002 regulation substantially alters the earlier regulation by (inter alia) inserting art 
1(3), which stipulates that structural assistance measures must not increase fishing effort, and deleting art 6 
which provided for ‘fleet renewal and modernisation of fishing vessels’ (see arts  1(1) and 1(6) of the 2002 
regulation).
46  Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of Regulation 2369/02 ibid read together with art 7of Regulation 2792/99 ibid. The 
legislative framework concerning joint enterprises is contained in art 8 of the regulations.
46  Details of these measures and available funding can be found in the European Commission, Financial 
Instruments for Fisheries Guidance: Instructions for Use (European Communities Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 2003) at 9, 31. See also the Commission’s comments 
in this regard in its Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 5.7.1 and its Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at para 
2.1. Council Regulation (EC) No  1421/04 of 19 July 2004 Amending Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 Laying 
Down the Detailed Rules and Arrangements Regarding Community Structural Assistance in the Fisheries Sector
[2004]  OJ L260/1 provides for the possibility of supplementary aid for scrapping when a recovery plan adopted 
by the Council or emergency measures adopted by the Commission or a member state forces crew members to 
give up fishing (see art 2, which amends art 12(3) of the 1999 regulation).131
modernisation may not increase the capacity of the vessel in question or the effectiveness of 
its fishing gear and member states seeking to build new vessels must comply with their fleet 
reduction targets.464
Strict  control  of  member  states’  fleet  size  was  seen  as  remaining  imperative;  the  2002 
conservation policy thus introduced new  ‘reference levels’  for national fishing fleets which 
replaced the previous multi-annual guidance plans. Member States are obliged to adjust their 
fishing capacity to these levels (via the means described above) with a view to achieving ‘...a 
stable and enduring balance between  ...fishing  capacity and their fishing opportunities’.465 
Reference levels provide an  ‘overall ceiling’  for national fishing capacity in terms of which 
any  new  entries  into  the  fleet  must  be  accompanied  by  an  equivalent  withdrawal  of 
capacity.466 Member states  can  ensure  that  their fleet  capacity  is  kept  within  the  specified 
limits, through their vessel licensing schemes.467 In an effort to aggressively foster sustainable 
fishing, the new structural policy provides that funding for fleet renewal and the transferral of
Community vessels to third countries is only available until 31 December 2004.468
New institutional mechanisms have developed to facilitate the realisation of these structural 
policy  goals.  Most  noticeably,  a European  Fisheries  Fund  is  due  to  replace  the  Financial 
Instrument  for  Fisheries  Guidance  from  2007  with  the  specific  objective  of  securing
464 Article 9(1) of Regulation 2369/02 op cit n 459 and art 11 of Regulation 2371/02 op cit n 221.
465 Article 11(1) of Regulation 2371/2002 ibid.
466 Article 12 (1) ibid. The new ‘reference levels’ are based on the objectives of the last MAGP (MAGPIV, 
1997-2002) and are expressed in terms of the vessel’s tonnage (GT) and power (kW).
467 This information is required in terms of Council Regulation (EC) 690/93 of 20 December 1993 Establishing a 
Community System Laying Down Rules of the Minimum Information to be Contained in Fishing Licences 
[1993] OJ L341/93. Article 11 of Regulation 2371/02 (ibid) requires all vessels in Community waters to be 
licenced; it should be read together with art 5 of Regulation 3760/92 (op cit n 418), which provides for the 
introduction of a general Community system of fishing licences.
^Articles 9(1) and 7(3) respectively of Regulation 2369/02 op cit n 461. Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1438/03 of 12 August 2003 Laying Down Implementing Rules on the Community Fleet Policy as defined in 
Chapter HI of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 [2003] OJ L204/21, sets out rules for implementing this 
decision. There have, however, been recent calls to reintroduce these subsidies through the European Fisheries 
Fund. See Committee on Fisheries (European Parliament),  ‘Report on the Proposal for Council Regulation on the 
European Fisheries Fund’ COM (2004) 497 final.132
sustainable fisheries.469 It aims to achieve this by promoting the reduction of the Community 
fleet, the use of more environmentally-friendly gear and the diminished dependency of coastal 
communities on fishing 470
5.  Progress towards sustainable Community fishing
Despite  numerous  revisions  of  the  CFP  over  the  years,  including  its  comprehensive 
restructuring in 2002, over-fishing and the resultant decline of key fish stocks in Community 
waters remain  two of the greatest problems within EU fisheries.  This  was highlighted in  a 
2004 Community evaluation of environmental integration efforts in the EU fishing sector 471 
The  report  focused  on  progress  towards  priority  objectives  such  as  the  promotion  of 
sustainable fisheries development, the reduction of fishing pressure to sustainable levels, the 
implementation of an ecosystems approach to fisheries management, and the elimination of 
public aid for fleet modernisation and renewal.472 It acknowledged that while the 2002 CFP 
reforms had established the means to pursue these goals, many of the proposed reforms had 
yet to be effectively implemented; new and improved regulatory methods could only take the 
integration  process  so  far.  Most  noticeably,  a  pressing  need  remains  to  further  drastically 
reduce fishing effort in Community waters.473
To  address  the  problematic  state  of  Community  fish  stocks,  the  Commission  recently 
proposed  a  fisheries  management  policy  aimed  at  maintaining  or  restoring  depleted
469 European Commission,  ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation: European Fisheries Fund’ COM (2004) 497 final. 
The current FIFG framework for the period of 2000 -  2006 is regulated by Regulation 1263/99 op cit n 393 as 
amended by Regulation 2369/02 (ibid).
470 Ibid at art 4.
471 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Commission Working Document Integrating Environmental 
Considerations into other Policy Areas -  A Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process’ COM (2004) 394 final.
472 Ibid at para 3.7.
473 Ibid.133
Community  stocks  to  maximum  sustainable  yield  (MSY)  levels  by  2015.474  The  policy 
advocates  ‘obtaining  the  best  from  the  productive  potential  of  Europe’s  living  marine 
resources, without compromising its use for future generations’.475 Within the framework of 
the stock plans envisaged by the CFP’s 2002 conservation regulation, it proposes the short­
term reduction of catch levels in Community waters (relying on the CFP’s structural policy to 
alleviate associated financial hardships) followed by an incremental increase in capture rates 
‘in a sustainable manner’ as stock rates become healthier 476 To implement this approach, the 
Council must first adopt suitable stock targets (as a key component of its stock plans). It will 
then be up to individual member states to decide on their respective pace of change to reach 
these  objectives  and  the  way  in  which  they  will  manage  the  transition  (by  reducing  fleet 
capacity  or reducing  fishing  efficiency) 477  The  policy  is  presented  as  compatible  with  an 
integrated, ecosystem-based approach to Community fisheries and oceans management 478  It 
envisages  substantial  stakeholder input into the Council’s  determination  of long-term stock 
plans and grants member states significant freedom in realising the stock targets established in 
these plans 479
One of the main contributing factors  to over-fishing in  Community waters continues  to be 
fleet over-capacity. While official Community reports cite progress towards reduced capacity, 
the EU nevertheless continues to generously subsidise capacity-expanding activities:  for the 
period of 2002-2005, Euros 565 208 was spent on constructing new vessels, Euros 290 278 on
474 In order to comply with commitments made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Implementing Sustainability 
in EU Fisheries Through Maximum Sustainable Yield’ COM (2006) 360 final.
475 Ibid at para 1.
476 Ibid at paras 3.1 and 3.3.
477 Ibid at paras 3.3 and 4.
478 Ibid at paras 3.1 and 3.3
479 Ibid at para 3.3 regarding input into the plans and para 4.134
modernising existing vessels and a further Euros 1 333 406 on ‘other’ areas; in contrast, only 
Euros 482 504 was dedicated to scrapping vessels.480
The deteriorating status of the Community’s broader marine environment - largely as a result 
of  commercial  fishing  -  is  also  particularly  worrying481  In  response  to  the  failure  of 
traditionally  sectoral-based  strategies  to  protect  the  Community’s  oceans,  the  Commission 
recently advocated an integrated approach aimed at achieving ‘good environmental status’ of 
the  Community’s  marine  environment  in  a  proposed  directive.482  This  will  entail  the 
establishment of marine management regions by member states in which they will be required 
to  implement  strategies  towards  securing  ‘good  environmental  status’  -  the  term,  which 
echoes  policy  goals  in  other  spheres,  is  defined  from  an  ecosystem  perspective  and  is 
recognised as a goal which is necessarily dynamic.483 Member states will be obliged to take 
fish  populations  into  account in  developing  their strategies,  but  any  fisheries  management 
measures  required  in  terms  of  them  will  have  to  be  instituted  under  the  CFP’s  2002
conservation regulation.484
The  promotion  of  sustainable  Community  fishing  also  requires  increased  compliance  of 
member states’ fleet with the CFP. Traditionally, compliance has been poor and enforcement 
by the member states has been  weak and erratic.485  A new  regulatory framework  aimed at
480 European Commission, Facts and Figures on the CFP: Basic Data on the Common Fisheries Policy 
(Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 2006) at 12,  13 and 
25.
481 Preamble (para 23) and art 2 of Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Proposal for a Directive for the 
European Parliament and the Council establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine 
Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Directive)’ COM (2005) 505 final.
482 Ibid at artl  and para 3 of ‘Explanatory Memorandum’. The long-term goal is to establish an EU maritime 
policy, which will foster the development of a ‘thriving maritime economy’ and ‘the full potential of sea-based 
activity in an environmentally sustainable manner’ (para 1 of ‘Explanatory Memorandum’).
483 Ibid at preamble (para 23) and art 2. In the EU’s water policy, the concept of ‘good’ surface and groundwater 
status is employed -  see Council Directive (EU) No 2000/60 of 23 October 2000 Establishing a Framework for 
Community Action in the Field of Water Policy OJ L327/1  at art 4(1)(1).
484 Ibid at arts 7, 28 and table 1 of annex II. See Regulation 2371/02 op cit n 220.
485 Roadmap Communication op cit n 221  at para 4.1 and Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 3.5.135
improved  monitoring  and  enforcement  was  thus  introduced  in  2002 486  It  responds  in 
particular  to  the  demand  for  greater  harmonisation  in  member  states’  enforcement 
mechanisms and for an increased, more clearly-defined, role for the Community. The system 
clarifies the respective roles of the member states and the Community and provides detailed 
guidance  on  the  fulfilment  of  their  various  duties.  Specifically,  member  states  retain 
responsibility for ensuring the  ‘effective control, inspection and enforcement of rules’  of the 
CFP,  including  the  obligation  to  take  ‘appropriate’  follow-up  measures  on  infringements; 
suggested inspection  and enforcement measures  are cited.487  The  Community’s  powers  are 
enhanced,  but  it  continues  to  play  an  overseeing  role,  evaluating  and  controlling  the 
application of the rules by the member states  and facilitating coordination  and cooperation 
between them 488 A proposal for the establishment of a joint fisheries inspection structure at 
Community level  to  assist  the  Community and  member  states  in  fulfilling  their respective 
obligations was released in 2004.489 The structure was established in 2005 and is currently in 
the process of being operationalised.490
On the whole it appears that the Community’s progress towards sustainable fishing continues 
to be slow, as acknowledged both by the Community and outside critics.491
The Control and Enforcement system is contained in chapV (arts 21-28) of Regulation 2371/02 (op cit n 221). 
These provisions supplement the existing CFP control system contained in Regulation 2847/93 (op cit n 414).
Articles 23(1), 24 and 25 of Regulation 2371/02 ibid. Member states are obliged to control fishing activities 
in waters subject to their sovereignty or jurisdiction and in Community waters as well as in external waters by 
Community vessels flying their flag (art 23(2)).
488 Ibid at arts 27 and 28.
European Commission,  ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Common Fisheries Control Agency 
and amending Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 Establishing a Control System Applicable to the Common Fisheries 
Policy* COM (2004) 289 final. In response to suggestions in the Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at para 
4.4 and the earlier Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 5.6.
490 Council Regulation (EC) No 768/05 of 26 April 2005 Establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency 
and Amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 Establishing a Control System Applicable to the Common Fishery 
Policy [2005] OJ L128/1.
491 See for example Song op cit n 404 at 42, Payne op cit n 409 at 304, 306, Symes op cit n 394 and Foders op cit 
n 215 at 15. See also Roadmap Communication op cit n 221  and Green Paper op cit n 249 at 5.136
6, Conclusion
The  CFP  has  undergone  a  significant  transformation  since  its  inception,  evolving  from  a 
policy that had little regard for the environmental impacts of Community fishing to one that 
emphatically  advocates  sustainable  fishing  within  the  context  of  protecting  the  marine 
ecosystem. Its policies, regulations and measures have been constantly re-shaped to actively 
promote these goals in response to increasing over-capacity and the decline of key fish stocks, 
with  alternative  methods  of regulation  introduced to  complement  traditional  means.  While 
some  progress  has  been  made,  the  CFP  has  nevertheless  failed  to  date  to  prevent  the 
continued deterioration of the Community’s marine environment and to ensure the sustainable 
use  of its  fisheries.  Renewed  efforts  are  underway  to  pursue  these  imperatives  within  the 
framework  of  an  integrated,  ecosystems-based  approach  to  marine  management  which 
embraces  ever-more  policy-oriented  and  procedurally-based  means  to  achieve  its  goals;  it 
remains to be seen how  successful they will be. Faced with a severe decline in its own fish 
stocks  and  a  persistent  over-capacity  problem,  the  Community  has  increasingly  relied  on 
access  to  fisheries  in  the  exclusive  economic  zones  of  non-Community  states  (mainly 
developing countries),  and continues  to  deploy  its  fleet  to  these waters.  The  Community’s 
fishing activities in non-jurisdictional waters are (in theory) similarly guided by the objective 
of sustainability; specifically, the Community fleet is obliged to pursue
‘...sustainable  and  responsible  fisheries  outside  Community  waters  with  the  same 
commitment as to in its own waters’.492 
I discuss the extent to which  this ideal  is realised in the next chapter,  where I examine the 
influence of sustainability in  theory and practice  regarding Community fishing activities in 
developing third country waters.
492 Ibid at 15.137
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THE PROMOTION OF SUSTAINABILITY IN COMMUNITY FISHING IN 
DEVELOPING THIRD COUNTRY WATERS
1.  Introduction
As  we have  seen in the previous chapters,  fish  stocks  in  the EU’s  waters  are in  a state of 
depletion.493 As a result, the Community fleet relies heavily on access to fisheries in waters 
beyond its jurisdiction, either in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of third countries or in 
international waters.494 In this chapter, I focus on the EC’s fishing activities in third country 
coastal waters. These are regulated by bilateral fisheries agreements which are shaped by the 
principles and rules of the Community’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (discussed in detail 
in chapter 5). From the  1970s onwards, the overriding objective of these agreements was to 
ensure continued Community access to fishing resources in external coastal waters.495 In the 
last ten  years,  however,  it has become  clear that these  arrangements  are  more than merely 
commercially-based  access  transactions;  they impact broadly  on  the  sustainable  (fisheries) 
development  of the  (mainly)  developing  coastal  partner  states.  The  Community’s  external 
fisheries  policy has  responded to  this  reality 496  Its  new  ‘partnership  approach’  to bilateral 
fisheries relations presents the theoretical means to regulate fisheries interactions with these 
states towards the sustainable use of their fisheries resources and the sustainable development 
of  their  fishing  sectors  while  ensuring  coherence  with  the  Community’s  development 
initiatives in these countries. This shift in policy reflects similar developments in other areas
493 Roadmap Communication op cit n 221  at  ‘Introduction’. See Annex  1  for a list of Community fish stocks that 
are outside safe biological limits.
494 Cross-reference with fn 387 in chap 5 for an explanation of the term ‘third countries’.
495 As noted in the Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 5.8.
496 1 use the term ‘partner’ states or countries to refer generically to coastal third countries that are party to 
bilateral fisheries agreements with the EU. I also refer to that aspect of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that 
regulates Community fishing beyond EU jurisdictional waters as the ‘external’ fisheries policy, in accordance 
with its description in Community policy and legislation.138
of  the  Community’s  fishery  policy  arising  from  integration  efforts,  namely  heightened 
concern  for sustainability  and environmental  protection  to be pursued by a combination of 
stricter legislative regulation of technical matters and a more flexible, holistic policy approach 
to other fisheries management concerns.497 Against this background, I narrow my focus in this 
chapter  to  analyse  the  Community’s  policy  regarding  its  external  fishing  activities  in 
developing third country waters with a view to assessing the extent to which it is informed in 
theory and practice by sustainability objectives. In part HI of my thesis, I focus exclusively on 
the  practical  operationalisation  of  this  policy  with  reference  to  the  case  study  of  EU- 
Senegalese bilateral fisheries relations.
2.  The influence of sustainability on the EU’s bilateral fishing activities
2.1  The rise in status of sustainability concerns
The Community is involved in various external fisheries-related activities. These comprise the 
conclusion of bilateral fisheries agreements with third countries to access their coastal stocks, 
involvement in the progressive development of  international fisheries law and participation in 
regional fisheries organisations 498 The Community is guided in these actions by its Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP), which, as I have already discussed, obliges it to promote the principle 
of sustainability and to comply with international  conservation and sustainable development 
commitments 499  In  practice,  however,  the  realisation  of  these  objectives  in  (particularly) 
developing  third country  waters  has  been  unsatisfactory.  The  Community  has  increasingly
497 As described above in chap 5.
The Community is empowered to engage in these activities by Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 op cit 
n 335 and in accordance with art 300 EC Treaty op cit n 170.
4  For example, through its involvement in conventions like UNCLOS (op cit n 25) and the Straddling Stocks 
Convention (op cit n 124) and its commitment to the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (op cit n 
126). See chap 5 above for a discussion of the rise of the importance of sustainability in the CFP, and chap 3 for 
a general discussion on the concepts of sustainability and sustainable development in the context of  international 
law.sought  to  redress  this  in  response  to  internal  and  external  criticisms  and  in  line  with  its 
international legal duties. Towards this end, it has expanded its traditional regulatory means to 
include  ‘new’  more  flexible  procedure-based  regulatory  measures.500  This  reflects  related 
regulatory  developments  in  other  Community  policy  spheres,  most  noticeably  the 
environment, and is well-suited to the permissive framework approach of the United Nations 
Convention  on  the  Law  of the  Sea  (UNCLOS).  The  fisheries  regime  of UNCLOS  grants 
coastal states significant freedom in managing their marine resources; while they are obliged 
to permit foreign fishers to access surplus stocks in their waters, many writers argue that the 
Convention’s  provisions  are  so  liberal  as  to  effectively  nullify  this  duty.  Access  must  be 
negotiated  within  the  ambit  of  loosely-defined  constraints  which,  inevitably,  must  be 
supplemented by the respective  state parties’  relevant domestic  polices.  UNCLOS  imposes 
minimal  constraints  on  the  contents  of  these  policies  and  it  is  thus  ultimately  up  to  the 
individual states to determine how they choose to regulate their bilateral fisheries interactions. 
The Community’s policy in this regard is strongly influenced by the other spheres of the CFP 
which  (as  I  described  in  chapter  5)  have  been  inculcated  with  sustainability  concerns;  its 
response to ambiguities and ‘gaps’ in the international regime in this area has thus (at least in 
theory) been to increasingly promote sustainable fishing as the guiding objective.
2.2  The ambiguity of the international regime and the Community’s response
As I have explained earlier, UNCLOS entitles coastal states to claim a 200 nautical mile zone 
adjacent to their coasts in which they enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over fishing resources - the 
exclusive  economic  zone,  or  EEZ.501  Coastal  states  must  promote  the  conservation  and 
sustainable use of fish resources within these waters by (amongst other things) determining
500 Cross-reference with pp 118 and 119 above.
501 UNCLOS op cit n 25 in terms of art 57. Cross-reference with pp 45,55 and 56 where I also discuss 
UNCLOS’ provisions regarding the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).140
their  total  allowable  catch  (TAC).  UNCLOS  ameliorates  the  adverse  effect  of  extended 
coastal jurisdiction -  the exclusion of distant water fishing fleets from their traditional fishing 
grounds -  by obliging coastal parties  that lack  the capacity  to  fully  harvest their TACs to 
grant other states reasonable, negotiated access to their surplus.502 The parties must take  ‘all 
relevant  factors’  into  account  in  determining  terms  and  conditions  of  access.503  Most 
importantly, this includes taking account of the economic significance of the fisheries to the 
coastal state’s economy as well as its impact on the state’s  ‘other national interests’.504 This 
reflects the socio-economic and cultural importance of fisheries in many developing coastal 
states  and  the  potential  role  that  access  agreements  can  play  in  fostering  their  sustainable 
development.505  Other factors  that  must be  considered  include  whether  (other)  developing 
states in the region require access to part of the surplus, the coastal state’s obligations towards 
regional  landlocked  and  geographically  disadvantaged  states,  and  the  need  to  ‘minimise 
economic dislocation’  in states whose nationals  have habitually fished in the coastal state’s 
waters or made a substantial contribution to their fisheries research.506 If coastal states permit 
foreign  vessels  into  their  waters  they  must  ensure  the  latter’s  compliance  with  domestic 
fisheries  conservation  and  regulatory  measures  in  line  with  the  Convention’s  obligations. 
Coastal states can employ various means towards this end such  as requiring foreign fishers 
and vessels  to  apply for licences,507  specifying  permitted target  species  for foreign fishers, 
establishing catch quotas and age and size restrictions of permissible catch, imposing fishing 
season and area restrictions, regulating vessel and gear type, size and number, requiring all or 
part of foreign catches to be landed in local ports, and articulating enforcement procedures.508
502 UNCLOS ibid at art 62(2).
503 Ibid at art 62(3).
504 Ibid.
505 B Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea  (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Netherlands  1989) at 64, 65.
506 UNCLOS op cit n 245 at art 62(3).
507 Ibid at art 62(4). A licence fee may be charged; developing states can request fisheries-related financial, 
educational or technological compensation in lieu of a fee.
508 Ibid.141
In  light  of the  significant  overall  freedom  that  UNCLOS  grants  coastal  states  to  regulate 
foreign access to their EEZs, it is argued that the article 62 obligation impacts minimally on 
coastal  states’  fisheries  management  sovereignty;  coastal  states  in  fact  retain  more  or  less 
complete discretion to manage their EEZ fisheries as they choose.509 State practice seems to 
confirm this - the majority of coastal states assert full national jurisdiction over their coastal 
fisheries in their domestic legislation and articulate their discretion to permit or deny foreign 
access to these resources.510 Thus, while
‘...jurisdiction is not absolute in theory...  in practice there are no real constraints on 
the execution of coastal state authority’.511
It follows that if coastal  states  have complete  freedom to  set their TACs  and to  determine 
whether or not they have the capacity to fully harvest their allowable catches, they effectively 
have the choice to declare or deny the existence of a surplus;  if they elect not to declare a 
surplus, they can eliminate the appearance of surplus stocks be establishing very low TACs. 
This interpretation is supported with reference to the fact that the Convention’s compulsory 
dispute settlement provisions do not apply to coastal states’ determination of their TACs, their 
domestic capacity to harvest these stocks or their allocation of any declared surplus.
509 G Munro,  ‘Coastal States and Distant-Water Fishing Nation Relations: An Economist’s Perspective’ (1989) 
Marine Fisheries Review 51  (1) 3-10 at 4, with reference to WT Burke,  ‘Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction and the 
New Law of the Sea’ in RJ Rothschild (ed), Global Fisheries: Perspectives for the 1980s (Springer-Verlag, New 
York  1983) 7-49 at 46. This view is also discussed in McRae and Munro op cit n 99 at  103,  104. See also FH 
Clarke and GR Munro,  ‘Coastal States, Distant Water Fishing Nations and Extended Jurisdiction: A Principal- 
Agent Analysis’ (1987) 2 (1) Natural Resource Modeling 81-107, and FH Clarke and GR Munro, ‘Coastal States 
and Distant Water Fishing Nations: Conflicting Views of the Future’ (1991) 5 (3) Natural Resource Modeling 
345-369. Cross-reference to pp 46,55 and 56, where the discretion afforded coastal states in managing their EEZ 
fisheries is also discussed.
510 McRae and Munro ibid at 104.
511 S Garcia, JA Gulland and E Miles,  ‘The New Law of the Sea, and the Access to Surplus Fish Resources’ 
(1986)  10 (3) Marine Policy 192-200 at 192.
512 Article 297(3) of UNCLOS. The exception is in fact very broadly worded - ‘ the coastal State shall not be 
obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to 
the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise’. See also Burke op cit n 509 at 29 and 30. 
Cross-reference with p 56.142
The  argument follows  that even  in  the  event  that  a coastal  state  does  declare  a  surplus,  it 
enjoys such leeway in determining the terms and conditions of foreign access to this surplus 
that it nevertheless ultimately retains the ability to effectively exclude foreign fleets from its 
waters;  highly  restrictive  access  terms  and  conditions  would  arguably  discourage  foreign 
states from seeking access.513 The coastal  state would have to ensure, however, that it does 
not  violate  the  Convention’s  good  faith  obligation  in  doing  so.514  Based  on  this  line  of 
reasoning, it follows that if a coastal state does grant access to a foreign fleet, it does so purely 
out of choice in order to promote its own interests; it would thus seek to negotiate an access 
arrangement  that  maximises  its  potential  long-term  benefits.515  Various  theories  suggest 
methods to determine the particular mix of terms and conditions best suited to this end, such 
as the economic principal-agent analysis.516
As we saw in chapter 2, however, not all writers endorse the view that coastal states enjoy full 
sovereignty  within  their  EEZs.  Rather,  various  authors  regard  coastal  states  as  mere 
‘stewards’ or ‘custodians’ of their EEZ resources and argue that the states’ powers are limited 
to  sovereign rights  to  explore, exploit,  conserve  and manage  the  natural  resources  in  these 
waters.517  Beyond  these  jurisdictional  powers,  coastal  states  are  bound  strictly  by  the
513 McRae and Munro op cit n 99 at  104.
514 Ibid. Article 300 of UNCLOS (op cit n 25) requires that  ‘States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the 
obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in 
this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right’.
515 Clarke and Munro (1987) op cit n 509 at 83.
516 Advocated by, for example, Munro and Clarke. In particular, see ibid at 83-85 and  101  for a comprehensive 
explanation of the principal-agent paradigm in the distant water fishing context. The authors argue for the 
suitability of this model based on the fact that the coastal state enjoys property rights over the fishery resources 
within its EEZ and has the power to grant or deny access to this resource, but having granted access, lacks the 
power to exercise absolute control over the foreign fishing nation to maximise its socio-economic interests (see 
also Munro op cit n 509 at 9,  10). It must thus devise a suitable ‘incentive scheme’ via the terms and conditions 
of the access agreement to remedy these. Devising such schemes on the basis of economic models is the subject 
matter of a series of papers authored by Munro and Clarke.
517 With reference to the wording in art 56(l)(a) -  ‘[i]n the exclusive economic zone the coastal state has 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources...’ 
N Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University Press, 
UK 1997) at 212 and 213 supports this view. See also Bimie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 659 and Lowe op cit n 103 
in particular at 9.143
provisions of the Convention. It is thus not entirely up to the discretion of the coastal state to
CIO
decide whether or not it will allow other states to fish in its EEZ.
There is no definitive opinion on which of the above two theoretical approaches has greater 
merit. Regardless, the worrying practical effect of UNCLOS’ EEZ provisions is that even if a 
(most likely developing) coastal state lacks the capacity or inclination to properly assess the 
appropriateness  (from  a  sustainability  perspective)  of permitting  foreign  fleet  access  to its 
fisheries,  it  has  the  power  to  declare  a  surplus  in  order  to  procure  short-term  economic 
benefits; the foreign state has no obligation to independently assess the existence (or not) of a 
surplus or to query the validity of a declared surplus.519 The Convention’s simplistic portrayal 
of the determination of surplus,  namely TAC minus domestic  fishing capacity,  compounds 
this  problem;  in  practice,  the  calculation  is  far more  complex  and uncertain  and is  simply 
beyond the capacity of many developing  states.  It is  dependent (inter alia) on the  complex 
dynamics  of fishing  populations  and  is  impacted  by  scientific  uncertainties  regarding  the 
status  of  coastal  stocks  as  well  as  a  plethora  of  national  interests  that  influence  the
590
government’s determination of catch limits and national fishing capacity.  A coastal state’s 
decision  to  declare  a surplus  is  thus based on  a  variety of biological,  social  and economic 
factors which require the government to have access to adequate data about its stocks and the 
likely  impact  on  them  of changes  in  fishing  patterns,  as  well  as  accurate  socio-economic
521 information about its fishing industry.
There has been increasing concern about the fact that the EU has no obligation to ensure the 
accurate assessment of surplus stocks in developing coastal states’ waters prior to concluding 
access agreements with them or during the operation of these agreements. This arises from the
518 Kwiatkowska op cit n 505 at 61.
519 See p 240 below for a discussion on this in relation to the EU-Senegalese case study.
520 Garcia, Gulland and Miles op cit n 511  at 192,  193.
521 Ibid at 198.144
(theoretical) potential  for the Community to  conclude  agreements  or to  continue  to  fish in 
terms of agreements with such states even where no surplus in fact exits; this runs contrary to 
the Community’s  professed endorsement of sustainable  fishing in  all  waters.  Already in 
1997,  the  European  Parliament’s  Committee  on  Fisheries  suggested  that  the  Community 
should respond to  this  legal  lacuna  by  assisting  developing  coastal  states  to  enhance  their 
stock evaluation  capacity;  while  this  capacity  remains  weak,  if necessary,  the  Community 
should  undertake  its  own  independent  assessments.523  The  Committee  also  urged  the 
Community to  refrain  from negotiating  the  highest possible  catch  opportunities  with  these 
countries to the potential detriment of long-term sustainable fishing.524
Prior  to  the  2002  CFP  review,  the  Community  did  not  commit  itself  to  conducting 
assessments  of  third  country  fish  stocks,  although  it  increasingly  acknowledged  the 
importance  of  ensuring  the  accuracy  of  these  assessments.525  During  the  review,  the 
Commission  took  the  matter  a  step  further  by  proposing  that  the  Community  should 
participate through  regional  fisheries organisations  in  stock evaluations of developing third 
countries  before  concluding  access  agreements  with  them.  It  also  recommended  that  the 
Community should conduct sustainability impact assessments of proposed agreements on the 
basis of best available data.  What exactly this would entail, however, was not clear, as the 
concept  was  neither defined nor elaborated  on  in  the  Communication.  It  was  nevertheless 
echoed  in  the  Commission’s  subsequent  Communication  on  Fisheries  Partnership
522 Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 82 and ADE-PWC-EPU,  ‘Evaluation of the Relationship between 
Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements’ (Final Report to the European Commission) 21 November 2002 
at 41.
523 Committee on Fisheries (European Parliament),  ‘Report on International Fisheries Agreements’ (Committee 
on Fisheries Report) (1997) A4-0149/07 of 22 April  1997 at 10 (points 24(i) and (ii)),  11 and 21  (point 24). See 
also ADE-PWC-EPU ibid at 42,43.
524 Committee on Fisheries Report ibid at 16.
525 FPA Communication op cit n 364 at para 2.2 and Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 5.8.2.
526 Roadmap Communication op cit n 221  at paras 5.2 and 5.3. This was proposed as part of an action plan to 
improve stock evaluations in external waters at regional levels, discussed below.145
Agreements.527 The importance of impact assessments was revisited and fleshed out in a later 
Council  Conclusion,  which  I  discuss  in  greater  detail  below.528  A  2003  Communication 
further  proposed  that  the  Community  and  member  states  should jointly  invest  with  third 
countries  in  developing  their  stock  assessment  capacity,  in  accordance  with  obligations 
imposed  by  the  FAO  Code  of  Conduct.529  This  has  been  operationalised  in  some  recent 
bilateral  fisheries  arrangements  with  developing  countries  in  terms  of  which  Community
530 funding has been dedicated to improved local stock assessment capacity.
3.  The evolution of the Community’s regulation of bilateral fisheries agreements
3.1  The changing nature of bilateral fisheries agreements
The Community’s regulation of its bilateral fisheries relations has  shifted with time both in 
response to international law and state practice and internal policy influences, most noticeably 
the  principle  of  integration.  Most  modem  bilateral  fisheries  access  arrangements  can  be 
classified as  ‘ordinary’  international  agreements as they are concluded between state parties 
and  are  available  for public  access.531  While they  are not  a  ‘new’  legal  phenomenon, their
527 FPA Communication op cit n 364 at paras 3.1 and 4. This policy is discussed below at pp  151-157 in 
substantial detail.
528 At p  152 below.
529 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission Improving Scientific and 
Technical Advice for Community Fisheries Management’ (Communication on Scientific and Technical Advice) 
[2003] OJ C47/5 at para 3.4.2. FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries op cit n  126.
530 Such as in the most recent agreement with Senegal, where a fixed amount of Community compensation is 
earmarked to support stock evaluation and monitoring by the Senegalese authorities. See art 4 of Council 
Regulation (EC) 2323/2002 of 16 December 2002 on the Conclusion of the Protocol Setting Out the Fishing 
Opportunities and the Financial Compensation Provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Republic of  Senegal on Fishing off the Coast of Senegal for the Period 
of 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2006 [2002] OJ L349/4 read together with Protocol Setting out the Fishing 
Opportunities and the Financial Contribution Provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on Fishing off the Coast of Senegal for the Period 
from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2006, OJ (2002) L349/46. Envisaged support includes research exchanges and 
regional initiatives. I revisit this below at p 201.
531 The remaining minority are concluded between coastal state governments and foreign private enterprises and 
are private contractual agreements which are not published; they are thus  ‘closed’ agreements. Inter­
governmental multi-lateral fisheries agreements also exist, such as those concluded between the United States of 
America and the Pacific Island Countries - see M Mwikya,  ‘Fisheries Access Agreements: Trade and146
contents  and  nature  differ  from  early  arrangements  as  they  have  evolved  over  the  years 
largely to  accommodate  developments  in  international  law,  particularly  the  introduction of 
UNCLOS. Initially, prior to  1970, few coastal states claimed jurisdiction over living marine 
resources in zones beyond 12 nautical miles from their baselines and distant water fleets were 
thus  free  to  fish  in  coastal  waters  from  this  boundary.532  Distant  water  fishing  nations 
nevertheless concluded numerous  access  arrangements  with  coastal  states  mainly  to  secure 
logistical support for their nearby fishing operations.533
Freedom to access coastal waters became increasingly restricted, however, from around 1976 
onwards, when coastal states began to unilaterally declare jurisdictions over their respective 
marine  resources  beyond  12  nautical  miles,  with  many  claiming  zones  up  to  200  nautical 
miles from their baselines. By 1981, very few coastal states had not claimed extended fishing 
jurisdictions.  This tendency  was  fuelled by the convening  of UNCLOS  III  in  1973  and its 
subsequent  nine-year  negotiation.534  A  key  topic  of  the  negotiations  was  the  desire  of 
developing states to claim ownership over their coastal marine resources in order to advance 
their  economic  development;  the  unilaterally-claimed  fishing  zones  were  thus  largely 
modelled on the expected outcome of the EEZ provisions of the negotiations, and agreements 
operating  during  this  period  frequently  made  express  reference  to  the  coastal  state’s 
‘sovereignty’ or ‘jurisdiction’ over its 200 nautical mile zone.535 Barred from freely fishing in 
their traditional coastal fishing grounds, distant water fishing fleets thus sought to negotiate
Development Issues’ International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Natural Resources, 
International Trade and Sustainable Development Series Issues Paper No 2 (ICTSD, Geneva Switzerland 2006) 
at para 2.3.
532 Copes op cit n 3 at 223 and WL Black,  ‘Soviet Fishery Agreements with Developing Countries: Benefit or 
Burden?’ (1983) 7 (3) Marine Policy  163-174 at 163,  164. The exceptions were various Latin American 
countries, which claimed extended fishing zones.
533 For example, to secure storage for their catch and to obtain vessel supplies. Copes ibid at 223.
534 The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea took place in  1958 and resulted in four treaties in 
1958 (Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Convention on the Continental Shelf, Convention 
on the High Seas, and Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas). The 
second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea took place in 1960 and did not result in any 
international agreements.
535 Such as the original EEC-Senegal agreement, concluded in  1980 op cit n 336. See also Black op cit n 532 at
164.with  coastal  states  to  gain  access  to their fish  stocks;  it  was not  a long-term economically 
viable  option  to  instead  simply  restrict  their  fishing  activities  to  waters  beyond  the  200 
nautical  miles  zone  because  most  of the  ocean’s  commercially  exploitable  fish  stocks  are 
found  within  200  nautical  miles  of at  least  one  nation’s  baseline.536  The  nature  of access 
agreements thus changed to focus increasingly on securing access to fisheries resources. The 
duty imposed on coastal states by article 62(2) of UNCLOS (discussed above) thus rendered 
an  existing  (albeit  limited)  common  state  practice  obligatory  and  dictated  a  regulatory 
framework for its continuation. As we have seen, UNCLOS  not only significantly extended 
the area of coastal  waters in which distant water fleets required permission to fish but also 
imposed conservation obligations on coastal states and bound all fishing nations to promote 
sustainable  fishing  beyond  their jurisdictional  waters.  Other  international  instruments  lent 
weight to these duties and some expanded on them.537 Bilateral fisheries agreements began to 
increasingly  accommodate  these  new  obligations,  as  exemplified  by  early  access 
arrangements  between  individual  EEC  states  and  third  countries  (prior  to  the  transfer  of 
competency to negotiate agreements to the Community in November 1976) and subsequently, 
between the Community and these states.538 Thus, while UNCLOS was only signed in  1982 
and came into operation  still  later (in  1994),  the  influence  of its EEZ provisions  (the  final 
draft  did  not  differ  significantly  from  the  negotiation  text)  was  already  evident  in  state 
practice by the 1980s, as reflected both in coastal states’ management of their adjacent marine 
waters and the contents of numerous bilateral fisheries agreements.
537 As discussed above at pp 52-59.
538 Carroz and Savini op cit n 335 at 84. As noted in chap 4 (p  lOlat n 335), the authors provide a detailed 
overview of the terms typically included in access agreements during the UNCLOS III negotiations, illustrating 
that most accorded with the provisions of the negotiation text. Competency was transferred to the Community 
via Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 (op cit n 335).3.2  The response of the EU’s common fisheries policy
Together with many other distant-water fishing nations, the EEC was compelled to negotiate 
bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  coastal  states  from  the  mid-1970s  onwards.  The 
Community was  driven  to  do  so by its  desire to ensure continued access  to distant coastal 
fisheries resources, to secure employment opportunities for its citizens on fishing vessels and 
in land-based sectors and to alleviate its fleet over-capacity problem. This in turn diminished 
fishing  pressure  in  the  Community’s  waters  while  simultaneously  meeting  the  European 
market’s increasing demand for fish.539 The Community’s existing over-capacity problem was 
compounded  in  1986  by  the  accession  of  Spain  and  Portugal  and  the  importance  of  its 
external fishing relations accordingly increased. The EEC concluded its first bilateral fisheries 
agreement  with  the  United  States  of America  in  1977  and  has  since  signed  an  increasing 
number  of  access  arrangements  with  various  coastal  states  to  such  an  extent  that  these 
agreements  are  now  viewed  as  an  integral  component  of  the  CFP.540
Historically,  the  Community  has  entered  into  mainly  ‘first  generation’  agreements,  that  is 
arrangements  where  coastal  states  grant  access  to  its  fleet  in  exchange  for  financial 
compensation  from  the  EC.541  Traditionally,  the  Community  has  covered  the  bulk  of this
539 A Acheampong,  ‘Coherence between EU Fisheries Agreements and EU Development Cooperation: The Case 
of West Africa’ ECDPM (European Centre for Development Policy Management) Working Paper No. 52 
(ECDPM, Maastricht  1997) at ‘EU Fisheries Agreements’, and Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 77. The 
Committee on Fisheries Report (op cit n 523) emphasises that international fisheries agreements are  ‘vital’ to 
maintain the EC fleet’s activities and employment at sea and on shore (point 3 at 8). See also Commission of the 
European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Fisheries and Poverty Reduction’ (Poverty Reduction Communication) COM (2000) 724 final at para 2, where 
the Commission emphasises that the core purpose of the agreements is to advance the Community’s socio­
economic goals. See also Foders op cit n 215 at 23, Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 76, 77, and ADE- 
PWC-EPU op cit n 522 at 35. Cross-reference with p  129 above regarding the over-capacity problem.
540 Committee on Fisheries Report ibid at  14.
541 Other common types of access agreements include reciprocal agreements, involving the exchange of 
equivalent fishing rights between the EC fleet and the fleet of the third country (Norway, the Faroe Islands and 
Iceland and the Baltic States), and  ‘second generation’ agreements in terms of which access to markets is 
secured through the establishment of joint ventures. For an explanation of the categories of fishing access 
agreements see, for example, the FPA Communication op cit n 364 at para 1, N Johnstone,  ‘Economics of 
Fisheries Access Agreements: Perspectives on the EU-Senegal Case’ (Discussion Paper) DP 96-02 International149
monetary compensation,  subsidising up to  80  percent  of access  costs,  with European  ship­
owners  paying  the  remaining  amount,  comprising  licence  fees.542  These  types  of fisheries 
agreements  are  concluded  almost  exclusively  with  developing  coastal  states  and  all  of the 
EU’s bilateral fisheries agreements with African states fall into this category.543 The incentive 
for  such  states  to  permit  the  Community  fleet  to  access  their  stocks  is  thus  largely  self- 
evident:  the financial benefits. Direct financial  advantages accrue from the foreign currency 
that is generated by the agreements while numerous indirect pecuniary benefits also follow, 
including domestic job opportunities in fisheries-related activities, the acquisition of scientific 
and  technological  fisheries-related  information  and  expertise,  and  the  development  of the 
domestic fishing industry through, for example, the construction and upgrade of ports and fish 
processing facilities.544
The  EU  assigns  a  significant  portion  of the  CFP  budget  to  bilateral  fisheries  agreements. 
Many of the species targeted by the Community fleet in third country waters are already over- 
exploited, however, fuelling an increasing debate about the extent to which the value of the 
Community  catch  justifies  the  ever-rising  costs  of  these  agreements,  especially  as  they 
primarily  benefit  only  select  fishing  sectors  in  a  small  number  of  member  states.545  In
Institute for Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programme (International Institute for 
Environment and Development, London  1996) at  1   and C Lequesne,  ‘The Common Fisheries Policy: Letting the 
Little Ones Go?’ in Wallace and Wallace op cit n 393 at 366, 367. The various authors make use of different 
systems of categorisation. See also Deere op cit n 203 at 4, IFREMER (Institut Frangais de Recherche pour 
L'exploitation de la Mer),  ‘Evaluation of the Fisheries Agreements Concluded by the European Community’ 
(Summary Report) Community Contract No 97/S 240-152919 of 10 December 1997 (1999) at para land 
Acheampong op cit n 539 at ‘EU Fisheries Agreements’.
542 ADE-PWC-EPU op cit n 520 at 36, Acheampong ibid, and Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 79, 90. 
Also IFREMER Study ibid at para 3.7: during the five year period covered by the study (January  1993- 
December 1997), the EC financed 82,8% of the total cost of agreements with eight African coastal states 
(amounting to an average of Euro  155 million per year). In chap 3 of this thesis the negative impact of 
subsidisation on the sustainability of the third countries’ fisheries was discussed (pp 82-90). Below at p  155,1 
revisit the EU’s efforts to reduce Community subsidisation of its distant water fleet.
543 Committee on Fisheries Report op cit n 531 at 14, IFREMER Study ibid at para  1.1 and ADE-PWC-EPU ibid 
at 36. The EC is currently a party to twenty-two bilateral fisheries agreements, of which approximately half are 
with coastal African states or island states off the African coast.
544 Black op cit n 532 at 171,  172. Cross-reference with pp 194-196 for a discussion of Senegal’s reasons for 
concluding access agreements with the EU.
545 Committee on Fisheries Report op cit n 523. See also ADE-PWC-EPU op cit n 522 at 13, 36. Fishers from the 
deep-sea sector in Spain, Portugal and France enjoy the primary benefits from bilateral fisheries agreementsaddition, critics argue that Community payments in terms of these agreements would benefit 
both parties more in  the  long-term if they were  directed at  specific  local  projects  aimed at 
promoting the sustainable development of the coastal  states’  fisheries.546 The Community’s 
new  policy  regarding  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  developing  countries  reflects 
elements of this suggestion, as discussed below in greater detail.547 In contrast, the past policy 
did  not  expressly  promote  the  need  to  advance  sustainable  fisheries  development  in  these 
countries. In fact in practice, there was no comprehensive policy and the Community simply 
negotiated agreements with coastal states on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis. It was, however, 
guided by the general CFP rules and the EC Treaty obligations to ensure coherence with the 
Community’s  development  cooperation  objectives,  as  well  as  relevant  international  legal 
obligations and fisheries management principles.548 Member states were required to exercise 
flag-state jurisdiction over their vessels to ensure compliance with CFP rules in third country 
waters. As the objective of sustainable fishing became increasingly core to the CFP, the need 
to  introduce dedicated regulatory means  to ensure that the  Community fleet promoted this 
goal in (particularly) developing coastal states became more apparent.
Early efforts  to incorporate  sustainability concerns  into  the  Community’s  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements  were  (by  its  own  admission)  largely  unsuccessful  and,  as  critics  pointed  out, 
highlighted the apparent discrepancy between  the Community’s  commitment to  sustainable 
fishing in its own waters and that in waters beyond its jurisdiction.549 In the 2002 CFP review, 
the  Community  thus  acknowledged  the  need  to  re-shape  its  policy  regulating  its  fishing
(ADE-PWC-EPU at 36 and Lequesne op cit n 541  at 367). In terms of the agreements with Senegal, vessels from 
Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Greece benefited.
546 Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 90.
547 FPA Communication op cit n 364.1 discuss the policy below at para 3.3.
548 See art 178 EC Treaty (op cit n  170). Cross-reference with p 98 regarding the Community’s development 
cooperation policy.
549 Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 and Johnstone op cit n 541. Also noted in United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP),  ‘Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related Policies: A Country 
Study on the Fisheries Sector in Senegal’ (UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report) (United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2002) at para 5, and in various Commission communications, such as the Poverty Reduction 
Communication op cit n 539 at para 3 and the Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 5.8.2.151
activities in developing third country waters towards ensuring that fisheries agreements better 
promoted the establishment and development of sustainable fisheries policies and practices in 
these  countries.  The  Commission  subsequently  proposed  a  new  framework  ‘cooperative 
partnership’ approach to guide future agreements towards these ends.550
3.3  Promoting sustainable fishing through a new fisheries partnership approach
While  the  new  framework for  fisheries  partnership  agreements  is  still  concerned  foremost 
with protecting the Community’s fisheries interests, it expressly aims to do so in the context 
of promoting sustainable  fishing activities  in  these countries  in  accordance  with  the CFP’s 
principles.551 It is thus committed to ensuring the conservation and sustainable exploitation of 
fish stocks via the use of effective catch controls, vessel and fishing effort limitation, and the 
implementation of technical conservation measures  based on  sound scientific  advice and in 
accordance with a precautionary approach.552  More broadly, the new approach is rooted in 
the  ideals  of enhanced coherence  between  access  agreements  and internal  policies  such  as 
development cooperation, environment and trade.553 In particular, the Community’s express
550 FPA Communitation op cit n 364. See also Green Paper ibid and Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at 
para 5.
FPA Communication ibid at para 2.1, 2.2 and Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, 
European Community,  The European Community External Fisheries Policy’ (European External Fisheries 
Policy) (2005) at 5 <http://www.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/publications/other_publications_en.htm> accessed 30 
October 2006.
552 Council Regulation 2371/02 op cit n 221.
553 European External Fisheries Policy op cit n 551  at 5. The development cooperation policy is discussed at pp 
98-110; aspects of the trade policy in particular are discussed at pp 102-107.1 discuss the Community’s 
environmental policy at p 117. The particular need for synergy between bilateral fisheries agreements with 
developing states and the development cooperation policy was first noted by the Committee on Fisheries in 1997 
(op cit n 523 see in particular point 10 (at 9), and  15 -  20, specifically at 20), where a call was made for broader, 
more development-orientated agreements; it was reiterated in the subsequent Poverty Reduction Communication 
(op cit n 538). See also European Parliament,  ‘Resolution on the Communication on Fisheries and Poverty 
Reduction’ 25 October 2001  (A5-0334/2001) at para 3. Coherence refers to the coordination of policies within a 
given framework to ensure that they are complementary and that at minimum, their objectives do not conflict. It 
is most frequently referred to in the context of development, where the aim is to ensure that policies in a range of 
areas contribute towards the objective of poverty reduction - synthesised from IDDRA (Institut du 
Developpement Durable et des Resources Aquatiques),  ‘Policy Coherence in Fisheries: A Scoping Study. A 
report for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’  April 2004 at para 4, where a 
number of potential definitions of ‘policy coherence’ are presented. See also A Weston and D Pierre-Anton,aim  is  to  ensure  that  the  agreements  accord  with  its  development  policy  and  act  as  a 
‘development vector’ in the fisheries sectors of the third countries by, for example, providing 
technical support to strengthen local fisheries management capacities, promoting cooperation 
in research, stock assessment, monitoring and surveillance, encouraging the rehabilitation of 
marine ecosystems and minimising wasteful fisheries practices.554 The instruments to translate 
this  into  practice  are  the  proposed  new  cooperative  fisheries  ‘partnership’  agreements 
(FPAs).555 These are to be negotiated between the Community and developing third countries 
as  part  of  an  enhanced  policy  dialogue  between  the  parties  geared  towards  promoting 
sustainable  fishing;  the  dialogue  is  thus  intended to  be  much  broader than  past inter-party 
interactions, which narrowly focused on access.556 The 2002 Roadmap Communication was 
specific about the core aim of the dialogue -  overall, it must be geared towards developing a 
sound fisheries policy for the third country that enhances its capacity for sustainable fisheries 
and contributes toward other local  development objectives  (such  as  food security, poverty- 
alleviation and sustainable development).557 The FPA will  (if successfully negotiated) serve 
as the means to ensure the progressive development and implementation of this policy with 
the EU providing the necessary financial, technological and scientific assistance towards this 
end in return for access to domestic coastal fish stocks.
The broad policy ideals  articulated in  2002 were subsequently refined in 2004 in  a suite of 
proposed Council Conclusions.558 The Conclusions outline procedural  mechanisms to guide 
the Commission in its fisheries partnership interactions. Most importantly, they suggest that 
impact  assessments  of  the  potential  environmental,  economic  and  social  consequences  of
Poverty and Policy Coherence: A Case Study of Canada’s Relations with Developing Countries (The North- 
South Institute, Canada 2003) at  17.
554 Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 5.8 in particular at para 5.8.1.
555 Roadmap Communication op cit n 221  at para 5.
556 Roadmap Communication ibid at para 5.3. Cross-reference with p  106 where I discuss a similar new 
emphasis on policy dialogue in the EU-ACP states development cooperation agreement (the Cotonou agreement 
-  op cit n 287).
557 Ibid.
558 Council Conclusions  11485/1/04 op cit n 451.153
FPAs  and assessments  of (inter alia)  sustainable fisheries  development opportunities in the 
partner coastal state, should be conducted prior to negotiating the partnership agreements so 
as  to enable the Commission  to prepare  negotiating  guidelines  and to  obtain  a negotiating 
brief from  the  Council;  for  this  purpose,  the  essentials  of the  assessments  must  be  made 
available to the member states  ‘in good time’.559 This  ‘borrowing’  of procedural  tools  from 
the  environmental  sphere  confirms  the  Community’s  increasing  tendency  to  incorporate 
broader,  more  flexible  and  participatory  tools  into  the  fisheries  field,  including  in  the 
regulation of the Community’s external fishing activities.560 The Community recently began 
conducting  impact  assessments  for  proposed  fisheries  arrangements  with  specific  West 
African coastal states.561
The  Council  Conclusions  further recommend that  the  Commission  proposes  establishing  a 
bilateral  fisheries  committee  with  the  partner  state  to  advise  on  sustainable  fishing 
opportunities  during  negotiations  and  that  it  implements  initiatives  to  ensure  that  the 
Community  fleet  promotes  responsible  fishing  in  the  third  country’s  waters.  Information 
exchange  is  emphasised:  the  Commission  is  required  to  ensure  that  the  agreement  is 
monitored and its implementation is periodically reported in light of pre-defined performance 
indicators.  In  addition,  the  negotiations  ‘proper’  must  be  guided  by  CFP-based 
sustainability objectives  as outlined in  the Council’s Conclusions.  These include promoting 
the rational and sustainable exploitation of surplus stocks in the third country’s waters taking 
due account of the needs and interests of the domestic fishing industry, improving scientific 
and  technological  knowledge  of  the  fisheries  in  question  (including  the  likely  impact  of
559 Ibid at paras 6, 7. Such assessment appears to be akin to strategic impact assessment, which is employed in 
the Community’s environmental sphere. Strategic environmental assessment is a particular method of 
environmental assessment; it refers to pre-emptive research to determine the potential economic, social and 
environmental impacts of a proposed plans, polices and programs. Strategic environmental assessment is 
regulated by Directive 2001/42/EC (op cit n 427). Cross-reference with pp  123,  124 above .
560 Cross-reference with p  119.
561 For example, the Community prepared an impact assessment for the proposed new fisheries access agreement 
with Senegal, as I discuss at p 239 (the negotiations failed, however, and no new agreement was signed).
562 Ibid at para 6. It is not specified to which Community body these reports should be made.154
fishing  on  the  environment),  combating  illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  fishing  -  in 
particular by strengthening the monitoring and control of Community fishing operations - and 
contributing  towards  domestic  sustainable  fisheries  management  efforts  while  ensuring 
coherence  with  Community  development  cooperation  activities  in  the  coastal  state.  The 
Conclusions include more rigid guidelines with regard to the content of the agreement:  they 
require that the agreements define the fishing opportunities available to the EU (together with 
detailed arrangements about the issuing of Community vessel fishing licences and the control 
and monitoring of their fishing activities), make adequate provision to ensure the funding and 
development  of  local  fisheries  (including  regular  supervision  and  follow-up)  and  outline 
procedures for the implementation, monitoring and review of the agreement.564 In terms of the 
Conclusions, a fisheries partnership agreement will come into being once it has been adopted 
by Council regulation on a proposal from the Commission.565
A distinguishing feature of the new partnership approach is the justification for and scope of 
the financial  compensation to  be paid by the Community in  terms  of the  agreement to the 
partner coastal  state.566 As outlined in the FPA Communication and the subsequent Council 
Conclusions,  the  financial  contribution  will  correspond  with  the  fishing  opportunities 
available to the EU (to be topped up by access fess paid by vessel owners) together with the 
monetary  support  necessary  to  realise  operationalisation  of  the  coastal  state’s  sustainable 
fisheries  management  policy.567  The  latter  portion  will  be  dedicated  to  specified  local 
‘partnership activities’ as an  ‘investment’ by the Community in the coastal state’s sustainable 
fisheries development. Examples of partnership activities include conducting scientific stock
564 Ibid at para 4.
565 European External Fisheries Policy op cit n 551  at 6.
566 FPA Communication op cit n 364 at para 2.2
567 European External Fisheries Policy op cit n 551  at 6 and FPA Communication ibid at para 3.2.155
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assessments  and  improving  fisheries  control  and  monitoring.  Community  funding  will 
ideally cover the  initial  set-up costs  of these activities  and provide for their follow-up  and 
evaluation; mechanisms will be put in place to control the use to which the funds are put.569
In  response  to  criticism  that  the  Community’s  continual  heavy  subsidisation  of its  distant 
water fleet impedes progress towards sustainable fishing in developing third country waters, 
the new policy emphasises the need for Community vessel  owners to increasingly bear the 
burden of access costs by paying higher portions of the vessel licensing fees in foreign coastal 
waters.570 While the Community has expressly acknowledged that ‘exporting’ vessels is not a 
viable long-term solution to its over-capacity problem, it has identified fisheries partnership 
agreements  as  an  appropriate mechanism to facilitate the  ‘permanent transfer’  of vessels to 
third countries  in  the context of  ‘joint enterprises’.571  Joint enterprises  refer to commercial 
fishing ventures between the Community and a coastal third country operating in the latter’s 
waters using locally-registered vessels; they are promoted as a method of reducing EU fishing 
capacity while simultaneously contributing to sustainable socio-economic development in the 
respective  coastal  states.572  Scepticism  remains,  however,  as  to  the  extent  to  which  joint
zn'i
ventures are genuinely conducive to promoting sustainable fisheries objectives.
In  light of the historically poor compliance of the Community fleet  with  bilateral  fisheries 
agreement terms in developing third country waters, the new policy emphasises the need to
569 FPA Communication ibid at para 2.3 and Roadmap Communication op cit n 221 at para 5.3.
570 Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 90, and Acheampong op cit n 539 at  ‘EU Fisheries Agreements’. For a 
discussion on fisheries subsidies and their potential adverse impact on sustainable fishing, see pp 82-90 above.
571 Committee on Fisheries Report op cit n 523 at  16. See, for example, art 8 of Council Regulation 2792/99 op 
cit n 461 read together with art 8 of Council Regulation 2369/02 op cit n 461  and FPA Communication op cit n 
364 at para 2.2.
572 The Community holds a significant proportion of the share capital and one or more of the partners are 
nationals of the third country. They may only be concluded if certain criteria are met, including ‘appropriate 
guarantees’ (it is not specified from which party) that international marine management law is  ‘not likely’ to be 
infringed, nor any of the CFP’s objectives. See arts 8(1) and (2) of Regulation 2792/99 ibid and 8(3)(b)(i) and 
(iv) of Regulation 2369/02 ibid.
573 1 discuss the advantages and potential problems with joint ventures in my conclusions from p 236.156
‘step  up’  the  EU’s  management,  control  and  follow-up  of  its  fleets’  foreign  fishing 
activities.574 This is to be achieved by including comprehensive measures towards these ends 
in  fisheries  partnership  agreements  and  by  entering  into  ‘partnership’  fisheries  control 
activities  with  the respective  coastal  states.  Specifically,  the FPA Communication  suggests 
that  the  Community  should  fund  the  establishment  of  joint  control,  monitoring  and 
surveillance activities with developing third countries.575 The Commission re-iterated the need 
for  the  Community  to  actively  cooperate  with  third  countries  to  ensure  improved 
implementation of Cl7 ? conservation measures in 2003  and suggested that responsibility for 
control and enforcement of these measures should be jointly assumed by the flag states and 
the  coastal  state  in  question.576  One  of  the  tasks  of  the  newly-formed  Joint  Community 
Fisheries  Control  Agency  (discussed  above  in  chapter  5)  is  to  assist  member  states  in 
complying with their control and inspection obligations in terms of their fisheries partnership 
agreements.  This  will  require  cooperation  between  the  Community  (as  part  of  the  joint
577 inspection structure) and the third countries concerned.
It is clear from what I have described above that the Community’s new fisheries partnership 
approach  is  based  primarily  on  flexible,  procedurally-based  regulatory  mechanisms  and  is 
strongly  rooted  in  broad  policy  ideals;  the  Community  (via  the  Commission)  is  granted 
significant scope in implementing the approach while there is relatively little room for input
574 As acknowledged in the FPA Communication op cit n 364 at para 2.2 and Green Paper op cit n 249 at para 
5.8.2, Community IUU Action Plan op cit n 451  and Committee on Fisheries Report op cit n 523 at 17, 21. See 
also criticism by Kwiatkowska op cit n 505 at 25, Kaczynksi and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 78 and 83 and 
Acheampong op cit n 539 at ‘Incoherence between Fisheries Agreements and Development Cooperation’. The 
need to improve in this regard is noted in the Council Conclusions 11485/1/04 (op cit n 451) at paras 3 and 4. 
Common violations include over-harvesting, the use of illegal gear, poor adherence to catch-landing provisions, 
and failure to employ local crew in accordance with the terms of agreements (Committee on Fisheries Report at 
17).
575 Council Conclusions 11485/1/04 ibid at para 4, FPA Communication ibid at paras 2.2 and 2.3 and 
Community IUU Action Plan ibid at para 5.1.
576 European Commission,  ‘Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Towards Uniform and Effective Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy’ COM (2003)  130 final at para 
3.2.1.
577 Ibid at para 3.2. See also Council Regulation 768/05 op cit n 490. Cross-reference with pp  135 for more on 
the new Community Fisheries Control Agency.157
from  the  member  states  through  the  Council.  It  is  therefore  not  synonymous  with  the 
collaborative,  multi-level  regulatory  trend  noticeable  in,  for  example,  the  Community’s 
environmental  field,  as  although  binding  legislation  does  not  dictate  the  mechanics  of 
agreement negotiations, clear divisions of competency remain.578 Nevertheless, as with much 
of  the  rest  of  the  common  fisheries  policy,  regulations  rather  than  directives  govern  the 
Community’s external fishing activities and while Council measures are passed under them to 
regulate  technical  matters  such  as  gear  restrictions  and  permitted  vessel  tonnage,  member 
states retain  significant leeway in key areas  such  as monitoring and control. The regulatory 
methods employed to govern the Community fleet’s fishing activities in third country waters 
thus  follow  a  similar  approach  to  that  favoured  in  the  rest  of  the  CFP,  comprising  an 
amalgamation  of traditional  centralised,  command-and-control  mechanisms  with  less  rigid, 
largely  procedural  means.  Currently,  the  new  fisheries  partnership  approach  is  being 
progressively implemented, guided by the development of ‘clear rules’  at Community level. 
The legal bases for negotiating and concluding the agreements remain the same as in the past, 
but the Community is adjusting its policies and actions as necessary to accommodate the new
579 strategy.
4.  Conclusion
The Community’s regulation of its fleet’s fishing activities in developing third country waters 
embraces the mixed-methods approach employed in other spheres of the CFP. Influenced by 
similar trends in the EU’s environmental policy and necessitated by the lack of guidance from 
international  law  in  this  area,  its  fisheries  partnership  approach  to  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements attempts to harness this new regulatory inclination to better promote sustainable
578 As discussed above in chap 5.
579 The legal bases remain article 300 EC Treaty (op cit n  170) read together with Council Resolution of 3 
November 1976 (op cit n 335). See FPA Communication op cit n 364 at para 3.2.fishing objectives. In the next section I examine the extent to which it has been successful in 
pursuing  this  goal  with  reference  to  the  illustrative  case  study  of EU-Senegalese  fisheries 
relations.159
PART III
CASE STUDY: AGREEMENTS IN PRACTICE
Part DI comprises an analysis of the practical operationlisation of the EU’s bilateral fisheries 
policy  with  reference  to  the  case  study  of EU-Senegalese  fisheries  relations.  Here,  I  pay 
particular attention to the most recent bilateral fisheries agreement between the parties, which 
operated from July 2002  until June 2006.  I examine its content and impact in detail  with  a 
view to ascertaining whether it operated overall as a conservatory legal instrument designed to 
foster the sustainability of Senegalese fisheries, or not. In order to provide a background for 
my  discussion  of the  recent  agreement  I  first  introduce  Senegalese  fisheries  in  chapter 7, 
highlighting  the  important  socio-economic  role  of  the  sector  and  the  worrying  biological 
status of various coastal fish stocks. In chapter 8, I critically analyse the (legal) nature of the 
recent  fisheries  agreement  and  its  impact  on  sustainable  fishing  and  sustainable  fisheries 
development in Senegal. My findings strongly evidence my earlier theoretical deductions as I 
explain further in the concluding section of my thesis.1 160
7
SENEGAL’S MARINE FISHERIES
1.  Introduction
In this chapter I discuss key aspects of Senegal’s marine fisheries as a prelude to examining 
Senegal’s most recent bilateral fisheries agreement with the EU in chapter 8. With reference 
to my research in Senegal, I focus on the biological and socio-economic aspects of Senegalese 
fisheries and discuss the domestic regulatory framework within which they operate, exploring 
its efficacy from a sustainability perspective. Various fish stocks in Senegal’s coastal waters 
are  over-exploited  and  domestic  sustainable  fisheries  management  is  presently  weak. 
Senegal’s  fisheries  are  thus  currently  suffering  from  both  a  biological  and  a  management 
crisis, which in turn impacts on the country’s bilateral fisheries relations with the EU. I draw 
on my empirical research in addressing why this is so and how these crises shape Senegalese- 
EU  interactions.  Based  on  interviews  and  observational  research,  my  fieldwork  offers  a 
unique  insight into  Senegalese  fisheries  including  the  effects  of the EU’s  influence  in  this 
sector.  The  observations  that I present  in  this  chapter are  intended to  enhance  the reader’s 
understanding of EU-Senegalese fisheries relations and to inform my subsequent analysis of 
the most recent Senegalese-EU fisheries agreement.161
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2.  Senegal’s marine fisheries
2.1  The socio-economic and geophysical background to Senegalese fisheries
The West African coast is rich in fish resources as a result of oceanographical conditions such
co n
as  currents,  areas  of  up-welling  and  wide  continental  shelves.  Fish  is  key  to  the  West 
African diet and culture,  particularly processed fish  (smoked, dried,  or salted) and artisanal 
fishers and fish processors play a central role in sustaining traditional lifestyles in this region. 
The domestic  fishing sector contributes  significantly to regional  food security and national 
employment,  while  fisheries  exports  provide  a  valuable  source  of  foreign  exchange 
earnings.581  The importance of fisheries is reinforced by the fact that most countries in the
C M
region  have lower-middle  or low  income  status.  Food security is  a great  concern  and is 
easily impacted by activities in the fisheries sector including the patterns and extent of fishing 
as  well as the state of regional  fisheries resources and marine ecosystems,  which  affect the 
quantities and type of fish available as well as their accessibility and affordability.583 Catch- 
landing  obligations  and  by-catch  restrictions  imposed  on  foreign  fishing  are  particularly 
influential, while the nature and extent of fish trade has a more complex, indirect impact. 
These issues are all revisited in greater detail below.
580 MacAlister Elliott and Partners Ltd,  ‘West Africa Sub-regional Fisheries Review: States of Mauritania, 
Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia’ (Report for the World Bank) (May  1995) 
(MacAlister Report) at para 1.2. See also fig 2.
581 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 1.1  and MacAlister Report ibid at para  1.2 and fig 3.
582 As defined by the World Bank see <http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm> accessed 
3 August 2005.
583 According to United Nations Food and Agricultural Organision (FAO) statistics. FAO, FAO Statistical 
Yearbook 2004 (Issue  1 Rome, FAO Statistical Division 2004).
584 CTA (Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU) and CFFA (Coalition for Fair 
Fisheries Arrangements),  ‘E-consultation on ACP-EU Fisheries Relations’ (Report of electronic discussion) 
December 2004 <http://www.cape-cffa.org/issues.php> accessed November 2005.162
Fisheries production  was fairly constant  along the West African  coast until  the mid-1960s,
585 conducted mainly by local  artisanal fishers who targeted small pelagic species.  Industrial 
operations  took  over  in  the  1970s,  dominated  by  foreign  fleets  -  initially,  those  from  the 
former Soviet bloc,  and later (from the  1980s onwards)  Southern European  and East Asian 
vessels. The  Soviet fleet  (supported by  substantial  state  subsidies) primarily targeted  small 
pelagics destined for the satellite states of Eastern Europe, while other foreign and domestic
r o / '
industrial vessels  favoured demersals.  In the  1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, most of its  vessels  withdrew,  accompanied by  a  significant  drop  in  the quantity of 
pelagics  harvested.  Industrial  fleets  subsequently  heightened  their  targeting  of  high-value 
demersals, Crustacea and cephalopods.587
Senegal gained independence from France on 4 April  1960. A period of relative political and 
social stability followed until the 1980s, when conflict arose between the central government 
and  the  south  (Casamance),  which  sought  autonomy.  Cease-fire  agreements  between  the 
government and the pro-independence movement (Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de 
Casamance (MFDC)) were signed during the 1990s but were not respected. A comprehensive 
peace  accord was concluded in  2001,  but relations between  the parties nevertheless remain 
fractious.  With  a population of around  10.5  million  and a gross national  product  (GDP) of 
US$  6.5  billion,  Senegal  is  classified  by  the  World  Bank  as  having  a  low-income 
economy.588  Poverty  is  pervasive  and  unemployment  is  high  (estimated  at  48  percent  in
585 Pelagics are migratory species, broadly divided into small pelagics (such as mackerel, herring and sardines) 
with low value, and large pelagics (such as tuna). MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at fn  1   and para 2.1.2.
586 Demersals are located near the bottom of the ocean within fairly confined areas and generally have a high 
commercial value (MacAlister Report ibid).
587 MacAlister Report ibid at para 1.1. Cephalopods are soft-bodies, tentacled marine species, including octopus, 
squid and cuttlefish, with high market values. Crustacea include species such as shrimp, crab and lobster. They 
too tend to have a high market value. MacAlister Report at fn 1  and para 2.1.2. For more on the species fished 
off Senegal’s coast, see p  185-192 below.
588 In 2003. World Bank,  ‘World Bank Development Indicators Database’ <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data- 
query> accessed 3 August 2005.163
2001).589 Most people therefore look to the sea as a source of food and income, engaging in 
subsistence or small-scale (artisanal) fishing -  over 80 percent of fishing is artisanal, with the 
industrial  catch  comprising  only  13  percent  of the  global  harvest.590  In  contrast,  Senegal’s 
maritime infrastructure (passed down by the French) is relatively modem and Dakar has one 
of  the  largest  deepwater  seaports  on  the  West  African  coast.  I  was  told  that  ports  are 
maintained and (where necessary) new ones  are built primarily with  foreign  funding either 
from  development  cooperation  projects  or  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  the  EU.591 
Senegal did not inherit a sound fisheries management administration, however, and to date, it 
remains beset by fisheries management difficulties, which I discuss in detail below.
Senegal’s  coastline  is  approximately  518  kilometres  long.  From  its  baseline,  the  state  has 
claimed various maritime zones in  accordance with international  law, including a territorial 
sea of 12 nautical miles and a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In terms of 
domestic law, industrial vessels are prohibited from fishing within six nautical miles from the 
coast,  establishing  an  area which  is  commonly referred  to  by  local  fishers  as  an  exclusive 
‘artisanal fishing zone’.592 Five marine protected areas (MPAs) were recently established to 
preserve Senegal’s coastal biodiversity and to protect its fisheries as part of a regional strategy 
for coherent MPA development.593 They vary in size but are all located within the six nautical 
mile zone. No fishing is permitted within these areas, but an official from the national marine 
fisheries department (Direction des Peches Maritimes (DPM)) told me that artisanal fishers do 
not  always  respect this  prohibition  and  as  enforcement  is  lax,  fishing  continues  in  various
589 CIA,  ‘World Factbook’ <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html> accessed 26 April 2006.
590 This is discussed further below in pp  183-185.
591 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
592 Ibid.
593 Five MPAs were created in 2004 at St Louis, Kayar, Joal-Fadiouth, Abene, and Bamboung. MPAs are 
established jointly by the Ministers of Maritime Economy and International Maritime Transport (previously 
Fisheries) and of the Environment and Nature Protection (previously Environment). Previously, the Minister of 
Fisheries was empowered to declare ‘protected areas’ along the coast in which fishing could be prohibited for 
defined periods (interview DPM official Dakar 6 February 2006). The Ministries were restructured in February 
2006, during my visit to Dakar. I thus refer to both the old and the current Ministries in order to prevent 
confusion.164
MPAs unabated.594 Coastal environmental problems include habitat loss, most noticeably the 
destruction of mangroves (which function as nursery grounds for fish and shellfish) and the 
over-exploitation of certain fish species, particularly coastal demersals (discussed below).595
Fish is discemibly an important food source in Senegal and provides around 75 percent of the 
rural population’s animal protein needs.596 It is supplied mainly by the local artisanal fishers 
and comprises primarily  coastal  pelagics.  During the past  twenty  years,  however,  artisanal 
fishers have increasingly joined the industrial sector in targeting high-value coastal demersals, 
often  favouring  them  over  coastal  pelagics  in  order  to  meet  the  increasing  international 
demand.597 This has contributed to the over-exploitation of various coastal demersal species, 
jeopardising long-term export yields.598 This is highly problematic as fisheries exports are an 
important  source  of  foreign  income  for  Senegal,599  and  make  a  valuable  contribution  to 
national  economic  growth.600  Various  DPM  officials  that  I  interviewed  expressly 
acknowledged  the  poor  state  of  coastal  demersals  and  emphasised  the  need  for  urgent 
government action to prevent their further decline and to assist with their recovery in order to 
avoid future adverse  trade and access  agreement ramifications.601  The current poor state of 
demersal stocks is partially an outcome of the state’s nurturing of the fisheries export industry 
during the  1970s  and  1980s.  The  result was  that from  1986  onwards,  fisheries  became the
594 Interview DPM official ibid.
595 The Parc National Delta du Saloum was created specifically to protect mangroves in Senegal. S Wells and C 
Bleakley,  ‘Marine Region 8: West Africa’ in G Kelleher, C Bleakley and S Wells (eds),  A Global 
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas,  Vol. II.  Wider Caribbean,  West Africa and South Atlantic 
(World Bank, Washington DC  1995).
596 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at 1. See also ICSF (International Collective in Support of 
Fishworkers), ‘Report of the Study on Problems and Prospects of Artisanal Fish Trade in West Africa’ (Report, 
ICSF 2002)  (Artisanal Fish Trade Report) at 6 and interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
597 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report ibid at para 1.2.
598 Ibid.
599 Approximately 35 percent of Senegal’s foreign exchange earnings are from the export of fish and fish 
products (ibid at xvii).
600 Ibid at para 1.1  and O Ndiaye, ‘International Fish Trade and Food Security -  Case of Senegal’ (Report of the 
Expert Consultation on International Fish Trade and Food Security, Casablanca Morocco 27-30 January 2003) 
FAO Fisheries Report No 708 (FAO, Rome 2003). For the period of 1990-2000, the contribution of the fisheries 
sector to the total GNP was on average two to two and a half percent.
601 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).165
primary  domestic  export  (ahead  of  combined  groundnut  and  phosphate  production), 
accounting for just over a third of the value of all foreign trade.602 Both over-fishing and the 
erosion of EU tariff advantages under the Cotonou agreement (discussed below) now threaten 
this role.603
The fisheries sector also contributes significantly to domestic employment, generating around 
600  000 jobs.  In  total,  between  15  to  17  percent  of  the  working  national  population  are 
employed in the fishing industry, (as noted above) primarily in the artisanal sector.604 Overall, 
the fishing sector accounts for around 11 percent of the primary sector GNP and between two 
to two and a half percent of the total GNP.605 Direct government revenue is generated through 
vessel  licences,  compensation  for  foreign  access,  fines  for  fishing  violations  and  fisheries 
taxes 606
Domestic fishing in Senegal grew steadily from the 1960s, with landings totalling 50 000 tons 
in  1965  and rising to just under 428 000 tons in 2003.607  As noted above, the industry was 
characterised by an increasing bias towards commercial, export-oriented fisheries, encouraged
602 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 1.1.
603 Ibid at para 1.3 and art 37 of Cotonou Agreement op cit n 287. See also B Olufemi and G Faber,  ‘From Lome 
to Cotonou: Business as Usual?’ (2004) 9 European Foreign Affairs Review  1, 26. The erosion of trade 
preferences under Cotonou is discussed further below as well as in greater detail in pp 104 and  105 below.
604 Directly, on board fishing vessels, and indirectly, in land-based employment (such as in the processing 
industry). UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report ibid at para 1.1. See also -  ‘Contribution to the Workshop on 
Fisheries Tax Reform: Report of the Ministry of Fisheries, Republic of Senegal’ in S Cunningham and T 
Bostock  (eds), Papers Presented at the  ‘Workshop on Exchange of View on Fiscal Reforms on Fisheries -  to 
Promote Growth, Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Management’ Rome,  13-15 October 2003 FAO Fisheries 
Report No 732 Supplement (FAO, Rome 2004) (Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report) at para  1.2.1, where it 
is suggested that around  100 000 direct jobs are generated and approximately 600 000 related jobs. Ndiaye op cit 
n 597 at para 1 and N Gueye,  ‘The Senegalese Experience in Negotiations of Fisheries Agreements with the 
European Union and the Impact of the Senegalese Populations’ (paper presented at International Seminar 
(CTA/CW) on ACP/EU Fisheries Relations: towards a greater sustainability 7-9 April 2003 Brussels)
< http://www.cta.int/events2003/fisheries/documents.htm> accessed February 2006 at 2, place the figures lower, 
at 600 000 jobs in total. See also Johnstone op cit n 541 at 5.
605 Gueye ibid at 2 and Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report ibid at para 1.2.1. Fisheries is in third position 
for sectoral contributions after agriculture and farming.
606 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 1.1.
607 Direction des Peches Maritimes (DPM),  ‘Resultats Generaux des Peches Mari times 2003’(Report) (Ministere 
de L’economie Maritime, Dakar 2005 (DPM Report) at 6. The 2003 figure was a  19.36 percent increase for the 
catch in 2002 (just under 358 000 tons) and had an estimated value of CFA  109 245  189 million. See also 
Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit 604 at para  1.2.1.166
by  the  state  and  compounded  by  external  factors.  State  support  included  numerous 
government  export  support  mechanisms  for  domestic  fish-export  companies,  such  as  tax 
exemptions,  tax  reductions  on  imported  equipment  and  repatriated  profits,  and  export 
subsidies.  In  addition,  companies  benefited  from  exemptions  on  value  added  tax  (VAT), 
customs tax,  and registering tax.608  Tax  benefits  were  also extended to  the  artisanal  sector 
(discussed  below).  Over  time,  these  export  incentives  created  over-capacity  in  the  fish 
processing  industry,  stimulating  the  establishment  of  numerous  new  export-oriented 
companies, which in turn heightened the demand for fish. Fishers strove to meet this demand, 
resulting  in  the  eventual  over-exploitation  of  numerous  coastal  demersal  stocks  and  a 
decreasing supply of fish to local markets.609 The export advantages offered under the Lome 
conventions (duty free entry into the EU market) compounded this trend.
A  second  impetus  for  the  industry’s  export  focus  was  the  mid-1990s  devaluation  of the 
Communaute  Financiere  Africaine  (CFA)  franc,  the  common  currency  of  francophone 
Africa.610 In  1994, the CFA was devalued by 50 percent on the initiative of the International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank  in  order  to  stave  off economic  crises,  revive 
exports in the region, restore credibility in the currency and protect French interests.611 The 
effect in Senegalese fisheries was to enhance trade competitiveness and significantly increase
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exports.  Finally,  governmental  support  policies  for  artisanal  fisheries  encouraged  this 
traditionally subsistence sector to focus on the external market, as discussed below in greater 
detail.
608 Ibid. Export subsidies were initially  15 percent and then 25 percent on canned tuna exports, and later 
extended to all fish products until devaluation.
609 Ndiaye op cit n 600 at paras 2.1  and 2.2.
610 The CFA is the common currency of the supranational financial system introduced by France in  1945 in its 
former West and Central African colonies, pegged to the French franc (now euro). Cross-reference to pp 96 and 
97, where the CFA is discussed in the context of the policy of associationism.
611 PJ Schraeder, ‘African International Relations’ in Gordon and Gordon op cit n 296 at 165,226, 227.
612 See UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 4 and Ndiaye op cit n 600 at para 2.3.167
2.2  The impact of subsidies
Fisheries subsidies are common in West African coastal states, including Senegal. Their main 
aim is to enhance fisheries output. Secondary benefits include national income growth (due to 
increased  fisheries  output),  increased  employment  in  the  fisheries  capture  and  processing 
sectors, enhanced business for fishing industries, heightened purchasing power of employees 
in the sector and improved national nutrition through greater domestic access to fish.613 The 
core objective of fisheries subsidies in Senegal are to foster food self-sufficiency and adequate 
nutrition. Additional goals include modernising the domestic fleet, creating local employment 
opportunities,  and generating foreign  income through  increased international  exports.614 To 
date, the bulk of the government’s fisheries subsidies have been directed at artisanal fisheries 
with a view to developing this sector. They were introduced in two successive phases, with 
the  first  beginning  at  independence  and  ending  in  the  1970s.  During  this  period,  the 
government  sought  to  transform  small-scale  fisheries  into  ‘intermediary  stage’,  semi­
industrial  fisheries  and  (later)  into  industrial  operations.  The  strategy failed,  however,  as  it 
was not supported by the small-scale fishers and government funds were inadequate.
The second phase began in the early 1980s. It followed a period of drought and accompanying 
crises in the agricultural sector during which fisheries rose to become the new leading sector 
in the Senegalese economy. It was hoped that fishing would foster sustainable national growth 
by reducing balance of payment deficits and unemployment rates and securing domestic food 
security. During this period the government shifted its approach from direct interventionalism 
to  export-stimulating  mechanisms,  offering  export  subsidies  throughout  the  sector  and 
providing  tax-free  fuel,  engines  and  fishing  gear.  Modernising  the  artisanal  fleet  was
613 AF Mabawonku,  ‘The Role and Effect of Subsidies on Fisheries Development in West Africa (Nigeria, Cote 
d’Ivoire, The Gambia and Senegal)’ Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF) Series 90/53 
(Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Rome  1990) at paras  1.2 and  1.4.
614 Ibid at para 2.3.1.168
prioritised  and  aid  was  provided  for  pirogue  motorisation  (with  significant  impact)  and 
purchasing  new  fishing  gear,  such  as  purse  seines.615  The  outcome  was  profound:  catch- 
landings rose rapidly from  130 000 tons in the early  1980s, to 250 000 in  1990 and around 
300 000 in  2002.616 The ability of fishers to harvest further from the shore for longer time 
periods enabled them to target off-shore high-value export species  and encouraged them to
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become more profit-oriented.
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By 2002,  approximately  60 percent of artisanal  catches  were destined  for export.  Short­
term  economic  benefits  were  evident,  but  broader,  long-term  implications  were  worrying: 
heightened  coastal  demersal  fishing  was  causing  over-exploitation  of  certain  species  and 
simultaneously resulting in  a dearth in supply to the local market.619 Local fish prices were 
rising  due  also  to  an  increase  in  input  costs  such  as  fuel,  spare  parts  and  timber  to  build 
fishing  vessels  (all  of which  are  imported  and  were  thus  adversely  impacted  by  the  CFA 
devaluation), which caused the inflation of production costs beyond the purchasing power of 
most locals.  Diminished supply to  local  markets  was exacerbated by the  inability of the 
newer, more sophisticated artisanal vessels to land on the open beach as they had done in the 
past. Most now require harbours, which raises landing costs and necessitates landing closer to 
urban cities. This compounds food security issues and by-passes the traditional role of rural
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women in artisanal  fish processing,  marketing and trading.  The DPM officials  and NGO 
representatives that I interviewed in Dakar were not,  however,  of the opinion that artisanal
615 Johnstone op cit n 541  at 12. In Senegal, the rate of motorisation of pirogues was higher than average in the 
West Africa region.
616 According to UNEP (Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 3.1), almost 350 000 tons were landed 
in 2002, but the DPM Report (op cit n 607 at 3) states that 311  536 tons were landed in 2002, increasing to 385 
766 tons in 2003.
617 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report ibid at paras 3.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 6 and Ndiaye op cit n 600 at para 4.
618 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report ibid.
619 Export agents continue to finance the artisanal sector to supply the export market (Artisanal Fish Trade 
Report op cit n 596 at 18). Cross-reference with p  189 below, where I discuss examples of over-exploited 
demersals.
620 Even timber is imported because large scale domestic forestry exploitation has resulted in a dearth of the local 
timber traditionally used to build pirogues. Artisanal Fish Trade Report ibid at  18,  19.
621 Ibid.169
fishing  subsidies  have resulted  in  significantly  diminished domestic  pelagic  catches  to the 
extent  that  local  food  security  is  threatened.  In  the  words  of one  DPM  official,  there  are 
‘enough  artisanal  fishers  catching  pelagics  for  food’.622  The  interviewees  did,  however, 
emphasise the urgent need for proper regulation of artisanal fisheries on the grounds that the
623 number of boats and fishers engaged in the sector is  ‘getting out of control’.  I revisit this 
issue of food security below in paragraph 4, where I focus on artisanal fisheries.
Overall, Senegal’s emphasis on export-oriented fishing fostered by governmental  subsidies, 
combined with its dependency on the EU market, appears to be a cause for concern from a 
long-term biological and socio-economic perspective. The way forward is difficult. Increased 
international trade liberalisation, required by the WTO regime and echoed in Cotonou, will 
likely see Senegal lose its comparative trade advantage in fisheries exports to the EU in the
near future.624 In response, Senegal could refocus its harvesting efforts on pelagics, the route
_
favoured by the regionally-based NGO representative I interviewed.  This would boost food 
security, but would result in a significant loss of foreign revenue. I was told that this could be 
offset  by  developing  a  viable  regional  export  market  for  pelagics.  But  in  previous  e-mail 
discussions with an FAO-based fisheries planning officer I was informed that lucrative large- 
scale  harvesting  of pelagics  along  the  West  African  coast  is  particularly  difficult  as  these 
stocks  are  migratory  species,  moving  between the EEZs  of regional  coastal  states,  and are 
highly  susceptible  to  fluctuations  in  abundance.626  Harvesting  pelagics  under  production 
conditions that are anything other than optimum is accordingly unlikely to be commercially
622 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
623 Interviews ibid.
624 The envisaged new liberalised, WTO-compliant trade arrangements under Cotonou due to be operationalised 
from January 2008 are discussed in detail in pp  104 and  105 above.
625 Interview Mr Ndiaye Socio-Economist, Programme Officer on Fisheries Policy of Enda Prospectives 
Dialogues Politiques (Enda Diapol) (Dakar 7 February 2006).
626 Informal interviews (e-mail correspondence September 2005).170
profitable.627 In addition, generating profitable regional fisheries trade will prove challenging 
(as I discuss below). The national economy will thus likely be (at least temporarily) adversely 
affected if this path is taken.628
On  the other hand,  if exports  continue  in  a similar vein  during the transitional  negotiation 
phase of Cotonou (until the end of 2007) as well as under its new trade arrangements, and/or 
are  boosted by existing  or new  measures,  the  over-fishing  of coastal  demersals  will  likely 
continue  with  potentially  disastrous  consequences.629  The  former  option  is  thus  arguably 
better from a long-term biological and socio-economic perspective. Ideally, it should be part 
of a multi-faceted approach that combines a focus on sound, sustainable resource management 
with  an  emphasis  on  increased  product  value-added  (rather  than  simply  focusing  on 
expanding trade volume) and on capturing new markets, particularly regionally.  This view, 
expressed in the literature, was echoed by the NGO representatives that I interviewed in the 
context of advocating the development of the domestic fleet in favour of diminished reliance 
on bilateral fisheries arrangements with the EU. They also suggested that in light of the poor 
state of the domestic industrial fleet, Senegal should consider entering joint fishing ventures 
with the EU in terms of which EU vessels would be re-registered in Senegal and required to 
land the majority of their catch  domestically.631  Arguably, the elimination  (or reduction) of 
current governmental fishing subsidies is also needed, particularly in light of the potentially 
more  stringent  regulation  of  fishing  subsidies  at  an  international  level  under  the  WTO 
framework.632
627 Optimal conditions would include abundant stocks, good onshore services to the catching fleets, and 
proximity to markets. MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at para 3.2.
28 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 1.4.
629 As I explained at pp 104 and  105, non-reciprocal free trade arrangements between least developed ACP states 
(of which Senegal is one) and the EU will be maintained under the EU’s preference programme.
630 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 1.4.
631 Interviews NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
632 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 2.1.2.171
As I explained in chapter 3, various WTO member states are calling for stricter regulation of
633 fishing subsidies in light of their contribution to fleet over-capacity and over-fishing.  While 
the matter is still under discussion, the possible future imposition of prohibitions on fisheries 
subsidies  raises  various  questions,  the  answers  to  which  impact  particularly  on  fishing 
relations  between  the  EU  and  African  coastal  states,  including  Senegal.  These  include 
whether the EU’s financial payments under its future bilateral fisheries agreements might be 
classified as  fisheries  subsidies  and thus  subject to new  future WTO rules  and whether the 
current preferential access enjoyed by Senegalese fisheries products to the EU market in terms 
of Cotonou  and EU  fisheries  development  cooperation  projects  in  Senegal  might  suffer  a 
similar fate.634  In  Senegal,  government  measures  to  foster  domestic  fisheries  development 
(discussed  above)  also  run  the  risk  of  future  classification  as  fisheries  subsidies  and 
consequential  challenge  within  the  WTO,  particularly  the  direct  financial  support  to  the 
artisanal  sector.  The  implications  of  such  an  outcome  for  Senegal  (and  African  coastal 
states  generally)  would  be  far-reaching  and  thus  warrants  further  attention.  Anticipating 
change, the EU has already initiated the phasing-out of fleet subsidisation -  as we saw earlier,
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in December 2004 it officially discontinued vessel transfer subsidies to third countries.  It is 
also  in  the  process  of  reconstituting  its  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  developing 
countries  into  fisheries  partnership  agreements  in  terms  of which  its  financial  contribution 
will  comprise  compensation  for  fishing  opportunities  and  targeted  payments  for  identified
633 For more on fisheries subsidies and their effects, see para 4.3 of ch 3. See also Cunningham and Maguire op 
cit n 205 at 72, Schrank op cit n 252 at 1, Milazzo op cit n 232 at 77 and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
‘Turning the tide on fishing subsidies: Can the World Trade Organisation play a positive role?’ (WWF, Gland 
2002).
634 The potential effect of tighter WTO regulation of fisheries subsidies is discussed in detail at pp 87-90; the 
Cotonou agreement and its future trade ramifications are discussed in chap 4 at p  104 and  105.
635 R Grynberg,  ‘Fisheries Subsidies: Casting a Net too Small’ (2002) 6 Bridges (paper) (International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Geneva 2002) 
<http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES6-7.pdf> accessed March 2006.
636 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the issue of fisheries subsidy regulation further.
637 In terms of art 8 of Regulation 2369/02 op cit n 461. Cross-reference with pp  129-132 where I discuss the 
structural pillar of the common fisheries policy in substantial detail.172
domestic fisheries development activities.638 Arguably, the financial compensation measures 
might nevertheless still be construed as a fisheries subsidies, although as I noted earlier, the
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EU officials that I interviewed were adamant that this would not occur.
2.3  The key role of  fisheries trade
As I have indicated above, fisheries trade is important to Senegal. It constitutes an estimated 
40 percent of total exports with over 50 percent of the total domestic catch in volume being 
exported.640  The  main  destination  is  the  EU.  This  is  largely  due  to  the  trade  preferences 
enjoyed by Senegal under the past Lome agreements and the current Cotonou arrangement, 
which permit customs free entry of piscatorial products into the EU market provided that the 
rules of origin are satisfied.641 Between 1982 and 1991, Senegalese fisheries exports to the EU 
increased from 90 000 to  120 000 tons, rising again to  125 000 in  1999.642 They have since 
dropped to  around  50 000  in  2003 643  Exports  to Asian  and North  American  markets  were 
historically marginal, but increased somewhat following the CFA devaluation (particularly for 
frozen fish products).644 Regional exports have traditionally been low, hindered by structural 
and institutional constraints, but are on the rise.645 Although the volume of fisheries exports to 
Europe have dropped, it nevertheless remains the main destination for Senegalese fisheries, 
absorbing around  52 percent of total  fish  exports;  this is  far more  significant from  a value
638 FPA Communication op cit n 364 at para 2.2.
639 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview Dakar 2 February 
2006). Cross- reference with p 89 at n 289. For a more sceptical view, see Gorez and O’Riordan op cit n 286 at 
para 3.4.
640 MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at para  1.2 and fig 3. In 2003, total fisheries exports were around 95 675 tons, 
amounting to around CFA 164 016 968 million (DPM Report op cit n 607 at 102).
641 Cross-reference with pp 102-107.
642 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 2.1
643 DPM Report op cit n 607 at 89, 90. The majority of these exports are frozen products (34 613. 30 tons).
644 In Asia, the main markets are Japan, China and South Korea (DPM Report ibid at ch 4).
645 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 2.2 and ibid. In 1999, only around 37 000 tons of fish 
were exported to African destinations. This amounted to less than 30 percent of Senegalese fisheries exports and 
constituted low-value products. In 2003, this figure rose to 38 649 tons, amounting to 40 percent of all fisheries 
exports. From a value perspective, however, this amounted to only eight percent of total fisheries exports (DPM 
Report ibid at 91-93 and annex at 103).173
perspective, with exports to the EU accounting for a massive  81  percent of the value of all 
Senegalese fisheries trade.646 Dependency on the EU market is thus still extremely high. This 
is  perpetuated  by  European  investment  in  African  fish  processing  industries  and  the 
conclusion of bilateral fisheries agreements with coastal African states.647 As I noted above, 
this is problematic in light of the new reciprocal trade arrangements envisaged by Cotonou, 
which may bring an end to the competitive trade preferences currently enjoyed by Senegalese 
fish  and fisheries  products  in the EU.648  Incremental  preference  erosion  is  likely to  be  felt 
even during the transitory period, compounded by the effects of the EU’s recently concluded 
free trade agreements with Mexico (in 2000) and Chile (2002), which envisage the eventual 
full  liberalisation  of  trade  in  fisheries  products  between  the  EU  and  these  states 
respectively.649 In 2005, the EU extended tariff exemptions on an extensive range of products 
to all least developed countries (LDCs), further weakening the comparative trade advantages 
enjoyed by Senegalese piscatorial products and thus their competitiveness.650
646 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report ibid at para 2.1 and DPM Report ibid at  103. The value of fisheries 
exports to Europe amounts to around CFA 133 million.
647 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report ibid.
648 Ibid and see Cotonou Agreement (op cit n 287) at, for example, art 37.
649 Cross-reference with p  103 at n 344.
650 In terms of the EU’s  ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) arrangement under its General System of Preferences 
(GSP), revised in Council Regulation No 980/2005. Cross-reference with p 105 at n 354. See also UNEP 
Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para 2.3.174
3.  The importance of sustainability in Senegalese fisheries regulation
Fisheries management in coastal West African states has traditionally been poor due to weak 
domestic fisheries policies and the dominating influence of external commercial concerns.651 
My  empirical  research  confirmed  the  former  point  in  relation  to  Senegal:  reflecting  the 
literature,  my  interviews  revealed  that  fisheries  administration  is  accorded  relatively  low 
governmental priority in Senegal and is regarded as being inadequately funded. This frustrates 
fisheries data collection and analysis and effective fisheries monitoring and control.  While 
some coastal states in the region have instituted national fisheries policies, many are said to be 
insufficiently detailed to ensure proper regulation of the industry and are poorly implemented.
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The common  result is thus  ineffective  fisheries  management.  This  is  exacerbated by the 
tendency of foreign investors to discourage tighter domestic regulation and control.654 Senegal 
was  in  a worse position  for a number of years  as  it had no national  fisheries  management 
policy  in  place  at  all.  Political  will  seemed  to  be  the  stumbling  block  to  this  end,  as  a 
comprehensive draft national management policy existed at the time of my research (I was 
shown a copy of this document on two occasions while in Dakar) but had simply not yet been 
implemented.655 While this changed in December 2006, when a fisheries management policy 
was  finally  adopted,  it  was  at  the  time  symptomatic  of  a  broader  failure  to  effectively 
operationalise fisheries policy and law domestically, as I discuss below in greater detail.
651 MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at para 4.1.3.
652 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
653 MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at para 4.1.3
*54 Ibid.
655 A draft national fisheries management policy has been drawn up, but it has yet to be implemented. It is 
acknowledged that this must occur soon. Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).175
3.1  Regulating domestic fishing
Senegal’s fisheries sector is primarily governed by the  1998 Marine Fisheries Code.656 The 
Code is ambitious in its conservation and management objectives  and includes measures to 
regulate  fishing  effort  and  control  the  expansion  of  national  fishing  capacity  as  well  as 
detailed  provisions  to  guide  the  establishment  of  fisheries  management  plans.657  It  also 
includes  institutional  management  mechanisms,  which  provide  for  the  establishment  of  a 
national  fisheries  consultative  council  and  local  fisheries  councils,  and  create  an  advisory
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commission  to  assist  with  the  issuing  of fishing  licences.  The  Code  regulates  industrial 
fisheries through vessel licences and size and volume catch limits.659 It also seeks to manage 
artisanal fisheries, outlining guiding principles to this end.660 This is an innovative move as 
the  artisanal  sector  has  historically  been  unregulated.  These  provisions  have  not  been 
implemented, however, and the artisanal sector remains unregulated.661 This is problematic in 
light of the  sheer number of fishers engaged  in  this  sector (noted  above) in  relation  to the 
diminishing coastal stocks. I was told that regulatory measures are unlikely to be implemented 
until after the next elections (February 2007), however,  as artisanal fishers comprise a large 
percentage  of the  electorate  and  many  of them  do  not  favour  the  envisaged regulation.662 
Comprehensive  provisions  for  improved  monitoring,  control  and  surveillance  of  fishing 
operations are also included 663
656 Marine Fisheries Code 98-32 of 14 April  1998 available at <http://www.gouv.sn/textes/PECHE.cfm> 
accessed February 2006 (which repealed and replaced the earlier 1987 Marine Fisheries Code (87-27 of 18 
August 1987)), together with its implementing Decree (No 98-498 of 14 April  1998) and Decree No 2000-833 of 
16 October 2000.
657 Ibid at art 10.
658 Ibid at arts 11,  12 and 22.
659 Ibid at arts 20, 21.
660 The principles are outlined in art 13 ibid. See also art 36.
661 This was valid at February 2006. It was confirmed by interviews with DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
662 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
663 Code op cit n 656 at Title VI.176
In  addition,  the  Code  tightens  the  regulation  of foreign  fishing  in  Senegalese  waters  and 
stipulates  minimum  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  terms.  These  include  specification  of the 
number and type of permitted foreign vessels, reporting requirements  and details regarding 
compensation and monitoring and enforcement. Agreement provisions must also accord with 
domestic fisheries management plans (if and when they are implemented).664
The government was slow to implement the Code despite the pressing need for more effective 
domestic fisheries regulation. In December 2000, a national multi-stakeholder gathering was 
thus  held  aimed  at  launching  the  legislation  and  crafting  a  long-term  sustainable  fisheries 
management  plan.  A  comprehensive  national  development  strategy  was  devised  and 
subsequently  published  in  2001.665  Its  objectives  included  ensuring  sustainable  fisheries 
management  while  maintaining  economic  viability,  modernising  the  artisanal  fishery, 
increasing the added value of fishery products,  and strengthening regional  and international 
bilateral cooperation in fisheries matters. Priority future legal reforms were identified to these 
ends,  the  most  urgent  being  the  establishment  of  a  sound  national  fisheries  management 
policy.  This  would  entail  implementing  fisheries  management  plans  in  the  industrial  and 
artisanal  sectors  (originally due to have been introduced in  terms of the  1998  Code) aimed 
primarily at reducing fleet capacity in the industrial sector and introducing vessel licensing in 
artisanal fisheries. The objectives of matching fish processing capacity with capture potential 
and maximising  value-added  were  also  identified,  as  was  the  need for institutional  reform 
towards  greater transparency in  fisheries  administration.666 The  strategy further highlighted
664 Ibid at Title VII, arts  16-19. See also Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 1.3.2.
665 Referred to cumulatively as the development strategy, it comprised four documents namely, a summary and 
three ‘Tomes’: Ministere de la Peche et des Transportes Maritimes,  ‘Diagnostic, Strategic et Plan d’Action de 
Developpement Durable de la Peche et de 1’ Aquaculture’ Note de Synthese,  ‘Peche Maritime et Continentale, 
Aquaculture; Analyse Descriptive et Diagnostic, Tome I’,  ‘Strategie de Developpement Durable de la Peche et 
de 1’Aquaculture, Tome II’, and  ‘Plan d’Action a Moyen Terme de Developpement Durable de la Peche et de 
l’Aquaculture, 2001-2007, Tome III’ (Ministere de la Peche et des Transportes Maritimes, Dakar 2001). See also 
Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report ibid.
666 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report ibid.177
the importance of effectively communicating its proposed new policies to all stakeholders so 
as to maximise its chance of success.
The envisaged re-ordering of the industry would require strong financial backing. To this end, 
the strategy recommended establishing a fisheries restructuring fund to compensate fishers for 
capacity-reduction and the introduction of selective gear requirements and to assist processing 
industries in upgrading their operations.667 Financial compensation under subsequent bilateral 
fisheries agreements  with the EU  (and other states) could arguably also contribute towards 
these ends. I was informed by the EU representatives that I interviewed that the Community 
intends  to  support  the  core  element  of  the  strategy,  namely  the  development  and 
implementation  of a  sustainable  domestic  fisheries  management policy,  by  channelling  all 
financial payments under future fisheries agreements with Senegal towards this end.  At the 
time  that  I  conducted  my  empirical  research  it  was  not  known  whether  this  would  be 
translated into a firm negotiation offer for the next agreement, and if so, whether it would be 
accepted by Senegal  (the  end of the  (then) current  agreement was  imminent - June  2006). 
Negotiations subsequently commenced in October 2005 but soon failed, however.669
The realisation of the development strategy lacked momentum and poor governance continues 
to prevail in the fisheries sector.670 DPM interviewees bemoaned the fact that the strategy’s 
suggestions have either not been operationalised or have been only partially implemented, in 
many  cases,  on  paper  only.  This  includes  recommendations  regarding  the  fisheries
667 Ibid at para 1.3.3.
668 Interview EU representative (telephone interview 21 September 2005).
669 The first official round was in April 2006 with the second in June of that year. I was informed that the 
primary reasons for their collapse was that while there was agreement on reduced fishing opportunities, there 
was no consensus on financial compensation. The parties also held differing views regarding the urgency of the 
need for Senegalese fisheries management reform. Personal e-mail correspondence with EU representatives 
(June and July 2006).
670 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 1.2.2 and interviews DPM officials (Dakar 
February 2006) and NGO representatives  (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
671 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).178
institutional  structure,  which  is  headed  by  the  national  marine  fisheries  department  (the 
DPM),672 assisted by the Centre for Oceanographic Research (CRODT), which provides the 
necessary scientific data and assessments.673 The structure remains unchanged from the 2000 
institutional revision despite the fact that, according to one DPM official, certain institutions 
have not been effectively fulfilling their mandates, most noticeably, CRODT 674
Equally  concerning  is  that  at  the  time  of  my  empirical  research,  a  national  fisheries 
management policy had still not been implemented even though key coastal demersal stocks 
were continuing to decline. As I suggested above, the reason for this seems to be political. My 
interviewees  revealed  a  keen  awareness  that  effective  domestic  fisheries  management  is 
urgently  required  to  halt  the  alarming  decline  in  coastal  demersal  stocks,  ensure  the 
sustainable fishing of other species  and enforce the long-overdue regulation of the artisanal 
sector.675 The domestic  fisheries regime facilitates these  goals but interviewees  were of the 
view that they will  remain  unrealised  until  there is a change in  mindset  at top  government 
levels towards a more pro-active stance.676 While Senegal has a relatively well-defined policy 
regarding fisheries access by foreign countries (particularly the EU), it is difficult to imagine
672 The DPM plays the lead role in establishing fisheries resource management and exploitation policies. It 
comprises an industrial and an artisanal fishery division, a fishery products control bureau, and regional services 
within each of the seven Senegalese maritime regions.
673 Centre de recherches oceanographiques de Dakar Thiaroye. It is helped by three bodies created under the 
2000 Decree, namely a fishery protection and surveillance department (Direction de la Protection et de la 
Surveillance des Peches (DPSP)), which is concerned with compliance with national fisheries regulations and 
with protection and surveillance of the EEZ, a planning and study group focusing on sustainable fisheries 
development (Cellule d'Etudes et de Planification (CEP)), and a continental fisheries and aquaculture department 
(Direction de la Peche Continentale et de l'Aquaculture (DPCA)), which  focuses on fisheries such as crustacean, 
molluscs and seaweeds. There is also a centre dedicated to artisanal fisheries improvement and experimentation 
(Centre de Perfectionnement et d'Experimentation pour la Peche Artisanale (CPEP)). Also important is the 
National marine fishery training centre (Centre National de Formation des Techniciens des Peches Maritimes 
(CNFTPM)), established by Decree No 91-1349 of December 1991, which trains marine fisheries technicians. 
For a discussion of these institutions and their respective roles, see Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op 
cit n 604 at para  1.3.1.
674 Interview with Mr Samb Former Technical Advisor to the Minister of Fisheries (Dakar 1 February 2006). The 
institutional structure was last revised in terms of the 2000 Decree (op cit n 653).
675 Interviews with DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 
2006).
676 Interview with Mr Samb op cit n 674.179
how  it  hopes  to  promote  sustainable  fishing  in  its  coastal  waters  without  strong  fisheries 
management plans and practice to underpin and guide it. Below, I briefly outline this policy.
3.2  Regulating fisheries access relations with the EU
Beginning in the early  1970s, Senegal concluded various bilateral fisheries agreements with
individual European states.677 These were long-term contracts which allowed an unspecified
number  of  vessels  to  fish  in  terms  of  ill-defined  harvesting  conditions.  Essentially,  they
amounted to financial loans for virtually unrestricted access.678 In  1979, prior to concluding
its  first  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  with  the  EU,  the  Senegalese  government  released
guidelines regulating foreign fleet access. The guidelines required foreign vessel numbers to
be limited to match domestic resource capacity, financial compensation to be paid for access
rights (to support national fisheries development), foreign fishing licence fees to be charged,
and a percentage of foreign catches to be landed and processed locally.  Priority access and
£70
processing rights were to be guaranteed to national fishers.
Two  basic  principles  emerged  from  these  guidelines  to  inform  future  bilateral  fisheries 
agreement negotiations with the EU: access rights granted to the EU would be non-reciprocal 
and the Community would be required to pay financial compensation in exchange for these 
rights  (together  with  vessel  license  fees).680  In  1990,  following  the  adoption  of the  1987 
Maritime Fishing  Code,  these principles  were  remoulded  into  a new  set  of guidelines  that 
required  negotiations  to  take  account  of  national  fishing  capacity  in  relation  to  declining 
domestic  stocks  and  the  need  to  foster  local  sustainable  fisheries  development.  They
677 With France in 1974, Italy in January  1975 and Spain in May  1975. Cross-reference to pp  100 and 101 at n 
335 and p 148 at n 538.
/no
Gueye op cit n 604 at 4 and Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 2.2.1.
679 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report ibid at para 2.2.1.
680 Ibid at para 2.2.1.180
highlighted  the  importance  of  reducing  fishing  pressure  in  Senegal’s  EEZ  while
acknowledging the country’s reliance on foreign income from bilateral fisheries agreements.
This  was  reflected  in  subsequent  agreements,  which  saw  a  reduction  in  EU  fishing
681 opportunities but an increase in the Community’s financial compensation package.
Senegal’s  first  fisheries  agreement  with  the  EU  coincided  with  the  re-launching  of  its
domestic efforts  to develop the  local  artisanal  sector (discussed above).  Artisanal fishers
thus  found  themselves  competing  for  species  and  fishing  grounds  with  not  only  domestic
industrial  vessels  but  now  also  the  EU  fleet.  Adverse  biological  and  socio-economic
68^
consequences followed (as outlined above).  The EU’s fishing off the Senegalese coast thus 
contributed  to  declining  domestic  fisheries  resources  and  simultaneously  diminished  the 
availability of fish stocks for local fishers.684
Senegal has nevertheless enjoyed significant socio-economic benefits from bilateral fisheries 
agreements  with  the  EU.  An  internal  governmental  analysis  of  the  1997-2001  agreement 
found that (in compliance with  compulsory landing provisions)  average annual  Community 
landings in Senegal during this period totalled 349 tons of demersals and 17 042 tons of tuna. 
These were processed locally, generating direct and indirect added value totalling CFA 5 579 
and  4  881  million  respectively.  In  addition,  locals  employed  on  EU  vessels  exceeded  the 
minimum fisheries agreement quota.685 Compensation for fishing opportunities was CFA 32 
billion,  averaging  CFA  8  billion  annually,  together with  trawler licence  taxes  of CFA  689
681 Ibid. The EU has become increasingly resistant to this trend  - interviews EU representatives (telephone 
interview 21 September 2005 and interview Dakar 2 February 2006).
682 The agreement was signed in  1980 - op cit n 336.
683 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 1.2.2.
684 Ibid and Ndiaye op cit n 600 at para 3.
685 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report ibid at para 2.22.2. For figures on economic impacts, see tables 5 
and 6.181
million and tuna tax of CFA 5.5 million. In sum, the total economic benefit to Senegal was an 
estimated CFA 19.2 billion , representing 9.6 percent of national added value.
The Senegalese government acknowledges that the bilateral fisheries agreements with the EU
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have  had  both  positive  and  negative  socio-economic  and  environmental  impacts.  Their 
adverse contribution to continual  stock decline in  Senegalese  waters nevertheless remains  a 
particular  cause  for  concern  which  for  critics,  overshadows  the  positive  effects  of  the 
agreements.  Senegalese  government  officials,  to  the  contrary,  tend  to  emphasise  the 
(financial) benefits of the agreements.
This bifurcated view came to the fore strongly in my empirical research -  the DPM officials 
that  I  interviewed  highlighted  the  valuable  foreign  currency  generated  by  the  agreements, 
arguing  that  it  was  used  to  develop  the  domestic  fishing  industry  and  that  it  ultimately 
benefited  the  country  as  a  whole;  the  fisheries  agreements  were  ‘in  the  interests  of  the
z o o
people’.  I was told by one senior official that any opposition to the agreements from local 
fishers that I might encounter was largely the result of NGO instigation and was fuelled by the 
fishers’  desire to see more immediate, direct financial benefits from the agreements coming
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their way.  The NGO representatives, on the other hand, were indeed highly critical of the 
agreements. As noted above, they advocated phasing out agreements with the EU in favour of 
developing the local fishing industry. Both NGO representatives that I interviewed explained 
in  detail  how  careful,  strategic  development  and  management  of domestic  fisheries  could 
result  in  long-term  financial  benefits  capable  of  matching  those  which  future  bilateral
686 Ibid at paras 2.2.2.3 and 2.2.2.4.
687 Gueye op cit n 604 at, for example, 8 and  13.
688 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
689 Ibid.182
fisheries agreements might generate (although each had different ideas about how exactly this 
should be realised).690
The  EU  representatives  that  were  interviewed  confirmed  that  the  EU’s  main  motive  for 
seeking to continue fisheries arrangements with Senegal is to meet Europe’s socio-economic 
needs, but emphasised that the Community would not pursue its own short-term interests at 
the expense of the long-term sustainability of Senegal’s fisheries.691 The interviewees assured 
me that the EU genuinely hopes to promote sustainable fisheries development in Senegal. 
They pointed to various terms of the (then) current agreement as proof of this intent, referring 
particularly to the targeted actions, and told me of plans to channel compensation under future 
fisheries  agreements  to  promote  the  implementation  of  an  effective  domestic  fisheries 
management plan.  One of the NGO representative expressed considerable scepticism of the 
EU’s intentions, however, emphasising that if the EU had any genuine interest in fostering 
sustainable  fisheries  development  in  Senegal,  it  would  not  do  so  obliquely  via  bilateral 
fisheries agreements but would directly assist Senegal in developing its domestic fisheries and 
help  it  to  improve  the  quality  and  quantity  of its  fisheries  exports  to  other countries.  He 
emphatically  asserted  that  the  (then)  current  fisheries  agreement  with  the  EU  was  nothing 
more than a business agreement securing direct Community access to Senegal’s fish stocks; it 
was  not  genuinely  concerned  with  fostering  the  long-term  sustainable  development  of 
Senegalese fisheries.693
In conclusion, at the time of my research the long-term sustainability of Senegal’s fisheries 
did not appear to be sufficiently highly-ranked by the government bodies of either the EU or
690 Interviews NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
691 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 2005 and interview Dakar 2 February 
2006).
692 Ibid.
693 Interview Nr Ndiaye op cit n 625.183
Senegal. This was despite the fact that both parties’ bilateral fisheries agreement policies have 
evolved in the last few  years to better reflect this goal. The failed recent negotiations for a 
new fisheries agreement between the parties is indicative of the parties’ inability to agree on 
‘sustainable fishing’  as the ultimate objective of such arrangements as well as their diverging 
views on what this goal should comprise and how it should be achieved.
4.  Senegalese artisanal fisheries and sustainability
The term ‘artisanal fishers’ is generally accepted as referring to small-scale fishers involved in 
a diverse range of fishing activities from non-advanced, non-differentiated subsistence fishing 
to highly differentiated and specialised semi-formal sector harvesting.694 This aptly describes 
the Senegalese  artisanal  fishing  sector.  As I have already indicated,  artisanal  fishers play a 
very important role in Senegalese fisheries; the overwhelming majority of Senegalese fishers 
are artisanal, with their catches cumulatively amounting to about 87 percent of total domestic 
landings.695 A large percentage of these fishers originate from outside the country and have 
either  settled  in  Senegal  (such  as  the  Guineans)  or  are  migratory  (for  example,  the 
Nyominka).  These  groups  strongly  influence  the  processing  market  (particularly  the 
Guineans) and thus also largely dictate the capture industry.696
Despite the fact that the artisanal  sector now also increasingly targets coastal demersals (in 
contrast to their traditional  fishing practices),  pelagics  still  constitute  around 70  percent of 
artisanal captures, most of which  are kept for local consumption with the remainder traded
694 For a succinct review of the meaning and nature of artisanal and subsistence fishing see M Hauck,
‘Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) Draft Report 6: Review of Literature on Artisanal and Subsistence 
Fishers’ (Report) Institute of Criminology Social Justice Resource Project, University of Cape Town (2000). See 
also R Lawson and M Robinson, ‘Artisanal Fisheries in West Africa: Problems of Management Implementation’ 
(1983) 7 Marine Policy 279, 290 at 280.
695 DPM Report op cit n 607 at 101.
696 Samudra, ‘A New Space: Excerpts from the Report on the Workshop on Problems and Prospects for 
Developing Artisanal Fish Trade in West Africa’ (August 2001)
<http://www.icsf.net/jsp/publication/samudra/pdf/english/issue_29/art05.pdi> accessed Febuary 2007.184
regionally.697  These  official  figures,  together  with  the  views  expressed  by  interviewees  in 
Senegal,  do  not  accord  with  some  of  the  literature  on  the  topic  which  suggests  that  the 
artisanal  trend  towards  targeting  export  species  (fostered  by  government  export  aids,  as 
discussed above) is  increasingly  at the expense  of the  local  supply  of pelagics  and is  thus
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threatening regional food security (as I have already noted above in paragraph 2.3).  Further 
research on this matter is needed to provide clarity, although arguably the mere potential of 
such a threat is worrying and should elicit pro-active governmental responses.
The most common pelagic species landed by the artisanal sector are bonga (ethmalosa) and 
sardinella, which have minimal commercial value and are sold locally at relatively low prices, 
comprising a central component of the  Senegalese diet.699 Both fresh  and processed fish is 
consumed locally but the latter is favoured as it is more easily preserved, an important factor 
in Senegal’s hot climate and given the scarcity of refrigeration facilities. EU fishing has the 
potential  to  interfere  with  artisanal  fishing,  particularly  its  trawler  activity,  as  it  produces 
significant by-catch that is generally high in pelagics. Under past access agreements, fishing 
opportunities  granted  to  the  EU  for  pelagic  species  were  particularly  problematic  as  they 
generated  competition  with  local  fishers  for  stocks  and  fishing  grounds.  As  a  result  of 
profound discontent expressed by the artisanal fishers and critics, EU rights to pelagics were 
accordingly  excluded  from  the  most  recent  bilateral  fisheries  agreement;  by-catch  limits 
remain problematic however.700
697 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 2.2.2.1  and Gueye op cit n 604 at 14.
698 See for example Ndiaye op cit n 600, who suggests that the threat is already significantly worrying.
699 UNEP Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at para  1.1, MacAlister op cit n 580 at para 1.2 and A
Sail,‘Case Study of the Fish Processing Sector in Joal: A Dynamic Reality’ in International Collective in Support 
of Fish workers (ICSF), Report of the Study on Problems and Prospects of  Artisanal Fish Trade in  West Africa 
(Report, ICSF 2002) at 29.
700 For more on this, see p 214 below.185
In brief, the key components of the local artisanal fisheries sector are capture, processing and 
trade.  Artisanal  fish  processing  and  trade  have  particular  social,  cultural  and  economic 
significance, generating employment opportunities, particularly for women, and contributing 
towards food security by ensuring the distribution of fish.701 Regional fish trade is conducted 
primarily on  an informal  basis in response to demand; exports are mainly to Burkino Faso, 
Mali  and  Guinea  Conakry.  Various  problems  hamper  regional  trade,  however,  including 
cross-border  transport  difficulties  (particularly  inadequate  transport  infrastructure),  border 
problems (such  as customs  and police  harassment of fish  vendors), tariff barriers  and poor 
market facilities.702 Expanded regional fish trade could have numerous benefits for Senegal 
such  as  providing  an  alternative  and/or  supplement  to  current exports  to  Europe,  securing 
diversified  and  sustainable  livelihoods  in  the  artisanal  fisheries  sector,  and  contributing 
towards  improved  regional  food  security.703  Domestic  and  regional  efforts  to  eliminate 
obstacles to this end should thus arguably be increased.704 My empirical research confirmed 
the importance of regional fisheries trade to Senegal and a number of my interviewees (most 
noticeably, the NGO representatives) expressed the view that the national government should 
make a greater effort to promote such trade.705 Development opportunities in the local fresh 
fish market brought about by the increasing availability of electricity and ice should also be 
investigated.706
701 While artisanal fishers are almost exclusively male, the artisanal processing sector is traditionally dominated 
by women. Samudra op cit 696 at 30. See also Samudra at 23 and N Nayak,  ‘Case Studies of Women Fish 
Processors and Traders’ in ICSF, Report of the Study on Problems and Prospects of Artisanal Fish Trade in West 
Africa (Report, ICSF 2002) at 60.
702 Ibid and see Sail op cit n 699.
703 Sumudra op cit n 696 at 24.
704 Gorez and O’Riordan op cit n 286 at para 2.3.
705 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
706 Nyak op cit n 701  at 42.186
5.  The exploitation and state of Senegalese fisheries
Senegal’s  diverse  coastal  fisheries  are  targeted  by  domestic  fisheries  as  well  as  various 
foreign fleets from neighbouring countries  and distant-water fishing nations.  In response to 
the  over-fishing  of  valuable  coastal  demersal  species,  the  Senegalese  government  is 
concerned  with  balancing  the  need  for  their  urgent  effective  management  with  permitting 
continual access to them by foreign fleets in return for generous financial compensation. At 
the  same  time,  it  must  protect  its  national  fisheries.707  My  fieldwork  highlighted  the 
importance of  pursuing these goals and the likely difficulties in doing so.
As noted earlier, the global Senegalese catch grew dramatically from the  1960s until present 
times.708  The  industrial  catch  is  currently  around 41  800,709  while  artisanal  landings  are  a 
massive  385  776  tons,  amounting  to  just  over  80  percent  of  the  total  domestic  catch 
(compared to 68.2 percent of the total catch in  1992).710 The most common species targeted 
by industrial fishers include octopus,  shrimp, cuttlefish, white carp and ombrina,  as well as 
tuna. I was told that the industrial fleet, which comprises trawlers (around 70 percent of the 
total  fleet),  seiners  and  ‘three  or  four’  tuna  vessels,  is  old  and  requires  urgent 
modernisation.711 As noted above, artisanal fishers traditionally favour small coastal pelagics 
and while they  are  increasingly targeting  higher value  coastal  demersal  species  for export, 
pelagics continue to dominate their catch. Pirogues (dugout canoes) remain the main artisanal 
fishing  vessels,  although  the  overwhelming  majority  are  now  motorised  (around  75.8
707 Interview DPM official (Dakar February 2006) and reflected in various government reports, such as Gueye op 
cit n 604 and Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 2.2.1  and ‘General conclusion’.
708 DPM Fisheries Report op cit n 607 at 6.
709 See Johnstone op cit  n 541 at 6 for figures regarding the industrial catch for  1981-1993. For current figures, 
DPM Report ibid at 6.
710 Ndiaye op cit n 600 at para 3, read together with DPM Report ibid at 3. As noted above, the figures for 2003 
are somewhat inconsistent. See also Johnstone ibid at 5 for earlier figures.
711 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and DPM Report op cit n 607 at ch 3 and at 101.187
712 percent).  Purse seines,  ring nets  and encircling nets  are  the  favoured  gear.  In  total,  the 
Senegalese  domestic  fleet  officially  currently  comprises  139  industrial  vessels  and  14  900 
artisanal  pirogues.  As  there  is  no  obligation  on  artisanal  fishers  to  licence  their  vessels, 
however  (as  noted  above),  it  is  likely  that  the  number  of pirogues  in  use  is  significantly 
higher.713
In  2003,  foreign  ships  in  Senegal’s  EEZ  accounted  for  about  32  percent  of all  industrial 
vessels in these waters,  harvesting around  11  987 tons (about two percent of the total EEZ 
catch).714 Distant-water fishing nations traditionally fishing in Senegalese waters in terms of 
agreements  include  the  former  Soviet  Union,  various  Eastern  European  fleets,  East  Asian 
vessels and the EU.715 In 2003, licences were issued for 28  trawlers and 30 tuna vessels in 
Senegal’s coastal waters (comprising ships from Spain, France, Portugal and Italy); their total 
catch was 10 839 tons.716 In addition, tuna vessels from Netherlands Antilles (two), Cap Vert 
(two), St-Vincent and Grenadine (one) and Venezuela (also one) and a Gabonese trawler were 
fishing off Senegal’s coast.717 The EU harvest comprised the overwhelming majority of the 
total foreign catch in line with its comparatively favourable fishing opportunities.
There  are  four  main  groups  of exploitable  stocks  in  Senegal’s  EEZ:  pelagics,  demersals, 
cephalopods  and crustaceans.718  Pelagics  are  migratory  species,  broadly  divided  into  small 
pelagics (such as mackerel, herring and sardines), which have a low value, and large pelagics
712 Seine nets are the most commonly used. Most artisanal catches were taken in the Thies region, followed by 
Dakar (DPM Report ibid at 100). See also Johnstone op cit n 541 at 5.
713 The current available data relates to 2003 figures. In 2003, the industrial fleet comprised  132 trawlers, three 
seiners and four tuna vessels (interviews DPM officials Dakar Febraruy 2006 and DPM Report ibid at ch 3 and 
at 101). According to ICC AT statistics, however, there are currently nine tuna vessels.
714 See Johnstone op cit n 541 at 6 for figures for 1982-1993 and DPM Report ibid at 101, as well as interviews 
DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) for current figures.
715 Ibid.
716 DPM Report ibid at 64.
717 Ibid. Their combined catch was relatively small.
718 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 1.1, based on information from CRODT.188
with a high commercial  value (such as tuna).719 Small coastal pelagics dominate fish stocks 
off the  West  African  coast  (primarily  sardinellas,  which  comprise  over  70  percent  of the 
resource).  Their  distribution  corresponds  with  geographical  coastal  features,  with  a 
concentration  of  stocks  in  areas  of  oceanic  up  welling:  Senegalese  and  Gambian  waters 
together support around 2.2 million tons of these pelagic species.  In Senegal, small pelagics 
have a relatively moderate harvest level, having traditionally only been fished by the artisanal 
sector (although catches temporarily rose to around one million tons in  1989 when they were 
also targeted by former Soviet-bloc fleets).  As noted above, there is potential for enhanced 
regional  trade  in  these  species;  if obstacles  to  this  end  are  reduced,  the  Senegalese  small 
pelagic industry could well expand.
Large pelagics are highly migratory high  seas  species,  moving down from the north  with a 
migration pattern that is difficult to predict. The stocks move between and through the EEZs 
of various coastal  states in the West Africa region, as well  as further off-shore. Their catch 
potential  is  accordingly  difficult to  evaluate.  The  main  commercial  species  in  the  Atlantic 
include yellowfin tuna, skipjack, bigeye tuna, swordfish, and sailfish. Tuna and tuna products 
are  highly  valuable  on  the  world market,  but  as  tuna  vessels  are  inhibitively  expensive  to 
purchase  and operate,  Senegal  relies  primarily  on revenues  from foreign  fleet  access to its 
tuna resources to redeem some of their value. Senegal has three tuna processing industries but 
due to low domestic catches and insufficient foreign landings, only two of the industries are 
currently operating, and they are not working to their full capacity.721 While the most recent 
bilateral fisheries agreement with the EU imposed higher catch-landing requirements for tuna 
vessels than previous agreements, both the DPM officials and the NGO representatives that I 
interviewed were strongly of the view that they should be further increased in the future to
719 MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at fn  1.
720 Ibid at para 3.1.
721 Interview Mr Samb op cit n 674.1 was informed by the EU representatives (e-mail exchange January 2007) 
that there is now only one tuna processing industry in operation.189
generate greater domestic revenue from Senegal’s tuna resources.722 Various DPM officials 
also expressed the view that increased access rights could be granted to tuna to compensate 
for  the  need  to  reduce  (or  eliminate)  fishing  opportunities  to  coastal  demersals  in  future 
agreements.723 Scientific assessment of tuna stocks would first need to confirm this as a viable 
option, however.
The second major species found off the Senegalese coast are demersals, which are prolific in 
this region due to the rich nutrients provided by seasonal up-wellings.724 Coastal demersals 
are  largely  fully-  to  over-exploited.725  Severely  over-exploited  stocks  include  grouper,  sea 
bream,  lesser  African  threadfin,  and  blue  spotted  sea  bream.726  Deep  demersals  (such  as 
Senegalese hake and deep-sea shrimp), however, are not over-exploited.727 As noted above, 
coastal demersals form a major component of Senegal’s fisheries exports to the international 
market  and  bring  in  valuable  foreign  revenue  from  access  rights  sold  through  bilateral 
fisheries  agreements  with  (primarily)  the  EU.  Their  over-exploited  status  is  thus  a  major 
concern  and  there  is  increasing  pressure  on  the  Senegalese  government  to  devise  and 
implement a scientifically-sound, sustainable management plan for these species as a matter 
of urgency.
The  final  two  major  stocks  are  cephalopods  and  crustaceans.  Like  coastal  demersals, 
cephalopods  are  harvested  off  Senegal’s  coast  by  fleets  of trawlers  and  many  species  are
722 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006). 
See pp 205,206, 208 and 220 below for a discussion on this aspect of the most recent bilateral fisheries 
agreement. Cross-reference also pp  103 and  104 above, where the rules of origin for trade preferences pertaining 
to tuna are discussed.
723 Interviews with DPM officials ibid.
724 MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at para 2.1.1.
725 Ndiaye op cit n 600 at para 3, Gueye op cit n 604 at 14, Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 
at para  1.1 and MacAlister Report ibid.
726 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report ibid.
727 Ibid.190
heavily  or  over-exploited  (an  exception  is  octopus).728  Crustacean  fisheries  are  also  fully 
exploited, if not over-exploited. Shrimp (especially southern pink shrimp and deep-water rose 
shrimp) has a particularly high export value and is heavily fished  in Senegalese and Gambian 
waters, predominantly by foreign industrial vessels.729 Shrimp trawling results in significant 
by-catch  of juvenile  fin  fish  in  shallow  waters,  which  is  discarded  as  it  has  a  low  value 
compared to shrimp. In  1994, it was estimated that for every ton of shrimp landed from the 
Senegal shrimp trawl fishery, 2.72 tons of fish was discarded, amounting to an annual value 
of around US$ 20 million.730
The Senegalese government is aware of the full- to over-exploitation of key domestic fisheries 
stocks, particularly coastal demersals, and recognises the likely adverse biological and socio­
economic implications of this.  It regards domestic over-capacity,  the continued targeting of 
over-exploited resources, and decreased productivity as key causes of this crisis. The Ministry 
of Fisheries is aware that drastic action is needed and has expressly advocated a  ‘break with 
old  attitudes  and  behaviour’  in  order  to  actively  foster  sustainable  national  fisheries 
development.731 It recognises that this will come at a high socio-political cost, however.732
6.  Conclusion
In terms of what I have described as a ‘sustainable fishery’ in chapter 3, it is clear that many 
Senegalese fisheries are currently unsustainable from particularly an institutional, ecological 
and  socio-economic  perspective.  However,  based  on  available  relevant  literature  and
728 MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at para 2.1.2.
729 Almost half of the total annual production in the region originates from Senegalese and Gambian waters 
(McAlister Report ibid at para 2.1.3).
730 Ibid.
731 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 2.2.2.4.
732 Ibid.
733 Cross-reference with pp 73 and 74 above, where I discuss the various elements of a sustainable fishery in 
detail.empirical  research,  it  is  arguable  that  sustainability  remains  an  attainable  goal.  Most 
importantly, the current domestic legal framework is conducive to pursuing this objective and 
policies have already been drafted to this end. What is now urgently required is the domestic 
political  will  to  implement  these  policies  and  the  support  of  foreign  fishing  nations, 
particularly the EU,  in  realising  them.  Securing  institutional  sustainability  is  thus  the  first 
step.734  This  requires  commitment  from  both  Senegal  and  the  EU  to  actively  promote 
sustainable  fisheries  development  in  Senegal.  It  is  particularly  important  that  any  future 
bilateral fisheries agreements (or any other kind of bilateral fisheries relations) are carefully 
shaped to foster this goal and to support and complement national initiatives taken to this end. 
I examine the extent to which this has already begun in my next chapter, where I discuss the 
most recent EU-Senegal agreement in detail, highlighting its impact on sustainable domestic 
fisheries management.
734 As noted above at p 73, institutional sustainability is the key-pin to securing a sustainable fishery.192
8
EU-SENEGALESE FISHERIES RELATIONS 
1. Introduction
The most recent bilateral  fisheries  agreement between  the EU and  Senegal  is  an  important 
illustrative  case  study  of how  such  arrangements  between  the  EU  and  developing  coastal 
states  can  play  out  in  practice  and  gives  us  an  idea  of  how  they  might  impact  on  the 
sustainability of the coastal  states’  domestic  fisheries.  In  the previous chapter I introduced 
Senegal’s fishing sector, highlighting its important domestic role and the consequential need 
to  ensure  its  effective  long-term  management.  With  reference  to  my  empirical  research  I 
revealed, however, that sustainable fisheries management is presently weak in Senegal, giving 
rise to various biological and socio-economic problems which are compounded by EU fishing 
activities  in  Senegalese  waters.  In  this  chapter  I  focus  on  the  most  recent  EU-Senegalese 
bilateral  fisheries  agreement  legitimising  Community fishing in  Senegal’s  coastal  waters.  I 
examine its contents in detail, referring to relevant provisions of the previous agreement for 
comparative  purposes  and  drawing  on  my  empirical  research  to  analyse  its  impact  on  the 
sustainability of Senegal’s fisheries.
2. Background to EU-Senegalese fisheries relations
The EU has enjoyed access to Senegalese fisheries for over 25  years in terms of a series of 
bilateral  fisheries  agreements.  The  first  agreement  was  concluded  in  1980.735  Seven  new 
agreements  have  since  been  negotiated  revising  the  original  arrangement  in  response  to 
domestic  and  international  law  developments  and  changes  in  the  status  of  coastal  fish
735 Op cit n 336.193
stocks.736 As I have illustrated in my thesis, bilateral fisheries agreements between the EU and 
developing coastal states have a multi-faceted character. At core they are rooted in, and are 
the  product  of,  broader  political  relations  between  the  two  parties,  reflecting  the  parties’
n'Xi
shared colonial history and subsequent related socio-economic ties.  They are also strongly 
commercial: access is granted in exchange for hard foreign currency and the agreements give 
rise  to  numerous  direct  and  indirect  economic  benefits,  including  broader  trade 
implications.738 The agreements also perceptibly impact upon Senegalese society, especially 
local artisanal fishers and coastal communities and have a significant effect on the domestic 
marine  and  coastal  environment,  particularly  the  sustainable  use  and  development  of 
Senegalese fisheries resources.739
As  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter,  both  parties’  policies  concerning  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements  have  evolved  over time  -  access  arrangements  were  initially  treated  as  purely 
commercial bilateral exchanges but are now recognised as comprehensive inter-governmental 
arrangements  that  reflect the  complexity  of fisheries  relations  between  the  parties  and the 
urgent need to promote sustainable fishing. From the Senegalese side, my research revealed 
that bilateral fisheries agreements nevertheless remain largely driven by commercial interests. 
I was told by a senior national marine fisheries department (Directions des Peches Maritimes 
(DPM))  official  that  although  the  (then)  current  agreement  is  in  theory  a  ‘partnership’ 
arrangement that aims to promote Senegalese fisheries development, it is in practice nothing 
more  than  a  contract  selling  a  right  to  fish;  a  business  arrangement.740  This  opinion  was 
echoed by the NGO representatives that I interviewed.741 The EU representatives were more
736 The agreement was re-negotiated  in  1982, 1985,  1990,  1992,  1994, 1997 and 2002. Sixteen protocols have 
been negotiated in total.
737
For a discussion on the role of the colonial legacy and its influence on bilateral fisheries relations between the 
EU and (particularly) West African states, including Senegal, see chap 4 above.
738 1 outline examples of indirect benefits at p  149.
739 Gueye op cit n 604.
740 Interview DPM official (Dakar February 2006).
741 Interviews NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).194
reluctant to characterise the agreements, emphasising that they defy easy classification and 
must  be  seen  as  unique  arrangements  influenced  by  a  broad  range  of  issues  including 
development  cooperation  relations.  They  noted,  however,  that  any  such  future  agreements 
will be fisheries partnership agreements ‘proper’.742
While it has been increasingly difficult for the parties  to reach  consensus  on key issues in 
recent  agreement  negotiations,  they  nevertheless  expressed  their  desire  to  continue  their 
tradition of bilateral fisheries agreements. Although negotiations for a new agreement failed 
in  June  2006,  it  remains  feasible  that  the  parties  will  attempt  to  re-negotiate  another 
agreement  in  the  not  too  distant  future  as  their  respective  incentives  for  concluding 
agreements remain valid.743 From the Senegalese perspective, the two main impetuses are the 
financial  benefits  that  the  agreements  secure  and  Senegal’s  broader  socio-economic 
dependency on the EU  as  a result  of political  history.  As  noted in chapter 7,  my research 
suggests that economic considerations are paramount. All of my interviewees in Dakar cited 
Community compensation  as  the  primary  domestic  benefit  of the  agreements;  specifically, 
many emphasised how badly Senegal needed the foreign currency to service national debts, 
‘run the country’  and administer the fisheries sector.744 One DPM official informed me that 
the government ‘wants the money [from the agreements] at all costs’. He illustrated this point 
with  reference  to  the  conclusion  of  the  1990  bilateral  fisheries  agreement:  apparently, 
following the Minister of Fisheries’ refusal to sign the agreement on the ground that it did not 
serve domestic fishing interests, his authority was by-passed by national government and the
742 In accordance with the implementation of the EU’s new fisheries partnership approach, which I discuss in 
detail at pp 151-157 above. Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 2005 and 
interview Dakar 2 February 2006).
743 Cross-reference with p 230 and 231, where I discuss this in greater detail.
744 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006), NGO representatives (6 and 7 Dakar February 2006) and 
EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview Dakar 2 February 2006). See also 
Johnstone op cit n 541  at 23.195
Minister of Finance was sent in his stead to Brussels to close the arrangement.745 In the words 
of  another  DPM  official,  to  grant  the  EU  access  in  exchange  for  generous  financial 
compensation  is  an  ‘easy’  way  for  Senegal  to  realise  some  of the  economic  value  of the 
fishing sector given  that the government is currently reluctant to invest time  and money in 
developing the domestic  industry.746 Ultimately,  it has traditionally  simply been easier and 
more profitable for Senegal to ‘sell [its] fish in the water’ rather than to do so from processing 
plants after value has been added.747
In addition to the financial attraction, Senegal also continues to conclude agreements in order 
to maintain positive broader development cooperation (trade and aid) relations with the EU. 
Bilateral  fisheries  agreements  theoretically  fall  outside  the  ambit  of  Cotonou  as  they  are 
sector-specific  bilateral  contractual  arrangements,  but  their  negotiations  are  nevertheless 
shaped by  and  have  broader repercussions  on  the  trade  and  aid  arrangements  between  the 
parties  under  the  Cotonou  agreement.748  As  noted  earlier,  Cotonou  expressly  promotes 
coherence between  arrangements  made  in  terms  of its  provisions  and  fisheries  agreements 
concluded between the EU and individual ACP countries, highlighting the close relationship 
between  the policy dialogues  in  these two  spheres in  practice.749 The NGO representatives 
that  I  interviewed  in  Senegal  acknowledged  this  link;  in  contrast,  EU  officials  were  less 
inclined to  recognise  it.  In  one  interview  I  was  told that  the EU regards  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements as  ‘completely’  separate from the new economic partnership agreements (EPAs) 
to be negotiated under Cotonou: EPAs are about trade in fish and fisheries products whereas 
bilateral  fisheries  agreements  are  about  access  to  fish  stocks.  Another  official,  however,
745 Interview Mr Samb op cit n 674.1 was not able to verify this account, but its possible validity makes a telling 
point.
46 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
747 Johnstone op cit n 541 at 29.
748 Johnstone ibid at 23 and 24. Cotonou Agreement op cit n 287. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of 
Cotonou on bilateral fisheries agreements between the EU and developing countries, see pp  100 and  101.
749 For more detail on this, see p  106 above.196
explained  their  relationship  as  follows:  ‘[e]conomic  partnership  agreements  will  simply 
complement bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  regard to  those regional  issues  that are not 
covered by the fisheries agreements. Those aspects of fisheries relations between the EU and 
the ACP states that are bilateral i.e. access to coastal waters and payment for such access, will 
remain covered by bilateral fisheries agreements; those aspects of fisheries relations that are 
regional,  such  as  trade,  and  strengthening  control  and  enforcement,  will  be  covered  by 
economic  partnership  agreements’.  Furthermore,  in  the  area  of  development  aid  some 
critics  suggest  that  those  ACP  countries  that  offer  the  EU  ‘favourable’  terms  in  bilateral 
fisheries agreements receive more development aid for their fisheries sectors than those that 
do not.751
The  EU’s  historic  incentives  for  directly  accessing  Senegalese  fish  stocks  via  bilateral 
fisheries  agreements  have  been  rooted  in  meeting  its  own  socio-economic  needs  and 
contributing to alleviating its fleet over-capacity problem, as I outlined earlier in chapter 5.752 
The EU’s economic analysis of the  1997-2001  agreement indicated, however, that while the 
Community paid Euros 16 million in terms of the contract, it was in fact worth only Euros 14
753 million largely due to the depleted state of Senegal’s high-value coastal demersal species. 
Accordingly,  the  EU’s  interest  in  and  dependence  on  accessing  Senegal’s  waters  is
750 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).
751 Johnstone op cit n 541  at 26 and Mwikya op cit n 531  at para 3.4, where the author asserts that failure to 
conclude a bilateral fisheries agreement with the EU can adversely affect the level of development aid received 
by the country in question. It remains to be seen if this is the case in Senegal, as my research could not confirm 
this. Furthermore, the EU representatives adamently deny this to be the case, stating that the Community’s 
development budget and fisheries agreements are ‘completely disconnected’ from one another (e-mail exchange 
January 2007).
752 Cross-reference with p 130 with regard to alleviating over-capacity and p  148 for further discussion on the 
general reasons. See also Committee on Fisheries Report op cit n 523 at 15, Poverty Reduction Communication 
op cit n 539 at para 2, Acheampong op cit n 539 Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 76, 77, Foders op cit n 
215 at 23, and ADE-PWC-EPUop cit n 522 at 35. These reasons were openly acknowledged during my 
interviews with EU representatives - interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and 
interview Dakar 2 February 2006).
753 Cross-reference to chap 7 where I discuss the over-fished status of coastal demersal species in Senegal; see p 
189 in particular.197
diminishing.754 Senegal’s tendency to nevertheless demand increasing financial compensation 
for access to its waters (reflected in negotiations for the 2002 agreement and the recent June 
2006 negotiations), is likely to further diminish its comparative strategic importance to EU in 
fisheries.755  As  the  EU  enjoys  access  to  almost  the  entire  West  African  coast  in  terms  of 
various bilateral fisheries agreements, Senegal’s tendency to demand high compensation may 
simply  encourage  the  Community  to  look  instead  to  neighbouring  West  African  states  to 
satisfy  its  future  fishing  needs.  The  recent failed  agreement  negotiations  may  indicate  the 
beginning of such a tendency. However, as I have noted above, various factors suggest that an 
attempt to re-negotiate an agreement in the near future remains a possibility.
Under past agreements, the EU had access rights to demersal, pelagic and celphalopod stocks 
in Senegal’s coastal waters. The main species targeted by the Community fleet were shrimps,
756 prawns,  squid,  octopi,  hakes, herrings,  sardines, groupers,  seabass  and tuna.  In  exchange 
for fishing opportunities, the EU paid financial compensation to the Senegalese government. 
The agreements suggested the broad ends to which the money should be used, but it was in 
essence  a  lump  sum  compensatory  payment  for  access.  This  changed  in  the  1997-2001 
agreement,  when  payments  for specified  ‘targeted  actions’  were included for the first time 
(discussed further below). Prior to this, the overwhelming majority of the money went to the 
Senegalese Treasury  (between 77 and over 90 percent of total  payments under the various 
agreements).757  The remainder of the money was generally divided between support for the
754 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview Dakar 2 February 
2006).
755 Interview Ms Adriaen, European Commission Delegate in Senegal for Fisheries Agreements in West Africa, 
(Dakar 2 February 2006).
756 Johnstone op cit n 541 at 7,8 and FAO, Statistical Bulletin for the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central 
Atlantic: Nominal Catches 1979-1991 (FAO, Rome 1994).
757 Under the 1992-1994 Agreement (Council Regulation  (EEC) No 2296/93 of 22 July 1993 on the Conclusion 
of the Protocol Defining, for the Period 2 October 1992 to 1 October 1994, the Fishing Rights and  Financial 
Compensation Provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government 
of the Republic of  Senegal on Fishing off the Coast of Senegal [1993] OJ L212/2) a total of ECU 31 200 000 
was paid to the Senegalese Treasurer General, with an additional ECU 800 000 set aside for the development 
actions described above (arts 2, 4, 5). The full financial compensation of the 1997-2001  Agreement (Council198
Senegalese  Ministry  of Fisheries,  the  monitoring  agency,  scientific  research  institutes  and 
programmes, bursaries for students in  various fisheries-related disciplines  and assistance to 
the artisanal sector.758 In addition, the Community fleet paid vessel license fees (amounting to 
a comparatively insignificant amount).759 The  member states  that benefited the  most under 
these agreements were Spain, Italy, Portugal, France, Greece and Germany.
The  Community  fleet  comprised in-shore  demersal  trawlers  (freezer and non-freezer),  off­
shore demersal fish and shrimp trawlers  and numerous types of tuna vessels  (bottom long- 
liners,  canner/pole  and  line  vessels,  freezer  seiners  and  surface  long-liners).  It  was 
considerably more heterogeneous than other distant water fleets in the region because of the 
variety  of  species  to  which  it  enjoyed  access  in  terms  of  the  fisheries  agreements.  The 
agreements required the  compulsory landing of specific  portions  of the  Community fleets’ 
catch of coastal demersals and tuna in order to secure some local socio-economic benefits for 
land-based domestic  fishing-related operations. For coastal  demersals,  these increased from 
130 to 200 kilograms per gross registered tonnage (GRT) per half year under the  1992-1994 
and  1997-2001  agreements  respectively,  but  for  tuna,  landing  obligations  remained 
constant.760  Under  the  most  recent  agreement,  compulsory  landings  are  higher  in  both 
categories (as I discuss below).
Regulation (EC) No 542/98 of 9 March  1998 on Conclusion of the Protocol Establishing the Fishing Rights and 
Financial Compensation Provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Government of the Republic of  Senegal on Fishing off the Coast of Senegal for the Period of 1 May 1997 to 30 
April 2001  [1997] OJ L302/1) - ECU 48 000 000 - was paid to Senegalese authorities, along with full 
responsibility for determining its use. The authorities were required to notify the Community of the use to which 
the money was put, using ‘as a basis the aims of sustainable development of fishing’ listed under previous 
protocols (art 3.1).
58 See for example arts 2-5 of Annex  1 of the 1992-1994 Agreement Protocol ibid and art 3 of the  1997-2001 
Agreement Protocol ibid.
759 Johnstone op cit n 541 at 8.
760 Para C Annex  1 of 1992-1994 Agreement Protocol (op cit n 757 ) and  1997-2001 Agreement Protocol (op cit 
n 757) respectively.The earlier agreements reflected some efforts - at least theoretically -  to promote sustainable 
fishing,  such  as  the  inclusion  of  various  technical  conservation  measures  (for  example, 
minimum authorised net size) and the demarcation of permitted EU fishing zones. In addition, 
EU vessel owners were required to employ a certain percentage of local crew members on 
board.761  Combined,  these  measures  indicate  that  the  earlier bilateral  fisheries  agreements 
between the EU and Senegal aimed (to varying degrees) to promote rational resource use and 
(to  some  extent)  also  domestic  socio-economic  development.  The  present  poor biological 
state  of  coastal  demersal  species  and  the  socio-economic  under-development  of  the 
Senegalese fisheries sector, however, indicate that these measures were either inadequate or 
their implementation was deficient. Most likely, it was a combination of both factors arising 
from  insufficiently  committed  policies,  attitudes  and  actions  on  both  the  EU  and  the 
Senegalese side.762 With this background in mind, below I examine the content and potential 
impacts of the most recent EU-Senegalese agreement with respect to sustainability in greater 
detail.
3.  The most recent EU-Senegalese bilateral fisheries agreement
3.1  The negotiation and content of the agreement
The  negotiation  of the  most  recent  EU-Senegalese  fisheries  agreement  was  protracted  and 
difficult and the parties  struggled to reach consensus.  To give themselves more negotiation 
time,  they  first  extended  the  (then)  existing  agreement  by  three  and  then  five  months
761 For more information on the specifics of these provisions, see for example Johnstone op cit n 541 at 9 
regarding the 1992-1994 agreement.
762 In earlier chapters, I have discussed the policies and practices of both parties regarding their commitment to 
sustainable fishing through bilateral fisheries agreements; in particular see chaps 5, 6 and 7.200
following  its  expiry  in  April  2001.763  Eight  rounds  of  negotiations  took  place  before 
agreement  was  reached  in  June  2002.  Senegalese  negotiations  were  led  by  a  multi-party 
national task force, which comprised representatives from the industrial and artisanal sectors 
and from fisheries administration and research. An independent evaluation of the  1997-2001 
protocol was commissioned by the state to inform the task force’s work, mandated to assess 
the  potential  contribution  of a new  agreement to  the  sustainable  development of domestic 
fisheries  and the  national  economy.764  The  EU  and  Senegal  mutually  identified three  core 
issues to be satisfactorily  accommodated in  the new  agreement, namely ensuring the long­
term  sustainable  exploitation  of  Senegalese  fisheries,  fostering  the  development  of  the 
domestic  fishing  industry,  and  protecting  the  interests  of  the  European  fleet.  From  the 
Senegalese perspective, there were a number of additional matters that were considered key to 
the negotiations. These included the method for limiting the EU’s catch possibilities (which I 
revisit later below), the determination of by-catch rates and EU fishing zones, the declaration 
of biological rest periods, the means for establishing tuna vessel  licence fees,  agreement on
765 financial compensation, and implementation conditions for ‘targeted actions’.  I was told by 
EU representatives  that  particular concerns  for the EU  included the  high  level  of financial 
compensation requested by the Senegalese delegation and the possibility of securing access 
rights for coastal demersals.766 Consensus was finally reached in mid-2002 and the agreement 
was signed on 25 June 2002.
The agreement covered the four year period of 1   July 2002 -  30 June 2006 at a total cost to 
the  EU  of Euros  64  million,  with  19  percent  (Euros  12  million)  earmarked  for  dedicated
763 Council Regulation (EC) No 2303/2001 of 15 November 2001 on the Conclusion of Two Agreements in the 
Form of Exchanges of Letters Concerning the Extension of the Protocol Establishing the Fishing Opportunities 
and Financial Compensation Provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
the Government of the Republic of Senegal on Fishing off the Coast of Senegal for the Periods  1 May 2001 to 31 
July 2001 and 1 August 2001 to 31 December 2001  [2001] OJ L310/6.
764 Gueye op cit n 604 at 8 and  9.
765 Ibid at 10.
766 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).201
‘partnership’  measures.767  In  return,  approximately  125  EU  vessels  were  granted  access to 
Senegalese  coastal  waters,  originating  from  Spain,  Portugal,  France,  Italy  and  Greece. 
Specifically, the agreement granted access to 77 tuna vessels (16 pole-and-line tuna vessels, 
39 freezer seiners and 23 surface longliners), with the remaining figure of 48 vessels based on
768 an  estimate  of  the  amount  of  ships  fishing  under  categories  limited  by  GRT  only. 
Interestingly (as noted in chapter 7), in 2003 Senegal recorded only 28 trawlers and 30 tuna 
vessels from the EU fishing in its EEZ during that year. I was told by the EU interviewees that 
this  reflects  an  increasing trend  among Community vessel  owners to under-use the fishing
769 rights granted to them in terms of the agreements due to the poor state of Senegalese stocks. 
This confirms the dire status of several of Senegal’s coastal demersal fisheries.
The  cost  provisions  of  the  agreement  reflected  the  proposed  financial  arrangements  of 
fisheries  partnership  agreements  (discussed  in  chapter  5)  as  they  clearly  distinguished 
between  financial  compensation  in  return  for  Community  fishing  opportunities  and 
‘partnership’  activity  payments.770  The  EU  was  bound  to  pay  Euros  16  million  to  the 
Senegalese  government  annually,  of which  Euros  13  million  was  to  be  paid  to  the  Public
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Treasury and Euros 3 million was for ‘partnership’  activities.  With regard to the latter, the 
agreement  obliged  the  parties  to  establish  a  ‘partnership’  to  support  various  fisheries 
development activities  in  Senegal  towards  the  ‘development of sustainable  and responsible 
fishing in  their mutual  interest’.  The  various  activities  were  listed  together  with  the  EU’s 
annual contributions towards each: Euros 500 000 a year was to be channelled into  ‘resource 
monitoring  and  evaluation  of  stocks’  comprising  research,  participation  in  exchange  of
767 Op cit n 529.
768 Institute for European Environmental Policy (DEEP),  ‘Fisheries Agreements with Third Countries -  is the EU 
Moving Towards Sustainable Development?’ November 2002 (lEEP, London 2002) at 9, fn 4.
769 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).
770 FPA Communication op cit n 364. See pp  151-157 for a detailed discussion of this Communication.
771 Agreement Protocol op cit n 530 at art 2.202
information, and regional coordination networks, Euros 700 000 annually was earmarked to 
improve fisheries inspection  and monitoring (including the installation of vessel  monitoring 
systems  (VMS)  in  Senegalese  fishing  vessels),  Euros  500  000  was  to be  paid  annually to 
improve the safety of local small-scale fisheries, a further Euros 500 000 a year was dedicated 
to institutional support ‘for establishing sustainable fishing’, and finally, Euros 700 000 was 
to be paid annually towards ‘improving skills’. The agreement provided that these partnership 
schemes  would be  evaluated and  audited  annually  -  Euros  100  000  was  set  aside  for this 
purpose.772  It  was  expressly  agreed  that  should  the  EU  fail  to  make  these  payments,  the 
agreement could be suspended.773
In  terms  of  the  agreement  the  Senegalese  Minister  of  Fisheries  had  significant  scope  in 
deciding  how  to  distribute  the  finances  to  measures  aimed  at  realising  the  partnership 
activities. The Minister was required to devise an ‘action programme’ to this end and to notify 
the  EU  of  its  contents,  and  was  obliged  to  deliver  a  detailed  annual  report  to  the  EU 
delegation  in  Senegal  on  its  implementation.774  This  would  be  considered  by  the  joint 
committee  established  to  oversee  the  implementation  of  the  agreement.  The  agreement 
entitled the EU to ‘review’ its payments to Senegal in light of ‘actual implementation’ of the 
measures.775  The  benchmark  for  determining  ‘actual  implementation’  was  not  outlined, 
however.
My  interviews  with  EU  representatives  revealed  that  the  parties  had  struggled  to  reach 
consensus  on  the  partnership  activities  provisions.  In  particular,  the  final  wording  of the 
‘review’ provisions (referred to above) had been a reluctant compromise. In practice, they had 
proven  to be  extremely  difficult to  implement  as  the EU could only investigate the  use to
772 Ibid at art 4.
773 Ibid at art 5.
774 Ibid at art 4.
775 Ibid.which the money was put up to a point before it risked encroaching on Senegal’s sovereignty. 
The Community had thus relied on the information contained in the Senegalese Ministry of 
Fisheries’  reports  as proof of  ‘actual implementation’; they had not been  able to  ‘test’  the 
validity of these reports further via audits or site visits. Ultimately, they could only carry out 
an ‘administrative accountability check’.776 These provisions had accordingly became a ‘huge 
source of tension’ between the parties and were, in the end,  ‘counterproductive, consisting of 
a lot of questions and paperwork’.777 The Senegalese DPM officials that I interviewed were 
generally less critical of the way that the provisions had operated. In response to my question 
of whether the allocated money had been spent on realising the listed activities, interviewees 
responded in the affirmative. One official, however, together with the NGO representatives, 
was considerably more sceptical about where the money had actually gone - he lamented that 
‘a lot’ of the money had not been spent as stipulated in the agreement despite the fact that the 
records showed its appropriate use. Instead, it had been spent in various other ways, including 
to corrupt ends.778
The agreement granted the EU fleet fishing opportunities for tuna, in-shore demersal fish and 
cephalopods,  and  deep  sea  demersal  fish  and  crustaceans.  The  annual  average  cost  of the
*77Q
agreement per vessel was Euros 128,000.  Benefiting vessel owners covered only a fraction 
of this cost. Trawlers  paid an  annual  licence  fee  of between Euros  157  and Euros 246 per 
GRT in the first year,  which increased over the four-year period to Euros  169 and Euros 
285 respectively.781
776 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview Dakar 2 February 
2006).
777 Ibid.
778 Interview with Mr Samb (op cit n 674) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
779 DEEP op cit n 768 at para 4.1.
780 See art 1.4 (a) para A of Annex to the Protocol op cit n 530.
781 For the exact amounts to be paid each year for these three groups of fishing vessels, see the table ibid.204
Under the agreement, pole-and-line tuna vessels paid no fee, but were charged Euros  15 per 
ton  of fish  caught  in  the  Senegalese  fishing  zone,  while  freezer  tuna  seiners  and  surface 
longliners paid a flat rate of Euros 3 000 and 2 000 respectively, equivalent to fees for 120 
and 42 tons of fish per vessel annually.782 Final fees of Euros 25 per ton for tuna seiners and 
Euros 48 per ton for surface longliners were calculated at the end of each calendar year by the 
Commission  based  on  ship  owners’  catch  statements,  confirmed  by  the  Centre  for 
Oceanographic  Research  (CRODT).783  Ship-owners  were  required  to  make  any  additional 
payment within  30 days of submitting their final  statement and were not reimbursed if the 
final fee was lower than the flat rate.784 These charges are particularly noteworthy as they are 
comparatively low in relation to tuna’s potentially high commercial  value. The commercial 
value of tuna on the open market is between Euros 500 to  1  500 per ton (depending on the 
species).785 The fees charged per ton of tuna caught were thus only a fraction of the average
nof.
commercial value.  The West African coast has considerable tuna stocks but I was informed 
that the coastal states  lack the capacity to profitably exploit them as the costs of equipping 
tuna vessels  are inhibitively high  and advanced technological  skills are required to conduct 
commercially  successful  tuna  operations.787  These  states,  including  Senegal,  are  therefore 
generally unable to profitably harvest tuna on a commercial scale. They thus try to reap the 
economic benefits  of tuna resources by  selling  direct  access  rights  to  tuna to the EU  (and 
others). This means of natural resource extraction echoes earlier colonial patterns in terms of 
which West African states supplied cheap raw materials to their (then) European colonisers.788
782 Article 1.4 (b) para A of Annex to the Protocol op cit n 530.
783 Centre de Recherches Oceanographiques de Dakar Thiaroye (CRODT). Ibid. The catch statement is to be 
forwarded simultaneously to the Senegalese authorities and the ship-owners.
784 Article 1.4 (b) para A of Annex to the Protocol op cit n 530.
785 Analysis in IEEP Report op cit n 768 at  para 4.1.
786 Ibid and Kazynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 89. Cross-reference generally with the authors’ discussion on 
the inequities of benefit-sharing between the EU and West African coastal states from tuna resources (86-89).
787 Informal e-mail exchange FAO representatives (September 2005) and interviews DPM officials (Dakar 
February 2006). See also CFFA op cit n 349.
788 For more on the shared colonial legacy between Europe and the West African states and the impact of this 
legacy on their bilateral fisheries relations, see chap 4.205
As noted in chapter 7,  my research indicated  a preference  on  both  sides for the  EU to be 
granted increased access rights to tuna under future fisheries agreements. This was a widely- 
held view, expressed by DPM officials, NGO representatives  and EU representatives  alike. 
Senegalese DPM officials and NGO representatives are acutely aware of the potential value of 
such  rights  and  were  indignant  that  Senegal  had  not  (in  their  view)  to  date  benefited 
sufficiently from granting the EU tuna access rights.  They intimated that if more extensive 
access  rights  were  granted  to  the  EU  in  the  future,  catch-landing  requirements  for  these 
species should also be significantly raised and catch limits should be more tightly regulated. 
This would enable Senegal’s (currently under-utilised) domestic tuna processing industries to 
contribute towards a potentially highly lucrative tuna export business.789 As tuna is a highly 
migratory  species  and  both  the  EU  and  Senegal  are  parties  to  the  UN  Straddling  Stocks 
Convention, they must ensure that any future fisheries agreement provisions are conducive to 
promoting the tuna’s ‘optimal utilisation’.790
There  were  various  resource  management  measures  in  the  agreement  that  (at  least 
theoretically) promoted sustainable fishing and sustainable local  fisheries  development. My 
interviews revealed, however, that many of these provisions were included largely for reasons 
of political diplomacy, with little expectation of their effective realisation. This is evidenced 
by their problematic implementation, as I discuss below.
Firstly,  the agreement provided for the declaration  of a biological  rest-period,  an important 
fisheries management tool. The relevant provision empowered the Senegalese government to
789 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006). 
Cross-reference with p  188 where I also discuss Senegal’s tuna processing industries as well as with pp 103 and 
104 where I discuss the rules of origin for tuna. According to the EU representatives, catch landing requirements 
have been complied with by pole and line vessels but less so by seiners as local canning factories have either 
paid them prices that are lower than market value, paid one to two months late or have failed to pay them for 
their catch at all (e-mail exchange January 2007).
790 Articles 7 and 8(1) of the Straddling Stocks Convention op cit n  124. Senegal acceded to the Convention in 
October 1984, and in December 2003 it was ratified by the EU.ban EU demersal trawlers from fishing for certain species for a specified period in the interest 
of sustainable fishing (in-shore trawlers and ocean-going freezer trawlers for two months, and 
ocean-going fish trawlers and bottom liners for four months).791  Senegalese authorities were 
also empowered to adopt ‘emergency measures’ for particular species if necessary in relation 
to both domestic and foreign vessels. The joint committee was to evaluate the impact of these 
measures  on  the  EU  fleet  and  ‘where  appropriate’  would  adjust  the  level  of  financial 
contribution  accordingly.  Arguably,  this  financial  rider  was  likely  to  discourage  the 
Senegalese  authorities  from  instituting  such  measures,  contrary  to  fostering  biological 
sustainability.  The  joint  stock  monitoring  provisions  (discussed  below)  suffered  from  a 
similar weakness. This is clearly highly problematic - if parties are serious about promoting 
sustainable fisheries, Senegal  should arguably not be financially  ‘penalised’  for introducing 
stock-management measures that effectively reduce the EU’s fishing opportunities.  I revisit 
this issue below when I present my analysis of the agreement.
Secondly, the agreement also specified Community by-catch limitations for various species, 
ranging  from  two  to  ten  percent  of  permitted  catches.  Noteworthy  was  that  in-shore 
trawlers fishing for demersal  fish  and cephalopods were allowed a by-catch  of seven  and a 
half percent crustaceans but no by-catch limits were imposed for fish.793 This is relevant to 
my discussions in chapter 7  and below  about the need to limit pelagic by-catch  as they are 
targeted by the local artisanal fishers. By-catch was to be calculated at the end of each voyage 
with  reference  to  the  total  catch  weight,  in  accordance  with  Senegalese  law.  If by-catch 
percentages exceeded the authorised amount, vessel owners would be penalised in accordance
791 Article H of Annex in Protocol op cit n 530. The annual closure period for in-shore trawlers is from 1 October 
to 30 November, and for ocean-going freezer trawlers from  1  September to 31 October. For ocean-going fish 
trawlers, the period is from 1 March to 30 June.
792 See article K of Annex ibid. For an explanation of by-catch and its effect on sustainable fishing, see p 77.
793 Article K of Annex ibid, at para 1. Limits for ocean-going trawlers are also specified (paras 2 and 3).207
with domestic law, which could entail the permanent banning of the relevant vessels from all 
fishing activities in Senegalese waters.794
As I noted earlier, detailed provisions were also included requiring the compulsory landing of 
parts of the Community catch in Senegalese ports. The amounts differed according to the type 
of vessel and the species targeted, ranging from 150 to 250 kilograms of fish and shrimp per 
GRT bi-annually.795 Failure to comply with the landing requirements attracted a fine from the 
Senegalese authorities of Euros 900 per ton not landed and could result in the withdrawal of 
the  vessel  concerned  (or of another vessel  belonging to the  same  owner) from  Senegalese 
waters.796 Landing requirements  for tuna vessels  were  listed  separately:  pole-and-line tuna 
vessels had to land at least 5000 tons of tuna a year, while freezer tuna seiners were required 
to land 12 5000 tons of tuna annually at the prevailing international price.797 The obligation of 
direct  landing  for  freezer  tuna  seiners  was  required  to  comprise  44  percent  by  French 
registered  vessels  and  the  remaining  56  percent  by  vessels  flying  the  Spanish  flag.798  My 
interviews in Dakar revealed that both  the DPM officials  and the NGO representatives felt 
that  not  only  were  the  landing  requirements  for  EU  tuna  catches  too  low,  but  that  the 
Community  also  failed to  sufficiently  comply  with  these  landing  obligations.799  I  was  not 
given statistics or figures to verify deviance from the catch-landing requirements, however.
The stock evaluation provisions  contained in  article 3  were particularly  interesting.  At first 
glance, they appeared to be far-reaching in  their efforts to promote sustainable fishing. On 
closer examination,  however,  the  measures  were  problematic  and  ultimately  weak,  as  was
794 Ibid at para 4. In accordance with ICCAT and FAO recommendations, catching basking shark, white shark, 
sand tiger shark, and tope shark is prohibited.
795 Article C of Annex ibid at para (a).
796 Ibid.
797 Ibid at para (b)).
798 Ibid at art 3.
799  t
Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).208
confirmed by my research.  The article bound the EC and Senegal  to  ‘make every effort’  to 
jointly monitor the state of Senegalese resources throughout the operation of the agreement, 
and to take appropriate measures to ensure their sustainable management. To this end, a joint 
annual scientific meeting was established. Management measures could be taken by common 
agreement after consultation in the joint committee, based on the findings of the meeting and 
the  ‘best available scientific advice’.800 The agreement recognised that these measures might 
require a reduction of the EC’s fishing opportunities and stated that this would in turn attract 
an  ‘adjustment’  in financial compensation. As I have noted above, this surely operated as a 
poor incentive for Senegalese authorities to agree to implement measures that might result in 
a  reduction  of EU  fishing  opportunities.  Its  inclusion  makes  more  sense,  however,  when 
viewed in light of its negotiation history. I was informed by an EU representative that (as with 
various other cardinal provisions in the agreement) the inclusion and wording of this measure 
was  a political  compromise:  the EU had agreed to the compensation  requested by  Senegal 
despite doubts that the agreement’s  value was worth this high figure on the grounds that if 
Community fishing opportunities were reduced for any reason whatsoever the EU retained the 
right  to  reduce  the  payment  accordingly.  The  parties  did  not  expect  that  the  payment- 
reduction provision would ever be utilised (and it has not been).
Overall, the stock monitoring provision proved to be ineffective. The main reason for this was 
that it was limited to regulating stocks affected by EU fleet activities only; it did not include 
stocks fished by the domestic fleet or other foreign vessels within its scope.  As Community 
fishing only comprised a small percentage of the global harvesting activities in Senegal’s EEZ 
during  the  operation  of  the  agreement,  it  contributed  proportionally  ‘insignificantly’  to
800 Article 3 of Agreement Protocol op cit n 530.209
domestic  stock  depletion.  The  provision  therefore  failed  to  address  the  overall  stock 
diminution problem in any real way.801
This leads on to a further problematic aspect of the agreement, namely that it failed to limit 
the  amount  of  catch  that  the  Community  could  take  from  Senegalese  waters.  Instead,  it 
restricted the Community’s  catch possibilities by reference to vessel numbers  and tonnage. 
Specifically,  the  agreement  granted  access  to  78  tuna  vessels  (39  freezer tuna  seiners,  23 
surface longliners and 16 pole-and-line tuna vessels), 1 500 GRT per quarter of the year of in­
shore demersal trawlers catching fish and cephalopods, an average of 3 000 GRT per month 
of fish  trawlers  fishing  for deep-water demersal  species  and bottom  longliners,  and  3  500 
GRT per month  of freezer trawlers  fishing  crustaceans.802  From  a biological  sustainability 
perspective  this  method  of restricting EU  catch  is  questionable,  as  I  discuss  below  in  my 
analysis of the agreement.
The agreement also specified the fishing zones in which the various types of EU vessels were 
permitted  to  operate.  These  had  been  reduced  from  past  agreements  to  ensure  greater 
protection  of the  Senegalese  artisanal  fleet and the regulation  of the  various  zones  was  far 
more  detailed  than  previously.803  In-shore  trawling  was  still  permitted,  however  -  smaller 
trawlers targeting fish and cephalopods (up to 250 GRT) were able to harvest from just six 
nautical  miles  off  the  coast.804  Larger  in-shore  trawlers  targeting  the  same  species  were 
required to fish further afield -  either from 12 or 15 nautical miles off the coast, depending on
801 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).
802 Article 1 of the Agreement Protocol op cit n 530. The allocation of opportunities according to member states 
is as follows: demersal fishing -  coastal demersal: Spain 704 GRT per quarter, Italy 563 GRT per quarter, and 
Greece 233 GRT per quarter; deep water demersal fish trawlers and bottom long-liners: Spain 3000 GRT per 
month, averaged yearly; and deep water demersal freezer trawlers fishing for crustaceans: Spain 3,186 GRT per 
month, averaged yearly, and Portugal 314 GRT per month, averaged yearly. Tuna fishing -  tuna seiners: France 
18 vessels, Spain 21  vessels; pole-and-line vessels: France 6 vessels, Spain 10 vessels; surface long-liners: 
Portugal 3 vessels and Spain 20 vessels. See article 2 of the Protocol.
803 Article G of the Annex to the Protocol ibid.
804 Ibid at art G, para 2.210
their GRT.805 The fishing grounds for ocean-going trawlers (demersal fishing for deep-water 
shrimp  and hake)  had  increased;806  this  could  arguably  have  resulted  in  increased  catches
given that catch limits were not specified.807 There were no zonal limits for pole-and-line tuna
808 vessels and tuna seiners, entitling them to harvest tuna anywhere in Senegalese waters.
In  addition,  gear restrictions  were  included in  the  agreement,  setting  minimum  authorised 
mesh sizes at  16mm for purse seines with live bait, 70mm for standard otter trawls (for in­
shore demersal fishing for fish or cephalopods and deep-sea demersal fishing) and 40mm for 
deep-sea demersal trawls for crustaceans except lobster. Methods of obstructing the selective 
effect  of the  mesh  sizes  were  expressly  prohibited.809  For  tuna  vessels,  the  international 
standards recommended  by the  International  Commission  for the  Conservation  of Atlantic 
Tunas (ICCAT) applied.
The  agreement  included  various  obligations  on  vessel  owners  regarding  monitoring  and 
control, technical inspections, and the constitution of their crew. EU vessels were required to 
notify the Senegalese authorities each time they entered or departed from Senegalese waters, 
specifying their position, course, speed and tonnage of catches on board, and at the conclusion 
of every  fishing  trip,  vessel  owners  were  obliged  to  forward  their catch  statements  to  the 
Senegalese authorities.810 Non-compliance entitled the Senegalese government to suspend the 
licence of the offending vessel and to apply the relevant penalty in terms of Senegalese law.
Ibid at paras 3- 5.
806 Ibid at para 6.
807 DEEP Report op cit n 768 at para 4.2.
808 Article G, para 7 of Annex to the Protocol op cit n 530.
809 Ibid at art L. Protective aprons of netting or other material on the underside of the cod-end of bottom trawlers 
is, however, permitted in the interest of reducing wear and damage.
810 Ibid at arts I and B. A copy of the catch statement must also be forwarded to the Delegation of the 
Commission in Dakar.Community vessels were entitled to tranship their catches in  Senegalese waters but only in 
accordance with the specified procedure.811 This required vessels to tranship their catch within 
Senegalese  ports  and  obliged  vessel  owners  to  report  specified  information  regarding  the 
transhipment to the Senegalese authorities  at least 24 hours in  advance.812  As transhipment 
was considered an exit from Senegalese waters, those EU vessels  wanting to tranship their
o n
catches were also required to comply with the catch statement requirements.  Transhipments 
that did not comply with these provisions were strictly prohibited and attracted penalties in 
accordance  with  Senegalese  law.814  Interestingly,  my  research  revealed  that  illegal 
transhipment  by  the  Community  fleet  has  not  been  nearly  as  problematic  as  domestic 
transhipment between  artisanal  fishing  vessels and other foreign fleets:  I was told that it is 
becoming  increasingly  common  practice  for  Senegalese  artisanal  fishers  to  tranship  their 
catch  to  (for  example)  Korean  vessels  waiting  just  beyond  the  Senegalese  EEZ  in 
international waters.815
EU vessel owners were obliged to take observers on board in order to promote compliance 
with  the  agreement and  with  domestic  fisheries  law.  Observers  were required to  report on 
fishing activities on-board the vessels (the agreement does not elaborate further on this duty). 
EU trawlers  and bottom  longliners  of  150 GRT or more  and other vessels  of  100  GRT or 
more  were  required  to  accept  observers  that  had  been  designated  by  the  Senegalese 
authorities; surface longliners could also be requested by Senegal to take an observer on board 
for the duration  of their  voyage.  On  freezer tuna  seiners  or tuna pole-and-line vessels,  the 
observer was elected from among the Senegalese crew members.816 This put the observer in a
811 Transhipping refers to the transferal of catch from one fishing vessel to another.
812 These include the names of the transhipping fishing vessels, the names of the cargo vessels, the tonnage by 
species to be transhipped, and the day of transhipment. Annex to the Protocol op cit n 530 at arts I and B.
813 Ibid at art M.
814 Ibid.
815 Interviews with DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
816 Art J at paras  1(a), (b) and (e) respectively of Annex to the Protocol (op cit n 530).212
potentially more impressionable position than the independent observers on other Community 
vessels. This was especially problematic in light of the high value of tuna catches (which in 
turn  increases  the potential  of under-reporting)  and the  allegations of non-compliance with 
landing requirements (highlighted above). During my interviews with DPM officials, concern 
was raised about the impartiality of observers on EU vessels in general. Various officials were 
worried  that  even  the  ‘independent’  observers  were  not  doing  their  jobs  satisfactorily, 
succumbing instead to bribes from vessel owners to under-report catches or to turn a blind eye
R17
to violations of catch-landing obligations.  Senegalese authorities were entitled to board EU 
vessels fishing under the agreement where necessary in accordance with domestic law. The 
EC  Commission  delegation  in  Senegal  was  to  be  informed  of this  within  48  hours  of the 
boarding and had to be provided with specified related information, including the reasons for 
boarding and the security required for the provisional release of the vessel.818
The  agreement  required  Community  trawlers  to  undergo  technical  inspections  annually  as 
well as in the event of a change in their tonnage or fishing category.819 The inspections were 
not concerned with issues of safety; these were the concern of the flag-state. Their purpose 
was rather to ensure that the vessels’  technical characteristics and fishing gear were in order 
and  that  there  was  compliance  with  the  required  quota  of  Senegalese  crew  -  owners  of 
Community  trawlers,  bottom  longliners  and  surface  longliners  fishing  were  required  to 
employ a crew comprising 50 percent Senegalese nationals.820 For freezer tuna seiners and 
pole-and-line  tuna  vessels,  the  number  of  local  seamen  to  be  taken  on  board  was  to  be
817
Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006). The EU representatives disputed this, however (e-mail 
exchange January 2007).
818 This is to be at least equal to the maximum fine and the value of the catches confiscated -  see art N of Annex 
to the Protocol op cit n 529. The subsequent procedure to be followed is laid out in this article.
819 Ibid at art F, specifically at para 1.
820  *
Ibid at para 3 and for the crew composition, see art D. This is to be confirmed by a certificate issued by the 
merchant navy.213
established  globally  on  the  basis  of the  scale  of activity  of the  vessels  in  the  Senegalese 
waters.
3.2  Analysis of the agreement
In its 2004 Report, the Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries expressed mixed views on the 1997- 
2001  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  with  the EU.  It  conceded that  while  the  agreement had 
promoted artisanal fishery development, scientific research, and surveillance and institutional 
support, it had nevertheless followed an overall  ‘commercial logic’  and supported a fishery 
strategy that was  ‘unsustainable and irresponsible’, thereby contributing to pressure on local 
food security and aggravating the decline of certain stocks.
The government’s official view on the 2002-2006 agreement has not yet been articulated, but 
I was able to gauge the opinions of various DPM officials and the two Senegalese-based NGO 
representatives  from  my  interviews.  They  varied  widely,  indicative  of  their  mixed  views 
about the success (or lack of it) of the agreement. My research elicited a clearer response from 
the  EU representatives,  who  painted  an  overall  picture  of dissatisfaction  with  the  way  in 
which the recent agreement had been operationalised. They expressed particular frustration at 
the Senegalese government’s continuing failure to institute an effective fisheries management 
policy; I was told that the EU’s willingness to continue bilateral fisheries arrangements with 
Senegal was becoming increasingly dependent on Senegal’s willingness to implement such a 
strategy.822 It is possible that the failure of the recent agreement negotiations was partially in 
response to Senegal’s continued inaction in this regard. Drawing on my interviews, I analyse 
the  impact  of  the  recent  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  on  the  sustainability  of  Senegal’s 
fisheries below.
821 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 641 at para 2.2.1.
822 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).214
Overall, the resource management measures of the agreement were an improvement on those 
under the  previous  agreement.  Firstly,  the  biological  rest-period  provision  was  potentially 
more effective than that under the previous agreement. It had been extended to cover coastal 
species (under the last agreement only deep-water species were protected) and permitted a ban 
for up  to  three  months  in  a  year  (as  opposed to  two months previously).823  The  changes 
introduced by the agreement were important as it is coastal species (demersals) that are over­
fished and thus the most in need of protection. I was told by the EU representatives, however, 
that  the  implementation  of  these  provisions  had  caused  difficulties  for  the  EU.  As  an 
illustrative  example,  I  was  informed  that  the  Senegalese  authorities  had  extended  their 
declared biological rest period for shrimps and cephalopods during 2005 without due notice to 
the EU on the grounds that the stocks were low. Without warning, they had then subsequently 
shortened  the  declared  extended  period  to  enable  their  disgruntled  artisanal  fishers  to  re­
access these stocks.824
A  second positive  development under the  agreement was the considerable reduction  of the 
EU’s fishing possibilities in coastal demersal stocks (around 30 percent) and the exclusion of 
the pelagic sector from EU fishing opportunities.825 DPM officials and NGO representatives 
alike expressed  particular  satisfaction  with  the  change  regarding  access  to  pelagics  on  the 
grounds  that  the  artisanal  sector  was  no  longer  required  to  compete  with  the  EU  for  its 
traditionally-targeted species.  Permitted by-catch percentages were also reduced under the 
agreement. This similarly benefited both the biological and socio-economic sustainability of
823 Article H of the Annex to the Protocol op cit n 529 (as discussed above) and  1997-2001  Agreement Protocol 
(op cit n 757) at art H of Annex  1.
824 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).
825 It should be noted that the EU did not fully utilise its pelagic quota under the previous agreement due to the 
poor state of the stocks.
26 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).215
artisanal fisheries. Mesh size restrictions remained the same as under the previous agreement, 
however.827 The opinion of a number of DPM interviewees was that these should have been 
reduced  and  that  additional  selective  gear  restrictions  should  be  included  in  the  future  to 
further restrict  by-catch  and  discards.  This  would further minimise  the  Community  fleet’s 
interference with local artisanal fisheries.828
A  major resource  management weakness  of the  agreement  was  that  it failed to  rectify the 
deficiency  of  the  past  agreement  by  establishing  maximum  EU  catch  or  effort  limits829 
Instead,  it  continued  to  regulate  the  Community’s  permitted  output  via  gross  registered 
tonnage  (GRT).  This  method  is  common  in  access  agreements  with  West  African  coastal 
states but has become an increasingly contentious issue. Critics argue that it is a weak method 
of ensuring the biological  sustainability of targeted stocks and that it contrasts sharply with 
the total  allowable catch  (TAC) method used by the EU in its own waters.830 While TACs 
alone do not guarantee sustainable fishing as we saw in chapter 3, they nevertheless establish 
fixed catch  limits  and if they  are  effectively  enforced and  used  in  combination  with  other 
resource management measures (like input controls and technical conservation measures) they 
can make a positive contribution towards this goal.831
I  was  interested  in  the  EU  representatives’  views  on  this  matter.  My  interviewees  were 
somewhat defensive when discussing this topic and although they provided justifications for 
the use of the GRT method, I did not find their explanations convincing.  Both interviewees 
acknowledged that using a GRT approach in the fisheries agreements was controversial; one 
expressly stated that ‘objectively, limiting catch [in Senegal] via GRT is slightly problematic’.
827 Ibid. See 1997-2001 Agreement Protocol (op cit n 757) at art L of Annex  1 for mesh size restrictions.
828 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
829 1997-2001 Agreement op cit n 754 7t art 1.
830 Highlighted in IEEP Report op cit n 768 at 15,  16. See also Johnstone op cit n 541 at 17,  18. Cross-reference 
with p 117.
831 See p 75- 79 for more on output controls and their relationship with sustainable fishing.216
They nevertheless defended it as a method of regulating catch with reference to the fact that 
the EU does use GRT in its own waters -  it is used in combination with quotas to control the 
output of Community mixed species fisheries; in contrast, quotas  are used alone to control 
single species fishing.  But this begs the question of why the EU continues  to use only the 
GRT system in Senegalese waters where it primarily targets single species (as acknowledged 
by  the  EU  representatives).  A  slightly  better  explanation  was  offered  by  one  of  the  EU 
representatives, namely that it would be difficult to limit the Community catch using TACs in 
Senegalese  waters  when  a  TAC  system  is  not  employed  domestically  by  Senegalese 
authorities.832  Critics  also  concede  that  the  lack  of reliable  stock  statistics  for  Senegalese 
fisheries  and  the  absence  of  accessible  information  on  actual  catches  taken  under  past 
agreements, makes it difficult to judge the appropriateness or not of using GRT to control the 
EU catch.833 Ultimately, however, it is problematic that the EU continues to use a method of 
catch  control  in  Senegalese  waters  that  it  cannot  satisfactorily  justify  on  sustainability 
grounds. The precautionary approach (endorsed by the EU) surely dictates that at minimum a 
mixed quota and GRT system should be used until there is greater clarity on the matter.
This  issue  compounds  a  difficulty  that  I  introduced  earlier,  namely  problems  with  the 
measures regulating possible decreased EU fishing opportunities during the operation of the 
agreement. The joint monitoring obligation imposed by the recent agreement was a positive 
step. However, the failure to indicate what is considered a  ‘sustainable level’  of a fish stock 
and accordingly, when EU fishing opportunities could justifiably be reduced, detracted from 
the  provision’s  effectiveness.  Also  (to  reiterate  my  earlier  point),  by  providing  that 
Community  compensation  will  be  ‘adjusted’  if  EU  fishing  opportunities  are  reduced,  the 
agreement  did  little  to  encourage  Senegalese  authorities  to  respond  to  stock  depletion  by
832 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).
833 Johnstone op cit n 541 at 18.217
agreeing to reduce catch opportunities.834 As I noted earlier, the EU representatives explained 
the provision’s contradictory nature with reference to its inclusion as a political compromise. I 
was told that under any future arrangements  the EU will  agree to not reduce payments for 
diminished catch rights provided that the stock depletion that necessitates this move has not 
arisen simply as a result of irresponsible domestic management strategies. An example of this 
would be if Senegalese authorities granted too many fishing licences to its waters (or as one 
official  put  it,  ‘s[old]their  resources  two  times’).  Rather,  the  decline  in  stock  must  have 
resulted from genuine sustainable management difficulties. They acknowledged that it will be 
difficult to determine the  ‘true reasons’  for stock reductions, but  stated that the EU would 
simply have to make this determination ‘as best as it can’ should the need arise.835
The recent agreement appears to better promote sustainable Senegalese fisheries development 
than the previous agreement. For the first time, relatively substantial amounts were earmarked 
for targeted measures to this end although the amounts were arguably comparatively low as a 
percentage of the total financial package.836 However, as under past agreements, movement 
towards realising sustainable fisheries development goals remains difficult to assess - progress 
is poorly monitored and reported which makes it hard to determine whether there has been a 
significant improvement in practice in this sphere or not.837 My empirical research confirmed 
this difficulty -  in particular, interviewees were unable (or unwilling) to provide me with hard 
evidence of progress in the partnership activities and proof that the money allocated for them 
had indeed been spent on their realisation (as noted above). Overall, the  ‘targeted action’  (or 
‘partnership’ measures) provisions appear to have proven highly problematic for both parties
834 IEEP Report op cit n 768 at 11.
835 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).
836 Agreement Protocol op cit n 530 at arts 4 and 2: Euros 3 000 000 per year is set aside for targeted partnership 
actions, while Euros  13 000 000 annually is paid as financial compensation.
837 IEEP Report op cit n 768 at 11.218
and  their  inclusion  in  the  agreement  has  not  noticeably  resulted  in  enhanced  domestic 
sustainable fisheries development.
A noticeable feature of the agreement was the high percentage of local crew that it required 
EU  vessel  owners  to  employ  and  the  increased  local  catch-landing  obligations  on  the 
Community fleet.  Both  these measures  had the potential  to contribute towards local  socio­
economic development in the fishing sector. Senegalese DPM interviewees were generally of 
the  view,  however,  that  even  greater catch-landing obligations  should have  been  imposed, 
while NGO representatives emphasised that in order to maximise the benefits of heightened 
compulsory  EU  landings,  the  Senegalese  government  and  the  EU  should  also  channel 
increased funds into value-added activities in local processing plants. This would enhance the
QOQ
value of fisheries products exported to foreign markets.  The cost of the agreement had risen 
for the EU:  an  increase of 33  percent from the previous bilateral  fisheries  agreement (with 
part of the increase due to the rise in the cost of vessel licences).  In theory, this too should 
have contributed towards sustainable development in the local fisheries sector provided that 
the Senegalese government channelled the compensation into this sphere.
Ensuring the effective enforcement of EU-Senegalese access arrangements is important. The 
monitoring and surveillance provisions in the recent agreement, however, arguably remained 
inadequate to ensure  this  goal.  In  terms  of the  agreement,  funds  dedicated  to  ‘partnership’ 
activities were set aside to improve domestic monitoring and control capacity and EU vessels 
were obliged to take Senegalese-designated observers on board. But the asymmetry between 
the  sophistication  of  the  foreign  fleet  and  the  Senegalese  monitoring  and  enforcement 
capacity, together with the problems with observers (noted above), weakened the efficacy of
838 Interviews NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).219
these provisions.839 This was confirmed by DPM officials who emphasised that the national 
authorities  are under-equipped to effectively control  all  fishing  activities  in  the  Senegalese 
EEZ.840 Furthermore,  while it is potentially advantageous that all EU vessels in  Senegalese 
waters have vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and that efforts are underway to ensure that all 
Senegalese industrial vessels are soon similarly equipped (currently, around 60 percent have 
VMS), this is countered by the fact that the Senegalese capacity to track VMS is currently less 
than ideal.841
According to past studies, EU fleet infractions in Senegal’s waters have not been particularly 
high; violations by the domestic fleet are far more common. Common violations include zone 
and gear infringements and fishing without authorisation or a licence.842  The adverse socio­
economic effects  of EU  violations  are,  however, more  far-reaching than  those of domestic 
infractions.  With  the  latter,  the  illegal  fish  is  usually  still  landed locally  and therefore  still 
generates numerous economic spin-offs; the main economic loss is the value of the licence fee 
(if  fishing  without  one)  and  /or  the  costs  resulting  from  the  specific  transgression.843  In 
contrast,  illegally caught EU fish  will  likely not be  landed in  Senegalese ports  and sold to 
domestic  processors  but  instead,  shipped  directly  to  Europe.  As  a  result,  there  will  be  no 
benefit to Senegal at all. This was stressed by both DPM officials and NGO representatives.844 
As noted above,  a common  complaint was that landing provisions  (especially for tuna) are 
violated. DPM officials as well as the NGO representatives accordingly highlighted the need 
for subsequent fisheries agreements to better regulate enforcement.845
O-IQ
Johnstone op cit n 541 at 19.
840 Interview DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
841 Ibid.
842 Johnstone op cit n 541 at 19, 21.
843 Ibid at 20.
844 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
845 Ibid.220
3.3  Reflections on the implementation of the agreement
As the most recent agreement has only just ended, it is too early to definitively comment on 
whether or not it has impacted more positively on the sustainability of Senegalese fisheries 
than past arrangements. During interviews, representatives of both parties were reluctant to 
judge  the  success  (or  failure)  of  the  agreement  at  the  given  point  in  time  (it  was  still 
operational at this time). They were, however, quick to expose particular problems with the 
agreement’s  implementation  and  to  make  suggestions  for  improvement.  Their  opinions 
appeared to be largely informed by the extent to  which  they believed that their respective 
national interests had or had not been realised via the operation of the agreement. A common 
discernible theme, however, was concern over the poor biological status of Senegal’s coastal 
resources  and  recognition  of  the  need  to  urgently  promote  their  sustainable  management 
through  (inter alia) the terms  and conditions of any future  fisheries agreements. There was 
less consensus on how this should be achieved, however.846
Overall,  my  conclusion  is  that  the  most  recent  agreement  took  EU-Senegalese  fisheries
relations a further step towards promoting the long-term sustainable use and development of
Senegal’s fisheries but in the end, failed (in a similar manner to that of its predecessors) to
make adequate strides  towards these ends. The EU was  arguably the main instigator of the
renewed emphasis on  sustainable fishing (at least theoretically) in this agreement, driven by
the  desire  to  realise  its  socio-economic  interests  and  political  goals.  That  said,  Senegal
appears to be similarly keen  that bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with the EU better promote
sustainable  fisheries  and  fisheries  development  domestically;  its  view  of what  these  goals
entail, however, seems to differ from that of the EU. Senegal wants to control the destiny of
its fishing sector, moving towards greater autonomy in this sphere. I was told of the desire to
846 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 
2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 2006).221
see  the  local  capture  and  processing  industry  develop,  value-added  Senegalese  fisheries 
products entering new lucrative markets, and interaction with new foreign partners in access
Q A n  _
and other types of fishing arrangements (including joint ventures).  The EU, on the other 
hand, appears to want to steer Senegalese fisheries development in a direction that continues 
to  serve  EU  interests.848  While  these  two  sets  of  goals  have  to  date  remained  largely 
compatible, the failed agreement negotiations in June indicate that they have perhaps reached 
a point (at least for now) of divergence.
4.  Conclusion
The most recent fisheries agreement between Senegal and the EU continued the tradition of 
bilateral  fisheries  relations  between  the  parties,  granting  the  Community  access  to  various 
species  in  Senegal’s  EEZ  in  return  for  significant  financial  benefits.  In  various  important 
ways, however, the agreement differed from past arrangements, most noticeably in its express 
emphasis (at least on paper) on sustainable fishing and sustainable fisheries development in 
Senegal. The financial compensation provisions reflected this renewed emphasis on long-term 
sustainability. The agreement accorded with the Community’s obligations under its common 
fisheries policy and responded to Senegal’s need to address the decline of key coastal stocks 
and to protect the socio-economic well-being of its local population. Its provisions to these 
ends  were  on  the  whole  an  improvement  from  past  agreements  and  have  generated  some 
positive  outcomes.  My  research  revealed,  however,  that  many  of  these  measures  were 
nevertheless  inherently  weak;  frequently  the  result  of  political  compromise.  Their 
implementation  was  thus  often  plagued  by  inefficiency.  Compounded  by  poor  domestic
847 Interviews with DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 
2006).
848 This is derived from my overall impression of the interviews with EU representatives (telephone interview 21 
September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 2006) as well as official EU policy documents on the topic.
This view is not based on any specific comment(s) made by my interviewees.222
fisheries  management,  they  therefore  seem  to  have  resulted  in  little  real  progress  towards 
ensuring the sustainability of Senegal’s fisheries.
In  the  concluding  chapter  of my  thesis  I  draw  on  my  analysis  of the  agreement  to  make 
suggestions  regarding  how  any  future  fisheries  relations  between  the  parties  could  better 
promote  sustainable  fishing  in  Senegalese  waters.  As  I  have  indicated  in  this  chapter,  a 
number  of  critics,  particularly  NGOs,  advocate  Senegal’s  decreased  reliance  on  bilateral 
fisheries agreements with the EU. Some would like to see their imminent discontinuation. For 
reasons that I explain in the following chapter, I too argue that in order to promote sustainable 
fishing  in  Senegal  and  other  developing  coastal  states’  waters,  the  EU  should  engage  in 
alternative  ways  of  conducting  its  bilateral  fisheries  relations.  I  nevertheless  accept  that 
bilateral fisheries agreements with developing coastal third states are likely to continue to be 
employed  in  the  imminent  future;  this  may  even  include  a  re-negotiated  agreement  with 
Senegal at some point. Accordingly, I present some ideas as to how these arrangements might 
be  reconstituted  in  the  future  to  better  promote  sustainable  fishing  alongside  my  other, 
preferred, alternative suggestions towards this end in chapter 9.223
PART IV 
CONCLUSIONS
In this final section I employ my thematic lenses to present the core findings of my thesis. I 
conclude,  with  reference  to  the EU-Senegalese case  study,  that the EU’s  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements  with  developing coastal  states do not operate  as  instruments  of conservancy in 
accordance  with  the  international  fisheries  regime.  The  pursuit  of  the  sustainable  use  of 
fisheries is neither the primary nor a key impetus for concluding these  agreements;  rather, 
these legal instruments are employed to satisfy the parties’  respective self-interests under the 
guise of international environmental agreements. Given the respective socio-economic status 
of the  parties  entering  them,  these  agreements  perpetuate  colonial-like  patterns  of natural 
resource  exploitation,  exposing  the  continuing  relationship  of  unequal  dependency  that 
dominates  relations  between  the  EU  and  particularly  West  African  coastal  states.  That 
bilateral  fisheries  agreements  can  legitimately  serve  these  goals  indicates  an  inherent 
weakness of the international regime in terms of which they are concluded. I suggest that the 
way forward  does  not lie  in  the  reform  of the  international  fisheries regime,  however, but 
rather in the adoption of a more ethically-based approach to bilateral fisheries relations (and 
all fishing activities).224
9
CONCLUSIONS
1.  Analysis of bilateral fisheries agreements as regulatory instruments
Traditionally, legal instruments serve one or more of various regulatory functions with regard 
to natural living resources. They can be distributive, determining who is to have ownership of 
and access to the resource, conservatory, in that they preserve the resource or conserve it at 
levels that can sustain exploitation, or proscriptive, prohibiting forms of exploitation or any 
exploitation of the resource for conservation or ethical  purposes.849 Instruments comprising 
the international fisheries regime fall largely into the latter two categories, although UNCLOS 
is also strongly distributory.  All, however, serve to promote a strong conservatory message. 
UNCLOS  is  no  exception;  its  conservancy  thrust  is  particularly  evident  in  the  provisions 
dealing with the management of living marine resources in the exclusive economic zone, as 
we have seen in earlier chapters. While these provisions do not dictate the manner in which 
states should operationalise the goal of ‘sustainable’ fishing (as I have discussed in chapters 3 
and  6),  when  interpreted  in  the  context  of  other  international  fisheries  instruments,  they 
arguably  promote  biological,  social  and  economic  sustainability  in  marine  fisheries  as  a 
necessary step towards the ideal of sustainable development.850
What  I  have  shown  in  this  thesis,  in  particular  in  chapter  8  with  reference  to  the  EU- 
Senegalese case study,  is that bilateral  fisheries agreements concluded between the EU and 
developing  coastal  states  are  not  on  the  whole  instruments  that  foster  these  sustainability 
objectives. They do not operate as restrictive, conservatory instruments that strive towards a 
mutually-conceived understanding of the goal  of sustainable fishing but instead function as
849 Bimie and Boyle op cit n 70 at 554.
850 Cross-reference with pp 55, 56 and p  140.225
framework regulatory tools within which the parties’ potentially quite different, self-interested 
understandings of sustainability and sustainable development can co-exist and be fostered. As 
we  have  seen,  each  component  of  the  multi-faceted  goal  of  sustainability  must  be 
satisfactorily realised in order for the natural resource in question to be used in a manner that 
promotes  sustainable  use  and  development.  The  freedom  that  is  granted  states  to 
operationalise  ‘sustainability’  in  the  context  of  bilateral  fisheries  relations  can  potentially 
result in excessive emphasis on  the economic facets  of sustainability to the exclusion or at 
least marginalisation of the biological and environmental components. Taken to the extreme, 
short-term economic and political concerns can dominate bilateral fisheries agreements to the 
active  detriment  of  long-term  sustainable  fishing.  Such  agreements  operate  as  legal 
instruments concluded under the guise of international fisheries law with the core intention of 
promoting the respective socio-economic self-interests of the parties involved.
Compounding  the  tainted  nature  of  these  agreements  is  the  likelihood  that  the  parties’ 
respective interests will be unequally met as the political and economic status of the parties is 
skewed in favour of the EU in terms of global economics arising from colonial history.851 In 
particular, the parties’ colonial legacy (as I have discussed earlier in this thesis) is manifested 
in  the  role  that  developing  coastal  states  play  in  these  agreements  as  suppliers  of  ‘cheap’ 
unprocessed natural  resources  to Europe.  This  mimics  early trade  interactions  between  the 
parties  and the dominant  theme  of their subsequent development cooperation relations  and 
entrenches  the  socio-economic  inequities  between  them.  Accordingly,  the  EU  wields  the 
strongest bargaining power in  fisheries  agreement negotiations  and  is  thus  likely to  secure 
conditions and terms of access that overwhelmingly serves its own interests rather than the 
domestic sustainability needs of the targeted fisheries.
851 The impact of this legacy is described in detail in chap 4.226
On one level, my thesis thus shows that bilateral fisheries  agreements between the EU and 
developing coastal states, far from being the intended regulatory instruments of conservancy 
envisaged  by  UNCLOS,  are  predominantly  self-interested,  commercially-driven  resource- 
access mechanisms.  As  they  stand,  they  are ill-suited means  to facilitate  the  integration  of 
environmental  protection  with  economic  development  towards  sustainable  fisheries 
development at a domestic (coastal state) and international level. Undeniably, in recent times 
the  respective  parties,  most  noticeably  the  EU,  have  amended  their  domestic  policies  on 
bilateral fisheries agreements in an effort to (at least theoretically) remedy this parody. But as 
the case study of EU-Senegalese fisheries relations demonstrates, it may well be a case of too 
little too late, at least in this specific case.852
On a broader scale, this thesis demonstrates the disparity between the theoretical pursuit of 
sustainable fisheries and sustainable fisheries development (as promoted by law and policy) 
and the  ‘on the ground’  effects of operationalising these legal principles in a specific area of 
fishing  activities,  namely  bilateral  fisheries  relations.  This  stems  from  the  more  generic 
assertion  that international  law  and its  associated regulatory mechanisms  are  inadequate to 
ensure  the  promotion  of  sustainable  fishing  through  bilateral  fisheries  agreements.  Put  in 
another  way,  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  are  inappropriate  mechanisms  to  promote 
sustainable  fishing  for  the  very  reason  that  the  current  international  fisheries  regime  -  in 
particular  UNCLOS  -  is  ill-suited  to  affect  the  sustainable  management  of  this  common 
natural resource.
852 Given that a number of Senegal’s coastal demersal species are already over-fished and the objective of 
domestic fisheries development remains unattained, as I discuss in chaps 7 and 8 above.227
2.  Weaknesses of international fisheries law in promoting sustainability
I suggest that there are two core reasons why the fisheries management regime advocated by 
UNCLOS,  specifically  in  relation  to  coastal  fish  stocks  in  the  200  nautical  mile  zone,  is 
deficient. The first becomes clear when examining the operation  of the regime through my 
‘sustainable  use’  lens.  It  is  evident  that  the  zonal,  jurisdictional  approach  introduced  by 
UNCLOS in terms of which coastal states are legally obliged and (theoretically) empowered 
to manage their EEZ fisheries sustainably has not proven to be the management solution to 
the  commons  problem  that  was  hoped  for.  Its  failure  is  rooted  in  its  disregard  for  the 
migratory nature of fish stocks and the complexity of the marine environment of which they 
are a part, which necessitate sound ecologically-based management not property rights-based 
solutions  that  rely  on  artificially-drawn  political  boundaries.  Viewed  in  this  light,  coastal 
states  have  little  hope  of  ever  ensuring  the  long-term  sustainable  management  of  their 
fisheries: even if a coastal state implements the  ‘perfect’  fisheries management system in its 
adjacent  waters,  it  can  do  little  to  prevent  other  states  from  over-fishing  those  stocks  that 
move beyond its waters into either the high seas or neighbouring coastal  states’  waters, nor 
can  it  wholly  prevent  foreign  states  accessing  its  coastal  fisheries  from  over-harvesting 
targeted  species  as  a  result  of  consistent  violation  of  domestic  fisheries  management 
regulations and measures. While UNCLOS promotes inter-state  ‘cooperation’  as the panacea 
to  counter these  dilemmas,  obligatory cooperation  arguably  ‘yields  no  substantial  advance 
over the opportunities for such cooperation in the past’ and is thus unlikely to readily procure 
sustainable fishing.853
The enduring legacy of the impact of colonisation provides the backdrop to the second ground 
for  UNCLOS’  weakness,  namely  that  it  arguably  takes  inadequate  account  of  the  socio­
853 Copes op cit n 3 at 222.228
economic  context  within  which  fisheries  management  decisions  are  made  and  bilateral 
fisheries  relations  play  out.854  Firstly,  as  we  have  seen  in  previous  chapters,  its  exclusive 
economic zone provisions grant states  significant freedom in interpreting key concepts like 
‘optimal  utilisation’  and  ‘conservation’  and  coastal  states  in  particular  enjoy  considerable 
latitude  in  how  they  choose  to  operationalise  these  objectives.  While  they  are  obliged to 
employ certain management means towards these ends,  such  as  determining the maximum 
sustainable  yield,  setting total  allowable catches  and determining their domestic harvesting 
capacity, the Convention respects their sovereign rights to implement these measures as they 
choose. Of course, this has the advantage of enabling coastal states to tailor their respective 
fisheries management policies and practices to their unique environmental needs and socio­
economic abilities. The downside, however, is that coastal  states can potentially implement 
these  provisions  in  a way that  does  little to  promote genuine  progress  towards  sustainable 
fisheries  management.  Developing  states  in  particular  may  favour  fisheries  management 
options that maximise short-term economic benefits even though such actions may be to the 
potential long-term detriment of biological and socio-economic sustainability.
As  I have  already highlighted,  the  extent  of the  data  about coastal  fish  stocks,  the  marine 
environment and the domestic fishing industry that must be assimilated and analysed in order 
to  even  hope  to  effectively  implement  the  EEZ  provisions  of  UNCLOS  is  vast.  The 
Convention  affords  little  attention  to  this,  down-playing  the  complexity  of  accurately 
determining domestic allowable catches and harvesting capacities and portraying them instead 
as  simple  calculations.  In  particular,  it  ignores  the  scientific  uncertainty  involved  in  these 
calculations  and  the  fact  that  frequently,  the  necessary  relevant  data  is  simply  lacking.855 
UNCLOS  further fails to acknowledge the disputed credibility of the maximum sustainable 
yield  concept  in  which  it  strongly  roots  its  conservation  provisions.  Its  emphasis  on  the
854 This legacy is discussed in detail in chap 4 above.
855 Cross-reference with p  143 above.229
management of marine living resources to the exclusion of the rest of the ecosystem of which 
they are a part is clearly also fatally flawed from a biological perspective and does little to 
promote a comprehensive, multi-dimensional understanding of sustainability. Accordingly, it 
is not surprising that even comparatively well-off coastal states with advanced scientific and 
technological  capacities  struggle  to  effectively  implement  the  Convention’s  exclusive 
economic zone provisions towards their intended objectives. For developing coastal states, it 
is almost impossible to do so -  their diminished economic and scientific capacities, combined 
with  their need to  balance  investment  in  fisheries  management  with  other  pressing  socio­
economic  priorities,  frequently  result  in  stunted  progress  towards  domestic  sustainable 
fisheries management. The overall outcome is that to date, the majority of the world’s coastal 
states have failed to ensure the sustainable management of their marine fisheries.
The  troubled  socio-economic  status  of  developing  coastal  states  also  provides  a  strong 
incentive  for them  to  declare  the  existence  of a  surplus  and  to  conclude  agreements  with 
wealthy  foreign  states  to  access  these  stocks  despite  their ignorance  of the  true  biological 
status  of  their  fisheries;  promised  short-term  economic  benefits  and  the  maintenance  of 
‘friendly’ political relations with powerful foreign states have the capacity to outweigh long­
term sustainability concerns. UNCLOS’  provisions concerning bilateral fisheries agreements 
(article  62)  are  thus  particularly  weak.856  Not  only  do  they  fail  to  account  for  the  socio­
economic interests that will likely drive coastal states to declare the existence of a surplus and 
to conclude agreements permitting access to these stocks, but they also fail to recognise the 
extent to  which  the negotiation  of such  agreements  will  be  shaped by  the  capitalist global 
market forces, thereby transposing instruments intended to promote the sustainable,  ‘optimal’  
use  of  coastal  fish  stocks  into  self-serving,  politically-defined  and  commercially-oriented 
contractual  arrangements.  The  significant  latitude  that  UNCLOS  grants  the  parties  in
856 Article 62 of UNCLOS is discussed in detail at pp  140-143.230
negotiating terms  and conditions  of access  in  practice  rarely  operates  in  overall  favour of 
developing  coastal  states  from  a  long-term  biological  and  socio-economic  perspective. 
Instead, the skewed bargaining power between the parties largely finds the more politically 
and  economically  powerful  foreign  fishing  nations  urging  for  agreement  on  terms  and
857 conditions of access that predominantly best serve their own interests.
That the provisions of UNCLOS permit exploitative bilateral  fisheries  agreements  (at least 
from  a  natural  resource  perspective)  does  not  prevent  individual  contracting  states  from 
cooperating to negotiate and conclude agreements that foster sustainable fishing practices and 
sustainable  fisheries  development  in  the  coastal  state.  Traditionally,  however,  this  has not 
been the manner in which the EU’s agreements with developing third countries have played 
out, as I have discussed in this thesis.
Recently, however, the urgent need to counter the continual decline of key fish stocks with 
renewed efforts to foster sustainable fishing practices has prompted the EU to take advantage 
of the interpretative freedom afforded to it by UNCLOS and introduce a new sustainability- 
driven  bilateral  fisheries  policy.  Against  the  background  of  the  international  regime’s 
increasing  emphasis  on  integration,  the  EU  has  drawn  on  its  integration  efforts  in  other 
domestic  spheres  (particularly  the  environment)  in  harnessing  various  ‘new’  regulatory 
mechanisms to these ends (such as environmental assessment and enhanced dialogue) in its 
new  fisheries  partnership  approach,  which  theoretically  promotes  a  more  responsible  and 
precautionary-oriented way forwards. The EU intends in turn to employ these agreements as 
sustainable  fisheries  development  vectors  in  developing  third  countries  and  to  expand  the 
number of bilateral fisheries agreements (now in the form of fisheries partnership agreements) 
concluded  with  these  states  as  part  of  its  commitment  to  the  pursuit  of  the  Millennium
857 Cross-reference with chap 6 ibid.231
Development  goals.858  It  is  through  these  new  agreements  that  it  proposes  extending  its 
integration efforts beyond the domestic realm to the fishing sectors of its developing partner 
states.  As  I  have  stated  earlier,  it  is  therefore  arguable  that  the  recent  cessation  of EU- 
Senegalese fisheries relations as a result of failed agreement negotiations is only temporary; it
859 is  possible  that  a  new  agreement  will  be  negotiated  in  the  not  too  distant  future.  As  I 
discuss  below,  however,  the  extent  to  which  such  an  approach  is  the  best  or  even  an 
appropriate way to foster sustainable fisheries development, is debatable.
In  sum, it is clear that in  order to pursue  ‘sustainable’  fishing as advocated in this thesis -  
namely,  biological,  economic  and  social  sustainability  towards  the  progressive  pursuit  of 
sustainable  development  -   states  need  to  drastically  alter  their  attitudes  towards  and 
conducting of bilateral fisheries interactions. Specifically, they need to harness different, more 
policy-oriented mechanisms to engage with one another along the lines of that which the EU 
has (at least theoretically) attempted towards this end through its integration efforts. While the 
concept of sustainability that is promoted by the international fisheries regime and the means 
that it suggests to pursue this goal do not fully accord with such an approach, neither are they 
incompatible;  as  I  have  explained  above,  the  ability  of particularly  UNCLOS  to  promote 
sustainability is simply weak due to its inappropriate, zonal response to the common resource 
management  complexities  of marine  fisheries.  Accordingly,  it  would  thus  be  possible  for 
states to comply with international  law  while  at the same time supplementing their actions 
with reference to an  ‘alternative’ ethical policy text in order to find means to better facilitate 
the  pursuit  of  sustainable  fishing.  Such  an  approach  would  likely  also  contribute  towards
858 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee Policy Coherence for Development: 
Accelerating Progress Towards Attaining the Millennium Development Goals’ COM (2005)  134 final at para 
3.5.
859 This is also premised on the fact that failed negotiations with Morocco after the 1995-1999 EU-Moroccan 
bilateral fisheries agreement gave way to a re-negotiated fisheries partnership agreement in 2006: Council 
Regulation (EC) No 764/06 of 22 May 2006 on the Conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between 
the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco’. It operates until 2010.232
countering the negative impact of the colonial legacy on EU-developing coastal state fisheries 
interactions, the effects of which are well illustrated by the EU-Senegalese case study.
At this stage, it appears that future bilateral fisheries relations will likely follow one of two 
main  directions.  The first,  and most  probable,  is that bilateral  fisheries  agreements,  in the 
form of fisheries partnership agreements, will continue to play a dominant role in fisheries 
interactions  between  the  EU  and  developing  coastal  states.  If this  is  the  case,  the  parties 
should  make  a  concerted  effort  to  ensure  that  future  agreements  better  foster  sustainable 
fishing; I discuss examples of ways in which this could be achieved below.
The  second  -   and  from  my  perspective,  ideal  -  direction  would  see  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements phased out.  Future bilateral  fisheries relations between the EU and developing 
coastal  states  would  still  be  conducted  within  the  framework  of the  existing international 
regime, but would additionally be guided in their content and objectives by  ‘ethically’-based 
international  codes,  principles  and  resource  management  mechanisms  such  as  the  Earth 
Charter, the Millennium Development  goals,  and ecological  footprint analysis.  As  a result, 
alternative, more cooperative regulatory instruments would be used to promote the objective 
of sustainable  fishing.  I present  this  as  my  ‘ideal’  way  forward  as  while  I  assert  that  the 
international  fisheries  regime  is  an  inappropriate  framework  within  which  to  pursue 
sustainable fishing worldwide, I acknowledge that it - particularly UNCLOS -  is unlikely to 
be amended to the fundamental  extent that is necessary in order to address its deficiencies. 
Accordingly,  it  is  realistic  to  assume  that  UNCLOS  will  remain  the  dominant  (legal) 
framework within which bilateral fisheries relations will be conducted in the future. The most 
that  one  can  thus  hope  for  is  thus  that  states’  actions  will  additionally  be  shaped  by  a 
supplementary ‘ethical text’.233
3.  The way forward
3.1  Improving bilateral fisheries agreements to better promote sustainable fishing
Arising from my analyses of the EU-Senegalese  agreement, there  are a number of ways in 
which  I  believe  that  future  bilateral  fisheries  relations  between  these  parties  could  better 
promote sustainable fishing. These suggestions are largely based on my empirical research, 
but  I  have  also  drawn  on  critical  literature  concerning  the  EU’s  fisheries  relations  with 
developing  states  in  compiling  them.  They  are  directly  applicable  to  any  future  fisheries 
arrangement that may be negotiated between the EU and Senegal.  Some, however, are also 
pertinent  to  potential  alternative  means  of  conducting  future  bilateral  fisheries  relations 
between  these  parties,  while  others  may  additionally  have  relevance  to  bilateral  fisheries 
relations  between  the  EU  and  other  West  African  coastal  states.  All  are  rooted  in  the 
necessary pursuit of a more comprehensive approach to sustainability in terms of which the 
importance of realising all facets of sustainable fishing is acknowledged. In addition, they are 
aimed at improving integration efforts towards  sustainable development.  As  I have already 
emphasised, however, I do not regard bilateral fisheries agreements of any nature as ideally- 
suited mechanisms to promote sustainable fishing or sustainable fisheries development and do 
not sanction the exploitative natural resource extraction patterns that they perpetuate.
Firstly, it is of paramount importance that developing states take responsibility for attempting 
to promote sustainable fisheries management in their own coastal waters, in accordance with 
international  law. As noted above, there are severe socio-economic constraints in  doing so, 
but as a starting point, these states must make efforts to develop and implement a sustainable 
domestic  fisheries  management  policy.  As  we  saw  in  the  case  of  Senegal,  the  greatest234
stumbling block may be implementation.860 But even if this can be overcome,  implementing 
the policy is not the end to ensuring  sustainable fisheries  management:  developing coastal 
states  must  also  improve  their  knowledge  of  the  state  of  their  key  fish  stocks  and  act 
appropriately to ensure  their long-term  sustainability.861  Funding  will  likely  be  required to
improve the capacity of these states  to collect and analyse necessary scientific data and to
862 compile accurate catch  statistics; technology transfer and training may also be necessary. 
The EU could arguably provide such funding either as part of its future fisheries partnership 
agreement  payments  or  as  a  separate  investment  in  fostering  the  sustainable  fisheries 
development of the coastal state(s) in question. The governments of these coastal states will 
need to  take  steps  to  ensure  that  financial  benefits  accrued  to  this  end  are  used  to  foster 
development in this sphere rather than to satisfy other national needs.  This is particularly 
the  case  in  Senegal:  during  my  interviews  allegations  were  levelled  at  the  government 
regarding the money allocated under the most recent fisheries agreement for improving stock 
monitoring  and  evaluation  -   while  it  had  theoretically  gone  into  researching the  status  of 
various local fish stocks, the tangible results of this research had been negligible to date; in 
the words of my interviewee ‘[r]esearch in fisheries in Senegal has been very slow’.864
Developing coastal  states  would also benefit  significantly from EU investment in on-shore 
fisheries-related activities and industries either as part of the financial package under future 
fisheries partnership  agreements or arising from independent Community financing. This is 
exemplified by the case of Senegal. As I highlighted in chapter 8, both the DPM officials and
860 Cross-reference with p 178. DPM officials acknowledged the importance of such a policy and the urgent need 
for its implementation (interviews DPM officials Dakar February 2006).
861 B Gorez, ‘ACP EU Fisheries Relations: Towards Greater Sustainability’ (Summary Report) Joint Meeting 
organised by CTA (Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU) and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat Held at ACP Secretariat, Brussels, 7-9 April 2003
<http://www.cta.int/events2003/fisheries/General%20report-EN.pdf> accessed August 2005 at para 2.3 at 18,
19.
862 Gorez ibid at para 4.2 at 29.
863 Kazynski and Fulharty op cit n 460 at 89, 90.
864 Interview with Mr Samb (op cit n 674).235
NGO  representatives  that  I  interviewed  favour  increased  catch-landing  requirements  for 
Community vessels in Senegal as most of the fish harvested by the EU is still frozen at sea 
and  transhipped,  which  generates  few  local  on-shore  benefits.  If  increased  catch-landing 
requirements  were  combined  with  more  effective  local  processing,  including  value-added 
measures, Senegalese fisheries exports could potentially demand higher prices and be more 
competitive on the international market.865 Investment should thus be ideally channelled into 
on-shore infrastructure development such  as ice production, processing, freezing, packaging 
and storage.866 This could be coupled with the training of local fish processors to enable them 
to better comply with and maintain the strict product standards of external markets, including
QA*7
health standards and quality control requirements.  This would likely require an increased 
focus on food safety, product identification, traceability (from catch to consumption) and eco­
labelling.868 Investment would also be beneficial to assist Senegal in diversifying its fisheries 
exports  and  developing  innovative  marketing  strategies  in  order  to  retain  its  status  in  the
OZQ
European market and to penetrate new markets (as discussed in chapter 7).
Developing coastal  states  may also  consider entering  into  (further) joint  fisheries  ventures 
with the EU as a means to develop their respective local fishing industries. These could be 
pursued either in combination with any future fisheries partnership agreements with the EU 
or,  as  I  would  suggest,  as  a  way  of  decreasing  reliance  on  these  agreements;  various 
commentators advocate joint enterprises as  a means for developing coastal  states to expand 
their domestic fishing capacity with a view to eventually ‘replacing’ the foreign fleets in their
865 See CFFA op cit n 349 for a discussion of problems regarding by-catch in ACP coastal states. Also McAlister 
Report op cit n 580 at para 4.2.
866 In particular, this was emphasised in interviews with NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
867 McAlister Report op cit n 580 at para 4.2.
868 Gorez and O’Riordan op cit n 286 at para 4.1.  ‘Value-added’ refers to the increase in value or price of a 
product due to a modification of the product or its marketing in some way. For example, making fish into fish 
products increases the value or price beyond that of the unprocessed fish.
69 MacAlister Report op cit n 580 at para 4.4.236
waters.870 While the Community no longer subsidises joint ventures (for reasons that I have 
explained in chapter 5), it nevertheless still promotes the ‘permanent transfer’ of its vessels to 
third countries in the context of ‘joint enterprises’.871  If they were carefully structured, such 
joint  ventures  could  potentially  promote  sustainable  local  fisheries  development  in  the 
relevant developing coastal states.
In  the  capture  sector,  if  joint  ventures  operated  within  the  framework  of  a  domestic 
sustainable  management  policy  they  could  generate  significant  long-term  catches  of high- 
value species. Within the processing sector, joint ventures could make a valuable contribution 
to creating local added value to fisheries products and to meeting export market hygiene and 
other standards.  The transfer of capital  as  well  as  know-how  and  skills from EU operators
R72 would be particularly beneficial in both sectors.
As the flag state, the coastal state would bear full responsibility for monitoring and controlling 
the activities of joint venture fishing vessels; the EU would no longer have any role to play in 
this  regard.  The  coastal  states  would  thus  need  to  be  sure  that  their  monitoring  and 
enforcement  capacities  were  capable  of  satisfactorily  coping  with  this  additional 
responsibility. Writers have identified various other domestic matters that developing coastal 
states  will  likely  need  to  address  in  order  to  attract  joint  ventures.  These  include  high
870 See UN Wijkstrom,  ‘Does African Participation in Industrial Fishing off West Africa Make Economic 
Sense?’ (Report) FAO Library Fiche AN: 345417 (FAO, Rome 1992). In  1992, the author concluded that it 
made economic sense for most West African coastal states to replace industrial distant water fleets with their 
own provided that certain steps were taken by the government (outlined at 19, 20, 33). See also MacAlister 
Report ibid at para 4.7.
871 As discussed at p 155. See, for example, art 8 of Regulation 2369/02 op cit n 461 and FPA Communication 
op cit n 364 at para 2.2. Joint enterprises refer to commercial fishing ventures between the Community and a 
coastal third country established in terms of the domestic law of the third country and using locally registered 
vessels to engage in fishing activities in its waters, in which the Community holds a significant proportion of the 
share capital and one or more of the partners are nationals of the third country.
872 B Gorez, ‘E-consultation on ACP-EU Fisheries Relations: Maximising Social and Economic Benefits for 
ACP Fishing Communities’ (report of the preparatory electronic discussion for a meeting on ACP-EU fisheries 
relations, to be held in Brussels on December 13-14, 2004) prepared for Coalition for Fair Fisheries 
Arrangements (CFFA) <http://www.cape-cffa.org/issues/E-report%20ACP-EU%20Fisheries%20Relations%20- 
%20social%20and%20economic%20benefits%20(December%202004).doc> accessed August 2005 at theme 3.237
operating costs in both the capture and processing sectors (particularly in relation to fuel and 
transport),  restrictive  investment  conditions,  adverse  trade  and  banking  systems  and 
regulations, and (perceived) bureaucratic ineffectiveness and corruption.873 As noted earlier, 
however, critics remain  sceptical as to the genuine potential  of joint enterprises to promote 
sustainable  fishing  in  developing  coastal  states.  The  matter  clearly  requires  considerable 
further research in the context of the specific coastal state(s) concerned.
Enhanced regional cooperation among West African coastal  states is  strongly advocated by 
various commentators and NGOs as a means to better foster sustainable fisheries management 
both  domestically  and  in  the  region.  Specifically,  they  advocate  increased  regional 
cooperation  (primarily  through  regional  fisheries  organisations)  towards  objectives  such  as 
improved generation and flow of fisheries stock and capture data and enhanced monitoring, 
control  and  surveillance.  They  argue  that  this  would  in  turn  strengthen  individual  states’ 
bargaining positions vis-a-vis the EU in bilateral fisheries agreement negotiations as countries 
would  have  more  accurate  knowledge  about  the  state  of their  stocks  and  would  be  more 
confident  of  their  capabilities  to  monitor  and  control  the  EU’s  fishing  activities  in  their 
waters.874  Some  writers  go  further,  encouraging  West  African  coastal  states  to  negotiate 
fisheries agreements on a regional basis in order to enhance their combined bargaining power. 
This is premised on the fact that the EU has historically concluded fisheries agreements with 
coastal states in the regional on an  individual, bilateral basis; as most of the species that its 
fleet targets are found along the entire West African coast, it has been spoilt for choice when 
deciding with which countries to conclude agreements. This has left individual coastal states 
with minimal leverage at the negotiation table.875 Coastal states are reluctant, however, to give
873 Kazynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 90 and Gorez ibid at theme 3.
874 See for example Johnstone op cit n 541 at 13,  14 and CFFA (op cit n 349).
875 Such as, for example, the CFFA and WWF.238
up  their  autonomy  in  this  area  due  to  the  exclusive  financial  benefits  that  bilateral
onf.
arrangements with the EU afford them.
Assuming that future fisheries agreements will thus continue to be concluded with the EU on 
a  bilateral  basis,  other  possible  areas  for  increased  regional  cooperation  could  include 
determining  minimal  conditions  of  EU  access  for  trans-boundary  and  highly-migratory 
species (such as tuna), devising a core code of conduct and compliance for EU fleets (to be 
tailored to each individual coastal  states’  domestic policy)  and establishing a register of all 
EU vessels operating in  West African coastal waters  in  order to assist with  more effective 
fisheries monitoring and control and to combat illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing in 
the region.877
The  EU’s  extensive  subsidisation  of its  fleet’s  fishing  operations  in  Senegalese  and  other 
developing country waters remains  a fundamental stumbling block to advancing sustainable 
fishing in these waters.878 As I have discussed earlier, the adverse effects of these subsidies on 
the domestic fishing industry include unfair advantages for Community operators over local 
fishers and the exacerbation of over-fishing. If the parties continue to conclude their bilateral 
fisheries relations through fisheries agreements, the Community must phase out subsidisation 
and  replace  it  with  private  funding  from  ship  owners.  This  would  force  unprofitable  EU 
fishing operations  to  exit  the  industry,  thereby reducing  fishing capacity in  the  Senegalese 
exclusive economic  zone  and decreasing competition  for resources.  It  may  also  prompt  an 
increase in the establishment of joint ventures between European private fishing enterprises 
and Senegal, which could potentially contribute to sustainable local fisheries development (as 
I have discussed above). While the EU professes to be reducing its subsidisation, Community
876 As confirmed by interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and EU representatives (telephone 
interview 21 September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 2006).
877 Gorez op cit n 861 at para 4.4.
878 Gorez ibid and Kazynski and Fulharty op cit n 460 at 90. See also pp 82-90 above.239
funding still  comprises  the  overwhelming bulk of compensation  paid to  Senegal  under the 
most  recent  bilateral  fisheries  agreement;  there  has  been  only  a  comparatively  marginal 
increase in  licence  fees  for vessel  owners.  The  NGO  representatives  that I  interviewed in 
Dakar confirmed the negative impact of the EU’s fleet subsidisation on the domestic fishing
879 industry, emphasising in particular the adverse effects on the livelihoods of local fishers.
In order to foster integration towards sustainable fisheries development in developing coastal 
states’ waters it is necessary for the EU to carefully tailor its future fisheries agreements with 
such countries to their specific fisheries development needs. This requires an upfront, in-depth 
socio-economic,  environmental  and  sectoral  analysis  of  the  potential  impact  of  the 
Community’s proposed fishing activities prior to agreement negotiations (possibly conducted 
jointly  by  the  parties).  The  EU’s  2004  Council  Conclusions  on  fisheries  partnership 
agreements proposed such an assessment.880 I was informed by an EU representative that the 
Community had  conducted  a  strategic  impact  assessment  in  preparation  for  agreement re­
negotiations  with  Senegal  and  that  this  would  become  ‘standard  practice’  for  all  future 
fisheries partnership agreements.881
The parties will also need to decide how best to assess the existence (or not) of surplus stocks 
in the coastal state’s waters. As we have seen, foreign states are only legally entitled to access 
coastal states’  excess fish stocks. The burden is on the coastal  state to accurately determine 
the  existence  and  extent  of  its  surplus  stocks;  foreign  states  may  legitimately  rely 
unquestioningly  on  this  declaration,  as  the  EU  has  traditionally  done  in  relation  to  the
879 Interviews NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 2006).
880 Council Conclusions  11485/1/04 op cit n 451 at paras 6 and 7. Strategic impact assessments were proposed in 
the earlier Roadmap Communication (op cit n 221) at para 5.3 and the FPA Communication op cit n 364 at paras
3.1 and 4. For a discussion on environmental assessment as part of the new fisheries partnership approach, see p 
152 and 153 above. See also Gorez op cit n 872.
881 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21  September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).240
developing  third  countries  with  which  it  has  concluded  fisheries  agreements.882  In  the 
particular case of Senegal, it did so despite the fact that it was aware of the ‘possibility’ that
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the Senegalese stock assessments were not scientifically sound.  In fact, evidence suggests 
that  the  Senegalese  domestic  fleet  was  and  remains  capable  of  fully  exploiting  the  total 
allowable  catch  in  the  Senegalese  exclusive  economic  zone:  this  was  confirmed  by DPM 
officials that I interviewed, who informed me that the only reason why pelagics are not fully 
exploited by the domestic fleet is because of the rise in input costs and the increased attraction 
of higher-value export species as opposed to capacity problems.884 According to independent 
scientific data, only high-seas  species  (deep-sea, off-shore demersals) should  ‘in theory’  be 
available for future bilateral fisheries agreements.885
Ideally,  a  joint  scientific  stock  assessment  should  be  carried  out  by  the  parties  before 
negotiations begin  and part of the payments under future  agreements  should be directed at 
developing the coastal  states’  scientific  and human resource capacity to eventually conduct 
these  assessments  independently.  Clear  scientific  benchmarks  for  maintaining  fish  stocks 
within safe biological limits during the operation of the agreement should be noted in future 
arrangements,  deviation  from  which  should  entitle  parties  to  jointly  implement  whatever 
measures are necessary to restore stocks’ stability, including instituting biological rest periods 
or reducing fishing opportunities.  Any necessary decrease in the EU’s  fishing opportunities 
should  not  attract  a  commensurate  reduction  in  financial  compensation  as  this  acts  as  a 
disincentive for the coastal state to agree to implement sustainable management measures, as I
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discussed  earlier  in  the  context  of  the  EU-Senegalese  agreement.  Accurate, joint  stock
882 Cross-reference with, for example, pp  143 and 144.
883 Interviews EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 
2006).
884 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
885 Senegalese Ministry of Fisheries Report op cit n 604 at para 2.2.1.
886 Cross-reference with pp 206, 208 and 216. Gorez and O’Riordan op cit n 286 and Gorez op cit n 861  at para
4.2 at 30 ardently argue that reduced payments in such events should  ‘under no circumstances’ be permitted.241
assessments should also be conducted throughout the operation of agreements to ensure that 
stocks are maintained within the specified biological limits.
I was told that the EU plans to establish a joint scientific committee with Senegal in future 
fisheries  partnership  agreements.  It  will  be  tasked  with  conducting both  stock  assessments 
prior  to  negotiations  and  continual  stock  assessments  throughout  the  operation  of  the 
agreement  and  will  have  the  power  to  recommend  necessary  sustainable  management 
measures, including the adjustment of fishing opportunities.887 Given the failure of the recent 
agreement  negotiations,  this  is  of  course  no  longer  immediately  relevant.  It  remains 
potentially germane, however, to any future agreements that may be concluded between the 
parties. It also has potential bearing on the EU’s agreements with other West African coastal 
states.
A key resource management question that will have to be  addressed in any future fisheries 
agreements is how best to regulate the Community fleet’s output to better promote biological 
sustainability.888 As I discussed in chapter 8, the effectiveness of the current vessel tonnage 
method  is  debatable  from  a  sustainability  perspective.889  While  alternative  output  control 
mechanisms,  such  as  total  allowable  catches  (TACs)  and  quotas,  are  not  necessarily  the 
solution to ensuring sustainable fishing from a biological,  social  and economic perspective, 
they are generally accepted as suitable catch control methods (subject to certain conditions). 
In particular, they are used by the EU in its own waters; it thus appears contradictory for the 
EU to  apply different control  methods  for its  fleets’  activities  in  developing third country 
waters.  Ideally,  thorough  independent  research  should  be  conducted  to  determine  whether
8 8 7
EU representatives (telephone interview 21 September 2005 and interview 2 Dakar February 2006). The EU 
will not respond to reduced access rights with a decrease in compensation unless it is clear that the stock decline 
is due wholly to overtly poor fisheries management by the Senegalese authorities -  cross-reference for a more 
detailed discussion on this at pp 217.
888 For a discussion of output controls and their contribution to sustainable fishing, see pp 75-79.
889 Cross-reference with pp 215 and 216.242
gross registered tonnage, harvest quotas or a combination of both methods is best suited to 
ensure the sustainably of the EU’s fishing activities in developing coastal states’ waters. The 
findings  should  guide  future  catch  possibility  negotiations  and  should  be  reflected  in  the 
management measures of subsequent agreements.
The parties will also need to consider further reducing the by-catch limits of those categories 
of  Community  vessels  that  incidentally  catch  species  that  are  targeted  by  local  artisanal 
fishers.  With regard to  Senegal,  my  research further indicated that the by-catch  provisions 
should  be  more  strictly  enforced.890  To  this  end,  reporting  of  by-catch  should  remain 
compulsory but it should be complemented by improved monitoring of compliance. Ideally, 
future agreements should impose more selective fishing gear restrictions on EU vessels and 
institute training of fishers to ensure that selective fishing methods are used in an attempt to 
prevent by-catch in the first place.891  Another possibility would be to introduce compulsory 
land requirements  of by-catch,  as  pelagic  species  included  in  these  catches  could then be 
processed locally and either sold for consumption or traded regionally.
The EU and Senegal  will further need to jointly address the overlap of species and fishing 
grounds between the Community fleet and domestic fishers (particularly the artisanal sector) 
should an agreement be re-negotiated between them in the future.892 While the zoning under 
the recent bilateral fisheries agreement insulated domestic artisanal fishers from competition 
with foreign fleets in the area up to six nautical miles from the coast (both EU and Senegalese 
interviewees  confirmed  that  Community  vessels  generally  respect  this  zone),  local  fishers 
commonly harvest beyond this area in  waters where they enjoy no special protection under
890 Interview with DPM officials (Dakar February 2006) and NGO representatives (Dakar 6 and 7 February 
2006).
891 Kaczynski and Fluharty op cit n 460 at 89, Gorez op cit n 861  at para 4.2 at 30 and Gorez and O’Riordan op 
cit n 286 at para 3.1 at 16.
892 Johnstone op cit n 541 at 12. Species targeted include as cuttle fish, sole, lobsters, and shrimp. See also UNEP 
Senegalese Fisheries Report op cit n 549 at paras 3.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 6 and Ndiaye op cit n 600 at para 4.243
the agreement. This includes both industrial vessels, which are only permitted to harvest from 
the  six  nautical  mile  boundary  onwards  in  terms  of  national  law,  and  increasingly  also 
artisanal fishers. The result is that physical collisions sometimes occur between Senegalese 
and EU vessels (particularly involving local industrial vessels as they are old and unable to 
move quickly) and local fishing gear is frequently destroyed.893  It may be possible to address 
this by reducing the EU’s coastal fishing zone, shifting its starting point further away from the 
coast than the current six nautical mile mark. This would protect domestic fishing vessels in 
the region between six nautical miles and the new boundary. Such a solution is possibly also 
relevant to agreements between the EU and other West African coastal states.
Finally, monitoring and control of EU fishing activities in Senegalese waters under any future 
bilateral fisheries agreements will require improvement in order to better foster sustainable 
fishing. The EU representatives that I interviewed informed me that all EU vessels fishing in 
Senegalese waters have vessel monitoring systems  (VMS). This potentially makes tracking 
Community vessel activities easy provided that future agreements oblige all EU vessels to use 
VMS  in  Senegalese  waters.  But  as  I  have  already  noted  in  chapter  8,  Senegal  does  not 
necessarily have the capacity to effectively monitor VMS.894 Funding and training should thus 
be directed through future agreements to development Senegal’s capacity in this regard. This 
should be combined with a more effective system of on-board observance to promote catch 
limit  compliance.  Problems  with  the  lack  of  independence  of  observers  under  the  past 
agreement  should be  addressed:  for example,  observers  should be  paid  from  public  funds 
rather than  directly by  vessel  owners,  all  observers  should be  ‘outsiders’  (none  should be 
designated from  among  the  crew,  as  was  the  case  in  the  recent  agreement regarding  tuna
893 Interviews DPM officials (Dakar February 2006).
894 As noted at p 219.244
vessels),  observers  should  be  qualified  to  a  certain  level  of  competence  and  agreements
895 should clearly outline their reporting duties.
3.2  Alternative ways forward towards sustainable fishing
As I have already noted,  the ideal  that bilateral  fisheries  agreements  will be phased out is 
unlikely to  materialise  in  the  near future.  I nevertheless  argue  that  a fundamental  shift in 
thinking  on  the  part  of both  the  EU  and  developing  coastal  states  (indeed,  of  all  fishing 
nations)  is  required  in  order  for  there  to  be  any  possibility  that  future  bilateral  fisheries 
relations (of any form) are capable of better effecting sustainable fishing. It is not enough to 
merely call for a  ‘renewed, genuine commitment to sustainability’;  something more drastic 
and at the same time more practical in its efforts to foster the integration of environmental 
concerns and development is required. If this were to occur, the likelihood of the demise of 
bilateral fisheries agreements (as we currently know them) would be greatly enhanced.______
I suggest that this  shift in approach  should be  grounded in  and guided by a framework of 
ethical principles that facilitates the achievement of sustainable development,  such as those 
contained in the Earth Charter, and driven by concrete goals and yardsticks like those found in 
the  Millennium  Assessment  and  advocated  in  the  Europe  2005  Ecological  Footprint 
Analysis.896 Parties should continue to conduct their bilateral fisheries relations in compliance 
with  the  international  fisheries  regime,  but  should  at  the  same  time  be  driven  to  pursue 
sustainable fishing by a sense of universal responsibility in a manner that extends beyond the 
legal  cooperation  obligations  imposed by traditional  regulatory  instruments  like UNCLOS. 
The  call  for  such  a  move  is  not  as  idealistic  as  it  might  sound;  it  is  necessitated by  the
895 Gorez op cit n 861 at para 4.2 at 29. Cross-reference with pp 211 and 212, where I discuss observers.
896 For an earlier introduction to the Millennium Development goals cross-reference with p 99 at n 325, to the 
2005 Europe Ecological Footprint Analysis cross-reference to pp 14 (at n 1) and 124 and to the Earth Charter, 
cross-reference to p 64.245
weakness  of  the  current  international  fisheries  regime  and  the  traditional  regulatory  and 
management  mechanisms  employed  under  it  (as  outlined  earlier  in  this  chapter),  and  is 
articulated in the three international documents mentioned above.
As  introduced  in  chapter  3,  the  Earth  Charter  originated  in  the  World  Commission  on 
Environment and Development’s  1987 call for a universal declaration of a new set of norms 
to guide the pursuit of sustainable development.  It comprises a declaration of fundamental 
principles,  values and aspirations for creating  a worldwide  ‘partnership’  to build a just and 
sustainable global society. Endorsed by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO)  and the World Conservation Union  (IUCN), together with over a 
thousand other international organisations and national bodies, it is increasingly recognised as 
a global  consensus  statement  on  the  meaning  of sustainability,  the  challenge  and ideal  of 
sustainable  development  and  the  principles  by  which  sustainable  development  can  be 
achieved.897  It  is  thus  an  international  instrument  that  offers  guidance  in  operationalising 
sustainability towards the realisation of sustainable development.
While the Earth  Charter’s  legal  status  currently falls  short  of classification  as  a  ‘soft law’ 
instrument, it is nevertheless a highly influential policy document as many of its principles 
reflect international law and the ethics that it promotes have received support at numerous key
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international fora.  The Charter introduces the environmental ethic that has  arguably been 
missing in  states’  discourse on  sustainable  development to  date,  namely that the  planetary 
ecosystem (or ‘community of life’) should be the centre of sustainable development concerns 
rather than  humans.899  It  does  so  by  suggesting  that  in  addition  to  the  distributive justice
897 <http://www.earthcharter.org/innerpg.cfm?id_page=106>accessed 22 October 2006. The Earth Charter is 
available at <http://www.earthcharter.org/files/charter/charter.pdf> accessed 22 October 2006.
898 Most recently, for example, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (op cit n 123). See 
Bosselmann op cit n 183 at para 3.
899 Bosselmann ibid at para 2.246
elements  of  sustainable  development  articulated  by  the  Brundtland  Report,  namely  intra- 
generational  equity  and  inter-generational  equity,  a  third  should  be  added:  inter-species 
equity.900 It is arguably only by accepting this as an  additional, necessary ethical  aspect of 
sustainable development that states will be engendered with the sense of moral responsibility 
towards the earth and its future that is required in order to truly realise this ideal.
Specifically, the Earth Chatter is rooted in four broad commitments. For our purposes, most 
relevant are the undertakings to respect earth and life in all of its diversity and to care for the 
community  of  life  with  understanding,  compassion  and  love.  The  latter  emphasises  that 
together with the right to  own,  use  and manage natural resources comes  a duty to prevent 
environmental harm.901 The Charter presents twelve principles to assist and guide parties in 
realising these commitments. The protection and restoration of the earth’s ecological systems 
is  one  such  principle.  This  can  be  pursued  through  various  means  including  managing 
renewable resources  in  wavs  that  do not exceed rates  of regeneration  and that  protect the 
health of ecosystems, applying a precautionary approach,  adopting patterns of consumption 
that safeguard the earth’s regenerative capacity, human rights and community well-being, and 
promoting the open exchange  and application  of knowledge  about ecological  sustainability 
through  international  scientific  and  technical  cooperation,  particularly  in  relation  to 
developing countries.902
The  principles  draw  on  existing  international  law  as  well  as  contemporary  science  and 
insights  of philosophy.  Cumulatively,  they  assert  strong  support  for  a  specific  ethical  and 
environmental  vision  of  the  world,  yet  they  are  deliberately  loosely-framed,  inviting
900 As noted above op cit n 183, this is particularly evident in principles 1-4 and 5-8 of the Earth Charter.
901 Principles 1-2 of the Earth Charter ibid. The other two are to build democratic societies that are just, 
participatory, sustainable, and peaceful and to secure earth’s bounty and beauty for present and future 
generations
2 Ibid at principles 5-8.247
interpretation and realisation according to the respective needs, capacities and responsibilities 
of  those  who  endorse  them.  If  future  bilateral  fisheries  relations  between  the  EU  and 
developing coastal  states were guided by the Charter they would arguably promote  a more 
progressive,  responsible  and  responsive  pursuit  of  the  sustainable  use  of  fisheries  in  the 
coastal states’ waters and would likely give rise to less self-serving, exploitative instruments 
than bilateral fisheries agreements to advance this goal.903
That the EU needs  to  change  its  resource use  habits  to  facilitate  integration  and to  foster 
sustainable  development  both  domestically  and  in  the  rest  of  the  world  (particularly  in 
developing nations)  was highlighted by the Europe  2005  Ecological Footprint Analysis.904 
The  report,  as  noted  earlier in  the  thesis,  employs  ecological  footprint  analysis.  This  is  a 
resource  management  and  accounting  tool  that  approximates  the  amount  of  ecologically 
productive  land  and  sea  area  that  is  required  to  sustain  a  population  (its  ‘ecological 
footprint’).905 By measuring a population’s ecological footprint one is able to assess the extent 
of the population’s  ‘ecological overshoot’, that is, the extent to which its ecological resource 
demands exceed that which natural resources are able to supply through regeneration. 906 The 
disparity  between  a  population’s  ecological  footprint  and  nature’s  regenerative  capacity 
indicates  the  extent  to  which  the  particular  population  is  unsustainably  using  its  natural 
resources;  the imbalance  can  only  be  redressed  by either reducing the ecological  footprint 
(through smaller population size, less consumption per person and higher resource efficiency), 
or an increase in the earth’s biologically-productive area.907
903 Examples of which I discuss below in this paragraph.
904 WWF op cit n 1. Cross-reference with pp 14 and 124, where I introduce this report.
905 WE Rees, ‘Ecological Footprints and Bio-Capacity: Essential Elements in Sustainability Assessment’ in J 
Dewulf and H Van Langenhove (eds), Renewables-Based Technology: Sustainability Assessment (John Wiley 
and Sons, UK 2006) at para 9.2.
906 <http://www.footprintnetwork.org/gfn_sub.php?content=footprint_overview>accessed October 2006.
907 WWT op cit n lat 4 and M Lensen and SA Murray,  T he Ecological Footprint -  Issues and Trends’ Integrated 
Sustainable Analysis Research Paper 01-03 (The University of Sydney, Australia 2003). The authors provide a 
comprehensive discussion on the ecological footprint including various criticisms of the original concept.248
According  to  the  Europe  2005  Ecological  Footprint  Analysis  report,  the  EU’s  ecological 
footprint is currently more than twice its area size: EU inhabitants use 4.9 global hectares per 
person in order to support their lifestyle while the continent is only able to supply 2.2 global 
hectares per person.908 Specifically, the EU, which is home to seven percent of the world’s 
population, uses  17 percent of the world’s  natural resources  supply.  The report pertinently 
notes that as a result of the EU’s growing human demands and declining ecological wealth, it 
increasingly  relies  for  its  continual  well-being  on  garnering  its  ecological  capacity  from 
elsewhere,  thereby  expanding its  consumption  while  avoiding further depletion  of its  own 
natural  capital.  Overwhelmingly,  it  imports  natural  resources  from  developing  countries, 
echoing past colonial extraction patterns of individual member states. It also relies heavily on 
use of the global commons.909 It does so at the expense of the potential degradation of both 
the global commons  and the ecosystems  of supplier developing states.910 In  the context of 
marine fisheries, the report confirms that the majority of the fishing grounds in the Southern 
hemisphere that supply the EU are located off the African coast.911_______________________
Suggested  ways  in  which  the  EU  could  eliminate  its  overshoot  include  reducing  the 
consumption  of goods  and  services  per person  and increasing  (or  at  least  maintaining) its 
biocapacity, which would include restoring and maintaining healthy fisheries.  One potential 
mechanism to this end would be the introduction of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
management  that  provides  for  both  a  sustainable  fisheries  sector  and  protects  vulnerable 
species and habitats.912 This responds  to the  fact that the majority of the EU’s  ecosystems 
services have been degraded in the last 15 years, including marine fisheries; this was noted in
908 The earth has only 1.8 global hectares per person available.
909 WWF op cit n 1 at 3. Note that while the report refers to  ‘Europe’s’ ecological footprint, it calculates the 
EU's ecological footprint.
910 Ibid at 6.
911 Ibid at fig 7.
912 Ibid at 10.249
the 2005 review of the EU’s environmental policy, which took particular note of the findings 
of the Europe 2005 Ecological Footprint Analysis.913
In sum, as noted in the (then) President of the European Commission’s forward to the report, 
the ecological footprint analysis provides clear information on the challenges  ahead for the 
EU  in  its  pursuit  of  sustainable  development.914  Embracing  these  challenges  will  require 
fundamental  re-thinking  in  the  ways  in  which  (inter  alia)  the  EU  acquires  and  consumes 
natural  resources,  particularly  its  current  pattern  of  extraction  from  developing  states, 
including marine fisheries.
The  EU’s  continued  failure  to  pay  adequate  attention  to  the  linkages  between  ecological 
sustainability  and  (economic)  development  threatens  the  achievement  of  the  Millennium 
Development goals.915 In the context of marine fisheries, the Community’s endorsement of 
these goals provides both an incentive and an avenue for the EU to employ means other than 
bilateral  fisheries  agreements  to  promote  sustainable  fishing  in  developing  third  country 
waters.
The  Millennium  Development  goals  (as  introduced  in  chapter  4)  comprise  eight 
comprehensive  action  targets  to  be  achieved  worldwide  in  response  to  core  world 
development challenges. Originating in a 2000 United Nations General Assembly resolution 
in which UN members adopted a  ‘new ethic of conservation and stewardship’ to pursue the 
protection  of  the  common  environment  and  the  realisation  of  worldwide  sustainable 
development (particularly in Africa), the goals were subsequently affirmed and fleshed out at
913 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Council and the Commission to the 
European Parliament: 2005 Environment Policy’ (Environmental Policy Communication) COM (2006) 70 final 
at para 2.4 dealing with resource use.
914 WWF op cit n 1 at forward.
915 Environmental Policy Communication op cit n 913 at para 2.2.250
various  international  gatherings,  such  as  the  2002  Johannesburg  World  Summit  on 
Sustainable Development.916 They now include eighteen further quantifiable target objectives, 
progress towards which is to be measured by specified indicators. Annual reports on progress 
have  been  released  by  the  UN  Secretary-General  since  2002,  in  accordance  with  the  UN 
resolution.917 One of the Millennium Development goals is the achievement of environmental 
sustainability,  which requires  the  integration  of sustainable  development principles  into  all 
country  policies  and  programmes;  another  is  the  reversal  of  the  loss  of  environmental
918 resources.
The European Commission released three communications in 2005 containing suggestions as 
to how to accelerate the EU’s progress towards meeting the Millennium Development goals 
and acknowledging the particular need for the EU to assist African  states towards realising 
these goals.919  With regard to marine fisheries, the Commission advocated enhanced use of 
fisheries  partnership  agreements  to  promote  sustainable  fishing  and  sustainable  fisheries 
development  in  African  coastal  states  and  urged  for  stronger  coherence  between  the 
agreements and the EU’s development policy in these countries. It further recommended that 
the EU should channel increased funds into those countries indicating willingness and ability
916 UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000 ‘United Nations Millenium Declaration’ (see in 
particular arts 22, 23 27 and 28) and the United Nations Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (op cit n 123), which reiterates international commitment to achieving these and 
related development-oriented goals. Cross-reference with p 99, where I introduce the Millenium Development 
goals.
17 Ibid at art 31.
918 The other goals are: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote 
gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases and develop a global partnership for development. For a summary of the Millenium 
Development goals and their targets and indicators, see <http://www.undp.org/mdg> accessed October 2006.
919 Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Accelerating Progress Towards 
Achieving the Millenium Development Goals -  The European Union’s Contribution’ COM (2005) 132 final, 
Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Accelerating Progress Towards Achieving the 
Millenium Development Goals -Financing for Development and Aid Effectiveness’ COM (2005)  133 final, and 
Commission of the European Communities,  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Policy Coherence for Development:
Accelerating Progress Towards Achieving the Millenium Development Goals’ (Policy Coherence 
communication) COM (2005) 134 final.251
to improve domestic  environmental  stability,  and that it  should employ the  new  economic 
partnership  agreements  introduced by the  Cotonou  agreement  to  foster regional  trade  and 
integration towards development in Africa.920
If these communications are translated into policy, it thus seems that the EU will pursue the 
Millennium Development goals in relation to African fisheries through means that are already 
employed in this sector (fisheries agreements and economic partnership arrangements). While 
this would not be surprising, it would be disappointing given the opportunity that the EU has 
to  address  its  current  self-serving  pattern  of  over-consumption  (as  exposed  by  the  2005 
Europe Ecological Footprint Analysis) by drawing on the Earth Charter to devise mechanisms 
and implement policies that are better suited to promoting collaborative, international efforts 
to realise sustainability. In fisheries relations, this would entail phasing out bilateral fisheries 
agreements  and  the  associated  export  of  Community  over-capacity  to  developing  coastal 
states to appropriate their fisheries  resources  and introducing  alternative  means to  conduct 
bilateral fisheries relations. These need not be ‘new’ mechanisms but must first and foremost 
be  driven  by  ethical  imperatives  and  a  sense  of  global  responsibility  towards  achieving 
sustainable development rather than economic, self-interested and commercial logic. The flip­
side will of course be that the Community will  need to find alternative  ways to  supply its 
market and to secure the socio-economic future of its fishing industry.
A  key  mechanism  of  the  EU’s  new  bilateral  fisheries  interactions  could  be  investment: 
Community finances that were previously spent on purchasing access to developing states’ 
marine resources could instead be invested in these coastal states, in coherence with existing 
EU and domestic development goals and projects, with the aim of assisting the coastal states 
in the sustainable development of their fisheries. Investment would be well-directed at both
920 European Commission Policy Coherence communication ibid at paras 3.5 4.2(b) and 4.3.252
the  capture  industry  and  the  on-shore  processing  and  marketing  sectors,  with  a  view  to 
increasing  value-added  and  expanding  markets  (particularly  regionally)  for  export.921  In 
particular,  investment  should  be  channelled  into  the  sustainable  development  of  artisanal 
fisheries given this sector’s key contribution to the socio-economic and nutritional well-being 
of the majority of developing coastal states, particularly in West Africa.922 In doing this, the 
EU would go some way towards addressing its ecological  ‘overshoot’  in the area of marine 
resource  use;  instead  of  extracting  resources  from  developing  states’  waters  as  it  has 
historically  done,  the  Community  would  contribute  towards  the  ‘normalisation’  of  local 
small-scale fishing in these regions in the wake of severe disruptions caused by (among other 
things) fisheries subsidies and the adverse impact of foreign fishing.
Given the diversified livelihood strategies of many artisanal fishers, in terms of which they 
engage in fishing on a seasonal and often migratory basis supplemented by employment in 
other  sectors  (such  as  agriculture),  Community  investment  in  projects  and  management 
policies that are sector-specific and top-down may be inappropriate.923 Alternatively, the EU 
could  consider  investing  in  and/or  collaborating  with  local  authorities  and  coastal 
communities to encourage the continuation of traditional  ‘part-time’  patterns of fishing and 
the diversification of income, and to foster technological developments in the artisanal sector 
geared towards reducing by-catch, promoting more efficient fisheries storage and processing 
and improving the safety of fishing vessels.924
9211 explain this in greater detail above in the context of suggesting how future bilateral fisheries agreements 
might better promote sustainable fishing. These suggestions are equally applicable whether the finances 
channelled into the coastal state for these purposes originate in a fisheries agreement or are simply direct EU 
investment.
922 As outlined in detail at pp 184-186 above.
As expressed by EH Allison and F Ellis,  ‘The Livelihoods Approach and Management of Small-Scale 
Fisheries’ (2001) 25 Marine Policy 377-388 at 383- 386.
924 Ibid at 387.253
Efforts  should  also  be  made  to  operationalise  the  United  Nations  Food  and  Agriculture 
Organisation’s  (FAO)  Code  of  Conduct  for  Responsible  Fishing,  which  recognises  the 
importance of artisanal fisheries and the need to protect their rights to a secure livelihood and 
urges fisheries  management policies  to provide  artisanal  fishers with preferential  access  to 
traditional  fishing grounds  and resources.925  The  type  of projects  promoted by the  FAO’s 
Sustainable  Fisheries  Livelihoods  Programme  in  West  Africa  might  provide  inspirational 
examples to the EU for investment. The programme,  which represents  a partnership of the 
Department for International Development of the UK and Northern Ireland, the FAO and 25 
participating West African states, is a regional development project aimed at reducing poverty 
in coastal fisheries communities through the sustainable improvement of their livelihoods by 
creating enabling institutional and policy frameworks and building on social capacity in the 
communities to this end.926 It draws on the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing, 
seeking to incorporate its relevant provisions into domestic fisheries policies and plans, and 
employs  the  sustainable  livelihoods  approach  as  an  analytical  framework  for  establishing 
guideline principles in which to root poverty-reduction initiatives.927 Clearly, however, before 
the EU considers investing in any such an undertaking, further comprehensive research would 
need to be carried out to determine the suitability of continuing or expanding this or a similar 
approach in West African coastal states.
In  summary, in this  section I have presented a number of largely practical, policy-oriented 
suggestions  in  response  to  the  failings  of bilateral  fisheries  relations  between  the EU  and
925 Op cit n 126 at para 6.18. The Code suggests that these rights could be secured by imposing technical 
conservation measures such as closed areas and seasons, restrictions on by-catch and minimum fish sizes (para 
7.6.9).
926 For information on the Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods Programme, see 
<http://www.sflp.org/eng/001/zindex.html> accessed October 2006. See also
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4281e/y4281e00.htm> accessed October 2006 for case studies of artisanal 
fisheries management arising from the Programme.
927 A wealth of literature exists on the topic of sustainable livelihoods analysis, some of which is cited in Allison 
and Ellis (op cit n 923). It is not my intention, however, to even begin to address this approach and its potential 
suitability to EU efforts to promote sustainable artisanal fisheries in West Africa. I thus cite this as an area that 
requires further future research at p 255 below.254
developing coastal states and the enabling legal regime from a sustainability perspective. On a 
more theoretical level, there is arguably little need for further development of the paradigms 
associated  with  key  concepts  such  as  sustainability  and  sustainable  development  in  this 
context. Even though they remain comparatively less well-traversed in the marine fisheries 
domain, this is rapidly changing. What is required, however, is further discussion on how best 
to operationalise these concepts both generally and more specifically, in relation to fisheries. 
The crux of the issue is the need to flesh out the realisation of ‘integration’.
At an  abstract level, this will entail determining how best environmental protection can be 
assimilated  into  all  aspects  of  human  activity  at  every  level  in  a  way  that  goes  beyond 
traditional thinking to date. As I have indicated, this will necessarily entail introducing a new, 
ethical  dimension  to  states’  discourse  on  sustainable  development  -   actions  towards 
sustainable development must be  geared towards  achieving  not only environmental justice 
within  and between  human  generations,  but  also  between  species  (inter-species  equity)  in
recognition  of the  need  to  preserve  the  entire  -planetary  ecosystem  or  in  this  context,  the 
marine ecosystem. Extending sustainability and sustainable development dialogue beyond its 
traditional human-centred boundaries in this  manner will  arguably also facilitate  less  state- 
centred  responses  to  the  pursuit  of  sustainable  development  and  instead  encourage  the 
development  of  paradigms  (and  subsequently,  actions)  which  reflect  a  sense  of universal 
responsibility towards ensuring the sustainable use of all natural resources (even though this 
will frequently involve short-term socio-economic sacrifices for individual states). For this to 
become an acceptable option for states, many will first need to acknowledge the pervasive, 
detrimental influence of past colonial relations on their current interactions. To move beyond 
self-interest and embrace a global response to the sustainable development challenge they will 
need to engage with the effects of this colonial legacy and find ways to step outside of their255
historically-determined roles.  At a practical  level, this will  of course prove  difficult,  as my 
thesis evidences.
4.  Future policy and regulatory challenges: particular areas where further research is 
required
The  conclusions  that  I  have  drawn  and  the  potential  ways  forward  towards  improved 
sustainable  fishing  and  fisheries  management  bring  to  the  fore  a  number  of  areas  which 
clearly require further in-depth research. Exploring them in greater detail is beyond the scope 
of my thesis, but they arguably provide potentially rich subject-areas for further examination. 
In  addition  to  the  adoption  of a  sustainable  livelihood  approach  to  promoting  sustainable 
development in West Africa artisanal fisheries (as noted above), I briefly mention two further 
domains which would benefit from further research.
- Thf* first is the, potential  mntrihntinn  that enhanced regional fisheries trade in West Africa 
could make to sustainable fisheries development in the region. Additional research into this 
matter is required as  the  literature on  the  topic  is comparatively  sparse.  Together with  my 
empirical research, it nevertheless supports the need for investment in this sphere, particularly 
with  regard to  pelagic  fish  species,  and highlights  the  importance  of regional  cooperation 
towards eliminating current physical  and administrative obstacles to expanded regional fish 
trade.  The  extent  to  which  this  is  viable  invites  further  examination  and  discussion. 
Research in this area could potentially over-lap with an examination of suitable methods to 
promote  sustainable  artisanal  fisheries  development  given  that  the  small  coastal  pelagics 
targeted by artisanal fishers in West Africa are the most common fish species that are traded
928 Cross-reference to pp  172-174 where I discuss regional fisheries trade in the context of Senegalese fisheries.256
regionally;  they  are  also  currently  under-fished  and  there  is  thus  potential  to  sustainably 
expand their catch levels.929
A further issue that requires  additional research is the capacity  of joint fishing enterprises 
between developing coastal states and the EU (and other powerful fishing nations) to foster 
the  sustainable  use  of the  coastal  states’  fish  stocks  and to  promote  domestic  sustainable 
fisheries  development.  As  I  highlighted in  chapter  8, joint  ventures  can  potentially  secure 
economically  and  biologically-sustainable  fishing  in  developing  coastal  states’  waters, 
enhance local added value to fisheries products processed in local land-based industries and 
facilitate the transfer of valuable scientific and technological fisheries skills from the EU to 
the coastal state in question. These positive results will be nullified, however, if the coastal 
state does  not have  sufficient conservation  measures  in  place  as  part  of a  sound  domestic 
fisheries  management policy  and  if the  state’s  monitoring  and  enforcement  capability  are 
weak.930
5.  Conclusion
Bilateral fisheries agreements between the EU  and developing coastal  states, particularly in 
West Africa, have to date failed to operate as conservatory regulatory instruments. They have 
accordingly  done  little  to  promote  sustainable  fishing  and  advance  sustainable  fisheries 
development  in  these  coastal  states.  This  partly  stems  from  the  weakness  of the  relevant 
international  legal  framework,  which  permits  the  conclusion  of  these  agreements  and 
legitimates their operation; in part, it is also due to the underlying socio-economic factors that 
drive  parties  to  enter  into  these  arrangements  to  the  frequent  detriment  of  long-term 
sustainability concerns. The way forward is to employ alternative, more ethically-motivated
929 As I noted above in pp 187 and 188.
930 As discussed above at p 237 above.257
means to engage in bilateral fisheries relations that are underscored by a sense of universal 
responsibility  towards  redressing  the  current  worldwide  marine  fisheries  crises.258
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APPENDICES
1
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES
1.1  European  Union  representatives’  questionnaire  on  the  most  recent  EU-Senegalese 
Bilateral Fisheries Agreement931
Question 1: The nature of bilateral fisheries agreements with Senegal
How does the EU regard the current bilateral fisheries agreement with Senegal? As a purely 
business arrangement, or more as a development cooperation arrangement?
-Question 2i  The  relationship  between  bilateral  fisheries  agreements and  the  Cotonou 
Agreement
How  does  the  EU  see  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  Senegal  as  ‘fitting  in’  with  the 
Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP states?
Question 3: The goal of ‘sustainable fishing’
Is the  ‘sustainable fishing’  of Senegalese stocks an important aspect of the bilateral fisheries 
agreements with Senegal?
9 3 1  Note that at the time it was the ‘current’ agreement.294
Question 4: Determining ‘surplus’
In  terms  of  article  62(2)  of UNCLOS,  foreign  fleets  are  only  entitled  to  access  declared 
surplus stocks of other coastal states. Who determines the Senegalese surplus to which the EU 
has access? Senegalese scientists alone or jointly together with EU scientists?
Question 5: Financial compensation for targeted ‘partnership activities’
Are  the  provisions  of  the  current  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  providing  financial 
compensation  for  targeted  ‘partnership  activities’  satisfactory?  Specifically,  is  the 
compensation effectively utilised towards the stated ends?
Question 6: Fishing opportunities
Is the EU of the view that the current bilateral fisheries agreement with Senegal  sufficiently 
limits the amount of catch that the Community fleet can take from Senegalese waters?
Question 7: Bilateral fisheries agreements and WTO concerns with fisheries subsidies
Is the EU of the  opinion  that the World Trade Organisation  (WTO) developments  towards 
stricter  regulation  (or  banning)  of  fishing  subsidies  might  affect  EU  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements  with  Senegal?  i.e.  does  the  EU  think  that  there  is  a  possibility  that  financial 
compensation might be seen as a fishing subsidy and accordingly be banned?295
Question 8: Artisanal fisheries
Is the Senegalese artisanal  sector adequately protected by the provisions of the current EU- 
Senegal bilateral fisheries agreement?
Question 9: Joint ventures
How would the establishment of ‘joint enterprises’ (or joint companies/ventures) between EU 
fishing vessel owners and Senegal likely impact on sustainable fishing in Senegalese waters 
and on development of the domestic fishing industry?
Question 10: Regional initiatives
How might increased regional  cooperation in  West Africa impact on  future EU-Senegalese 
bilateral fisheries agreement negotiations?296
1.2  Senegalese  representatives’  questionnaire  on  the  most  recent  EU-Senegalese  Bilateral 
Fisheries Agreement932
A: The current EU-Senegalese bilateral fisheries agreement:
Question 1: The nature of bilateral fisheries agreements with the EU
How does Senegal regard the current bilateral fisheries agreement with the EU? As a purely 
business arrangement, or more as a development cooperation arrangement?
Question  2:  The  relationship  between  bilateral fisheries  agreements  and  the  Cotonou 
Agreement
Hnw  rines  Senegal  see  bilateral  fisheries  agreements  with  the  EU  as  ‘fitting  in’  with  the 
Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP states?
Question 3: The goal of ‘sustainable fishing’
Is  ‘sustainable  fishing’  of  Senegalese  stocks  an  important  aspect  of the  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements with the EU?
9 3 2  Note that at the time it was the ‘current’ agreement.Question 4: Determining ‘surplus’
297
In  terms  of  article  62(2)  of  UNCLOS,  foreign  fleets  are  only  entitled  to  access  declared 
surplus stocks of other coastal states. Who determines the Senegalese surplus to which the EU 
has access? Senegalese scientists alone or jointly together with EU scientists?
Question 5: Financial compensation for targeted ‘partnership activities’
Are  the  provisions  of  the  current  bilateral  fisheries  agreement  providing  financial 
compensation  for targeted  ‘partnership  activities’  satisfactory  (from  a  financial  perspective 
and the list of activities cited)?
Question 6: Fishing opportunities
Is Senegal of the opinion that the current bilateral fisheries agreement with the EU sufficiently 
limits the amount of catch that can be taken from Senegalese waters?
Question 7: Bilateral fisheries agreements and WTO concerns with fisheries subsidies
How does Senegal think the World Trade Organisation (WTO) developments towards stricter 
regulation  (or  banning)  of  fishing  subsidies  might  affect  its  future  bilateral  fisheries 
agreements with  the  EU?  i.e.  is  it possible that financial  compensation  might be  seen  as  a 
fishing subsidy in the future and accordingly be banned?298
Question  8:  General  provisions  of  the  current  EU-Senegalese  bilateral  fisheries 
agreement
Is Senegal satisfied with the content of the current bilateral fisheries agreement with the EU or 
are there any provisions that it would have preferred to have seen structured differently?
Question 9: Artisanal fisheries
Is  the  domestic  artisanal  sector adequately  protected  by  the  provisions  of the  current EU- 
fisheries agreement?
Question 10: Joint ventures
What  is  Senegal’s  view  on  the  establishment  of  ‘joint  enterprises’  (or  joint 
companies/ventures) between EU fishing vessel  owners and local Senegalese interests? Is it 
likely to be good for Senegalese fisheries?
Question 11: Regional initiatives
Is  it  possible  that  Senegal  might  benefit  from  increased  regional  cooperation  regarding 
fisheries  management?  How  might  this  affect  Senegal’s  negotiations  of  future  bilateral 
fisheries agreements with the EU?299
B: The state of Senegalese fisheries
Question 12: The state of the industrial Senegalese fleet
What is the size of the local industrial fleet, the state of it (modem or old), the common gear 
used, the species targeted, the catch size and the percentage of these catches of the total catch 
taken domestically?
Question 13: The state of the artisanal Senegalese fleet
What is the size of the local artisanal fleet, the state of it (modem or old), the common gear 
used, the species targeted, the catch size and the percentage of these catches of the total catch 
taken domestically?
Question 14: Foreign fleet catches in Senegalese waters
What percentage of all vessels fishing in domestic waters are foreign? What percentage of the 
annual catch is taken by foreign fishers?  And what are the primary foreign countries fishing 
in Senegalese waters?300
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